The  American  Army 

•  William  Harding  Carter  • 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CAUFORNIA 
AT  LOS  ANGELES 


.<F 


Digitized  by  tine  Internet  Arciiive 

in  2007  witii  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


littp://www.arcliive.org/details/americanarmyOOcartiala 


THE  AMERICAN  ARMY 


WiLUAM  IIardivg  Carter 
Major  (fcneral  I'nitcd  States  Army 


THE 

AMERICAN  ARMY 


By 
WILLIAM  HARDING  CARTER 

Major  General,  United  States  Army 

Author  of 

Old-Army  Sketches,  Horses,  Saddles  and  Bridles 

From  Yorktown  to  Santiago  with 

Sixth  Cavalry.  Etc. 


m/ 


INDIANAPOLIS 

THE  BOBBS-MERRILL  COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS 


copvbight  1915 
Thb  Bobbs-Merrill  Company 


•KAUNWOHTH   A   CO. 
•OOKaiNPfRt   ANQ   WMTtW 


4- 


j 


With  profound  respect  this  volume  is  inscribed  to 
^i  GEORGE  WASHINGTON 

^  the  first  Commander-in-Chief,  whose  customs  of  war 
have  come  down  through  the  generations  to  mark 
all  that  is  noblest  in  the  ethics  of  the  Amcirican  army. 


^ 


^ 


207902 


AUTHOR'S  NOTE 

The  manuscript  of  this  volume  was  begun  before 
the  outbreak  of  the  present  war  in  Europe,  with  a 
view  to  setting  forth  the  conditions  and  methods  of 
administration  of  the  American  army,  and  the 
urgent  need  of  nationalizing  and  organizing  our 
military  resources  while  there  is  no  war-cloud  on 
our  horizon.  During  all  the  earlier  years  of  the 
Republic,  the  limitless  faith  in  the  ocean  barriers 
guarding  our  coasts  prevented  a  hearing  of  those 
who  urged  a  definite  military  policy  for  the  nation. 
Leviathan  passenger  ships,  each  capable  of  trans- 
porting a  brigade  such  as  fought  the  battles  of  the 
Civil  War,  have  changed  all  that.  We  are  now  at 
peace  with  the  world  and  the  prayers  of  every 
American  household  are  for  a  continuation  of  that 
desirable  status  for  all  time,  but  our  interests  are 
too  great  for  us  to  occupy  forever  the  safe  side  of 
every  (Question. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTEB  PAGE 

I  Pbogbess  and  Problems .  1 

II  Lessons  of  History 14 

III  Military  Policy 27 

IV  Economy  of  Pbevision 50 

V  Obganization  and  Chaeacteb  of  the  Abmy        .       .  34 

VI  Colonial  Tboops 90 

VII  Reserves 101 

VIII  Regimental  Depots 117 

IX  Fedebal  Volunteebs 133 

X  Expeditionaby  Fobce           151 

XI  Army  Administeation 163 

XII  Command  of  the  Abmy 184 

XIII  The  General  Staff  Cobps 205 

XrV  The  Cobps  of  Officers 219 

XV  Army  Schools 244 

XVI  The  Triumph  of  Medical  Science         ....  252 

XVII  The  Obganized  Militia 267 


THE  AMERICAN  ARMY 


PROGRESS  AND  PROBLEMS 

"A  solicitude  for  your  welfare,  which  cannot  end  but  with  my 
life,  and  the  apprehension  of  danger,  natural  to  that  solicitude, 
urge  me  to  offer  to  your  solemn  contemplation,  and  to  recommend 
to  your  frequent  review,  some  sentiments  which  are  the  result 
of  much  reflection,  of  no  inconsiderable  observation,  and  which 
appear  to  me  all  important  to  the  permanency  of  your  felicity 
as  a  people." — Washington. 

THE  problems  of  advancing  civilization,  instead 
of  growing  simpler,  are  becoming  more  varied 
and  complex,  through  territorial  expansion,  race  an- 
tagonism and  unequal  distribution  of  economic 
power.  Nations  unable  or  unwilling  to  defend  their 
rights  are  accorded  scant  respect.  Helpless  peoples, 
rankling  with  injustice,  may  hold  rebellious  hearts, 
but  the  price  of  liberty  still  remains  in  strong  bat- 
talions. Elihu  Root,  jurist,  diplomat  and  statesman, 
has  thus  epitomized  the  necessity  for  armies: 

**No  sense  of  justice,  no  desire  for  peace,  no  kind- 
ness of  heart  can  turn  aside  the  inexorable  decree 
of  the  overwhelming  powers  that  bring  war  and  will 
bring  war  in  the  future,  as  they  have  brought  it  in 
the  past.    It  lies  not  in  the  generous  impulses  of  the 

1 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


human  heart,  but  it  lies  in  the  working  out  of  the 
destiny  of  mankind  that  no  people  can  avoid." 

A  well-balanced  distribution  of  the  influence  of 
nations  will,  in  the  future  as  in  the  past,  depend 
upon  the  ability  of  each  to  guard  its  own  interests. 
It  is  folly  for  one  nation  to  expect  favors  from  an- 
other. Nations  play  unceasingly  at  diplomacy,  but 
grim-visaged  war  lurks  ever  in  the  background.  The 
wise  men  of  a  day  and  generation,  drawing  general 
conclusions  from  isolated  examples,  evolve  schools 
of  philosophy  which  are  soon  shattered  by  the 
proofs  of  rude  experience.  The  most  altruistic  con- 
ceptions are  confounded  by  the  actual  events  of  his- 
tory. Since  the  foundations  of  the  peace  palace  at 
The  Hague  were  laid  there  has  followed  a  proces- 
sion of  wars,  and  no  amount  of  hopefulness  or  liter- 
ature concerning  the  prevention  of  international 
disputes  may  be  expected  to  alter  materially  the 
course  of  history,  which  evinces  quite  indubitably 
that  interruptions  of  peace  will  continue  to  arise 
from  commercial  rivalry  or  a  desire  to  throw  off  the 
yoke  of  a  government  become  insupportable  to  the 
burden  bearers. 

The  greediness  of  man  is  responsible  for  much  of 
the  miscarriage  of  justice  amongst  his  fellow  men. 
So  the  greediness  of  nations,  arising  not  from  mere 
selfishness,  but  from  the  necessity  for  providing  for 
the  increase  of  population  incident  to  prolonged  pe- 
riods of  well-fed  peace,  operates  to  interrupt  the 
course  of  other  peoples,  sometimes  to  their  higher 
civilization,  sometimes  to  their  all  but  annihilation, 

2 


PROGRESS   AND   PROBLEMS 


as  in  the  case  of  the  American  Indians  of  the  tide- 
water region,  whose  country  was  desired  by  onr  own 
colonizing  ancestors.  Some-  of  the  smaller  countries 
owe  their  separate  existence  to  that  indefinable 
something  called  balance  of  power,  but  which  some- 
how suggests  inability  of  the  more  powerful  nations 
to  agree  upon  terms  of  partition  or  absorption,  with 
the  same  ease  as  in  the  cases  of  Poland,  Egypt,  Ko- 
rea, Africa,  and  as  seems  in  a  fair  way  to  be  done 
with  Manchuria,  Mongolia,  Persia  and  Thibet. 

The  expenditures  of  nations  for  war  purposes 
have  assumed  such  vast  proportions  as  to  stagger 
students  of  history,  unless  they  constantly  bear  in 
mind  the  changes  due  to  steadily  increasing  civiliza- 
tion and  its  wealth  producing  attributes.  Without 
the  restraints  of  modern  civilization  there  would  be 
no  encouragement  to  accumulation,  for  all  would  be 
at  the  mercy  of  those  who  seize  and  hold. 

No  great  nation  has  yet  been  able  to  establish  and 
maintain  a  permanent  form  of  government  without 
an  armed  power  to  sustain  it.  Between  the  societies 
for  the  prevention  of  international  disputes  and  the 
practical  fact  of  ever  increasing  armament,  there  is 
ample  evidence  that  upon  no  other  subject  are  men 
so  widely  apart  to-day  as  that  of  war.  If  there  be 
a  middle  ground  between  the  extremes  of  opinion, 
America  should  point  the  way  and  mark  the  course. 
Regardless  of  arguments,  war  will  continue  to  be 
respectable  so  long  as  human  liberty  and  the  oppor- 
tunity for  progress  depend  upon  the  arbitrament  of 
arms.    Inspired  by  the  enthusiasm  of  a  just  cause, 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


men  will  continue  to  enlist  under  their  country  *s 
banners  without  regard  to  the  hardships,  dangers 
and  paltry  pay,  to  the  end  that  the  door  of  hope 
may  not  be  closed  to  them  and  to  their  descendants. 
When  the  veil  is  lifted  from  the  tangles  of  diplo- 
macy, peace-loving  nations  often  find  themselves  en- 
meshed in  the  vagaries  of  contrary  policies  due 
primarily  to  the  efforts  of  each  nation  to  gain  advan- 
tage to  the  end  that  the  prosperity  of  its  own  people 
may  be  favorably  affected. 

Civilization  has  progressed  fitfully  along  rough 
and  often  bloody  roads  but,  considered  by  decades 
and  centuries,  progress  has  been  steadfast,  and  each 
generation  has  managed  to  solve  the  difficult  prob- 
lems of  its  own  period.  It  is  only  a  question  of 
concentration  of  energy  upon  a  given  subject,  at  a 
particular  time,  with  the  best  means  available.  Of 
all  the  questions  of  the  hour  none  is  more  important 
than  that  of  preserving  peace  through  comprehen- 
sive and  well-defined  policies  and  ability  to  enforce 
them.  The  complications  arising  from  an  immigra- 
tion policy  with  a  closed  door  and  a  commercial  pol- 
icy of  the  open  door  furnish  our  public  officials  with 
practice  in  mental  gymnastics  that  would  be  much 
simplified  if  our  political  and  military  policies  were 
more  carefully  harmonized. 

Our  country  leads  the  world  in  the  number  of  its 
arbitration  treaties,  in  which  are  incorporated  the 
principle  of  preliminary  deliberation  in  interna- 
tional disputes  before  resorting  to  war.  More  than 
thirty  of  the  forty  nations  maintaining  embassies  at 


PEOGRESS   AND   PROBLEMS 

our  seat  of  government  have  signified  their  accept- 
ance of  the  principle  and  it  is  confidently  expected 
that  ultimately  all  the  nations  will  agree  to  a  period 
of  time  for  reflection,  conciliation  and  adjustment 
of  questions  in  dispute  and  thus  reduce  occasions 
for  appeal  to  the  arbitrament  of  arms.  In  the  mean- 
time, treaties  are  useless  without  sufficient  power, 
separately,  or  jointly  with  allies,  immediately  avail- 
able to  enforce  them. 

Notwithstanding  all  the  safeguards  that  a  higher 
civilization  may  provide,  there  will  continue  to  come 
into  the  life  of  nations,  at  uncertain  intervals,  ques- 
tions which  will  arouse  so  deeply  the  spirit  of  pa- 
triotism and  the  resentment  of  a  whole  people  that 
those  who  continue  the  appeal  for  peace  will  be  cast 
out  as  traitors,  and  those  who  lead  armies  and  fleets 
to  victory  will  be  heralded  as  heroes  and  their  deeds 
commemorated  in  bronze  and  marble.  When  deep- 
seated  patriotism  is  aroused,  men  no  longer  con- 
sider the  commercial  elements  of  questions  at  issue, 
but,  knowing  full  well  the  dangers  of  camp  and  bat- 
tle, march  forth  to  do  or  die,  for  the  honor  of  the 
nation's  flag,  merely  a  bit  of  silk  or  bunting,  but  a 
sacred  emblem  around  which  are  clustered  memo- 
ries of  ancestors  who  have  rallied  to  its  defense. 
This  reverent  feeling  of  patriotism,  immeasurable 
in  a  commercial  way,  is  confined  to  no  age  or  gen- 
eration, but  lingers  in  the  atmosphere  of  homes 
from  the  frozen  fiords  of  the  Arctic  North  to  those 
opposite  regions  of  eternal  ice  under  the  Southern 
Cross  and  continues  one  of  the  foundation  stones 

5 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


of  stable  government.  In  the  face  of  all  theory  and 
academic  argument,  this  has  been  the  history  of 
progress,  and  out  of  gigantic  struggles  upon  land 
and  sea  civilization  has  come  triumphant  and  in- 
dividual liberty  has  been  guaranteed  to  a  greater 
degree  than  at  any  former  period  of  the  world's 
existence. 

The  affairs  of  nations  call  for  the  best  efforts  of 
statesmen  and  the  legitimate  development  of  high 
and  patriotic  politics,  yet  we  seem  ever  to  stand  and 
wait  at  the  door  of  opportunity  until  each  crisis  is 
at  the  threshold.  Our  isolation  and  the  rivalries  of 
European  nations  have  served  in  the  past  to  guard 
us  from  the  usual  results  of  neglect  of  an  established 
military  policy.  All  our  energies  have  been  directed 
to  the  development  of  a  vast  agricultural  domain 
and  the  upbuilding  of  infant  industries,  too  much 
devotion  to  which  may  in  the  end  subject  the  nation 
to  a  humiliation,  which  diplomacy  may  assuage  but 
not  remove,  with  the  questionable  balm  of  palaver 
-^an  ansBsthetic  without  an  operation. 

World  questions  have  come  to  inject  themselves 
into  our  national  life  and  though  we  attempt  to  drug 
the  public  conscience  by  calling  interference  in  the 
affairs  of  autonomous  nations  pacification,  restora- 
tion of  order  or  merely  the  protection  of  the  rights 
of  American  citizens  residing  abroad,  nevertheless 
we  are  becoming  gradually  accustomed  to  such  em- 
ployment of  our  military  and  naval  forces.  Whether 
it  be  the  taking  over  of  the  customs  houses  of  neigh- 
boring islands,  or  defending  legations  in  the  far- 

6 


PROGRESS   AND   PROBLEMS 

distant  Orient,  or  restoring  order  in  disrupted  Cen- 
tral American  republics,  we  are  gradually  assuming 
the  role  of  arbiter  of  helpless  nations  and  the  human 
mind  can  not  foresee  the  trail  of  consequences  which 
will  inevitably  follow  from  precedents  trivial  in 
themselves.  We  are  not  executing  comprehensive 
policies,  but  drifting  from  one  international  obliga- 
tion to  another,  basing  our  action  in  each  case  upon 
the  expediency  of  the  moment. 

Vast  numbers  of  high-minded  Christian  men  and 
women,  pondering  upon  the  horrors  and  waste  of 
the  existing  war  in  Europe,  honestly  believe  that 
the  dawn  of  a  new  civilization  is  at  hand,  and  that 
in  the  not  distant  future  armies  and  navies  will  be 
maintained  only  to  enforce  the  decisions  of  courts 
of  arbitration.  Principles  sometimes  yield  to  ex- 
pediency, as  laws  yield  to  force,  while  the  cupidity 
of  nations  goes  relentlessly  on  undermining  the  re- 
sourcefully planned  schemes  of  men,  the  destruction 
and  overturning  of  which  may  be  and  ofttimes  are 
rehabilitated  only  through  the  carnage  of  war. 

In  the  face  of  accumulated  and  presumptuous 
wrong,  affecting  the  commercial  or  political  rights 
of  a  nation,  all  fine-spun  and  academic  arguments 
against  war  are  swept  away  in  the  rising  tide  of 
public  opinion,  against  which  parties  and  govern- 
ments are  as  chaff  before  the  wind.  It  was  this 
state  of  the  public  mind  that  Washington  portrayed 
in  his  farewell  address : 

**  Antipathy  in  one  nation  against  another  disposes 
each  more  readily  to  oifer  insult  and  injury,  to  lay 

7 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


hold  of  slight  causes  of  umbrage,  and  to  be  haughty 
and  intractable,  when  accidental  or  trifling  occasions 
occur.  Hence  frequent  collisions,  obstinate,  enven- 
omed and  bloody  contests.  The  nation,  prompted  by 
ill-will  and  resentment  sometimes  impels  to  war  the 
government,  contrary  to  the  best  calculations  of  pol- 
icy. So  likewise,  a  passionate  attachment  of  one 
nation  for  another  produces  a  variety  of  evils.  Sym- 
pathy for  the  favorite  nation,  .  .  .  leads  to 
concessions  to  the  favorite  nation  of  privileges  de- 
nied to  others,  which  is  apt  doubly  to  injure  the 
nation  making  the  concession,  by  unnecessarily  part- 
ing with  what  ought  to  have  been  retained,  and  by 
exciting  jealousy,  ill-will  and  a  disposition  to  retal- 
iate, in  the  parties  from  whom  equal  privileges  are 
Avithheld." 

It  is  the  acceptance  of  these  unalterable  facts  that 
brings  to  the  front,  in  each  generation,  those  who 
contend  for  a  military  policy  adapted  to  the  genius 
of  our  political  institutions.  The  ever  changing 
elements  controlling  a  republican  form  of  gov- 
ernment seem  absolutely  athwart  the  path  of  a 
consistent  policy,  sufficiently  enduring  to  insure  a 
guarantee  of  military  efficiency.  Nevertheless,  there 
is  a  steadily  increasing  sentiment  that  a  reasonable 
preparation  for  probable  contingencies  is  the  surest 
guarantee  of  peace.  It  is  this  sentiment  which  has 
brought  about  the  reconstruction  of  the  fleets,  which 
in  twenty  years  have  passed  from  a  state  of  absolute 
and  shameful  mediocrity  to  a  high  plane  of  efficiency, 

8 


PROGRESS   AND   PROBLEMS 

creditable  alike  to  American  shipyards  and  to  a 
superb  naval  personnel. 

In  every  crisis  of  human  affairs  the  pessimist  is 
ever  present,  and  governments  can  not  count  upon 
unanimous  support  in  the  adjustment  of  grave  ques- 
tions. In  all  our  wars  we  have  encountered  these 
conditions.  The  Tory  of  the  Revolution  had  his  coun- 
terpart in  the  Copperhead  of  the  Civil  War  and,  in 
both  struggles,  it  was  the  faith  of  the  few  which  car- 
ried along  sufficient  mass  to  deliver  the  final  blows 
necessary  to  secure  success.  Nevertheless,  we  have 
regarded  ourselves  with  much  complacency  as  being 
something  different  and  apart  from  the  rest  of  the 
world  and  our  awakening  has  been  long  overdue.  It 
may  not  come  until  the  ruthless  development  of 
nature 's  wealth  shall  have  proceeded  to  a  point  when 
fortune  no  longer  flows,  as  by  a  touch  of  the  magi- 
cian's wand,  and  we  find  ourselves  in  a  world's  com- 
petition which  the  tariff  wall  may  not  forefend. 
There  can  be  no  individual  accounting,  for  the  re- 
sponsibility rests  upon  the  nation,  struggling  with 
the  manifold  problems  and  seeking  for  light  with  as 
much  intelligence  and  righteousness  as  ever  charac- 
terized the  efforts  of  the  human  race. 

The  brief  war  which  tore  from  the  crown  of  Spain 
the  last  and  finest  of  her  galaxy  of  colonial  posses- 
sions, thrust  upon  America  responsibilities  of  world- 
wide gravity,  demanding  more  than  altruism,  if  the 
nation  is  to  enter  the  tangled  fields  of  diplomacy 
upon  terms  of  equality  with  others  of  like  claims  to 

9 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


greatness.  When  the  diplomats  with  their  courteous 
formalities  have  withdrawn;  when  The  Hague  and 
its  arbitral  opportunities  have  been  scorned  and  the 
tocsin  of  war  resounds  in  the  land,  history  will 
repeat  itself  unless  we  are  prepared. 

War  is  one  of  the  recognized  instruments  of  civil- 
ization for  enforcing  the  decrees  of  diplomacy,  yet 
our  practice  has  ever  been  to  drift  complacently,  con- 
fident that  the  greatness  of  our  unorganized  re- 
sources will  deter  militant  nations  from  attacking  us. 

It  is  profitless  to  indulge  in  academic  discussion  as 
to  the  wisdom  of  expending  national  wealth  upon 
fleets  and  armies,  so  long  as  the  countries  possessing 
those  military  essentials  continue  to  be  the  centers  of 
the  world 's  wealth  in  treasure,  science  and  the  arts. 
Capital  seeks  investment  at  reasonable  rates  of  in- 
terest only  under  governments  whose  stability  is 
assured.  The  American  army  is,  and  of  a  right 
should  be,  maintained  for  the  preservation  of  law 
and  order  within  our  own  borders  and  to  prevent 
aggression  wherever  floats  the  flag  which  in  a  world- 
wide journey  has  not  lost  its  benediction.  A  nation 
which  has  not  the  force  at  call  to  guarantee  the  neu- 
trality of  its  borders  and  to  give  protection  to  its 
citizens  at  home  and  abroad  lacks  the  very  essentials 
of  a  sovereign  power. 

In  the  closing  hours  of  his  mortal  career.  General 
Ulysses  Grant  wrote  these  warning  words : 

**To  maintain  peace  in  the  future  it  is  necessary  to 
be  prepared  for  war.  There  can  scarcely  be  a  possi- 
ble chance  of  a  conflict,  such  as  the  last  one,  occur- 

10 


PROGRESS   AND   PBOBLEMS 

ring  among  our  own  people  again;  but  growing  as 
we  are  in  population,  wealth  and  military  power,  we 
may  become  the  envy  of  nations  which  led  us  in  all 
these  particulars  only  a  few  years  ago ;  and  unless 
we  are  prepared  for  it  we  may  be  in  danger  of  a  com- 
bined movement  being  some  day  made  to  crush  us 
ouf 

In  the  presence  of  grave  emergencies,  no  other  na- 
tion has  been  more  prodigal  than  America  of  its 
wealth  for  military  and  naval  purposes.  Our  plain 
duty,  based  solely  on  self-interest,  now  lies  in  fore- 
casting probable  international  disputes  and  their  re- 
lation to  our  policies  and  to  make  such  preparation 
as  will  enable  us  to  insist  upon  proper  solutions  of 
questions  which  might  otherwise  provoke  war.  Well 
considered  laws  and  regulations,  administered 
through  a  proper  military  hierarchy,  make  a  national 
force  the  safest,  the  best  and  by  far  the  most  econom- 
ical having  regard  to  our  widely  dispersed  obliga- 
tions and  the  needs  for  keeping  alive  military  knowl- 
edge, traditions  and  customs  which  are  of  great  mo- 
ment to  the  security  of  the  nation,  and  which  Avill 
enable  it  always  to  stand  with  bold  front,  while  the 
great  body  of  patriotic  but  untrained  citizens  are 
organizing  for  war. 

Sophistry  and  concealment  find  no  place  in  our 
treatment  of  other  nations  and  the  country  will  con- 
tinue its  endeavor  to  fulfill  its  destiny  and  its  duties 
as  one  of  the  great  world  powers  without  becoming 
a  nation-in-arms.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  an  impera- 
tive duty  that  our  military  resources  shall  he  organ- 

11 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


ized  and  nationalized  and  that  the  doctrine  of  peace 
at  any  price  shall  not  be  permitted  to  confuse  or 
retard  the  execution  of  that  policy. 

Accepting  without  hesitation  the  doctrine  that  no 
amount  of  desire  on  our  part  and  no  degree  of  intel- 
lectual heights  to  which  we  may  attain  will  prevent 
the  recurrence  of  wars,  it  behooves  us  to  analyze  the 
problems  of  the  hour  and  being  forewarned  to  fore- 
arm for  contingencies  by  common  and  general  con- 
sent and  not  fritter  away  our  strength  by  separating 
in  hostile  camps  under  the  banners  of  those  who  be- 
lieve in  military  preparedness  and  those  who  pray 
for  peace  at  any  price. 

The  period  following  the  war  with  Spain  has  been 
filled  with  accomplishment.  Never  before  has  the 
army  found  such  generous  encouragement  of  profes- 
sional preparation  and  such  willingness  to  experi- 
ment with  every  proposed  improvement  giving  gen- 
uine promise  of  success.  But  reforms  move  slowly, 
especially  when  congressional  action  is  required,  for 
experienced  legislators  realize  that  enthusiasm  is 
not  always  followed  by  achievement  and  that  policies 
sometimes  change  with  chameleon-like  rapidity.  The 
responsibility  of  Congress  is  absolute,  under  our 
government,  and  the  only  way  to  ultimate  success  is 
to  present  the  needs  of  the  army,  under  whatever 
policy  may  be  adopted  by  the  military  authorities, 
leaving  to  the  legislative  bodies  the  determination  as 
to  the  order  in  which  public  funds  shall  be  appropri- 
ated for  the  execution  of  the  manifold  projects  aris- 
ing in  a  great  country  still  in  its  swaddling-clothes 

12 


PROGRESS   AND   PROBLEMS 

stage  of  development.  If  the  majority  of  a  commit- 
tee of  Congress  is  convinced  of  the  righteousness  of 
any  measure  there  is  encouragement  for  the  future, 
but  without  conviction  there  is  no  hope.  Success  by 
appeal  over  a  committee  to  Congress  is  practi- 
cally impossible.  An  honest  public  opinion  may  and 
does,  often,  induce  consideration  of  measures,  but  the 
mere  padding  of  newspapers  and  magazines  with  in- 
spired articles  results  not  infrequently  in  more  harm 
than  good.  The  dignity  of  the  service,  preserved 
and  transmitted  by  a  long  line  of  educated,  gallant 
and  distinguished  soldiers,  dictates  that  the  problems 
of  the  army  should  be  clearly  set  forth,  relying  upon 
the  merits  of  the  case  to  secure  consideration  and 
leaving  untrammeled  the  responsibility  for  action 
where  the  nation  has  placed  it. 

That  the  great  and  small  problems  of  the  army 
have  been  studied  by  as  intelligent  and  devoted  offi- 
cers as  are  possessed  by  any  nation,  there  is  no 
doubt.  Whether  the  solutions  produced  from  time 
to  time  accord  with  our  civil  policies  is  for  those  in 
authority  to  determine.  In  any  event,  the  late  Gen- 
eral Upton  very  clearly  pointed  the  path  of  duty 
when  he  wrote,  that : 

*' Unless  we  frame  and  bequeath  to  the  succeeding 
generations  a  military  system  suggested  by  our  past 
experience  and  commended  by  the  example  of  other 
enlightened  nations,  our  rulers  and  legislators  in  the 
next  war  will  fall  into  the  same  errors  and  involve 
the  country  in  the  same  sacrifices  as  in  the  past. ' ' 


n 


LESSONS   OF   HISTORY 

"In  proportion  as  the  structure  of  goremment  gives  force  to 
public  opinion,  It  Is  essential  that  public  opinion  should  be  en- 
lightened."— Washington. 

THE  diflBculty  encountered  in  the  past  in  securing 
consideration  of  any  comprehensive  policy  con- 
cerning preparation  for  national  defense  has  been 
greatly  due  to  the  absence  of  any  serious  public 
opinion  on  the  subject.  It  requires  much  of  study 
and  reflection  to  arrive  at  a  comprehensive  knowl- 
edge of  any  policy  of  national  dimensions,  and  an  ed- 
ucated public  opinion  is  the  only  guarantee  of  wise, 
continuing  and  certain  action.  Many  worthy  causes 
have  been  sacrificed  as  hostages  to  political  expedi- 
ency even  when  great  principles  were  at  stake.  There 
is  a  fellowship  and  a  freemasonry  in  politics  difficult 
for  the  layman  to  understand  but  directly  traceable 
to  pressure  of  constituencies  in  behalf  of  local  in- 
terests. Men  in  public  life  well  understand  that  he 
who  hews  to  the  line  in  any  policy  for  the  general 
welfare  which  may  conflict  with  local  interests  stands 
confronted  with  the  danger  of  incurring  political  an- 
imosity which  will  not  only  avail  itself  of  any  oppor- 
tunity to  hamper  him,  but  will  gloat  over  his  discom- 
fiture in  event  of  failure. 
One  of  England  *8  most  accomplished  military 

14 


LESSONS  OF  HISTOEY 


students  has  expressed  tlie  opinion  that :  **  Republic- 
anism and  military  efficiency  are  two  hopelessly 
irreconcilable  terms."  When  we  consider  the  small 
degree  of  success  which  has  come  from  the  writings 
of  Washington  and  a  long  line  of  statesmen  and  mil- 
itary students  through  the  intervening  years,  in  their 
pleadings  for  a  better  state  of  preparedness  for 
passing  from  a  peace  to  a  war  establishment,  we  are 
forced  to  the  conclusion  that  our  critic  had  some 
foundation  for  his  remark.  It  should  not  be  as- 
sumed, however,  that  the  nation  is  indifferent  con- 
cerning the  existing  army  and  navy,  for  the  annual 
appropriation  of  upward  of  $200,000,000  for  tlieir 
maintenance  and  for  reserve  supplies,  is  a  refutation 
of  such  an  assumption. 

Provision  for  the  establishment  of  a  proper  na- 
tional defense  must  take  into  consideration  the 
character  of  our  obligations,  which  have  materially 
increased  since  we  abandoned  the  slogan  "54-40  or 
fight,"  and  retain  only  the  highly  charged  and  in- 
flammable Monroe  Doctrine,  which  seems  to  carry  in 
its  wake  a  series  of  responsibilities  requiring  some- 
thing more  material  than  diplomatic  notes  for  their 
adjustment.  The  terrorism  and  misrule  which  so 
often  prevail  in  the  smaller  American  republics  pre- 
sent grave  problems  to  the  nation  that  stands  solidly 
behind  the  pronouncement  which  resents  and  rejects 
political  colonization  or  interference  in  their  affairs 
on  the  part  of  other  nations.  With  the  widespread 
and  vast  ramifications  of  modern  commerce  and  con- 
sequent interchange  of  ideas  have  come  awakenings 

'  15 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


of  human  aspirations,  feebly  characterized  as  un- 
rest, which  will  not  down  at  command,  but  are 
destined  to  grow  in  ever  enlarging  circles  in  the 
hopeless  effort  to  insure  an  equitable  distribution  of 
wealth  and  power  as  between  the  strong  and  the 
weak,  the  capable  and  the  incapable. 

The  most  far-seeing  student  of  the  military  weak- 
ness inherent  in  our  government  was  Alexander 
Hamilton  who  wrote  much  of  value  on  the  subject 
during  all  the  earlier  years  of  our  national  life.  At 
the  close  of  the  Civil  War,  the  late  General  Emory 
Upton  addressed  himself  to  the  task  of  interpreting 
its  lessons  for  the  benefit  of  his  countrymen  and  pro- 
duced a  work  which  remained  unpublished  during  his 
lifetime  but  which  has  become  a  classic  since  the 
true  value  of  his  investigations  and  recommenda- 
tions has  penetrated  the  minds  of  military  students. 
Washington's  writings,  and  those  of  all  our  military 
students  down  to  the  present  time,  exhibit  a  con- 
sensus of  opinion  that  the  correct  principle  on  which 
our  nation  should  predicate  its  defense  has  as  its 
basis  a  federal  army  of  regulars  and  volunteers,  un- 
der the  direct  command  and  control  of  the  President, 
and  that  the  militia  of  the  states  should  be  comprised 
of  men  whose  enlistments  should  be  made  with  the 
distinct  agreement  that  their  services  should  not  be 
demanded  otherwise  than  as  provided  in  the  Consti- 
tution. 

The  costly  errors  of  organization  and  lack  of  mili- 
tary policy  during  the  Civil  War  and  the  consequent 
financial  burden,  have  been  the  most  potent  causes 

16 


LESSONS   OF   HISTORY 


of  objection  to  every  plan  for  putting  our  peace  es- 
tablishment upon  a  proper  basis  for  expansion  auto- 
matically in  war.  The  opinions  of  those  of  wide  and 
varied  experience,  in  command  of  troops  during  the 
Civil  War,  substantiate  completely  the  view  that  we 
should  abandon  all  further  efforts  at  preparing  to 
make  war  as  an  aggregation  of  forty-eight  states 
and  take  the  necessary  steps  to  nationalize  our  war 
forces  during  peace.  Fifteen  years  of  loyal  and  ear- 
nest effort  have  been  given  to  the  scheme  to  provide 
for  the  national  defense  through  the  instrumentality 
of  the  organized  militia,  and  the  results  are  wholly 
unsatisfactory,  when  the  requirements  of  a  war  with 
any  nation  maintaining  a  modem  army  are  consid- 
ered. 

It  should  require  no  argument  to  prove  that  in  the 
emergency  of  war  we  would  need  for  our  first  line 
not  less  than  500,000  men  at  once.  The  present  force 
of  regulars  at  many  isolated  stations  within  the 
United  States,  together  with  the  estimated  available 
organized  militia,  scattered  through  forty-eight 
states,  would  not  aggregate  in  excess  of  one-fourth 
the  requirement  of  the  first  call — ^mobilization  is 
hardly  the  term  to  use  regarding  forces  which  have 
none  of  the  larger  tactical  organizations  complete 
in  peace.  There  would  result  an  immediate  neces- 
sity for  a  call  for  untrained  volunteers. 

It  seems  very  certain  that  we  may  count  always 
upon  less  than  100,000  men  of  the  forty-eight  states 
being  available  as  organized  militia,  with  a  limited 
field  of  action.    If  this  force,  which,  to  he  available 

17 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


for  war,  mibst  volunteer  as  individuals  after  war  has 
been  declared,  is  to  constitute  our  main  reliance,  then 
some  steps  must  be  taken  to  increase  it  many  fold. 
It  would  seem  that  as  practical  people  Americans 
would  no  longer  trifle  with  so  grave  a  situation,  but 
seek  a  remedy  without  delay. 

The  recent  decision  of  the  Attorney  General  con- 
cerning the  use  of  the  state  forces  by  tbe  federal 
power,  is  based  upon  the  constitutional  limitations 
as  to  calling  forth  the  militia.  The  effect  upon  our 
military  policy  is  so  far  reaching,  having  in  mind 
the  continuous  efforts  to  develop  the  organized  mili- 
tia as  part  of  the  first  line  for  service  with  the  reg- 
ular army  in  event  of  war,  that  a  reconsideration  of 
the  subject  from  its  foundations  is  essential  to  mili- 
tary eflSciency.  It  is  certain  that  the  several  states 
are  reaching  the  maximum  limit  of  appropriations 
which  may  be  reasonably  expected  for  the  support 
of  their  organized  militia,  and  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  organizations  of  the  special  arms  if  maintained 
at  all  must  be  at  the  expense  of  the  general  govern- 
ment as  part  of  the  regular  army  in  excess  of  the 
proportions  necessary  for  that  force  considered  as 
a  well  balanced  army. 

It  is  clearly  a  national  duty  to  provide  for  the 
contingencies  of  war  before  the  occasion  for  the  use 
of  armies  shall  arise.  The  most  serious  questions 
of  military  policy  now  before  the  country  for  solu- 
tion have  arisen  as  the  results  of  legislation  having 
for  its  object  the  precedence  of  the  organized  militia 
over  national  or  federal  volunteers.     None  of  the 

X8 


LESSONS   OF   HISTORY 


schemes  proposed  by  the  representatives  of  the  na- 
tional guard  has  admitted  of  allowing  the  Presi- 
dent to  exercise  control  over  the  state  organizations 
during  peace,  and  so  much  of  the  militia  legislation 
of  1903  as  did  authorize  the  President  to  give  orders 
in  emergencies  direct  to  commanding  officers  of  the 
organized  militia  instead  of  calling  upon  the  gover- 
nors of  states,  was  quickly  withdrawn  by  a  repeal  of 
the  statute. 

The  failure  of  execution  of  the  conscription  or 
draft  act,  during  the  Civil  War,  makes  it  most  un- 
likely that  the  principle  of  compulsory  service  will 
ever  be  acceptable  to  our  people,  unless  the  very  ex- 
istence of  republican  institutions  shall  be  at  stake. 
It  is  useless  for  military  enthusiasts  to  suggest  such 
schemes  for  our  army,  although  it  requires  but  a 
brief  study  to  bring  the  conviction  that  state  laws, 
requiring  a  year's  instruction  in  the  theory  and  or- 
ganization of  our  government  and  in  military  train- 
ing as  members  of  the  organized  militia  before  being 
accorded  the  right  of  suffrage,  would  in  a  few  years 
strengthen  and  enlighten  the  whole  fabric  of  popular 
government,  and  be  lasting  monuments  to  the  com- 
monwealths courageous  enough  to  submit  themselves 
to  such  preparation  for  the  duties  of  citizenship. 

In  self-governing  countries  it  has  long  been  rec- 
ognized that  there  is  no  political  danger  from  an 
army  recruited  by  voluntary  enlistments,  and  sug- 
gestions of  inimical  possibilities  arise  only  in  the 
minds  of  demagogues  in  search  of  a  slogan  for  self- 
ish purposes.    Armies  do  not  declare  war  nor  are 

19 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


they  responsible  for  declarations  of  war.  Those  who 
proclaim  that  the  existence  of  armies  induces  war 
would  hesitate  to  assert  that  the  existence  of  insur- 
ance policies  is  a  general  incentive  to  arson,  yet  the 
active  campaign  of  present  day  peace  advocates  is 
tinged  with  equally  fallacious  arguments. 

As  the  results  of  the  war  with  Spain  unfolded 
and  the  causes  of  many  unsatisfactory  conditions 
were  analyzed,  it  became  evident  that  our  state  of 
preparation  for  modern  war  with  a  strong  and  re- 
sourceful nation  was  decidedly  in  need  of  improve- 
ment. Because  of  the  character  of  equipment  and 
stores  required  by  armies  in  the  field  and  which  can 
not  be  purchased  in  the  ordinary  markets  of  the 
world,  nations  are  compelled  to  hold  in  reserve  war 
funds  and  to  establish  great  depots  of  supplies  to 
arm  and  equip  troops  and  enable  them  to  make  the 
initial  movements  in  campaign  without  the  delay 
necessary  to  manufacture  arms,  equipments  and 
other  articles  required  by  soldiers. 

Prior  to  the  establishment  of  the  General  Staff 
Corps  in  our  army,  the  Secretary  of  War  took  up 
the  subject  and  caused  this  communication,  which 
contains  the  essence  of  material  preparation  for 
war,  to  be  addressed  to  a  body  of  officers  then  re- 
cently organized  under  the  title  of  **The  War  Col- 
lege Board'*: 

"I  wish  to  reach  a  definite  statement  of  the  quan- 
tities of  arms,  ammunition,  equipments  and  supplies 
of  all  kinds  which  it  sliould  be  the  aim  of  the  War 
Department  to  provide  and  keep  on  hand  for  use  in 

20 


LESSONS   OF   HISTORY 


case  of  sudden  and  unexpected  hostilities,  and  also 
to  reach  a  definite  understanding  as  to  the  domestic 
sources  from  which  may  be  obtained  in  any  emer- 
gency a  further  supply  of  material  for  arms,  ammu- 
nition, equipments  and  military  supplies  in  excess 
of  the  reserve  stock  kept  on  hand  by  the  War  De- 
partment. 

** Assuming  first,  an  army  of  150,000;  second,  an 
army  of  250,000,  the  question  being  answered  in  each 
case  both  with  reference  to  a  campaign  in  a  cold, 
northerly  climate,  and  with  reference  to  a  campaign 
in  a  hot  climate : 

*'What  is  our  present  supply  of  each  article  or 
class  of  articles  reported  as  necessary  for  such  an 
emergency? 

*'What  is  our  present  capacity  for  the  production 
of  such  articles! 

**What  are  the  domestic  sources  of  supply  to 
which  we  could  look,  in  an  emergency,  for  the  mate- 
rial with  which  to  increase  either  by  purchase  or 
manufacture  our  war  materials  of  all  kinds,  and 
what  is  the  productive  capacity  of  the  establish- 
ments from  which  such  material  could  be  produced  1 

*'Wliat  are  the  present  storage  facilities  of  each 
of  the  supply  departments  and  what  relation  do  they 
bear  to  the  requirements  for  the  storage  of  the  full 
stock  of  supplies  in  that  department  which  you  shall 
report  to  be  requisite  under  the  foregoing  direc- 
tions? 

*'Are  the  present  places  for  storage  properly  lo- 
cated with  reference  to  strategical  requirements  of 

21 


THE  AMERICAN  ARMY 


possible  hostilities?  What,  if  any,  of  the  present 
places  of 'storage  should  be  enlarged?  "What,  if  any, 
should  be  abandoned?  What  new  places,  if  any, 
should  be  established? 

**At  present,  subject  only  to  the  approval  of  a 
civilian  Secretary  of  War,  the  Chief  of  Ordnance 
determines  where  powder,  projectiles  and  equip- 
ments shall  be  kept ;  the  Quartermaster  General  de- 
termines where  clothing  and  equipage  shall  be  kept ; 
the  Commissary  General,  where  food  shall  be  kept ; 
but  it  is  not  the  business  of  those  officers  to  plan 
campaigns  or  determine  where  these  things  are  most 
likely  to  be  needed,  and  there  is  therefore  no  proper 
relations  between  the  place  where  supplies  are  kept 
and  the  place  where  they  will  probably  be  needed.*' 

Nothing  of  militarism  in  this,  but  a  situation  ur- 
gent enough  to  appeal  to  any  statesman.  Considera- 
tion of  the  subject  was  begun  by  the  War  College 
Board  and  later  assumed  by  the  newly  created  Gen- 
eral Staff,  but  it  was  nearly  ten  years  before  the 
first  general  depot  was  established.  Now  that  the 
scheme  is  launched,  we  are  in  a  fair  way  to  multiply 
the  number  of  such  depots  until  the  probable  needs 
of  the  army  in  an  emergency  will  be  met,  if  war  will 
but  await  our  further  convenience. 

Military  men  are  usually  subjected  to  more  or 
less  harsh  criticism  for  every  proposal  for  increase 
of  the  army  and  its  appurtenances.  Many  of  those 
who  have  been  indifferent  during  peace  or  in  active 
opposition  to  the  adoption  of  essential  measures  of 
preparedness,  become  the  severe  critics  of  the  short- 

22 


LESSONS   OF   HISTORY 


comings  usually  developed  by  active  campaigns 
without  previous  and  mature  preparation.  When 
the  resolution  reaffirming  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  con- 
cerning the  colonization  of  this  continent  was  under 
discussion  in  the  Senate,  January  15,  1853,  General 
Cass  noted  then  this  same  disposition,  so  often  mani- 
fested, and  spoke  as  follows: 

**I  have  seen  a  great  deal  of  this  political  per- 
versity,— this  unpatriotic  predisposition,  which 
prompts  many  men  always  to  take  part  against 
their  country,  whatever  be  the  position  in  which  she 
is  placed.  I  do  not  recollect  a  single  controversy  in 
which  we  have  been  involved  with  a  foreign  power, 
since  I  have  been  on  the  stage  of  action,  when  the 
whole  sentiment  of  the  country  was  united  in  the 
cause  of  the  country.  I  doubt  if  there  is  another 
people  on  the  face  of  the  globe  whose  history  pre- 
sents so  many  instances  of  this  want  of  true  national 
pride — ^patriotism  rather — as  our  own." 

The  grave  problems  involved  in  the  establishment 
of  a  comprehensive  and  continuing  policy  are  well 
worthy  the  study  of  statesmen,  to  the  end  that  the 
lives  of  America's  sons  may  not  be  needlessly  sacri- 
ficed and  the  wealth  of  the  nation  wasted.  A  correct 
solution  of  these  problems  will  demand  some  sacri- 
fice of  preconceived  opinions  and  of  personal  and  lo- 
cal interests.  There  will  be  some  convictions  as  to 
states'  rights  hard  to  overcome,  but  our  past  experi- 
ences and  the  interests  which  have  been  acquired  be- 
yond our  territorial  limits  demand  that  the  military 
resources  of  the  United  States  shall  be  nationalized, 

23 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


and  that  the  impropriety  and  extravagance  of  wag- 
ing war  as  an  aggregation  of  forty-eight  states, 
should  be  recognized  by  appropriate  legislation. 

Fortunes  may  continue  to  be  dedicated  to  the  end 
that  sincere  and  able  men  shall  carry  out  the  cam- 
paign for  the  abolition  of  war,  yet  there  will  remain 
the  vital  drop  of  red  blood  coursing  in  the  veins  of 
those  who  fear  not  conflict  when  principles  are  at 
stake,  and  who  cherish  the  memory  of  bloody  sacri- 
fices whose  fruits  have  endured  in  the  life  of  the  na- 
tion. It  will  be  difficult  to  convince  the  great  body 
of  young  Americans  that  it  is  more  patriotic  to  fight 
out  questions  involving  the  nation's  prestige  and 
honor  in  the  arena  of  intellectual  discussion  rather 
than  upon  the  battlefield.  We  may  rewrite  history 
and  eliminate  the  stories  of  campaign  and  battle,  of 
daring  and  suffering,  but  there  will  still  remain  the 
spirit  expressed  in  the  immortal  words  of  Nathan 
Hale:  "I  only  regret  that  I  have  but  one  life  to 
lose  for  my  country.'* 

Our  people  have  never  been  enthusiastic  over 
some  of  our  recent  acquisitions  of  territory  and  are 
in  nowise  anxious  to  increase  our  holdings,  but  the 
nation  is  overwhelmingly  behind  the  opening  of  the 
trade  routes  through  the  Panama  Canal  and  will 
make  any  expenditure  or  sacrifice  in  the  determina- 
tion and  maintenance  of  policies  involved  therein. 

International  duties,  whether  treaty  obligations 
or  merely  assumed  in  the  interests  of  humanity, 
carry  grave  responsibilities  and  demand  above  all 
things  the  means  to  enforce  them.    The  nation  un- 

24 


LESSONS   OF   HISTORY 


able  to  defend  itself  invites  aggression  whenever  its 
accumulations  tempt  the  cupidity  of  other  nations. 
The  limit  of  elasticity  of  our  comparatively  small 
mobile  army  has  been  long  since  reached.  To  pro- 
vide for  future  contingencies  Americans  should  not 
hesitate  to  study  the  questions  at  issue  and  having 
once  made  up  their  minds  as  to  the  desirable  and  cor- 
rect action  to  insist  upon  it. 

It  is  morally  certain  that,  not  only  our  altruistic 
ideas  of  fair  play,  but  the  official  construction  and 
delimitations  of  our  recently  confirmed  treaties  of 
arbitration  will  absolutely  put  a  ban  upon  all  prep- 
arations for  war  during  the  period  provided  for  pre- 
liminary discussions  of  matters  in  dispute.  The 
marked  advantage  of  this  to  other  nations  whose 
armies  and  reserves  are  always  organized  and 
equipped  is  apparent,  for  it  would  attract  no  com- 
ment for  each  and  every  individual  of  such  a  force 
to  put  himself  and  his  equipments  in  a  state  of  fit- 
ness for  immediate  service,  because  it  is  his  duty -to 
do  so.  In  the  meantime,  we  could  not  fill  a  single 
vacancy  in  our  skeleton  army. 

The  most  pacific  policy  on  the  part  of  the  nation 
will  not  preserve  it  from  being  engaged  in  war,  more 
or  less  frequently.  The  circumstances  and  past  his- 
tory of  our  country  suggest  the  improbability  of  our 
ever  having  a  large  military  establishment  in  peace, 
so  that  it  becomes  extremely  important  that  as  much 
perfection  as  possible  should  pertain  to  that  which 
does  exist. 

Parkman,  the  historian,  has  wisely  said  that: 

25 


THE  AMERICAN  ARMY 


"In  every  well-balanced  development  of  nations, 
as  of  individuals,  the  warlike  instinct  and  the  mili- 
tary point  of  honor  are  not  repressed  and  extin- 
guished, but  only  refined  and  civilized.  It  belongs 
to  the  pedagogue,  not  to  the  philosopher,  to  declaim 
against  them  as  relics  of  barbarism.  *  * 

Americans  when  aroused  concerning  matters  of 
principle  have  always  evinced  warrior  character- 
istics, but  they  are  not  a  military  people,  the  mod- 
em craze  for  buttons  and  badges  notwithstanding. 
They  are,  however,  to  be  credited  with  marked  abil- 
ity, morality  and  energy  in  business,  and  they  have 
never  hesitated  to  tear  down  and  build  anew  when 
greater  success  was  reasonably  to  be  anticipated. 

Shall  we  continue  to  sacrifice  principles  to  ex- 
pediency and  evade  a  national  duty,  leaving  to  pos- 
terity, as  our  ancestors  have  done,  the  cost  of  our 
neglect  to  read  aright  and  to  profit  by  the  lessons  of 
history? 


Ill 


MILITAKY  POLICY 

"In  proportion  as  the  circumstances  and  policy  of  a  country  for- 
bid a  large  military  establishment,  it  is  important  that  as  much 
perfection  as  possible  should  be  given  to  that  which  may  at  any 
time  exist." — Washington. 

THE  military  policy  of  a  nation  is  fundamentally 
dependent  upon  its  political  policy.  The  la- 
mented John  Hay,  late  Secretary  of  State,  has  thus 
tersely  stated  this  relation : 

**War  and  politics,  campaign  and  statecraft,  are 
Siamese  twins,  inseparable  and  interdependent;  to 
talk  of  military  operations  without  the  direction  and 
interference  of  an  administration  is  as  absurd  as  to 
plan  a  campaign  without  recruits,  pay  or  rations. 
Historical  judgment  of  war  is  subject  to  an  inflexi- 
ble law,  either  very  imperfectly  understood  or  very 
constantly  lost  sight  of.  Every  war  is  begun,  dom- 
inated and  ended  by  political  considerations ;  with- 
out a  nation,  without  a  government,  without  money 
or  credit,  without  popular  enthusiasm  which  fur- 
nishes volunteers,  or  public  support  which  endures 
conscription,  there  could  be  no  army  and  no  war — 
no  beginning  nor  end  of  methodical  hostilities." 

Where  the  sentiment  of  a  people  forbids  the  main- 
tenance of  a  regular  military  establishment  sufficient 
for  war  purposes,  carefully  devised  laws  for  putting 

27 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


such  part  of  the  nation  as  it  may  be  necessary  to  em- 
ploy under  arms,  should  be  placed  upon  the  statute 
books  before  an  emergency  arises.  Such  statutes 
should  be  founded  upon  right  principles  and  have  as 
their  basis  a  simple  and  practicable  scheme  for  mo- 
bilizing armies  before  or  immediately  upon  a  dec- 
laration of  war,  because  it  is  readiness  to  strike 
which  makes  for  arbitration  and  peace.  The  pres- 
tige of  a  proud  nation  may  be  sadly  lowered  by  lack 
of  foresight  and  preparedness,  and  patriotism  and 
material  interest  alike  suggest  the  propriety  of  giv- 
ing the  highest  moral  support  to  those  who  under- 
take to  prepare  the  nation  in  time  of  peace  for  the 
shocking  realities  of  war.  For  more  than  a  hundred 
years  Presidents  have  periodically  invited  the  at- 
tention of  Congress  to  the  fact  that  unless  a  system, 
or  policy,  for  organizing  and  equipping  our  military 
forces  shall  be  adopted  in  time  of  peace,  the  legiti- 
mate consequences  may  and  probably  will  be  initial 
defeat,  humiliation,  and  greater  cost  of  preparation 
during  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war. 

At  a  time  when  practically  every  member  of  Con- 
gress was  a  veteran  of  the  Civil  War,  and  during 
the  progress  of  our  greatest  Indian  war,  the  subject 
of  a  military  policy  was  under  consideration  by  the 
House  of  Representatives  and  a  conclusion  was 
reached  that: 

**Our  army  is  viewed  as  a  nucleus  wherein  is  to  be 
acquired  and  preserved  military  knowledge,  and 
from  which  should  radiate  the  elements  of  instruc- 
tion and  discipline,  thus  to  form  in  time  of  war  a 

28 


MILITARY  POLICY 


competent  force  endowed  with,  talent  to  direct  it  as 
a  whole,  and  provided  with  agencies  capable  of 
grasping  the  responsibility,  organization,  and  dis- 
tribution of  numerous  supplies  necessary  to  the  con- 
duct of  successful  military  operations." 

The  world  has  moved  rapidly  during  the  forty 
years  which  have  elapsed  since  Congress  com- 
placently accepted  the  announcement  of  our  army 
policy  but  failed  to  provide  the  agencies  for  radiat- 
ing instruction  and  discipline  to  form  in  time  of  war 
a  competent  force  with  talent  to  direct  it  as  a  whole. 
A  well  ordered  military  establishment  requires  time 
and  experience  for  its  creation  and  perfection.  Every 
provision  for  its  being  or  its  improvement  must 
usually  follow  lines  of  great  resistance  arising  from 
the  necessity  of  convincing  Congress  through  its 
overworked  committees.  The  play  for  partisan  ad- 
vantage is  the  rule  always  in  evidence,  and  nearly 
all  progressive  laws  for  the  betterment  of  govern- 
ment are  but  compromises,  in  which  wise  and  patri- 
otic legislators  are  compelled  often  to  make  terms, 
to  the  end  that  great  public  good  may  not  be  wholly 
sacrificed.  No  class  of  legislation  should  be  so  free 
from  party  clamor  as  that  which  has  for  its  object 
the  perfection  of  the  organization  and  administration 
of  the  army,  but  broad-minded  and  practical  men 
realize  that  dreams  of  perfection  in  government  are 
Utopian. 

All  of  our  wars  have  been  fought,  so  far  as  mili- 
tary organizations  are  concerned,  on  the  principle 
that  our  states  constitute  a  confederacy  of  independ- 

29 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


ent  governments  and  not  one  nation  for  war  pur- 
poses. Our  history  contains  only  one  remarkable 
variation  from  this  course  and  this  experience  is  not 
apt  to  be  repeated,  for  it  is  beyond  belief  that  an- 
other George  Washington  will  arise  in  our  national 
existence.  The  one  notable  exception  to  our  usual 
method  of  raising  troops  and  appointing  officers  was 
authorized  by  this  resolution  of  the  Continental  Con- 
gress : 

"Having  perfect  reliance  in  the  wisdom,  vigor  and 
uprightness  of  George  Washington  do  hereby: 

**  Resolve,  That  General  Washington  shall  be  and 
he  is  hereby  vested  with  full,  ample  atid  complete 
powers  to  raise  and  collect  together  in  the  most 
speedy  and  effectual  manner  from  any  or  all  of  these 
United  States  sixteen  battalions  of  infantry  in  addi- 
tion to  those  already  voted  by  Congress ;  to  appoint 
officers  for  the  said  battalions  of  infantry ;  to  raise, 
officer  and  equip  three  thousand  light  horse,  three 
regiments  of  artillery  and  a  corps  of  engineers  and 
to  establish  their  pay ;  to  apply  to  any  of  the  States 
for  such  aid  of  the  militia  as  he  shall  judge  neces- 
sary; to  form  such  magazines  of  provisions  and  in 
such  places  as  he  shall  think  proper ;  to  displace  and 
appoint  all  officers  under  the  rank  of  brigadier  gen- 
eral and  to  fill  all  vacancies  in  every  other  depart- 
ment in  the  American  army;  to  take,  wherever  he 
may  be,  whatever  he  may  want  for  the  use  of  the 
army.'* 

Nearly  forty  years  have  elapsed  since  General 
Emory  Upton  analyzed  the  military  system  which 

30 


MILITARY   POLICY 


had  prevailed  in  America  since  the  Revolution  and 
cited  the  causes  of  our  weakness  to  be : 

First.  The  employment  of  militia  and  undis- 
ciplined troops  commanded  by  generals  and  officers 
utterly  ignorant  of  the  military  art. 

Second.  Short  enlistments  from  three  months  to 
three  years,  instead  of  for  or  during  the  war. 

Third.  Reliance  upon  voluntary  enlistments,  in- 
stead of  voluntary  enlistments  coupled  with  con- 
scription. 

Fourth.  The  intrusion  of  the  states  in  military 
affairs  and  the  consequent  waging  of  all  our  wars 
on  the  theory  that  we  are  a  confederacy  instead  of 
a  nation. 

Fifth.  Confusing  volunteers  with  militia  and  sur- 
rendering to  the  states  the  right  to  commission  offi- 
cers of  volunteers  the  same  as  officers  of  militia. 

Sixth.  The  bounty — a  natural  consequence  of 
voluntary  enlistments. 

Seventh.  The  failure  to  appreciate  military  edu- 
cation, and  to  distribute  trained  officers  as  battalion, 
regimental,  and  higher  commanders  in  our  volunteer 
armies. 

Eighth.  The  want  of  territorial  recruitment  and 
regimental  depots. 

As  a  result  of  his  painstaking  study  of  the  Civil 
War,  reinforced  with  valuable  statistics  of  all  our 
previous  military  experiences,  General  Upton  rec- 
ommended that  the  military  system  of  this  nation 
should  embrace,  in  order,  the  following  forces:  the 
regular  army,  federal  volunteers,  militia.    The  fed- 

n 


THE  AMERICAN  ARMY 


eral  volunteers,  to  be  officered  and  supported  by  the 
government,  and  organized  in  each  congressional 
district;  the  militia  to  be  supported  by  the  states 
and  to  be  used  only  as  intended  by  the  Constitution, 
to  execute  the  laws,  suppress  insurrection  and  repel 
invasions. 

In  commenting  upon  this  subject  just  prior  to  his 
retirement  from  the  office  of  Secretary  of  War,  Hon. 
Elihu  Root,  after  a  remarkably  successful  series  of 
appeals  to  Congress  for  authority  for  certain 
changes  of  army  organization,  said: 

"One  other  field  of  great  importance  remains  to 
be  covered  by  legislation ;  that  is,  the  establishment 
of  an  adequate  system  for  raising,  training,  and  offi- 
cering the  volunteer  forces  of  the  future.  It  is  of 
first  importance  that  the  distinction  between  volun- 
teers and  militia  shall  be  observed,  and  that,  while 
the  selection  of  officers  of  the  militia  shall  continue, 
as  it  must  under  the  Constitution,  to  rest  with  the 
States,  following  such  mode  of  selection  as  they  pre- 
fer, the  officers  of  the  volunteer  forces  of  the  United 
States  shall  hold  their  commissions  from  the  Presi- 
dent, who  is  to  command  them  during  the  war  for 
which  they  are  called  out,  and  shall  look  to  their 
Commander-in-Chief  for  the  promotion  which  should 
reward  their  good  conduct,  as  well  as  for  such  dis- 
cipline as  they  may  merit ;  and  that  an  adequate  sys- 
tem shall  be  provided  for  the  selection  of  such  offi- 
cers and  the  direct  recruitment  of  the  enlisted  volun- 
teer force  under  the  authority  of  the  national  gov- 
ernment.*' 

32 


MILITAEY   POLICY 


In  February,  1906,  Hon.  William  H.  Taft,  Secre- 
tary of  War,  wrote  for  publication  his  views  that : 

* '  It  is  our  duty,  therefore,  if  we  would  be  wise  in 
our  generation,  to  make  provision  for  a  compara- 
tively small  regular  army  and  efficient  reserve  of 
volunteers,  and  an  adequate  and  co-operating  force 
of  State  militia." 

This  was  in  exact  accord  with  the  recommenda- 
tions of  his  predecessor  in  office,  than  whom  none  has 
delved  deeper  into  the  conditions,  needs  and  tradi- 
tions of  the  army,  for  he  did  not  fail  to  perceive  how 
all-important  are  these  traditions,  recognized  in  the 
oath  of  honor  administered  to  all  members  of  courts- 
martial,  as  *  *  customs  of  war. ' '  This,  then,  was  the 
recognized  policy  of  the  War  Department  from  the 
period  immediately  following  the  war  with  Spain, 
yet  so  strong  was  the  influence  brought  to  bear  in  the 
interest  of  the  national  guard  or  organized  militia 
of  the  states,  that  every  effort  to  profit  by  our  pre- 
vious experience  and  plain  military  lessons,  through 
provision  for  a  reserve  of  volunteers,  was  defeated, 
and  conditions,  far  more  drastic  than  ever  before  im- 
posed, were  enacted  into  laws  which  actually  forbid 
the  government  from  employing  any  volunteers  even 
in  war,  until  after  all  the  organized  militia,  which 
includes  numerous  generals  and  staff  officers  ap- 
pointed by  governors  of  states,  and  whose  military 
qualifications  the  governors  have  no  possible  way  of 
ascertaining,  have  been  received  into  the  service. 
The  national  guard  or  organized  militia  of  the  states 
has  really  thus  brought  about  a  military  policy  for 

33 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


the  nation  regarded  as  antagonistic  to  military  effi- 
ciency. 

The  organized  militia  as  yet  is  the  only  available 
military  force,  other  than  the  regulars,  with  any 
training  ivhatever,  but  the  error  of  the  whole  situa- 
tion, and  one  needing  immediate  remedy,  lies  in  the 
attempt  to  nationalize  the  militia  of  the  states,  and 
yet  retain  it  under  control  of  the  governors  until  ac- 
tually in  the  service  of  the  United  States  during  war, 
and  then  to  continue  the  appointment  and  promotion 
of  the  officers  in  the  hands  of  the  governors. 

When  it  was  first  proposed  after  the  Civil  War  to 
establish  a  war  policy  involving  a  small  body  of  reg- 
ulars and  a  force  of  federal  volunteers  in  each  con- 
gressional district,  the  arguments  fell  upon  deaf  ears 
for  the  deeds  of  the  great  volunteer  armies  of  1861- 
65  were  still  fresh  in  memory,  and  the  veterans  of 
that  conflict  believed  that  no  nation  would  be  guilty 
of  the  unthinkable  folly  of  assaulting  another  nation 
comprising  upward  of  2,000,000  men  who  had  experi- 
enced recent  service  in  a  great  war. 

An  agreement  was  reached  in  1902  between  the 
War  Department  and  representatives  of  the  national 
guard  that  a  joint  act  should  be  urged  to  provide  for 
improving  the  condition  of  the  state  militia  and  to 
authorize  the  organization  of  a  force  of  100,000  fed- 
eral volunteers  during  peace,  with  officers  appointed 
by  the  President,  subject  to  immediate  call  for  war, 
and  legislation  necessary  to  accomplish  this  was 
passed  by  the  House  of  Representatives.  The  provi- 
sion for  the  officers  of  volunteers  was  enacted  into 

34 


MILITAEY  POLICY 


law  in  the  Senate,  but  that  for  the  men  encountered 
the  opposition  of  a  small  group  of  senators  who  op- 
posed on  principle  any  system  which  would  take 
from  the  governors  in  time  of  peace  control  of  vol- 
unteer troops  raised  in  the  several  states  and  was 
stricken  out,  making  the  first  part  ineffective.  The 
provision  for  a  body  of  f ederel  volunteers  embodied 
the  result  of  painstaking  study  and  involves  so  essen- 
tial a  principle  that  it  should  not  be  abandoned  until 
Congress  has  further  opportunity  to  determine  as 
to  the  merits  of  the  system  as  a  whole  without  neces- 
sity for  sacrificing  part  as  a  compromise,  for  the 
proportions  and  character  of  special  arms  to  be 
maintained  as  regulars  in  peace  are  involved  in  the 
correct  determination  of  this  question. 

The  able  opponent  of  the  proposed  legislation  cre- 
ating a  volunteer  reserve  stated  in  the  Senate  his  ob- 
jections as  follows : 

"My  purpose  in  presenting  these  views  is  to  put 
myself  on  the  record  and  register  my  protest  against 
this  legislation,  for  I  am  satisfied  that  as  time  passes 
the  evil  will  be  seen  and  realized.   .   .   . 

**It  takes  out  a  part  of  the  citizen  soldiery  of  a 
State,  provides  for  their  being  officered  by  the  United 
States,  and  takes  them  away  from  the  authority  and 
training  of  the  State  in  which  they  live  and  puts 
them,  as  far  as  military  duty  is  concerned,  under  the 
exclusive  authority  of  the  President  and  of  Congress. 
The  President  of  the  United  States  can  call  on  these 
citizens  for  military  duty,  but  the  governor  of  the 
State  can  not,  although  riot  and  insurrection  may  be 

35 


THE   AMEEICAN  ARMY 


at  their  doors.  These  men,  thus  enrolled  and  set 
apart,  are  to  be  still  citizens  and  civilians  in  a  State, 
but  the  governor  can  not  call  on  them  for  any  mili- 
tary duty  whatever,  nor  can  the  State  by  any  law  im- 
pose any  military  duty  upon  them.  They  are  to  be 
subject  to  the  orders  of  the  President  in  military 
matters,  but  not  to  the  orders  of  the  governor. 

*  *  The  governor  of  a  State  is  the  military  head  of 
the  State  in  the  same  way  that  the  President  is  the 
military  head  of  the  United  States.  The  duty  to 
preserve  order,  put  down  insurrection,  to  maintain 
law,  devolves  upon  the  governor  of  a  Sijate  in  the 
same  manner  and  even  in  greater  degree  than  it  de- 
volves upon  the  President  of  the  United  States. 
Every  citizen  of  the  State  capable  of  bearing  arms 
and  not  in  the  active  military  service  of  the  United 
States  is,  by  every  principle  of  our  government,  sub- 
ject to  the  order  of  the  governor  when  required  to 
enforce  law  and  maintain  authority.  It  is  a  violation 
of  this  fundamental  principle  to  enact  a  law  by  the 
federal  government  which  shall  set  apart  a  certain 
class  of  citizens  of  the  State  and  say  that  they  shall 
be  subject  only  to  the  call  of  the  President  and  to 
the  military  duty  prescribed  by  Congress ;  that  they 
shall  not  be  subject  to  the  call  of  the  governor  or  to 
any  military  duty  which  may  be  laid  upon  them  by 
the  legislature  of  their  State.** 

More  than  ten  years  had  elapsed  since  this  oppo- 
sition was  developed  when,  during  the  closing  hours 
of  the  session  of  Congress  in  1912,  the  same  views 
were  repeated  and  applied  in  opposition  to  any  sys- 
i  36 


MILITARY  POLICY 


tern  which  carries  men  in  civil  life,  furloughed  as 
reservists  from  the  regular  army  until  their  serv- 
ices shall  be  needed  in  war. 

The  Secretary  of  War,  who  had  recommended  ten 
years  previously  the  creation  of  a  body  of  federal 
volunteers,  was  present  as  a  member  of  the  Senate, 
and  made  answer: 

**I  have  the  highest  respect  for  the  opinions  of  the 
Senator  from  Georgia.  Whatever  he  says  upon  a 
question  arising  out  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  I  regard  as  entitled  to  most  serious  and  re- 
spectful consideration.  But  I  think,  and  have 
thought  for  many  years,  during  all  the  long  history 
the  Senator  from  Georgia  has  referred  to — the  his- 
tory of  the  attempt  to  secure  something  which  may 
be  called  a  reserve  force  for  the  Army  of  the  United 
States — that  the  Senator  from  Georgia  builds  up  his 
opinion,  regarding  a  reserve  force,  upon  an  essen- 
tially false  basis. 

**The  Senator  has  said  that  the  spirit  of  the  Con- 
stitution forbids  the  creation  of  a  reserve  force  other 
than  the  militia.  I  am  not  endeavoring  to  give  his 
words  accurately,  but  that  is  the  substance,  and  the 
Senator  now  indicates  his  assent.  .  .  .  The  Sen- 
ator has  referred  to  the  two  provisions  in  the  Con- 
stitution contained  in  the  first  article,  which  sets 
out  the  powers  of  the  legislative  branch  as  the  basis 
for  the  assertion  that  the  creation  of  any  reserve 
force  for  the  Army  of  the  United  States,  is  in  viola- 
tion of  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution.  He  does  not 
say  that  it  is  in  violation  of  the  letter  of  the  Con- 

37 


207902 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


stitution,  but  of  the  spirit.  Those  two  provisions 
are,  first,  that  Congress  shall  have  power  to  provide 
for  organizing,  arming  and  disciplining  the  militia, 
and  for  governing  such  part  of  them  as  may  be  em- 
ployed in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  reserving 
to  the  States,  respectively,  the  appointment  of  the 
officers  and  the  authority  of  training  the  militia  ac- 
cording to  the  discipline  prescribed  by  Congress. 
And  then  there  is  the  further  provision — for  calling 
forth  the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union, 
suppress  insurrections,  and  repel  invasions. 

**  There  are  here  two  independent  and  different 
fields  of  action  indicated.  The  one  is  to  raise  and  sup- 
port armies,  with  no  limitation  upon  the  scope  of 
action  of  the  armies  raised  and  supported.  The 
other  is  to  provide  for  organizing  the  army  and  for 
disciplining  the  militia,  with  a  limitation  upon  the 
use  to  which  the  militia  can  be  put.  For  the  power 
of  Congress  over  the  militia  is  to  call  it  forth  to  ex- 
ecute the  laws  of  the  Union,  suppress  insurrections, 
and  repel  invasions,  and  that  I  take  it  to  be  unques- 
tioned, is  the  enumeration  of  the  things  to  be  done 
within  the  territory  of  the  United  States — whatever 
has  to  be  done  within  our  territory — the  execution  of 
the  laws  of  the  union  that  are  to  be  executed  within 
our  jurisdiction;  the  repelling  of  invasions,  which 
must  be  invasions  in  our  own  jurisdiction.  For  these 
things  the  militia  must  be  used.  But  for  all  that  field 
of  warlike  operations  which  go  beyond  the  frontier 
of  the  United  States  the  militia  may  not  be  used,  and 
for  all  offensive  defense  the  Army  of  the  United 

38 


MILITARY  POLICY 


States  is  the  sole  military  power  under  the  control 
of  the  nation. 

*  *  .  .  .  We  have  during  our  entire  military  his- 
tory experienced  upon  each  recurring  occasion  of 
war  the  necessity  of  immediately  and  greatly,  and 
under  stress  of  imminent  need  for  action,  increasing 
the  Army  of  the  United  States.  That  is  to  say, 
whenever  war  comes  we  are  obliged  to  increase  the 
army,  which  is  not  subject  to  the  restrictions  rest- 
ing upon  the  use  of  the  militia.    .    .    . 

* '  In  the  Civil  War,  immediately  upon  the  breaking 
out  of  hostilities  we  had  recourse  to  the  raising  of 
a  volunteer  force,  and  that  great  conflict  was  fought 
by  volunteers  and  not  by  militia. 

* '  In  the  war  with  Spain  the  first  thing  we  did  was 
to  call  for  volunteers ;  that  is  to  say,  an  increase  of 
the  military  establishment  of  the  United  States  as 
distinguished  from  militia,  and  that  war  was  fought 
by  such  a  force  and  not  by  militia.    .   .   . 

**...!  mean  the  militia  of  the  States ;  and  I 
am  drawing  a  distinction  between  those  forces  which 
are  a  part  of  the  military  establislmaent  of  the  United 
States  and  the  militia  of  the  States. 

**When  we  came  to  suppress  the  insurrection  in 
the  Philippines,  Congress  provided  for  the  raising 
of  a  force  of  35,000  volunteers,  the  officers  to  be  ap- 
pointed and  commissioned  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  and  that  war  was  fought  by  those  vol- 
unteers in  addition  to  the  regular  army. 

*  *  The  militia,  including  all  the  organizations  which 
the  Senator  from  Georgia  describes,  is  insufficient 

39 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


in  number  to  answer  to  the  demands  of  the  country 
in  any  considerable  war.  The  purposes  for  which 
its  members  are  enlisted  are  not  the  purposes  that 
have  to  be  attained  in  any  considerable  war.  The 
constitutional  authority  of  the  commander-in-chief 
of  the  Army  of  the  United  States  over  them,  the  con- 
stitutional authority  of  Congress  over  them,  are  in- 
evitable to  the  carrying  on  of  any  considerable  war 
by  the  use  of  them. 

**The  only  way  in  which  we  can  prepare  for  war 
which  would  really  exhibit  danger  to  our  country  is 
to  make  adequate  preparation  in  time  for  the  in- 
crease of  the  military  establishment  of  the  United 
States.  I  say  that  all  our  history  shows  that  immedi- 
ately when  the  stress  comes  we  turn  to  the  increase 
of  that  military  establishment. 

"...  Statesmanship  consists  in  foreseeing 
the  necessities  of  the  future.  When  war  comes  action 
must  be  swift,  decisive  and  effective.  There  is  no 
time  to  consider  and  discuss  the  details  of  organiza- 
tion and  the  machinery  necessary  to  progress.  In 
time  of  peace,  when  men  can  consider  deliberately 
the  methods  by  which  the  military  establishment  may 
be  quickly  and  effectively  increased,  is  the  time  to 
discuss  and  adopt  provisions  for  the  machinery,  in- 
stead of  waiting  until  everybody  is  in  excitement 
and  judgments  are  swayed  by  feeling  and  impulse 
and  then  hurriedly  adopting  a  jury-writ  system 
which  is  sure  to  be  defective  and  inefficient.    .   .   .** 

It  is  probable  that  such  discussions  will  in  the  end 
crystallize  public  sentiment  and  induce  Congress 

40 


MILITARY   POLICY 


to  enact  such  legislation  as  will  adjust  this  very  se- 
rious question  of  broad  policy  on  which  all  else  de- 
pends. The  national  guard  has  long  objected  to  the 
creation  of  federal  volunteers  during  peace  as  a  re- 
serve for  the  regular  army  unless  it  be  provided  that 
such  volunteers  shall  not  be  called  into  any  service 
until  after  the  organized  militia  shall  have  been 
called  forth. 

The  federal  volunteers  are  intended  to  be  a  force 
to  be  called  upon  only  when  a  war  exists  which  re- 
quires a  reinforcement  for  the  regular  army,  and  to 
be  composed  of  men  not  restricted  as  are  the  militia 
in  their  sphere  of  action.  Such  a  force  of  federal 
volunteers  should  be  liable  to  serve  for  three  years 
or  the  war  and  be  comprised  entirely  of  men  whose 
home  ties  would  permit  of  that  length  of  absence 
without  embarrassment. 

One  primary  and  important  reason  for  having  the 
question  of  a  federal  volunteer  system  settled  with- 
out delay  lies  in  its  intimate  connection  with  the 
proper  organization  of  the  regular  army.  It  needs 
no  argument  to  carry  the  conviction  that  the  organ- 
ized militia  of  the  states  will  never  comprise  a 
proper  proportion  of  the  special  arms  but  will  in 
future  as  in  the  past  consist  mainly  of  infantry.  The 
expense  of  maintenance  of  proper  proportions  of 
cavalry  and  field  artillery  is  too  great  to  be  assumed 
by  any  state  unless  all  the  states  shall  agree  to  pro- 
vide for  their  proportionate  share.  The  work  de- 
manded of  cavalry  and  field  artillery  in  the  regular 
army,   to   reach  and  maintain  a  recognized   and 

41 


THE  AMERICAN  ARMY 


proper  standard  of  efficiency,  makes  it  certain  that 
militia  organizations  of  those  special  arms  can  not 
be  made  efficient  for  immediate  war  purposes  in  the 
limited  time  available  for  instruction.  For  these 
reasons,  the  organization  of  the  regular  army  can 
never  be  based  upon  its  use  as  a  complete  field  army, 
for  it  must  always  comprise  an  undue  proportion  of 
cavalry,  field  artillery  and  special  branches  to  bal- 
ance the  infantry  of  the  citizen  soldiery  whether  fed- 
eral volunteers,  organized  militia,  or  volunteers  en- 
listed during  war. 

The  legitimate  conclusions  are  that  the  military 
policy  of  this  nation  should  embrace  as  cardinal 
features  of  organization,  first,  the  regular  army; 
second,  federal  volunteers ;  third,  the  organized  mili- 
tia or  national  guard.  So  long  as  the  term  national 
guard  is  used  for  state  militia,  it  will  avoid  confu- 
sion to  use  the  designation  federal  instead  of  na- 
tional for  the  volunteers. 

Under  the  policy  herein  suggested  the  military  es- 
tablishment of  the  national  government  would  com- 
prise in  peace  the  regular  army  and  the  federal  vol- 
unteers. The  active  state  forces  would  comprise 
the  organized  militia  or  national  guard.  The  fed- 
eral volunteers  are  intended  to  be  organized  in  each 
congressional  district  and  to  be  proportioned  among 
the  several  branches  of  the  service  as  may  be  re- 
quired by  the  war  establishment,  in  connection  with 
the  regulars.  Under  this  policy,  the  strength  and 
character  of  the  federal  volunteer  organizations  may 
be  modified  from  time  to  time,  without  disturbance 

42 


MILITARY   POLICY 


of  the  principles  involved.  The  proportions  of  the 
several  branches  of  the  regular  army  being  fixed 
by  statutes,  the  character  of  federal  volunteer  or- 
ganizations may  then  be  determined  by  the  probable 
needs  of  the  combined  forces  and  their  distribution 
made  \vith  due  regard  to  local  conditions.  Cavalry, 
for  instance,  may  be  more  readily  recruited  and 
maintained  in  horse-raising  districts  than  in  more 
thickly  populated  agricultural  sections  or  cities.  The 
fact  that  young  men  may  ride  their  own  horses  to 
places  of  assembly,  for  drill  and  instruction,  will  in- 
sure maintenance  of  organizations  in  districts  too 
sparsely  settled  to  justify  the  efforts  necessary  to 
create  and  maintain  effective  infantry  organizations. 
Similarly,  with  field  artillery  organizations,  some  lo- 
calities will  be  more  favorable  than  others. 

Under  this  scheme  the  general  government  will  be 
entirely  responsible  for  the  support  of  the  regular 
army  and  the  federal  volunteers  and  the  several 
states  responsible  for  the  maintenance  of  their  mili- 
tia, the  national  government  continuing  to  furnish 
necessary  arms  and  equipments.  The  character  of 
the  organized  militia,  however,  should  be  wholly 
changed  so  that  there  may  be  no  cause  for  misunder- 
standing. The  officers  and  men  physically  fit  for 
and  desirous  of  being  a  part  of  the  war  army,  should 
enter  the  federal  volunteers;  the  militia  should  be 
recruited  and  maintained  primarily  for  state  pur- 
poses and  subject  to  call  by  the  national  government 
solely  as  provided  by  the  Constitution.  In  any  war 
of  magnitude  our  coasts  would  be  threatened,  and  in 

43 


THE  AMERICAN  ARMY 


order  that  the  regular  army  and  federal  volunteers 
may  be  available  at  all  times  for  service  as  a  mobile 
force  beyond  our  borders,  the  organized  militia  may 
well  constitute  the  main  reliance  for  land  defense  of 
the  seacoast  fortifications. 

Under  such  an  arrangement  of  our  military  estab- 
lishment the  organized  militia  would  gradually  be 
recruited  with  men  to  whom  the  changed  conditions 
of  probable  service  would  be  acceptable  and  those 
who  have  heretofore  attached  themselves  to  the 
state  organizations  with  expectation  of  unrestricted 
active  field  service  would  be  induced  to  enter  the 
federal  volunteers  where  there  would  be  no  doubt 
as  to  their  status  in  event  of  war. 

The  inauguration  of  this  policy  would  be  in  line 
with  the  best  military  judgment  of  the  past  century. 
It  conforms  to  the  Constitution  without  evasion  or 
subterfuge.  It  contemplates  a  minimum  peace  es- 
tablishment of  regulars  with  a  dependable  support 
of  trained  federal  volunteers,  and  a  constitutional 
employment  of  the  organized  militia,  and  should 
commend  itself  to  patriotic  Americans  who  desire 
a  military  establishment  proportioned  to  possible 
contingencies,  maintained  without  necessity  for 
either  amending  or  evading  the  Constitution. 

There  has  been  no  student  of  military  affairs  in 
this  generation  the  equal  of  Emory  Upton.  As  the 
result  of  long  and  patient  study  of  the  armies  of  the 
world  he  wrote : 

**The  true  object  to  be  kept  in  view  in  studjdng 
European  military  organization  is  to  present  those 

44 


MILITARY   POLICY 


features  which  are  common  to  all  armies,  and  to  in- 
dicate those  which  we  should  adopt  as  indispensable 
to  the  vigorous,  successful,  and  humane  prosecution 
of  our  future  wars. 

**The  impossibility  of  forming  a  trained  reserve 
as  in  Europe  and  the  certainty  that  the  States  can 
not  be  relied  upon  to  support  a  numerous  and  well- 
organized  militia,  even  with  the  aid  .  .  .  appro- 
priated annually  by  the  Government,  should  impress 
us  with  the  importance  of  devising  some  method 
whereby  in  peace  and  in  war  we  may  have  a  national 
force  ready  to  increase,  and  support,  our  troops  in 
the  field." 

"The  organization  of  National  Volunteers  would 
give  us  in  time  of  peace  a  Regular  Army,  a  re- 
serve (National  Volunteers),  and  the  Militia,  and 
would  enable  us  in  time  of  war  to  prosecute  our  cam- 
paigns with  vigor  and  economy,  and  with  that  re- 
gard for  human  life  which  becomes  a  free  people." 

General  Upton's  views  have  received  the  contin- 
ued approval  of  Presidents,  Secretaries  of  War  and 
experienced  officers  of  the  army,  and  his  conclusions 
as  to  the  value  of  a  reserve  of  federal  volunteers  to 
be  maintained  in  peace,  accords  exactly  with  the  re- 
sult of  a  similar  study  of  the  records  made  without 
reference  to  his  previous  investigations  along  that 
line.  It  is  too  grave  a  situation  to  be  met  with  mere 
theories.  The  burden  of  evidence  is  all  in  favor  of 
complying  with  the  spirit  and  letter  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, which  contemplates  a  maintenance  by  the  gen- 
eral government  of  a  national  military  and  naval 

45 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


force  in  peace  and  war,  and  that  the  militia  shall  not 
be  called  forth  except  to  suppress  insurrection,  re- 
pel invasion,  or  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union. 

Our  course  for  some  years  has  been  misleading 
and  improper  and  a  reconsideration  and  revision  of 
practice  as  well  as  of  law  is  demanded  by  the  high- 
est considerations  of  wisdom,  public  policy  and 
statesmanship.  The  time  for  accomplishment  of  na- 
tional military  purposes  has  arrived,  but  there  may 
be  differing  opinions  as  to  the  fundamental  objects 
and  means  of  attaining  them.  Those  problems  re- 
garded as  in  greatest  need  of  immediate  and  definite 
determination  involve  the  employment  of  the  na- 
tional and  state  forces  in  their  appropriate  spheres. 

Unquestionably  the  best  interests  of  the  nation  de- 
mand that  the  army  of  the  United  States  shall  con- 
sist of  the  regular  army  and  the  federal  volunteers, 
maintained  both  in  peace  and  war.  The  batteries, 
troops,  companies,  battalions,  and  regiments  of  fed- 
eral volunteers  should  be  organized  in  congressional 
districts  and  in  such  numbers  as  may  be  propor- 
tionally and  equitably  allotted  by  the  President,  the 
total  force  not  to  exceed  the  strength  authorized  by 
Congress,  and  the  officers  of  such  organizations  to 
be  appointed  by  the  President.  The  organization 
and  discipline  of  the  federal  volunteers  should  be 
provided  for  in  regulations  approved  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  under  an  enabling  act  of  Congress.  All 
laws  providing  for  the  use  of  the  militia  in  conflict 
with  the  Constitution,  as  interpreted  by  the  Attor- 
ney General  of  the  United  States  should  be  formally 

4q 


MILITARY   POLICY 


repealed  and  no  further  attempts  made  to  provide 
for  the  use  of  the  national  guard  and  organized  mi- 
litia for  general  war  purposes.  It  should  be  clearly 
understood  that  those  ^vho  desire  to  serve  in  war 
without  regard  to  state  or  national  borders  must  at- 
tach themselves  to  the  federal  volunteers. 

The  effect  of  this  system,  besides  providing  a  fed- 
eral force  of  potential  war  power,  would  be  to  relieve 
the  states  of  the  unequal  taxation  now  involved 
through  maintenance  of  miniature  armies  by  some 
states  while  others  go  to  the  opposite  extreme.  Much 
of  the  militia  duty  in  states  could  very  properly  be 
performed  by  constabulary,  as  is  now  done  in  Penn- 
sylvania, and  leave  the  national  guard  to  its  proper 
employment — that  of  preparation  to  suppress  in- 
surrection and  grave  disorder  and  to  resist  invasion. 

The  establishment  of  a  body  of  federal  volunteers 
is  a  practicable  military  scheme  and  its  full  develop- 
ment will  create  a  war  asset  of  recognized  and  per- 
manent value.  The  ultimate  saving  in  pensions  alone 
would,  in  a  great  war,  meet  all  the  expenses  incurred 
for  its  maintenance  in  peace.  As  trained  men  pass 
out  of  the  federal  volunteers  they  would  remain  in 
their  own  communities  available  to  aid  in  organiz- 
ing and  drilling  subsequent  increments  of  volun- 
teers, when  called  forth  to  war.  The  dictates  of  ex- 
pediency, common  sense  and  economy  all  combine  to 
suggest  the  desirability  of  such  a  plan  to  meet  the 
crisis  brought  on  through  the  inability  of  the  Presi- 
dent to  call  upon  the  governors  for  their  militia  for 
service  beyond  our  borders.    It  is  morally  certain 

47 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


that  the  states  will  never  consent  to  any  plan  by 
which  the  governors  will  surrender  control  over  any 
part  of  their  organized  militia  or  national  guard  in 
peace,  and  particularly  so  where  large  state  appro- 
priations have  been  made  for  their  support.  A  force 
of  federal  volunteers  or  similar  force  under  any 
other  designation,  is  a  military  necessity,  if  we  are 
to  avoid  considerable  increase  of  the  regular  army, 
and  we  should  proceed  with  its  organization  with- 
out further  delay. 

It  is  fully  appreciated  that  such  a  reorganization 
of  our  military  establishment  will  suggest  and  make 
advisable  many  minor  changes.  It  is  also  recognized 
that  many  earnest,  worthy  and  energetic  officers  of 
the  national  guard  will  feel  resentful  at  the  recent 
course  of  events  and  think  their  efforts  have  not 
been  appreciated.  It  is  not  a  question  of  the  effi- 
ciency of  this  or  that  state  organization,  but  whether 
or  not  the  whole  system  is  wrong;  if  so,  the  public 
welfare  demands  an  early  and  comprehensive  read- 
justment. It  is  certain  that  if  this  be  not  undertaken 
during  peace,  another  war  will  find  us  unprepared 
and  leave  us  again  with  an  unnecessary  burden  of 
debt  and  possible  unhappy  termination.  All  this 
contemplates  no  special  preparation  for  a  great  war 
but  only  a  reasonable  arrangement  of  our  resources 
that  we  may  mobilize  them  for  the  military  con- 
tingencies likely  to  come  to  us  as  a  nation.  It  has 
never  been  our  practice  to  add  any  strength  to  our 
army  except  in  the  presence  of  actual  hostilities.  It 
remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  demands  of  economy, 

48 


MILITARY   POLICY 


the  needs  of  foreign  garrisons  in  our  over-sea  posses- 
sions and  our  willingness  to  continually  threaten  en- 
forcement of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  are  together  suffi- 
cient to  appeal  to  our  statesmen  and  to  secure  ap- 
proval of  the  necessary  action  to  create  a  reinforce- 
ment for  the  regular  army  in  time  of  peace  which 
will  be  immediately  available  for  war  and  thus  se- 
cure conjointly  a  thoroughly  efficient  and  modern 
fighting  machine  ready  for  any  ultimatum  when 
diplomacy  fails. 


IV 


THE  ECONOMY   OF   PREVISION 

"There  Is  a  rank  due  to  the  United  States  among  nations,  which 
•will  be  withheld,  if  not  absolutely  lost,  by  the  reputation  of  weak- 
ness. If  we  desire  to  avoid  insult,  we  must  be  able  to  repel  it;  if 
we  desire  to  secure  peace,  one  of  the  most  powerful  instruments 
of  our  rising  prosperity,  it  must  be  known  that  we  are  at  all 
times  ready  for  war." — ^Washington. 

SUCCESS  in  war  depends  upon  preparedness, 
which  in  turn  is  based  upon  the  proper  organ- 
ization of  military  resources,  comprising  men,  money 
and  materials.  Loyal  men,  physically/  fit  and  trained, 
properly  provided  with  war  materials  and  sustained 
by  the  moral  support  of  the  nation  and  a  continually 
replenished  treasury,  constitute  the  most  econom- 
ical guarantee  of  avoidance  of  national  humiliation. 
During  the  progress  of  war  it  is  not  uncommon  to 
draw  general  conclusions  from  isolated  experiences 
and  to  ascribe  success  or  failure  to  unimportant  de- 
tails. It  is  only  by  patient  investigation  and  expert 
analysis  that  sources  of  error  and  weakness  are  dis- 
closed. 

In  the  history  of  the  world  no  other  nation  has 
made  such  lavish  expenditures  as  America  for  mili- 
tary purposes  after  wars.  A  mere  tithe  of  the  ap- 
palling total,  devoted  to  preparation  before  war, 
would  have  lifted  a  great  and  increasing  burden  from 
the  taxpayers.    The  vast  volume  of  such  expendi- 

50 


THE   ECONOMY  OF  PREVISION 

tures  has  been  incurred  mainly  for  pensions  and  in 
this  regard  no  charge  may  ever  be  justly  made  that 
the  Republic  is  ungrateful.  The  pension  system  was 
adopted  early  in  the  career  of  the  nation  and  has  be- 
come so  influential  a  factor  in  political  life  that  no 
material  change  may  be  expected  in  this  generation. 
Disregarding  the  earlier  wars  before  pension  agents 
became  scientific  promoters  of  legislation,  it  may  be 
entertaining  if  not  informing  to  review  some  of  the 
facts  developed  under  the  existing  system. 

Since  the  close  of  the  Ci^dl  War,  a  constant  stream 
of  laws,  making  less  and  less  exacting  the  require- 
ments for  pensions,  has  been  enacted  until  it  has 
come  to  pass  that  those  who  were  merely  on  the 
rolls  for  a  few  days,  and  the  malingerers  and  de- 
serters all  march  as  veterans  of  the  great  conflict 
upon  a  parity  Avith  the  noble  men  who  volunteered 
and  fought  to  the  finish  in  that  fratricidal  contest. 

In  the  year  1866,  immediately  following  the  close 
of  the  Civil  War,  the  appropriation  by  Congress  for 
the  payment  of  pensions  amounted  to  a  little  in  ex- 
cess of  $15,000,000.  In  1911,  forty-five  years  later, 
the  amount  paid  out  on  that  account  was  $157,325,- 
160.35,  the  average  annual  disbursement  for  the 
three  preceding  years  exceeding  $160,000,000.  An- 
nual pension  payments  on  account  of  the  Civil  War 
have  increased  tenfold  fifty  years  after  the  close  of 
the  war,  and  continue  on  the  ascending  scale.  Since 
the  close  of  the  war  in  1865  pension  payments  on  ac- 
count of  service  in  that  war  aggregate  upward  of 
four  billions  of  dollars. 

51 


THE   AMERICAiNr  ARMY 


At  the  beginning  there  was  a  general  public  opin- 
ion favoring  proper  provision  for  the  real  veterans 
who  through  wounds  or  disease  had  been  placed  at 
a  disadvantage  with  their  comrades  in  the  struggle 
of  life.  As  years  went  by  the  resourcefulness  of  the 
pension  agents  increased  and  finally  an  act  was  se- 
cured which  opened  wide  the  doors,  even  to  the  de- 
serter, except  one  **who  left  his  command  whilst  in 
the  presence  of  the  enemy,  unless  he  was  sick  or 
wounded,  and  that  when  the  charge  of  desertion 
should  he  removed  against  the  soldier  its  effect 
should  be  to  restore  him  to  the  status  of  honorable 
service  and  an  honorable  discharge  should  be  is- 
sued in  those  cases  where  the  soldier  received  none, 
and  that  he  should  he  restored  to  all  his  rights  as 
to  pension,  pay  or  allowances  as  if  the  charge  of  de- 
sertion had  never  been  made."  Even  that  restric- 
tion has  now  been  done  away  with. 

The  younger  generations  had  become  familiar 
with  the  pension  system  and  its  large  appropria- 
tions, so  that  the  pension  agents  found  an  open  field 
in  the  camps  of  the  volunteers  in  the  war  with 
Spain,  where  their  operations  were  shocking.  Thou- 
sands of  well-meaning  young  men  who  had  patriot- 
ically enlisted,  after  rigid  physical  examinations, 
made  their  arrangements  for  pension  applications 
before  taking  the  field  or  performing  any  duty  what- 
ever. In  the  brief  campaign  in  Cuba  there  were  five 
volunteer  regiments  selected  for  the  Santiago  cam- 
paign by  reason  of  presumed  superiority  and  readi- 
ness for  service.     Immediately  following  their  re- 

52 


THE   ECONOMY  OF  PREVISION 

turn  home  a  stream  of  applications  for  pensions  be- 
gan and  in  a  brief  time  a  tabulation  of  the  applica- 
tions was  made  by  the  Commissioner  of  Pensions, 
and  comparisons  made  with  those  of  five  regiments 
of  regulars : 

_  ,      .  Claims  filed 

Volunteers:  Killed.    Wounded.  Missing,  for  pensions. 

1st  District  of  Columbia..  0  0  0  472 

9th  Massachusetts 0  0  0  685 

33rd  Michigan 0  0  0  573 

34th  Michigan 0  0  0  615 

8th  Ohio 0  0  0  652 

Total 0  0  0  2,997 

Regulars: 

6th  U.  S.  Infantry 17  106  17  162 

7th  U.  S.  Infantry 33  93  0  249 

13th  U.  S.  Infantry 18  90  0  87 

16th  U.  S.  Infantry 13  107  17  143 

24th  U.  S.  Infantry 12  75  6  125 

Total 93  471  40  766 

The  reports  of  the  Commissioner  of  Pensions  show 
that  between  July,  1861,  and  June  30,  1900,  invalid 
pensions  had  been  allowed,  under  the  general  law,  to 
556,255  volunteers,  and  under  the  Act  of  June  27, 
1890,  to  451,531,  a  total  of  1,007,786.  During  the 
period  from  July  1,  1861,  to  January  1,  1901,  pen- 
sions were  allowed  to  30,266  regulars,  including  the 
wounded  and  invalided  men  of  more  than  thirty 
years  of  almost  constant  Indian  wars.  To  make  the 
comparison  intelligible,  the  total  number  of  volun- 
teers who  enlisted  in  the  Civil  War,  reduced  to  a 
basis  of  three  years'  service  is  2,324,516  men.   The 

53 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


total  number  of  men  on  the  rolls  of  the  regular  army 
during  the  whole  period  from  1861  to  1901  is  577,- 
000,  including  re-enlistments,  for  which  a  liberal  de- 
duction should  be  made,  to  avoid  counting  the  same 
soldier  more  than  once.  On  this  basis  of  computa- 
tion, up  to  June  30, 1900, 1,007,786  volunteers  out  of 
2,324,516  were  in  receipt  of  pensions,  while  only  30,- 
266  regulars  out  of  577,000  were  recipients  of  such 
bounty.  This  shows  that  the  regulars  have  been  sin- 
gularly free  from  any  accusation  of  pension  seeking. 
These  figures  contain  much  food  for  thought  besides 
affording  a  sound  argument  in  behalf  of  a  well-or- 
ganized, trained  and  cared-for  body  of  regulars,  to 
the  end  that  the  country  may  not  be  subjected  to  the 
great  expense  of  calling  out  volunteers  or  militia 
for  short  service  periods  with  the  resulting  hospital 
and  pension  records.  The  increase  of  expense  for 
short  term  volunteers  arises  not  only  from  pensions 
but  from  the  waste  and  injury  of  public  property 
which  results  from  their  lack  of  experience. 

"Washington  observed  such  conditions  at  the  very 
beginning  of  the  Revolution  and  makes  this  refer- 
ence to  the  subject  in  a  letter  to  Congress : 

**  Heights  of  Harlem, 
, ,  g^ .  * '  24  September,  1776. 

"From  the  hours  allotted  to  sleep  I  will  borrow  a 
few  moments  to  convey  my  thoughts  on  sundry  im- 
portant matters  to  Congress.    .   .   . 

"It  becomes  evident  to  me  then  that,  as  this  con- 

54 


THE   ECONOMY  OF  PREVISION 

test  is  not  likely  to  be  the  work  of  a  day,  as  the  war 
must  be  carried  on  systematically,  and  to  do  it  you 
must  have  good  officers,  there  are  no  other  possible 
means  to  obtain  them  but  by  establishing  your  army 
upon  a  permanent  footing,  and  giving  your  officers 
good  pay.  This  will  induce  gentlemen  and  men  of 
character  to  engage ;  and,  till  the  bulk  of  your  officers 
is  composed  of  such  persons  as  are  actuated  by  prin- 
ciples of  honor  and  a  spirit  of  enterprise,  you  have 
little  to  expect  from  them.  .  .  .  There  is  nothing 
that  gives  a  man  consequence  and  renders  him  fit  for 
command  like  a  support  that  renders  him  independ- 
ent of  everybody  but  the  state  he  serves.     .     .    . 

' '  When  the  army  was  first  raised  at  Cambridge,  I 
am  persuaded  the  men  might  have  been  got  without 
a  bounty  for  the  war.  After  this,  they  began  to  see 
that  the  contest  was  not  likely  to  end  so  speedily  as 
was  imagined,  and  to  feel  their  consequence  by  re- 
marking that,  to  get  in  their  militia  in  the  course  of 
the  last  year,  many  towns  were  induced  to  give  them 
a  bounty.  Foreseeing  the  evils  resulting  from  this 
and  the  destructive  consequences  which  unavoidably 
would  follow  short  enlistments,  I  took  the  liberty  in 
a  long  letter  to  recommend  the  enlistments  for  and 
during  the  war,  assigning  such  reasons  for  it 
as  experience  has  since  convinced  me  were  well 
founded.    .    .    . 

**  Certain  I  am  that  it  would  be  cheaper  to  keep 
fifty  or  a  hundred  thousand  in  constant  pay  than  to 
depend  upon  half  the  number  and  supply  the  other 
half  occasionally  by  militia.    The  time  the  latter  are 

55 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


in  pay,  before  and  after  they  are  in  camp,  assem- 
bling and  marching,  the  waste  of  ammunition,  the 
consumption  of  stores,  which,  in  spite  of  every  reso- 
lution or  requisition  of  Congress,  they  must  be  fur- 
nished with,  or  sent  home,  added  to  other  incidental 
expenses  consequent  upon  coming  and  conduct  in 
camp,  surpass  all  idea  and  destroy  every  kind  of  reg- 
ularity and  economy  which  you  could  establish 
among  fixed  and  settled  troops,  and  will,  in  my  opin- 
ion, prove,  if  the  scheme  is  adhered  to,  the  ruin  of 
our  cause.    .    .    .  '* 

The  volunteer  system  has  met  with  much  favor  in 
our  national  life  and  is  so  surrounded  with  sentiment 
due  to  past  services  of  a  glorious  character  that  it  is 
certain  to  continue  as  the  main  reliance  in  any 
great  war,  and  yet  the  most  careful  students 
of  the  Civil  War  are  quite  unanimous  in  the 
opinion  that  the  volunteer  system  with  limited 
conscription,  adopted  by  the  southern  Confed- 
eracy, was  more  businesslike  and  a  fairer  dis- 
tribution of  the  burden  of  war  than  the  purely 
volunteer  system  of  the  North.  In  the  South  the 
services  of  all  able-bodied  men  were  deemed  due  the 
government.  When  the  flower  of  the  courageous 
northern  youth  had  been  swallowed  up  by  the  armies 
in  the  field,  the  calls  for  volunteers  fell  upon  ears  not 
so  easily  attuned  to  the  din  of  war.  Then  began  a 
pernicious  system  of  bounties,  state  and  national. 
New  York  alone  expended  upward  of  $75,000,000  on 
this  account  in  the  effort  to  fill  its  quota  of  troops. 

56 


THE   ECONOMY   OF   PREVISION 

No  system  of  raising  armies  produces  a  better  or 
more  intelligent  class  of  soldiers  for  a  patriotic  war 
than  American  volunteers.  No  system,  however, 
could  be  more  unjust  from  an  academic  viewpoint. 
A  just  and  equitable  distribution  of  the  duties  of  citi- 
zenship in  a  republic  dictate  the  righteousness  of 
arranging  for  the  defense  of  the  nation  upon  a  plan 
which  recognizes  that  each  and  every  citizen  owes 
the  debt  of  personal  service  in  war.  There  will 
always  be  many  who,  under  any  rule  of  right  reason, 
should  not  enter  the  service.  Campaigning  demands 
the  best  type  of  physical  manhood,  and  requires  that 
the  mind  shall  not  be  harassed  by  brooding  over  de- 
pendents left  without  provision  for  support  and  lia- 
ble to  become  a  public  charge.  Then  there  are  im- 
portant civil  duties  which  must  go  on  in  war.  All 
these  details,  however,  demand  action  at  the  hands 
of  those  in  authority  and  may  not  be  properly  left  to 
personal  decision  of  interested  parties.  After  two 
years  *  experience  in  the  great  Civil  War  it  was  fully 
realized  that,  in  some  contingencies,  nothing  short  of 
a  nation  in  arms  would  suffice,  and  draft  legislation 
was  enacted  providing  for  enrolling,  calling  out  and 
organizing  the  national  forces  under  the  direction  of 
provost-marshals  appointed  by  the  President.  The 
orderly  procession  of  events  of  a  nation  at  war,  as 
contemplated  by  the  Constitution,  were  thus  wholly 
reversed. 

History  constantly  repeats  itself  in  the  formation 
of  our  armies :  popular  excitement,  a  glowing  of  local 
pride,  stimulation  of  patriotism,  boys  pleading  for 

57 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


opportunity  and  the  final  departure  of  regiments  of 
untrained  men,  many  of  whom  are  foredoomed  to 
the  hospital  instead  of  the  battlefield.  It  cost  much 
in  blood  and  treasure  to  train  the  great  volunteer 
armies  of  the  Civil  War,  but  in  the  end  they  became 
regulars  in  all  but  name  and  the  equals  in  battle  of 
any  troops  in  the  world.  The  records  contain  many 
instances  of  regiments  fighting  courageously  after 
sustaining  losses  of  from  fifty  to  eighty  per  cent. 
But  war  is  an  expensive  school  of  training  and  mod- 
ern wars  do  not  allow  much  time  for  preparation 
before  the  first  blow  is  struck,  and  it  is  the  first  bat- 
tle which  counts  for  much  in  morale  and  national 
prestige  when  the  appeal  to  arms  has  been  made. 

The  great  body  of  citizens  to-day  is  far  less  well 
equipped  for  military  duty  in  war  as  militia  than 
their  forebears  who  were  accustomed  to  the  use  of 
firearms.  Existing  law  provides  for  calling  out  this 
force  in  addition  to  the  organized  militia,  when  it  is 
morally  certain  that  they  will  not  become  fit  in  time 
to  join  in  the  first  battles  of  modern  war.  Given  time, 
under  trained  oflficers,  good  results  will  follow.  It  is 
to  provide  this  time  or  period  for  training  that  the 
regular  army  and  a  body  of  federal  volunteers 
should  be  maintained  in  an  effective  condition.  In 
these  organizations  the  unfit  will  be  excluded  from 
the  beginning,  thus  reducing  the  probable  list  of 
claimants  for  hospital  accommodations  and  subse- 
quent pensions.  The  man  who  qualifies  for  his  coun- 
try's defense  in  the  regular  army  or  the  proposed 

58 


THE   ECONOMY   OF   PREVISION 

federal  volunteers,  is  just  the  same  patriot  as  his 
brother  who  offers  his  untrained  self  in  the  new  regi- 
ments of  volunteers ;  in  the  former  case,  however,  the 
country's  draft  for  service  is  immediately  honored, 
while  in  the  latter  instance  considerable  time  must 
elapse  before  there  is  an  available  asset. 

The  nation,  through  its  lack  of  military  policy,  is 
historically  committed  to  its  present  burden  for  pen- 
sions, but  with  all  the  warnings  of  the  past  half  cen- 
tury it  would  seem  the  part  of  wisdom  to  provide  for 
trained  and  physically  fit  men  in  the  composition  of 
our  future  armies  and  make  possible  less  exhaustive 
demands  upon  the  treasury.  Those  who  are  rendered 
incapable  of  self  support  by  reason  of  military  serv- 
ice, whether  by  wounds  or  disease,  will  never  be  per- 
mitted to  go  uncared  for  by  the  nation.  The  economy 
which  the  nation  may  wisely  introduce,  is  through 
provision  for  a  sufficient  peace  force  of  regulars  and 
federal  volunteers  enlisted  for  three  years,  or  the 
war,  to  stand  in  the  breach  while  the  second  line  of 
citizen  soldiers  to  be  enlisted  for  three  years  or  the 
war,  is  being  taught  to  shoot,  march  and  take  care  of 
itself  in  campaign. 

The  enormous  roll  of  men  enlisted  for  the  Civil 
War  appears  incredible  when  the  small  size  of  the 
armies  -engaged  in  the  various  campaigns  is  consid- 
ered. The  abnormal  condition  arose  from  the  enlist- 
ment of  large  numbers  of  men  for  three,  six,  nine  and 
twelve  months.  The  mainstay  of  the  fighting  force 
was  composed  of  those  who  enlisted  for  three  years 

59 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


or  the  war,  and  nothing  short  of  that  requirement 
should  again  he  embraced  or  allowed  to  continue  in 
our  army  schemes. 

Existing  law  for  calling  forth  the  organized  militia 
or  national  guard  of  the  several  states  for  federal 
duty  provides  that  every  officer  and  man  comprising 
the  organizations  shall  be  mustered  for  service  with- 
out further  enlistment.  In  other  words,  under  this 
system  there  will  be  no  enlistment  for  the  war  and 
men  with  one  or  two  months  or  less  to  serve  may  be 
transported  to  the  points  of  mobilization  without 
prospect  of  rendering  any  real  service  to  the  coun- 
try, but  with  sufficient  time  upon  the  rolls  to  justify 
claims  for  pensions  after  the  mellow  period  of  memo- 
ries of  the  war  has  arrived  in  the  nation.  This  may 
be  splendidly  sentimental,  but  it  does  not  treat  war 
as  the  grave  business  it  has  heretofore  turned  out  to 
be  in  our  history. 

The  plan  adopted  in  the  Civil  War  after  a  large 
experience  provided  for  enlistments  for  three  years 
or  the  war  and  furnished  men  employed  for  a  suffi- 
cient period  to  justify  their  systematic  training  for 
campaign  and  battle.  By  doing  away  with  the  ex- 
pensive, unsatisfactory  and  all  but  useless  short 
term  men,  the  number  of  pensioners  of  the  future 
would  be  materially  decreased.  One  man  enlisted  for 
three  years  furnishes  but  one  probable  pensioner 
and  his  services  will  be  far  more  valuable  than  those 
of  six  men  called  in  for  six  months,  each  of  whom 
may  become  a  pensioner.  The  three-months  men 
might,  and  probably  would,  in  the  same  period  fur- 

60 


THE   ECONOMY   OF   PREVISION 

nish  twelve  pensioners.  There  can  be  no  more  effect- 
ive way  of  reducing  the  number  of  pensions  in  future 
than  by  adhering  to  the  ''three  years  or  the  war" 
enlistment  which  was  so  constantly  urged  by  General 
Sherman  and  other  commanders  and  students  of  the 
Civil  War.  Such  a  simple  and  practicable  method  of 
curtailing  the  enormous  expense  of  the  pension  rolls 
of  our  future  wars  requires  adoption  in  peace,  for  if 
nothing  is  done  until  another  war  may  be  declared, 
under  the  enthusiasm  and  excitement  incident  to 
such  events,  all  precautions  will  be  thrown  to  the 
winds  and  our  descendants  will  be  left  to  count  the 
cost  of  their  forebears*  neglect. 

The  enrolment  in  our  various  wars  was  as  fol- 
lows : 

War  of  the  Revolution: 

Continentals  231,771 

Militia   164,087 

Total  395,858 

War  of  1812: 

Regulars   38,186 

Militia   458,463 

Volunteers    10,110 

Rangers  3,049 

Total 509,808 

War  with  Mexico: 

Regulars   26,922 

Volunteers    73,532 

Total 100,454 

61 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


War  o/  the  Rebellion: 

Regulars  46,679 

Volunteers  and  Militia 2,637,080 

Total 2,683,759 

War  toith  Spain: 

Regulars  (June  30,  1898) 45,669 

Volunteers    232,235 

Total 277,904 

The  amounts  paid  to  June  30,  1911,  for  pensions, 
including  payments  to  widows,  minor  children  and 
dependent  relatives  in  the  several  wars  are  as  fol- 
lows : 

War  of  the  Revolution  (estimated) $70,000,000.00 

War  of  1812  (service  pension) 45,853,024.19 

War  with  Mexico  (service  pension) 11,192,205.52 

Civil  War  3,985.719,836.93 

Unclassified    16,488,147.99 

Regular  establishment  since  foundation, 

including  Indian  wars 21,705,852.33 

A  glance  at  the  history  of  any  of  our  wars  will 
show  how  impossible  it  has  ever  been  to  get  together 
a  respectable  proportion  of  the  number  enrolled  for 
the  army  to  prosecute  a  campaign.  This  arises  from 
the  character  of  our  armies  which  have  in  all  wars 
been  to  a  great  extent  composed  of  short  service 
men,  disqualified  by  the  terms  of  their  enlistment  for 
distant  campaigning.  There  are  few  instances  where 
any  militia  or  volunteers  have  remained,  willingly, 
beyond  the  period  for  which  called  forth.  All  had 
the  same  ideals  and  interest  in  the  maintenance  of 

62 


THE   ECONOMY   OF   PREVISION 

the  government,  but  they  were  simply  victims  of  a 
wrong  military  system.  Later  on,  however,  the  gov- 
ernment, representing  the  entire  people,  in  its  taxa- 
tion became  the  victim,  for  pensions  flowed  alike  to 
those  who  marched  to  battle  and  those  who  de- 
manded their  release  after  a  few  months'  service  in 
the  midst  of  a  campaign.  Prevision  demands  a  dif- 
ferent and  a  better  system  of  raising  armies,  and  in 
its  adoption  we  should  be  guided  rather  by  our  own 
experiences  than  by  those  of  European  nations-in- 
arms. 


ORGANIZATION   AND   CHARACTER   OF   THE   ARMY 

"I  am  persuaded,  and  as  fully  convinced  as  I  am  of  any  one  fact 
that  has  happened,  that  our  liberties  must  of  necessity  be  greatly 
hazarded  if  not  entirely  lost,  if  their  defense  is  left  to  any  but  a 
permanent  standing  army;  I  mean  one  to  exist  during  war.  Nor 
would  the  expense  incident  to  the  support  of  such  a  body  of 
troops  as  would  be  competent  to  almost  every  exigejicy  far  exceed 
that  which  is  daily  incurred  by  calling  in  succor  and  new  enlist- 
ments, which  when  effected  are  not  attended  with  any  good  con- 
sequences."— Washington. 

ANALYSIS  of  past  and  existing  systems  bring 
military  men  continually  to  the  question  of  a 
determination  as  to  the  foundation  character  of  the 
military  establishment  which  America  should  main- 
tain, bearing  in  mind  always  the  actual  demands,  of 
peace  as  well  as  the  probable  fields  of  action  in  war. 
To  the  very  large  majority  of  Americans  the  regular 
army  and  its  activities  in  peace  are  as  a  sealed  book. 
To  many  it  is  known  only  through  the  tales  of  flood 
and  field  drifting  homeward  from  time  to  time  from 
loved  ones  who  have  followed  the  flag  in  its  globe 
circling  journey.  In  America  military  matters  have 
been  treated  usually  as  questions  of  expediency, 
rather  than  of  broad  policy,  because  the  abnormal 
growth  of  the  nation  has  directed  its  attention  to  the 

64 


ORGANIZATION   AND    CHABACTER 

solution  of  the  manifold  and  intricate  problems  of 
social  and  economical  development  arising  under  a 
modern  civilization  for  which  there  are  few  prece- 
dents in  the  experience  of  other  and  older  nations 
for  our  guidance. 

In  the  not  distant  past  the  main  functions  of  the 
regular  army,  which  dictated  its  organization,  were 
embraced  in  guarding  the  movement  of  our  advanc- 
ing frontiers,  westward,  into  and  over  the  country 
claimed  as  hunting  grounds  of  the  Indians,  and  in 
keeping  alive  a  knowledge  of  the  art  of  war  in  a  na- 
tion given  over  body  and  soul  to  business.  During 
the  long  period  between  the  Civil  War  and  the  war 
with  Spain,  while  the  country  was  supposed  to  be  in 
a  state  of  profound  peace,  the  little  frontier  garri- 
sons, which  made  the  settlement  of  half  a  continent 
possible,  went  about  their  work  of  car\dng  the  path 
of  an  empire  without  expectation  of  other  reward 
than  a  consciousness  of  duty  right  nobly  performed. 
It  was  the  self-reliance  which  the  frontier  training 
brought  about  that  enabled  the  generals  at  Santiago 
to  feel  confident  that  each  subordinate  would  lead  his 
little  band  of  followers  through  the  chaparral 
straight  for  the  enemy  on  San  Juan  Hill. 

With  no  policy  other  than  that  dictated  by  expe- 
diency of  the  moment,  the  declaration  of  war  in  1898 
found  the  government  incapable  of  putting  a  single 
complete  army  corps  in  the  field  until  volunteers 
could  be  brought  into  the  service.  While  new  regi- 
ments were  being  mustered  in  and  crowded  into  un- 

65 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


sanitary  camps,  the  little  army  of  regulars  was 
rushed  aboard  improvised  transports,  landed  in  the 
surf  of  a  tropical  shore,  marched  against  a  fortified 
city  and,  in  face  of  all  academic  teaching,  wrested 
victory  from  an  astonished  and  superior  adversary. 

Scarce  had  the  smoke  of  battle  in  the  war  with 
Spain  vanished  when  the  regulars  were  hurried 
away  upon  the  distant  voyage  to  the  Philippines,  to 
suppress  an  insurrection  notable  alike  for  its  wide 
dispersal,  resourceful  cunning  and  viciousness.  With 
infinite  patience,  prodigious  labor  and  rare  courage 
the  army  of  regulars,  and  the  new  regiments  of  na- 
tional volunteers,  accomplished  the  difficult  task  of 
restoring  order  in  a  thousand  islands  just  in  time  to 
enable  a  detachment  in  force  to  respond  to  the  cry 
from  the  beleaguered  legations  in  Pekin  and  to  win 
new  honors  in  the  high  character  of  its  services  dur- 
ing the  continuance  of  the  Boxer  Rebellion. 

Wlien  the  military  obligations  of  this  country,  in- 
volving outlying  garrisons  in  the  Philippines,  China, 
Hawaii,  Porto  Rico,  Panama  and  Alaska,  are  consid- 
ered, the  natural  conclusion  results  that  America 
already  possesses  a  large  army.  Not  so,  however, 
for  it  is  only  by  undue  attenuation  that  the  small 
force  may  present  a  bold  front  at  the  most  important 
points.  It  was  not  until  after  the  war  with  Spain,  in 
1901  when  a  reorganization  of  the  army  took  place, 
that  legislation  was  sought  and  obtained,  which  au- 
thorizes the  President  in  emergencies  to  fill  the  peace 
organizations  to  war  strength,  provided  the  total 

66 


ORGANIZATION   AND   CHARACTER 

strength  of  the  army,  including  Philippine  scouts 
and  exclusive  of  the  hospital  corps,  does  not  exceed 
100,000  men.  This  legislation  is  of  great  importance, 
in  that  regiments  destined  for  particular  service  may 
be  filled  with  recruits  to  war  strength  without  de- 
pleting others  below  the  minimum  or  peace  strength. 

The  reorganization  of  the  army  then  adopted 
involved  other  material  changes.  Through  the  aboli- 
tion of  regiments  of  artillery  and  the  formation  of 
a  corps  of  coast  artillery,  with  companies  of  flexible 
strength  for  the  service  of  harbor  defense,  the  ad- 
ministration and  training  of  that  arm  was  much 
simplified  and  improved.  The  subsequent  separa- 
tion of  the  field  artillery  and  its  organization  into 
battalions  and  regiments  was  in  harmony  with  mod- 
ern practice  and  calculated  to  insure  the  proper  use 
of  fire  in  battle.  Our  previous  practice  had  been 
quite  uniformly  to  treat  the  field  battery,  instead  of 
the  regiment,  as  the  unit  of  organization. 

Under  the  reorganization  act  of  1901,  there  was 
no  intention  of  considering  the  regular  army  as  a 
properly  balanced  field  army  of  divisions,  with  only 
sufficient  cavalry,  field  artillery  and  special  arms  to 
make  them  complete  units.  On  the  contrary  the 
strength  of  the  several  arms  was  arranged  with  a 
view  to  having  the  regular  army  furnish  as  far  as 
practicable  within  its  limited  strength,  the  special  or 
auxiliary  arms  not  comprised  in  the  militia,  which 
had  volunteered  for  the  war  with  Spain  almost 
wholly  as  infantry.  It  is  not  now  and  probably  never 

67 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


will  be  possible  to  insure  a  sufficient  force  of  trained 
cavalry,  field  artillery  and  other  special  arms  for  the 
first  line  in  war,  except  by  maintaining  them  in 
active  existence  as  regulars.  It  therefore  follows, 
from  the  point  of  view  of  those  who  advocate  the  or- 
ganization and  maintenance  of  the  regular  army  in 
divisional  and  field  army  units  that  our  force  is  ill 
assorted. 

In  considering  the  organization  of  the  army  it 
should  be  remembered  that  many  of  the  laws  on  the 
statute  books  are  the  result  of  historic  development, 
while  others  have  come  about  through  special  plead- 
ing and  not  as  the  result  of  any  comprehensive  pol- 
icy. The  existing  organization  of  the  army  has 
resulted  from  efforts  to  improve  upon  conditions 
developed  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  with  Spain. 
Reforms  of  recognized  value  have  come  in  the  inter- 
vening period  but  out  of  proposed  policies  there  have 
developed  some  grave  differences  as  to  organization 
which  must  be  finally  determined  by  Congress  to 
whom  the  Constitution  has  committed  the  power  and 
thereby  the  duty  of  raising  and  supporting  armies. 
These  differences  relate  not  only  to  the  general  war 
policy  but  also  to  the  actual  purpose  and  utilization 
of  the  regular  army  which  is  the  basic  element  of 
national  defense. 

The  present  organization  and  authorized  strength 
of  the  regular  army  is :  y 


M 


ORGANIZATION   AND   CHARACTER 


aejj  po^STxna; 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


In  the  number  of  first  lieutenants  of  the  Medical 
Department  are  included  ninety-nine  Medical  Re- 
serve Corps  officers  and  sixty  dental  surgeons.  Un- 
der authority  of  Congress  the  enlisted  men  of  the 
Hospital  Corps,  now  4,012,  and  the  6,000  men  au- 
thorized for  the  Quartermaster  Corps  are  not 
counted  as  part  of  the  strength  of  the  army. 

It  should  be  observed  that  the  total  force  of  mo- 
bile American  troops  comprises  34,128  infantry,  14,- 
148  cavalry  and  5,513  field  artillery,  a  total  of  53,- 
789  when  all  vacancies  are  filled.  From  this  force 
are  drawn  the  regiments  for  Alaska,  Panama,  Ha- 
waii, the  Philippines  and  China,  amounting  in  the 
aggregate  to  more  than  20,000  men. 

The  authorized  enlisted  strength  of  the  line  of  the 
army  in  previous  decades  subsequent  to  the  Civil 
War,  was  as  follows : 


1870.       1  battalion  of  engineers 762 

10  regiments  of  cavalry 9,300 

5  regiments  of  artillery 5,065 

25  regiments  of  infantry 16,375 

Total   31,502 

1880.       1  battalion  of  engineers 200 

10  regiments  of  cavalry 8,450 

5  regiments  of  artillery 2,600 

25  regiments  of  Infantry 12,085 

Total   23,335 

1890.       1  battalion  of  engineers 500 

10  regiments  of  cavalry 7,970 

5  regiments  of  artillery 2,650 

25  regiments  of  Infantry 12,625 

Total   23,745 

70 


ORGANIZATION   aND   CHARACTER 

1901.       3  battalions  of  engineers 2,002 

15  regiments  of  cavalry 18,540 

30  batteries  of  field  artillery \\9,  922 

126  companies  of  coast  artillery J 

30  regiments  of  infantry 55,080 

Total 94,544 

The  act  of  February  2, 1901,  authorizes  the  Presi- 
dent to  enlist  natives  of  the  Philippine  Islands  as 
scouts,  not  exceeding  12,000  in  number,  but  requires 
that  the  total  enlisted  strength  of  the  regular  army, 
including  such  native  force,  shall  not  exceed  at  any 
one  time  100,000.  The  actual  strength  during  the 
past  decade  has  at  no  time  approached  the  author- 
ized maximum  strength.  Upon  the  reorganization 
of  the  army,  under  the  act  cited,  the  President  under 
date  of  October  24,  1902,  fixed  the  authorized 
strength  of  the  army,  including  all  detachments,  and 
exclusive  of  native  troops,  at  59,866  men.  The  au- 
thorized strength  has  been  frequently  modified,  but 
maintained  always  well  within  the  maximum  limit 
of  100,000. 

Some  distinguished  officers  in  the  past  have  sought 
to  eliminate  the  question  of  the  strength  of  the  army 
in  time  of  peace  from  further  consideration  at  the 
hands  of  Congress,  by  establishing  a  fixed  ratio  as 
to  population,  the  most  favored  proposition  being 
that  of  one  soldier  to  1,000  of  population.  The  pop- 
ulation of  the  United  States,  and  the  percentage  re- 
lation of  the  strength  of  the  army  in  each  decade 
from  the  year  1790  to  and  including  the  year  1890, 
were  as  follows: 

71 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


Year 

Strength  of  the  Army 

Population 

V^f^r  ppnt 

Ofllcers 

Men 

Total 

of  U.  S. 

1790 

57 

1,216 

1,273 

3,929,214 

.03  of  1% 

1800 

318 

4,118 

4,436 

5,308,483 

.08  of  1% 

1810 

774 

9,147 

9,921 

7,239,881 

.14  of  1% 

1820 

712 

8,230 

8,942 

9,633,822 

.09  of  1% 

1830 

627 

5.324 

5,951 

12,866,020 

.05  of  1% 

1840 

733 

9,837 

10,570 

17,069,453 

.06  of  1% 

1850 

948 

9,815 

10,763 

23,191,876 

.05  of  1% 

1860 

1,108 

15,259 

16,367 

31,443,321 

.05  of  1% 

1870 

2,541 

34,534 

37,075 

38.558,371 

.10  of  1% 

1880 

2,152 

24,357 

26,509 

50,155,783 

.05  of  1% 

1890 

2,168 

24,921 

27,089 

62,622,250 

.04  of  1% 

The  desirability  of  removing  the  army  from  the 
necessity  of  constant  legislation  is  clearly,  apparent, 
but  however  much  the  fixed  ratio  plan  may  have  com- 
mended itself  in  the  past,  it  would  not  now  meet  the 
conditions  of  our  varied  requirements.  This  nation 
has  assumed  grave  responsibilities  in  widely  sep- 
arated parts  of  the  world,  which  may  not  with  honor 
and  safety  be  trifled  with.  Their  consideration  is  of 
the  first  importance  from  the  view-point  of  national 
prestige.  The  nation  relies  upon  that  broad  instru- 
mentality— the  War  Department — to  accomplish  all 
things  needful  to  meet  the  demands  of  the  hour  in 
military  matters.  Any  policy  as  to  the  present 
strength  of  the  army  must,  as  matters  of  first  im- 
portance, take  into  consideration  the  actual  demands 
of  garrisons  maintained  beyond  the  continental  lim- 
its of  the  United  States  and  the  necessity  for  an  ex- 
peditionary corps  to  reinforce  them  when  threat- 
ened. 

A  considerable  part  of  the  regular  army  will,  for 

72 


OBGANIZATION  AND  CHABACTER 

an  indefinite  period,  be  required  to  maintain  the 
Alaska,  Panama  and  over-sea  garrisons.  It  is  pos- 
sible that  some  or  all  of  these  garrisons  may  require 
reinforcements  from  the  home  forces,  but  it  is  not 
probable  that  any  of  them  could  be  reduced  in  time 
of  war  for  the  purpose  of  strengthening  any  other 
part  of  the  army.  It  would  be  inexpedient  and  po- 
litically unwise  to  allow  conditions  ever  to  reach  a 
point  where  it  might  be  deemed  desirable  to  deplete 
the  necessary  over-sea  garrisons  to  meet  any  home 
emergency.  The  minimum  force  required  to  main- 
tain the  Alaska  and  over-sea  garrisons  exclusive  of 
signal  companies  and  medical  department  organiza- 
tions has  been  determined  by  the  War  Department 
to  be  as  follows : 


tf 


d  0} 
o  a> 


Regiments  of  infantry 

Regiments  of  cavalry 

Battalions  of  field  artillery 

Companies  of  coast  artillery 

Companies  of  Philippine  scouts. . 
Porto  Rico  regiment  of  infantry. 
Companies  of  engineers 


4 
2 

2 
24 
52 


6 

1 

3 

13 


3 
1-3 

1 
12 


14 

3  1-3 

6 
49 
52 

1 

6 


With  this  serious  detachment  from  our  small  army 
it  may  be  seen  at  a  glance  that  the  remaining  force 
is  not  sufficient  for  any  extended  service  in  war  nor 
for  peace  instructi(^n  in  large  tactical  units.  An  ear- 
nest effort  has  been  made  to  improve  the  administra- 

73 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


tion  of  the  army  by  segregation  of  the  coast  artillery 
and  the  arrangement  of  the  mobile  army — ^infantry, 
cavalry,  and  field  artillery — ^in  such  manner  as  to 
admit  of  its  organization  in  brigades  and  divisions 
in  time  of  peace.  Heretofore  tactical  organizations 
above  that  of  the  regiment  were  created  only  for 
maneuvers  or  war.  The  nature  of  its  duties  and  the 
vast  field  over  which  our  small  army  operates  ren- 
ders it  difficult  if  not  impracticable  to  maintain  the 
integrity  of  any  system  embracing  the  higher  tac- 
tical organizations.  Expediency  in  emergencies  ever 
plays  havoc  with  policy. 

The  following  table  gives  the  total  numbers  of  or- 
ganizations now  existing  in  the  army  of  the  United 
States,  the  total  numbers  required  to  meet  the  min- 
imum requirements  of  the  foreign  garrisons,  and 
those  which  will  be  available  within  the  United 
States  after  providing  for  requirements  of  the  for- 
eign garrisons: 


-sal 


0.2  e 
1-11 


^a  a)53 


Regiments  of  infantry 

Regiments  of  cavalry 

Regiments  of  field  artillery 

Companies  of  Philippine  scouts. . . 
Porto  Rico  regiments  of  infantry. 
Companies  of  engineers 


30 
15 

6 
52 

1 
12 


14 

3  1-3 

3 
52 

1 

6 


16 

112-3 
3 


74 


ORGANIZATION  AND   CHABACTER 

It  should  be  apparent  to  any  novice  that  our  newly 
acquired  liabilities  leave  us  in  a  far  worse  plight,  as 
regards  our  army  within  the  continental  limits  of 
the  United  States,  than  before  the  war  with  Spain. 
Without  any  opening  for  criticism  of  advocating 
''militarism,'^  it  may  be  stated  in  the  plainest  man- 
ner, that  we  are  allowing  our  insurance  to  dwindle 
below  a  reasonable  guarantee  of  home  protection. 
There  should  be  an  immediate  increase  of  the  reg- 
ular army  and  the  character  of  this  increment  should 
be  determined  in  connection  with  the  organization 
of  the  volunteer  force  which  is  to  become  a  part  of 
the  army  immediately  upon  a  declaration  of  war, 
leaving  the  proper  distribution  of  the  several  arms 
of  the  greater  volunteer  army  for  determination 
later  in  accordance  with  the  number  of  men  sum- 
moned under  each  call.  The  problem  is  one  of  pro- 
viding a  proper  scheme  of  expansion  of  a  progress- 
ive character  from  a  peace  footing  to  a  war  basis. 
On  the  assumption  that  the  existing  organized  mili- 
tia will  be  always  available  for  the  land  defense  of 
our  seacoast  fortifications,  to  repel  invasions  and 
suppress  disorder  when  required,  the  mobile  force 
of  regulars  constitutes  the  only  immediately  availa- 
ble force  for  any  military  expedition  beyond  our  ter- 
ritorial borders. 

Coming  from  a  nation  generally  accustomed  to  the 
use  of  firearms,  the  volunteers  of  1861  required  quite 
two  years  before  they  became  the  trained  armies 
that  eventually  settled  the  war.  Of  course  it  is  not 
possible  to  train  all  the  volunteers  in  peace  who  may 

75 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


be  needed  in  a  great  war,  but  it  is  essential  that  all 
the  forces  subject  to  immediate  call  of  the  President 
for  active  service  shall  be  organized  and  given  as 
much  training  in  peace  as  possible.  For  the  next  and 
possibly  greater  call  for  volunteers  the  serious  prob- 
lem will  be  the  absence  of  a  sufficient  number  of 
trained  officers  and  men  as  a  nucleus  for  each  or- 
ganization. That  this  is  not  a  new  problem  may  be 
seen  from  this  petition  to  the  Virginia  House  of 
Delegates  from  the  officers  of  the  Minute  Battalion 
which  had  obeyed  the  first  call  of  the  Revolution : 

''To  the  Honorable  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of 

Delegates : 

**  Portsmouth,  December  1,  1776. 

**SiR — In  expectation  of  there  being  a  number  of 
additional  troops  raised,  who  are  to  be  on  Colonial 
Establishment  the  officers  of  the  Minute  Battalion 
now  in  service  beg  leave  to  address  your  Honorable 
House,  on  a  matter  of  infinite  importance  to  them- 
selves. 

*'The  disadvantages,  under  which  they  came  into 
their  present  service  hath  occasioned  them  to  suf- 
fer exceedingly  in  their  private  fortunes — especially 
as  they  have  been  continued  much  longer  than  they 
at  first  expected — disadvantages  which  nothing  but 
the  calls  of  an  injured  country  would  have  induced 
their  subjecting  themselves  to. 

**  You  will  not  conceive  them  trivial  when  you  con- 
sider that  it  was  in  midsummer,  when  every  prepara- 
tion they  had  been  making  for  crops,  were  in  their 

76 


ORGANIZATION  AND   CHARACTER 

progress  to  perfection — and  lost  by  leaving  them. 
Even,  under  these  circumstances,  it  is  still  their  fer- 
vent wish  to  continue  in  the  service  of  their  country ; 
in  posts  of  equal  rank,  with  those  they  have  the 
honor  to  fill. 

' '  Confined  to  their  duty  at  this  place,  they  were  to- 
tally prevented  from  offering  themselves  as  candi- 
dates in  their  respective  counties,  by  personal  ap- 
plication— ^(the  only  successful  mode)  at  the  choice 
of  officers  for  the  six  regiments  now  raising  on  Con- 
tinental Establishment. 

*'You  will  conceive  it  a  hardship  for  the  officers 
of  the  Battalion ;  now  to  be  obliged  to  return  to  their 
counties,  fall  into  the  militia  as  common  soldiers 
and  at  a  future  day  be  called  into  service,  among 
the  common  mass — under  the  command  of  those  who 
remained  at  home  enjoying  every  conveniency  of 
life — whilst  they  were  sacrificing  both  happiness  and 
fortunes. 

**  These  sentiments  they  take  the  liberty  of  com- 
municating through  you  to  your  Honorable  House — 
and  have  the  honor  to  be,  Sir, 

**YouR  Very  Humble  Servants." 

No  nation  has  a  more  intelligent  personnel  from 
which  to  draw  its  armies.  The  extent  to  which  the 
nation  may  go  in  the  organization  of  its  military  re- 
sources in  time  of  peace  is  dictated  by  its  political 
policies.  The  peace  administration  of  our  army 
through  a  War  Department  heavily  burdened  with 
non-military  duties  has  ever  made  the  pro  rata  cost 

77 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


of  the  soldier  so  high  that  Congress  avoids  as  far  as 
possible  any  discussion  having  for  its  object  a  mate- 
rial increase  of  the  regular  army.  The  fact  that  the 
cost  of  administration  goes  on  without  much  regard 
to  the  size  of  the  regiments  is  always  ignored.  The 
same  number  of  administrative  officers  could  easily 
handle  the  business  affairs  of  a  much  larger  army. 

The  regular  army  is  confronted  with  serious  du- 
ties in  so  many  parts  of  the  world  that  its  usefulness 
as  a  school  of  instruction,  except  for  its  own  person- 
nel, is  quite  limited.  Indeed  attempts  thus  to  utilize 
it  so  expose  its  paucity  of  strength  as,  not  infre- 
quently, to  bring  it  into  disrepute  in  the  minds  of 
those  who  have  no  comprehensive  information  as  to 
existing  conditions.  A  practice  has  grown  up  of 
continually  attempting  to  expand  the  modest  force 
by  simulating  organizations  of  the  next  higher  de- 
gree— thus  skeleton  battalions  are  made  to  masquer- 
ade as  regiments  and  regiments  as  brigades,  when 
their  small  numbers  should  naturally  suggest  their 
consolidation  into  the  unit  of  the  next  lower  order 
for  practice  at  real  war  strength. 

So  far  as  the  army  is  concerned  it  needs  only 
added  strength  to  fill  any  demand  which  in  reason 
may  be  made  upon  it.  Its  officers  are  educated  and 
well  trained ;  the  men  in  the  ranks  are  as  intelligent, 
brave  and  resourceful  as  any  in  the  world.  The  army 
is  the  best  armed,  equipped,  clothed  and  fed  of  any 
troops  ever  in  our  service.  The  alternating  employ- 
ment in  line  and  staff  duties — the  detail  system — ^to- 
gether with  rotation  of  service  in  over-sea  garrisons 

78 


ORGANIZATION  AND  CHARACTER 

and  much  consequent  travel  has  enlarged  the  hori- 
zon of  all  officers  and  qualified  them  for  administra- 
tion and  command  in  the  higher  grades  to  a  degree 
impossible  under  old  conditions.  The  army  of  to- 
day could  supply  a  larger  number  of  officers  quali- 
fied for  high  command  than  at  any  previous  period 
of  its  history,  and  the  number  is  being  constantly 
increased  through  the  instrumentality  of  post-grad- 
uate schools  and  practical  application  in  most  varied 
fields  of  activity. 

The  regulars  have  maintained  the  honor  of  the 
nation  upon  innumerable  fields  of  combat  and  their 
achievements  and  sacrifices  will  live  in  song  and 
story  to  bring  the  glow  of  pride  to  coming  genera- 
tions. Through  their  dignity  and  manhood  in  the 
hour  of  victory  and  their  tenderness  and  sympathy 
in  public  disaster,  they  have  ever  earned  honorable 
recognition.  Imbued  with  the  principles  and  cus- 
toms instilled  by  Washington  in  the  *' Continentals" 
— our  first  body  of  regulars  to  whom  the  nation 
owed  so  much  in  the  struggle  for  liberty — they  have 
cherished  ideals  of  duty  ever  incompatible  with  hire- 
lings and  soldiers  of  fortune.  Coming  down  the  cen- 
tury, the  regulars  are  found  guarding  our  frontiers, 
the  friend  of  the  Indian  in  his  hopeless  struggle  to 
stem  the  rising  tide  of  Anglo-Saxon  land-hunger,  for 
the  course  of  the  pioneer  had  ever  been  to  enter  the 
wilderness  with  both  rifle  and  axe  and  what  he  con- 
quered he  held. 

The  nation  was  ostensibly  at  peace,  but  during 
the  long  period  of  development  of  our  land-empire 

79 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


the  little  columns  of  regulars  were  incessantly  bat- 
tling with  Indians  that  the  pioneer  might  build  his 
cabin  and  plant  his  corn  in  peace.  Sometimes  a 
genius  would  arise  amongst  the  red  men  and,  arous- 
ing them  to  united  action,  halt  the  westward  move- 
ment momentarily,  but  the  inevitable  course  of  des- 
tiny swept  relentlessly  on,  and  Dade,  Canby,  and 
Custer  and  a  host  of  other  gallant  souls  of  the  reg- 
ulars passed  to  eternity,  their  honored  memory  serv- 
ing but  as  landmarks  of  frontier  history.  Their  sac- 
rifice upon  the  inglorious  fields  of  the  Indian  wars 
enshrined  them  in  the  hearts  of  their  comrades  and 
with  the  later  generations  the  stories"  of  their 
achievements  have  lived  through  repetition  in  the 
isolated  and  widely  dispersed  garrisons  of  a  con- 
tinent. 

Not  alone  in  the  protection  of  the  emigrant  wagon- 
trains,  ceaselessly  winding  their  way  across  plain 
and  mountain,  did  the  regulars  make  their  presence 
felt,  but  upon  the  distant  battlefields  of  Mexico, 
their  valor,  discipline  and  steadfastness  assured  vic- 
tory from  a  courageous  adversary,  superior  in  num- 
bers and  battling  among  his  native  deserts  and 
mountains.  Coming  down  to  the  Civil  War  period 
and  possessing  practically  all  the  knowledge  of  the 
art  of  war  in  the  country,  the  regular  oflScers  were 
widely  dispersed  amongst  the  great  army  of  volun- 
teers and  the  regular  troops  almost  lost  their  iden- 
tity in  the  meagerness  of  their  strength,  yet  the  in- 
fluence of  such  organizations  as  Sykes's  Division  of 
regulars  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  of  inesti- 

80 


ORGANIZATION  AND   CHAEACTER 

mable  value,  and  there  is  nothing  finer  than  the 
stoic  courage  of  Baird's  Division  at  Chickamauga, 
where,  with  a  loss  of  fifty-five  per  cent.,  they  re- 
mained firmly  in  line  of  battle  while  heroic  Thomas 
gathered  the  broken  fragments  of  the  army  about 
him  for  the  last  stand.  There  is  nothing  so  demo- 
cratic, in  all  military  history,  as  the  conduct  of  the 
regulars  who,  as  generals,  having  led  armies  to  vic- 
tory, surrendered  their  high  commissions  in  the  vol- 
unteers, resumed  the  modest  shoulder  straps  of  regi- 
mental ofiicers  and  returned  to  the  frontier  to  take 
up  again  the  trail  of  the  Indian  marauder,  grown 
overbold  through  the  prolonged  absence  of  his  erst- 
while guardians. 

As  the  hand  of  fate  pointed  more  and  more  defi- 
nitely to  the  end  the  warrior  instinct  guided  the  In- 
dian race  to  its  last  and  greatest  wars,  but  the  re- 
sistless wave  swept  over  and  about  them  and  closed 
near  three  centuries  of  effort  to  stem  the  tide  of  a 
civilization,  altruistic  in  heart  and  theory  but  prac- 
tical in  its  execution  of  the  inexorable  decree  of  des- 
tiny. With  the  closing  scenes  of  the  Indian  wars, 
the  history  of  the  ancient  regime  was  laid  away  in 
the  lavender  of  memory.  A  new  era  was  initiated 
by  the  war  with  Spain,  and  followed  by  a  train  of 
consequences  that  has  led  the  army  and  nation  far 
afield.  The  old  days  of  the  frontier  will  live  in  tra- 
dition and  history,  but  under  the  mellowing  in- 
fluence of  time  the  hardships  of  campaigning  against 
the  most  cunning  and  resourceful  of  foes  will  fade 
from  memory.    This  in  brief  is  the  story  of  the  past. 

81 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


No  one  can  read  the  biographies  and  diaries  of  the 
generations  of  soldiers  whose  services  made  possible 
the  opening  up  of  this  continent,  without  a  feeling 
of  deep  and  reverent  regard  for  American  manhood, 
as  typified  by  those  gallant  men  during  the  crude 
period  of  our  national  development. 

Raw  troops  have  been  known  to  perform  deeds  of 
wondrous  courage  and  of  lasting  importance,  but 
there  is  a  something  called  discipline  which  binds 
together  an  army  and  gives  it  a  dependable  morale 
not  akin  to  the  spasmodic  action  of  new  levies.  The 
well-disciplined  officers  and  men  of  the  regular  army 
who  went  to  Santiago  and  whose  brief  campaign  in 
connection  with  the  naval  victories  promptly  set- 
tled the  war  with  Spain,  rendered  the  country  a 
great  service  not  only  in  Cuba  but  in  the  jungle  cam- 
paigns of  the  Philippine  insurrection,  which  fol- 
lowed close  upon  the  termination  of  the  war  with 
Spain.  In  the  battle  near  Santiago,  Cuba,  usually 
referred  to  as  ''San  Juan,"  the  Cavalry  Division, 
serving  dismounted,  with  a  strength  of  127  officer ; 
and  2,522  men,  suffered  a  loss  of  36  officers  and  339 
men  killed  and  wounded.  Nearly  one-third  of  the 
regular  officers  were  killed  or  wounded,  the  loss  in 
one  regiment  being  exactly  fifty  per  cent.  In  Kent's 
Infantry  Division,  with  a  strength  of  235  officers  and 
4,869  men,  the  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  51 
officers  and  650  men. 

Senator  Henry  Cabot  Lodge  in  a  volume  entitled 
The  War  With  Spain,  paid  a  tribute  to  the  reg- 

82     . 


ORGANIZATION   AND   CHABACTER 

ular  army  in  connection  mth  the  operations  against 
Santiago,  Cuba,  in  this  language: 

"The  battle  of  San  Juan  was  preeminently  the 
battle  of  the  American  regulars,  of  the  flower  of  the 
American  standing  army.  With  scarcely  any  artil- 
lery support,  armed  only  with  rifles,  they  were  set 
to  take  heights  and  a  village  strongly  held  by  reg- 
ular soldiers  and  defended  by  forts,  intrenchments, 
batteries,  and  a  tangle  of  barbed  wire  fences.  This 
is  something  which  the  best  military  critics  would 
declare  well  nigh  impossible  and  not  to  be  attempted. 
The  American  army  did  it."* 

Major-General  Sir  E.  T.  Hutton,  K.  C.  M.  G.,  C. 
B.,  in  an  address  before  the  United  Service  Institu- 
tion in  London,  said: 

**I  think  all  British  soldiers  owe  Sir  Howard  Vin- 
cent much  gratitude  for  a  very  instructive  paper, 
and  for  so  much  useful  information  in  connection 
with  the  army  of  that  other  great  branch  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon  race  which  we  are  so  proud  to  claim  as 
kinsmen.  Having  during  the  course  of  my  service 
commanded  in  Canada,  I  have  had  especial  oppor- 
tunities of  being  conversant  with  the  feelings  and 


♦That  part  of  the  5th  Corps  which  participated  in  the  expedi- 
tion to  Santiago  comprised  parts  of  the  1st,  2d,  3d,  6th,  9th  and 
10th  Cavalry;  the  1st,  2d,  3d,  4th,  5th,  7th,  8th,  9th,  10th,  12th, 
13th,  16th,  17th,  20th,  21st,  22d,  24th  and  25th  Infantry;  and  two 
light  batteries  from  each  of  the  1st,  2d  and  4th  Artillery.  The 
strength  of  these  organizations,  as  shown  by  the  rolls,  comprised 
a  total  of  14,604  men.  Of  these  4,963  were  in  their  first  year  of 
service;  8,699  had  less  than  three  years  of  service,  and  10,773  had 
less  than  seven  years  of  service. 

83 


THE   AMERICAN   AEMY 


ideas  of  the  United  States  Army,  and  I  also  think 
to  a  certain  extent  with  the  trend  of  the  military  de- 
velopments of  which  Sir  Howard  Vincent  has  been 
speaking.  I  should  like,  first  of  all,  to  refer  to  one 
or  two  points  as  regards  the  regular  army.  The 
United  States  Eegular  Army  is  one  of  unquestioned 
excellence  in  physique,  discipline,  and  general  mili- 
tary efficiency.  It  especially  proved  its  value  during 
the  recent  Cuban  War;  and  I  think  if  Sir  Howard 
Vincent  will  allow  me  to  say  so,  in  a  great  measure 
its  present  popularity  is  due  to  the  extremely  gal- 
lant and  excellent  service  which  it  rendered  during 
that  campaign  in  Cuba.  It  is  a  well-known  fact  to 
those  who  were  present,  that  the  success  of  the 
United  States  arms  was  almost  entirely  due  to  the 
steadiness  and  gallantry  of  the  regular  troops  which 
took  part  in  that  campaign — " 

The  army  has  always  responded  to  every  demand 
made  upon  it  to  the  limit  of  its  strength.  That  it 
fades  away  under  the  influence  of  battle  casualties 
is  the  common  fate  of  courageous  Anglo-Saxon 
armies  in  all  history, but  that  they  have  risen  and  will 
rise  again,  even  from  the  ashes  of  defeat,  and  move 
forward  at  their  country's  call  is  equally  true.  That 
the  American  army  failed  not  to  repeat  its  history, 
we  have  the  words  of  Hon.  Elihu  Eoot,  who,  as  Sec- 
retary of  War,  had  every  possible  means  of  ascer- 
taining the  true  state  of  affairs  and  who  wrote : 

**No  organization  could  have  produced  the  re- 
sults exhibited  by  the  army  during  the  past  two  years 
which  was  not  in  the  main  sound  and  efficient.    With 

84 


ORGANIZATION   AND    CHARACTER 

its  handful  of  regular  officers  and  its  small  body  of 
trained  troops,  merged  with  nearly  double  their  num- 
ber of  raw  recruits,  and  combined  with  large  forces 
of  new,  untrained,  volunteers,  it  has  in  surprisingly 
short  periods  of  time  produced  a  great  body  of  men, 
uniformly  well  disciplined,  of  good  conduct  and 
morale,  patient  in  endurance  of  hardships,  steady, 
indomitable,  and  heroic  in  action,  and  who,  against 
the  debilitating  influences  of  tropical  climates, 
against  physical  obstacles  which  seemed  insur- 
mountable, and  against  enemies  of  superior  num- 
bers and  approved  courage,  and  armed  with  weap- 
ons of  modern  warfare,  have  won  a  long  series  of 
victories  unbroken  by  a  single  defeat. ' ' 

Practically  all  the  cavalry  and  infantry  regiments 
which  had  participated  in  the  campaign  against  San- 
tiago were  engaged  subsequently  in  the  Philippine 
Insurrection.  AVhen  peace  had  been  sufficiently  re- 
stored in  the  Philippine  Islands  to  justify  the  in- 
auguration of  civil  government,  the  President  di- 
rected the  transfer  of  authority  on  July  4,  1902,  and 
that  the  following  order  containing  encomiums  fairly 
won  and  deserving  a  page  in  the  history  of  that 
eventful  epoch,  be  read  at  parade  to  every  American 
garrison : 
**To  the  Army  of  the  United  States: 

**The  President  upon  this  anniversary  of  National 
independence  wishes  to  express  to  the  officers  and 
enlisted  men  of  the  United  States  Army  his  deep 
appreciation  of  the  service  they  have  rendered  to 
the  country  in  the  great  and  difficult  undertakings 

85 


THE   AMEEICAN   ARMY 


which  they  have  brought  to  a  successful  conclusion 
during  the  past  year. 

*  *  The  President  thanks  the  officers  and  enlisted  men 
of  the  Army  in  the  Philippines,  both  regulars  and 
volunteers,  for  the  courage  and  fortitude,  the  indom- 
itable spirit  and  loyal  devotion  with  which  they  have 
put  down  and  ended  the  great  insurrection  which  has 
raged  throughout  the  archipelago  against  the  lawful 
sovereignty  and  just  authority  of  the  United  States. 
The  task  was  peculiarly  difficult  and  trying.  They 
were  required  at  first  to  overcome  organized  resist- 
ance of  superior  numbers,  well  equipped  with  mod- 
em arms  of  precision,  intrenched  in  an  unknown 
country  of  mountain  defiles,  jungles,  and  swamps, 
apparently  capable  of  interminable  defense.  When 
this  resistance  had  been  overcome  they  were  re- 
quired to  crush  out  a  general  system  of  guerrilla 
warfare  conducted  among  a  people  speaking  un- 
known tongues,  from  whom  it  was  almost  impos- 
sible to  obtain  the  information  necessary  for  suc- 
cessful pursuit  or  to  guard  against  surprise  and 
ambush. 

"The  enemies  by  whom  they  were  surrounded 
were  regardless  of  all  obligations  of  good  faith  and 
of  all  limitations  which  humanity  has  imposed  upon 
civilized  warfare.  Bound  themselves  by  the  laws  of 
war,  soldiers  were  called  upon  to  meet  every  de- 
vice of  unscrupulous  treachery  and  to  contemplate 
without  reprisal  the  infliction  of  barbarous  cruelties 
upon  their  comrades  and  friendly  natives.  They 
were  instructed,  while  punishing  armed  resistance, 

86 


ORGANIZATION   AND    CHABACTER   ' 

to  conciliate  the  friendship  of  the  peaceful,  yet  had 
to  do  with  a  population  among  whom  it  was  impos- 
sible to  distinguish  friend  from  foe,  and  who  in 
countless  instances  used  a  false  appearance  of 
friendship  for  ambush  and  assassination.  They 
were  obliged  to  deal  with  problems  of  communication 
and  transportation  in  a  country  without  roads  and 
frequently  made  impassable  by  torrential  rains.  They 
were  weakened  by  tropical  heat  and  tropical  disease. 
Widely  scattered  over  a  great  archipelago,  extending 
a  thousand  miles  from  north  to  south,  the  gravest  re- 
sponsibilities, involving  the  life  or  death  of  their 
commands,  frequently  devolved  upon  young  and  in- 
experienced officers  beyond  the  reach  of  specific 
orders  or  advice. 

*  *  Under  all  these  adverse  circumstances  the  Army 
of  the  Philippines  has  accomplished  its  task  rapidly 
and  completely.  In  more  than  two  thousand  combats, 
great  and  small,  within  three  years,  it  has  exhibited 
unvarying  courage  and  resolution.  Utilizing  the  les- 
sons of  the  Indian  wars  it  has  relentlessly  followed 
the  guerrilla  bands  to  their  fastnesses  in  mountain 
and  jungle  and  crushed  them.  It  has  put  an  end  to 
the  vast  system  of  intimidation  and  secret  assassina- 
tion by  which  the  peaceful  natives  were  prevented 
from  taking  a  genuine  part  in  government  under 
American  authority.  It  has  captured  or  forced  to 
surrender  substantially  all  the  leaders  of  the  insur- 
rection. It  has  submitted  to  no  discouragement  and 
halted  at  no  obstacle.  Its  officers  have  shown  high 
qualities  of  command,  and  its  men  have  shown  devo- 

"  87 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


tion  and  discipline.  Its  splendid  virile  energy  has 
been  accompanied  by  self-control,  patience,  and  mag- 
nanimity. With  surprisingly  few  individual  excep- 
tions its  course  has  been  characterized  by  humanity 
and  kindness  to  the  prisoner  and  the  noncombatant. 
"With  admirable  good  temper,  sympathy,  and  loyalty 
to  American  ideals  its  commanding  generals  have 
joined  with  the  civilian  agents  of  the  Government  in 
healing  the  wounds  of  war  and  assuring  to  the  peo- 
ple of  the  Philippines  the  blessings  of  peace  and 
prosperity.  Individual  liberty,  protection  of  per- 
sonal rights,  civil  order,  public  instruction,  and  re- 
ligious freedom  have  followed  its  footsteps.  It  has 
added  honor  to  the  flag  which  it  defended,  and  has 
justified  increased  confidence  in  the  future  of  the 
American  people,  whose  soldiers  do  not  shrink  from 
labor  or  death,  yet  love  liberty  and  peace. 

''The  President  feels  that  he  expresses  the  senti- 
ments of  all  the  loyal  people  of  the  United  States  in 
doing  honor  to  the  whole  Army  which  has  joined  in 
the  performance  and  shares  in  the  credit  of  these 
honorable  services." 

The  efficiency  of  a  republican  army,  based  on  vol- 
untary enlistments,  depends  upon  its  contentment 
with  conditions,  which  in  turn  depends  wholly  upon 
the  integrity  of  its  administration.  Absence  of  fa- 
voritism and  cliques  is  essential  to  contented  and 
loyal  service.  The  foundation  stones  of  regular 
army  discipline  comprise  a  frank  adherence  to 
the  principle  of  supremacy  of  the  civil  law,  a  thor- 
ough knowledge  of  theory  and  the  highest  grade  of 

88 


ORGANIZATION  AND  CHARACTER 

proficiency  in  the  practical  performance  of  every 
military  duty.  It  is  not  enough  that  each  regular 
shall  do  his  best  but  that  he  shall  know  and  do  what 
is  right.  With  these  ingrained  principles  it  is  only 
necessary  that  the  regular  army  shall  be  governed 
by  well  considered  laws  and  regulations,  adminis- 
tered through  a  proper  military  hierarchy,  to  enable 
it  to  keep  alive  the  knowledge,  traditions  and  cus- 
toms of  war,  so  essential  to  safeguarding  the  vast 
material  interests  of  the  nation. 

It  has  come  to  pass  that  out  of  our  altruistic  senti- 
ment for  the  people  of  the  neighboring  isle  of  Cuba 
a  line  of  increasing  responsibilities  for  the  nation 
has  unfolded  and  led  the  army  far  afield.  The  office 
of  the  army  of  to-day  in  China,  the  Philippines, 
Hawaii,  Alaska,  Panama,  Porto  Rico  and  within  our 
continental  limits  calls  for  a  degree  of  ability  and 
training  hardly  comprehended  by  the  public.  The 
character,  efficiency  and  courage  of  the  officers  and 
men  of  the  army  have  ever  been  beyond  question, 
due  not  only  to  a  long  and  brilliant  history  of  arms, 
but  also  to  the  humanity  with  which  they  have  han- 
dled the  problems  arising  from  earthquakes,  floods, 
forest-fires  and  pestilence,  of  so  grave  a  nature  as 
to  demand  immediate,  organized  and  disciplined  re- 
lief. Through  a  century  of  experience  the  title  of 
''regular"  has  come  to  signify  safe,  conservative 
and  dependable  action  and  the  verdict  of  history 
during  the  recent  period  of  world  power  expansion, 
will  be  clear-cut,  decisive  and  unimpeachable  as  to 
the  character  and  value  of  the  services  rendered  by 
the  army. 

89 


VI 

COLONIAL,  TKOOPS 

"Remember,  especially,  that,  for  the  efficient  management  of  your 
common  interest  in  a  country  so  extensive  as  ours,  a  government 
of  as  much  vigor  as  is  consistent  with  the  perfect  security  of 
liberty  is  indispensable." — Washington. 

DTJEING  the  past  fifteen  years  the  nation  has 
wandered  far  from  the  traditional  paths  of 
pioneer  development  and,  in  consequence,  our  little 
army  of  regulars  has  found  employment  in  many 
strange  lands.  With  the  thought  and  hope  that  each 
demand  would  be  the  last,  expediency  rather  than  a 
comprehensive  and  previously  considered  policy  has 
dictated  in  each  instance  the  employment  of  our 
forces.  To  meet  the  modest  demands  of  almost  any 
conceivable  call  for  pacification  or  intervention  in- 
cident to  treaties  or  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  would 
drain  our  country  of  all  the  available  mobile  army  re- 
maining at  home,  and  interfere  with  the  timely  re- 
lief of  those  employed  on  foreign  service. 

Whatever  may  be  the  policy  of  the  future  as  to  our 
political  relations  with  the  Philippines,  the  existing 
form  of  government  makes  them  autonomous  so  far 
as  the  collection  of  customs  and  internal  taxes  are 
concerned  and  the  actual  administration  of  the  is- 
lands may  be  likened  to  that  of  a  limited  republic. 
In  the  reform  of  our  military  system,  which  seems 
essential,  it  would  be  a  serious  mistake  not  to  include 

90 


COLONIAL   TROOPS 


a  complete  modification  of  the  defense  and  utiliza- 
tion of  the  military  forces  in  the  Philippine  Islands. 
Some  of  our  most  experienced  officers  have  long 
agreed  that  the  solution  of  the  problem  would  be  best 
met  by  appointing  the  military  commander  in  the 
Philippines  to  office,  under  the  Civil  Governor,  with 
duties  akin  to  those  of  a  Secretary  of  War  and  Ad- 
ministrator of  Police.  This  would  not  involve  much 
additional  administrative  force  to  that  now  em- 
ployed for  the  army  and  would  materially  decrease 
the  expenditure  in  connection  with  constabulary  ad- 
ministration. 

The  military  forces  maintained  in  the  islands  com- 
prise three  classes :  American  regulars  of  all  arms ; 
Philippine  scouts,  natives,  organized  in  companies 
and  battalions  under  American  officers  and  sup- 
ported out  of  army  appropriations ;  Philippine  con- 
stabulary, natives,  under  American  officers  with  but 
few  exceptions,  and  supported  by  the  Philippine  gov- 
ernment. A  reformation  of  the  system  has  been  re- 
peatedly urged  by  those  in  authority  and  the  time 
has  arrived  when  the  situation  should  be  considered 
in  connection  with  legislation  having  for  its  object 
the  modernization  of  our  entire  military  system,  in- 
cluding regulars,  volunteers  and  militia. 

The  Philippine  scout  organizations  were  brought 
into  existence  under  an  act  of  Congrss  providing 
for  a  reorganization  of  the  army,  without  any  view 
other  than  provision  for  a  temporary  force  of  na- 
tives to  assist  in  restoring  and  maintaining  order  in 
the  islands.     The  constabulary,  supported  by  the 

91 


THE  AMERICAN  ARMY 


Philippine  government,  comprises  a  military  organ- 
ization of  natives  with  a  brigadier  general  at  the 
head  and  numerous  field  officers  from  the  regular 
army  as  assistants,  and  has  to  its  credit  innumerable 
gallant  actions  occurring  in  the  suppression  of  dis- 
orders arising  from  various  causes  in  a  thousand 
islands.  When  civil  government  was  substituted  for 
military  control  in  the  islands,  it  seemed  obvious 
that  the  native  troops  dispersed  for  maintenance  of 
order  throughout  the  archipelago  would  idtimately 
be  placed  under  the  same  directing  authority  that 
controls  the  native  constabulary.  The  proposition 
to  transfer  the  Philippine  scout  companies  from  the 
army  to  the  constabulary  was  much  advocated  but 
the  condition  of  the  Philippine  treasury  did  not  seem 
to  warrant  the  immediate  assumption  of  the  obliga- 
tion involved  in  the  support  of  the  additional  force.. 
A  compromise  was  effected  by  an  act  of  Congress 
which  continues  the  burden  of  expense  for  mainte- 
nance of  the  scouts  upon  the  army  appropriations, 
but  authorizes  their  temporary  transfer  in  emer- 
gencies to  the  control  of  the  chief  and  assistant 
chiefs  of  constabulary.  The  scouts  so  detached  are 
not  subject  to  orders  from  any  other  constabulary 
officers  which  places  a  limitation  upon  their  employ- 
ment. The  scheme  was  based  wholly  upon  expedi- 
ency during  a  critical  and  unsettled  condition  in  the 
Philippines,  both  as  to  income  and  public  order  and 
should  not  be  continued  indefinitely. 
The  opinion  was  held  by  numerous  army  officers 

92 


COLONIAL  TROOPS 


that  the  scouts  should  remain  under  military  con- 
trol and  be  thoroughly  drilled  and  disciplined  as  a 
counterpoise  to  the  constabulary  in  event  of  any 
considerable  portion  of  the  latter  body  being  se- 
duced into  disloyalty  by  designing  native  politi- 
cians. This  argument  falls  to  the  ground  in  face  of 
the  innumerable  and  courageous  actions  of  the  con- 
stabulary forces  in  the  maintenance  of  law  and  or- 
der among  their  own  people  in  all  parts  of  the  ar- 
chipelago. 

When  our  army  was  first  sent  to  garrison  stations 
beyond  the  seas,  expediency,  apparent  exigencies 
of  the  service,  and  perhaps  some  favor,  combined  to 
prevent  the  full  quota  of  officers  from  accompanying 
their  organizations.  In  the  course  of  time  some  offi- 
cers who  continued  on  duty  with  their  regiments  ac- 
quired records  of  tropical  service  covering  many 
years,  while  others  had  little  or  none.  It  appeared 
difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  correct  the  inequality 
by  returning  the  absentees  to  their  organizations.  In 
the  end,  the  initiation  of  a  corrective  was  undertaken 
by  the  transfer  of  certain  regiments  to  constitute 
permanent  garrisons  in  the  Philippines,  the  system 
being  applied  later  to  the  organizations  serving  in 
the  Hawaiian  Islands  and  Panama.  Under  this 
scheme,  it  is  contemplated  gradually  to  correct  in- 
equalities in  length  of  tropical  service  at  over-sea 
stations  by  transferring  officers,  the  non-commis- 
sioned officers  and  privates  being  privileged  by  the 
terms  of  their  enlistments  to  return  home  upon  ex- 

93 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


piration  of  service,  where  they  may  reenlist  as  pri- 
vates in  home  organizations. 

To  meet  existing  and  increasing  responsibilities 
it  seems  inevitable  that  a  material  increase  of  our 
military  establishment  shall  take  place  in  the  not 
distant  future.  When  that  occurs  it  should  include 
a  drastic  change  of  method  of  providing  the  over- 
seas garrisons  now  demanded  in  widely  separated 
parts  of  the  world. 

To  provide  for  the  garrisons  in  the  Philippines, 
Hawaii  and  Panama,  there  should  be  created  an  en- 
tirely new  military  force  of  Colonial  Troops,  or- 
ganized especially  for  that  service  and^^not  given 
designations  as  part  of  the  home  army  of  regulars. 
The  lists  of  officers  of  the  regular  army  should  be  in- 
creased by  the  addition  of  extra  officers  of  the  sev- 
eral grades  necessary  for  duty  with  the  Colonial 
Troops,  and  the  additional  number  of  men  to  consti- 
tute the  enlisted  force  should  be  authorized.  In  the 
execution  of  this  scheme  the  Philippine  scout  com- 
panies would  be  amalgamated  with  the  constabulary 
and  the  entire  expenses  of  the  native  forces  for  the 
preservation  of  order  should  be  borne  by  the  Philip- 
pine treasury.  The  old  organizations  of  the  regular 
army  now  permanently  assigned  to  stations  in  the 
Philippine  Islands,  Hawaii  and  Panama,  may  then 
be  returned  to  home  stations  and  thereafter  previous 
foreign  service  should  be  considered  in  assigning  of- 
ficers to  the  new  colonial  troops.  In  this  way  provi- 
sion would  be  made  for  the  immediate  obligations 

94 


COLONIAL   TROOPS 


confronting  the  nation  and  if,  in  the  future,  the  po- 
litical status  of  the  Philippines  becomes  so  changed 
as  no  longer  to  require  the  American  army,  the  co- 
lonial troops  there  may  be  returned  and  the  enlisted 
force  transferred  to  the  permanent  army  units,  or 
discharged,  and  the  officers  continued  on  duty  until 
disposed  of  by  Congress.  As  our  nation  grows,  the 
need  of  trained  officers  increases  and  we  will  never 
have  even  a  modest  proportion  of  those  required  to 
supply  our  requirements  in  the  preparation  of  our 
forces  for  the  exigencies  of  war. 

The  minimum  garrisons  for  the  Philippine  Is- 
lands, the  Hawaiian  Islands  and  Panama  having 
been  determined,  it  is  important  that  there  be  cre- 
ated and  maintained  at  home  a  sufficient  force  of  reg- 
ulars to  constitute  at  least  three  reliefs  for  foreign 
service,  for  it  is  neither  economical  nor  desirable  to 
have  our  officers  and  men  spend  more  than  one- 
third  of  their  time  at  tropical  stations.  If  merely  a 
sufficient  army  is  maintained  to  alternate  tours  of 
foreign  and  home  service,  it  would  make  impossible 
any  reasonable  arrangement  of  other  necessary  serv- 
ice, such  as  instructors  of  schools  and  colleges,  the 
militia,  recruiting  and  numerous  other  kinds  of  de- 
tached duties  of  recognized  importance. 

The  garrison  of  about  eight  hundred  and  fifty  men 
maintained  in  China  may  be  disregarded  in  the  cal- 
culations of  colonial  troops  inasmuch  as  it  is  de- 
tached from  the  Philippine  Islands  during  the  exist- 
ing temporary  emergency.     The  organizations  re- 

95 


THE  AMERICAN  ARMY 


quired  ultimately  for  service  as  Colonial  Troops 
under  the  existing  War  Department  policy  as  to  gar- 
risons comprise  the  following : 

Philippine  Islands:    4  regiments  of  infantry. 
i»  2  regiments  of  cavalry. 

1  regiment  of  field  artillery. 
24  companies  of  coast  artillery. 

2  companies  of  engineers. 

Hawaiian  Islands:     6  regiments  of  infantry. 
1  regiment  of  cavalry. 
1  regiment  and  1  battalion  of  field  artillery. 

3  companies  of  engineers. 

13  companies  of  coast  artillery. 

Panama:  3  regiments  of  infantry. 

1  squadron  (4  troops)  of  cavalry. 
1  battalion  of  field  artillery. 
12  companies  of  coast  artillery. 
1  company  of  engineers. 

To  these  should  be  added  the  proper  proportion 
of  staff  and  supply  corps,  quartermaster,  sanitary, 
signal,  ordnance  and  others  essential  to  military  effi- 
ciency. The  troops  required  to  garrison  Alaska 
should  be  drawn  from  the  home  army. 

To  accomplish  this  reorganization  of  the  forces  it 
will  be  necessary  to  add  to  the  regular  army  the  of- 
ficers and  men  to  comprise  thirteen  regiments  of  in- 
fantry, three  and  one-third  regiments  of  cavalry, 
three  regiments  of  field  artillery,  forty-nine  com- 
panies of  coast  artillery,  six  companies  of  engineers, 
and  the  proportional  strength  of  staff  personnel  in 
accordance  with  legal  and  tables  of  organization  au- 
thorizations. 

96 


COLONIAL   TBOOPS 


Based  on  existing  organizations  this  will  provide 
for  additions  to  the  regular  army  as  follows: 

13  regiments  of  infantry,  total  enlisted 23,868 

3  1-3  regiments  of  cavalry,  total  enlisted 4,120 

3  regiments  of  field  artillery,  total  enlisted 3,384 

49  companies  of  coast  artillery,  total  enlisted 5,096 

6  companies  of  engineers,  total  enlisted 988 

Total  37,456 

The  additional  officers  required  for  these  organiza- 
tions will  comprise : 


00 

a 

a 

01 

ea 

« 

a 

a 

_  0 

m 

^■S 

^2 

•g. 

t  s 

OS 

b  <D 

O  <D 

O 

'M 

&a 

195 

195 

195 

49 

50 

50 

33 

39 

39 

49 

49 

49 

326 

333 

333 

Infantry    

Cavalry   

Field  artillery. 
Coaist  artillery. 

Total    . . 


13 
3 
3 
4 


23 


13 
3 
3 
4 


23 


39 

10 

6 

12 


13 
3 
3 

4 


67 


23 


13 


Based  on  the  organization  suggested  in  another 
chapter  as  most  suitable  for  volunteers  of  the  mo- 
bile army — the  units-of-threes  system — the  require- 
ments would  be  as  follows : 

13  regiments  of  infantry,  9  companies  and  1  depot  com- 
pany each,  total  enlisted 18,317 

3  1-3  regiments,  cavalry,  9  troops  and  1  depot  troop  each, 

total  enlisted   3,203 

3  regiments  field  artillery,  6  batteries  and  1  depot  battery, 

total  enlisted   3,522 

49  companies  coast  artillery,  total  enlisted 5,096 

6  companies  engineers,  total  enlisted 988 


Total 31,126 

97 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


The  additional  officers  required  for  these  organiza- 
tions will  comprise : 


09 

"a 

a 
o 

4a 

a 

el  CO 

a 

■ 
a 

1 

B 

a 

a 
a 
c 

X  a 

I.  e 

a 

0  0 
u  O 

n 

a 

"S. 

.a 

s 

.i  * 

J,  a 
> 

Infantry    

Cavalry   

Field   artillery 

Coast  artillery 

Total    

13 
3 
3 

4 

23 

13 
3 
3 
4 

23 

39 

10 

7 

12 

68 

169 
42 
36 
49 

296 

169 
43 
45 
49 

306 

169 
43 
45 
49 

306 

13 
3 
3 
4 

23 

7 
6 

13 

There  are  enough  extra  colonels  of  the  line,  with- 
out commands,  promoted  to  present  grade  to  rectify 
inequalities  of  rank  arising  from  former  legislation, 
to  provide  colonels  for  all  the  regiments  of  colonial 
troops.  The  officers  for  the  additional  companies 
of  engineers  can  be  provided,  at  least  temporarily, 
from  the  authorized  personnel  of  the  engineer  corps 
as  soon  as  the  vacancies  authorized  by  recent  legis- 
lation are  filled.  Should  it  develop  later  that  there 
is  need  for  more  engineer  officers  to  fulfill  these 
conditions  they  can  be  provided  by  special  legisla- 
tion. 

To  add  at  once  a  large  number  of  untrained  civil- 
ians to  the  regular  service  as  commissioned  officers 
would  lower  the  standards  of  the  army  materially 
and  require  a  long  period  for  recovery.  It  would  be 
■s\iser  to  plan  for  a  preliminary  training  and  profes- 
sional sifting  of  those  not  supplied  from  the  mili- 
tary academy  and  the  army,  and  add  approved  can- 

98 


COLONIAL   TROOPS 


didates  at  the  rate  of  not  exceeding  one-fifth  the  to- 
tal increment  each  year.  Together  with  the  vacancies 
arising  annually  from  casualties  among  the  commis- 
sioned personnel,  this  would  require  about  three 
hundred  each  year  for  five  years  to  complete  the 
quota  for  the  Colonial  Troops,  and  provide  for 
current  vacancies  occurring  normally  in  existing 
army  organizations. 

Upon  the  completion  of  this  reorganization  the  en- 
tire regular  army  as  now  organized  and  comprising 
thirty  regiments  of  infantry,  fifteen  regiments  of 
cavalry  and  six  regiments  of  field  artillery  with  a 
total  strength  of  47,077  officers  and  men  with  peace 
strength  organizations  would  be  stationed  within 
the  continental  limits  of  the  United  States  and 
Alaska. 

Should  the  unit-of-three  system  of  organization 
be  adopted,  coincident  with  the  creation  of  the  pro- 
posed body  of  Colonial  Troops,  the  number  of 
regiments  in  the  mobile  army  would  be  increased 
by  the  organization  into  regiments  of  the  surplus 
companies  arising  from  the  change  from  four  to 
three  of  these  units  to  each  battalion.  The  coast  ar- 
tillery comprises  170  companies  and  would  not  be 
modified  through  the  adoption  of  the  unit-of-three 
system  for  the  mobile  army. 

With  the  infantry  and  cavalry,  including  Colo- 
nial Troops  of  those  branches,  organized  with 
nine  companies  and  a  depot  company  to  each  and  a 
depot  battery  added  to  each  of  the  present  regi- 
ments of  field  artillery,  the  strength  of  the  army  ex- 

99 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


elusive  of  communication,  sanitary,  and  supply  corps 
units,  all  organizations  at  the  maximum  or  war 
strength,  would  be  as  follows : 

Colonial  troops   31,123 

36  regiments  of  infantry 50,724 

18  regiments  of  cavalry 17,298 

6  regiments  of  field  artillery 7,044 

170  companies  of  coast  artillery 18,931 

Total   125,120 

Such  increase  of  this  force  as  may  be  determined 
upon  should  take  into  consideration  the  serious  ob- 
stacles in  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  expensive 
special  arms  of  volunteers  and  militia  and  also  the 
necessity  for  having  a  sufficient  number  of  officers  of 
all  arms  to  insure  three  reliefs  in  each  grade  to  meet 
the  requirements  of  service  with  Colonial  Troops. 


VII 


BESERVES 

"The  firmness  requisite  for  the  real  business  of  fighting  is  only 
to  be  attained  by  a  constant  course  of  discipline  and  service." 

— ^Washington. 

A  FEW  years  ago  the  ranks  of  the  army  were 
depleted,  recruits  were  scarce  and  there  were 
not  so  many  reenlistments  as  seemed  desirable.  It 
then  became  the  policy  of  the  administration  to  re- 
gard the  service  in  the  light  of  a  career  for  the  men 
in  the  ranks  as  well  as  for  the  officers,  with  a  view 
to  having  the  small  regular  army  not  only  a  model 
for  volunteers  and  militia  but  also  a  highly-trained 
and  efficient  body  of  dependable  troops  for  immedi- 
ate military  purposes.  In  presenting  this  matter  in 
his  annual  message  to  Congress,  December  3,  1907, 
President  Roosevelt  said : 

**  Inducements  should  be  offered  sufficient  to  en- 
courage really  good  men  who  make  the  army  a  life 
occupation.  .  .  .  Increase  over  the  present  pay 
need  not  be  great  in  the  lower  grades  for  the  first 
one  or  two  enlistments,  but  the  increase  should  be 
marked  for  the  noncommissioned  officers  of  the 
upper  grades  who  serve  long  enough  to  make  it 
evident  that  they  intend  to  stay  in  the  army,  while 
additional  pay  should  be  given  for  higher  qualifica- 
tions in  target  practice.    .   .    . 

"...   the  man  who  serves  steadily  in  the  army 

101 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


should  be  treated  as  what  he  is,  that  is,  as  preemi- 
nently one  of  the  best  citizens  of  this  Republic. 
After  twelve  years '  service  in  the  army  my  own  be- 
lief is  that  the  man  should  be  given  a  preference  ac- 
cording to  his  ability  for  certain  types  of  oflSce  over 
all  civilian  applicants  without  examination    .    .    ." 

The  efforts  of  the  War  Department  to  show  Con- 
gress that  the  army  should  be  regarded  in  the  light 
of  a  professional  body  of  soldiers  were  successful, 
for  the  pay  was  increased,  special  inducements  were 
provided  for  reenlistments  and  numerous  other 
things  done  to  make  the  life  of  the  soldier  more  at- 
tractive to  the  class  of  men  desired  for  the  army. 
The  result  was  a  great  improvement ;  the  organiza- 
tions began  to  fill  up  and  enough  men  reenlisted  to 
insure  a  broad  field  of  selection  for  the  important 
grades  of  noncommissioned  officers. 

Considerable  permanency  of  personnel  is  the  basic 
element  of  the  policy  which  regards  the  regular  army 
as  a  striking  force  of  dependable  soldiers.  Such  a 
force  maintained  at  war  strength  and  not  as  skeleton 
organizations  in  peace,  constitutes  a  school  for  offi- 
cers where  they  may  practise  the  art  of  war  and 
standardize  organizations  and  methods  of  training 
so  that  they  will  constitute  acceptable  models  for  vol- 
unteers and  state  troops.  Under  this  policy  it  is  ex- 
pected that  experienced  and  dependable  soldiers, 
when  discharged  from  the  service,  will  be  available 
in  their  communities  to  assist  in  raising  and  training 
volunteers  and  filling  many  of  the  important  offices 
for  which  they  will  be  better  qualified  than  the  great 

102 


RESERVES 

body  of  patriotic  but  nninstructed  young  volunteers. 
Honorably  discharged  soldiers  who  prefer  to  return 
to  service  in  war  with  the  regulars  are  not  only  not  to 
be  deprived  of  the  privilege,  but  by  statute  author- 
ized to  receive  a  bonus  for  so  doing. 

With  the  advent  of  a  new  administration  in  the 
War  Department,  a  wholly  different  policy  as  to  the 
enlisted  personnel  of  the  army  was  brought  forward, 
which  contemplates  the  utilization  of  the  regular 
army  as  a  training  school  where  young  men  will  be 
taught  the  duties  of  the  soldier  and  then  be  trans- 
ferred to  the  reserve  for  the  remaining  period  of 
their  enlistments,  which  were  recommended  to  Con- 
gress to  be  fixed  at  eight  or  ten  years'  duration. 
Legislation  was  finally  enacted  which  fixed  the  pe- 
riod of  enlistment  at  seven  years,  of  which  four  are 
to  be  spent  with  the  colors,  and  three  in  the  reserve. 

Here  are  found  not  mere  differences  of  opinion 
concerning  a  policy,  but  two  diametrically  opposed 
policies  presented  to  the  same  Committees  of  Con- 
gress, within  a  brief  period,  and  each  carrying  the 
burden  of  considerable  appropriations.  All  human 
institutions  are  subject  to  the  laws  of  progress,  but 
care  is  necessary  to  the  end  that  mere  change  be  not 
mistaken  for  reform.  Those  military  men  whose 
views  President  Roosevelt  so  ably  championed  in 
1907  must  be  credited  with  proper  motives,  some 
ability  and  much  experience.  They  were  confronted 
with  conditions,  not  theories.  The  army  was  ill 
prepared  at  the  time  to  perform  all  the  duties  which 
actually  crowded  upon  it,  the  nature  of  which  de- 

103 


THE  AMERICAN  AEMY 


manded  a  more  perfect  military  machine  than  can 
be  produced  by  turning  our  inadequate  army  into  a 
training  school  for  reservists.  Regimental  ofl&cers, 
on  duty  with  their  organizations  and  who  are  ex- 
pected to  maintain  them  in  a  state  of  discipline  and 
efficiency  equal  to  the  difficult  and  delicate  duties 
upon  the  Mexican  border,  in  Alaska,  Panama,  Ha- 
waii, the  Philippines  and  China,  and  those  involving 
service  such  as  the  occupation  of  Cuba  upon  two 
occasions,  should  not  be  denounced  as  non-progress- 
ive if  they  view  with  some  concern  a  change  of  pol- 
icy which  may  make  their  organizations  less  depend- 
able, less  a  fulfillment  of  the  nation's  -idea  of  the 
** regulars."  It  is  wholly  unfair  to  question  the  mo- 
tives of  military  men  because  they  do  not  change 
their  views  with  every  new  suggestion,  but  await 
proof  as  to  the  soundness  of  proposed  doctrines.  Al- 
together, the  new  proposal  for  short  service  with 
the  colors  and  a  long  period  in  reserve  was  a  violent 
overturning  of  the  policy  so  recently  and  so  force- 
fully presented  to  and  adopted  by  Congress,  and  the 
opinion  that  the  new  policy  was  quite  incapable  of 
meeting  the  expectations  of  its  supporters,  except 
when  applied  to  semi-permanent  or  specially  as- 
signed organizations  and  not  to  the  army  as  a  whole, 
was  not  without  some  justification. 

Under  the  new  system  of  long  enlistments,  seven 
years,  with  part  of  the  service  in  the  reserve,  it  will 
be  many  years  before  any  material  effect  will  be 
visible  in  the  existence  of  a  body  of  dependable  re- 
servists, whose  addresses  are  listed  with  the  War 

104 


RESERVES 


Department.  If  we  assume  the  army  to  consist  of 
100,000  men,  enlisted  for  four  years '  service  with  the 
colors  and  three  in  reserve,  and  there  were  no  inci- 
dents to  occur  to  interfere  with  the  orderly  pro- 
cedure of  events,  in  theory  we  might  then  count  upon 
one-fourth  of  the  whole  or  25,000  men  annually  pass- 
ing back  into  civil  life  and  becoming  available  for  a 
call  to  arms  during  the  ensuing  three  years.  Those 
who  have  not  given  the  available  War  Department 
records  careful  study  may  well  be  surprised  at  the 
vast  difference  between  the  theoretical  and  actual 
results.  To  avoid  any  possible  selection  of  excep- 
tional examples  from  the  vast  accumulation  of  army 
records,  the  following,  within  the  author's  personal 
experience,  are  believed  to  show  conclusively  that 
the  number  of  enlisted  men  who  will  become  availa- 
ble as  reservists  upon  discharge  from  the  average 
organization  of  regulars,  will  bear  a  very  modest 
relation  to  the  total  number  whose  connection  with 
the  organization  is  severed  during  any  given  period. 
The  regimental  records  of  the  8th  U.  S.  Infantry  for 
the  year  ending  December  31, 1874,  show  the  changes 
in  personnel  as  follows : 

Discharge  by  expiration  of  service 42 

Discharge  for  disability 21 

Discharge  sentence  general  court  martial 16 

Discharge  by  order 21 

Dropped 11 

Transferred   56 

Died  7 

Deserted    74 

Total    248 

105 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


The  regiment  had  exceptionally  hard  service  dur- 
ing 1872,  1873  and  1874,  and  during  the  last-named 
year,  there  were  only  eight  reenlistments.  Deduct- 
ing those  from  the  number  discharged  by  expiration 
of  service  there  would  have  remained  but  thirty-four 
possible  reservists  out  of  a  total  of  238  lost  to  the 
regiment,  had  the  present  reserve  law  been  in  effect. 

During  the  six  months  ending  August  31, 1913,  the 
losses  from  the  Second  Division,  which  comprised 
an  average  strength  of  12,000  men  during  that  pe- 
riod, were  as  follows ; 

Discharge  by  expiration  of  service ^.  761 

Discharge  by  sentence  court  martial 202 

Discharge  without  honor 19 

Discharge  by  purchase 56 

Discharge,  all  other  causes 71 

Deserted   430 

Reenlisted    269 

Of  those  who  deserted  127  were  apprehended  or 
surrendered.  An  analysis  of  the  figures  shows  that 
for  the  six  months'  period  the  losses  of  the  Division 
aggregated  1,412.  Of  the  761  discharged  by  expira- 
tion of  service,  269  reenlisted,  leaving  492  or  about 
one-third  of  all  those  whose  connection  with  or- 
ganizations was  severed  during  the  same  period, 
available  as  possible  reservists  had  the  present  law 
been  applicable  to  them. 

The  average  monthly  enlisted  strength  of  the 
army,  exclusive  of  Philippine  scouts,  between  July 
1,  1912,  and  June  30,  1913,  was  86,140.    During  the 

106 


RESERVES 


same  period  the  losses  from  all  causes  totaled  25,349 
men  distributed  as  follows : 

Expiration  of  period  of  enlistment 12,095 

Discharge  for  disability 1,056 

Discharged  by  sentence  general  court  martial.  2,729 

Discharged  by  order 4,278 

Died  of  wounds,  disease,  accidents,  drowned, 

suicide  and  homicide 398 

Deserted  4,451 

Retired   342 

Reenlisted  during  same  period 7,033 

Had  the  reserve  law  been  applicable  to  all  men  dis- 
charged during  the  year  the  number  of  possible  re- 
servists would  have  been  5,349  out  of  25,349,  whose 
connection  with  the  service  was  severed  from  all 
causes. 

In  this  connection  it  is  of  interest  to  note  the  de- 
creasing rate  of  reenlistments  which  for  all  branches 
was  in  1911, 14,172 ;  in  1912, 11,601 ;  and  during  1913, 
7,033;  only  about  one-half  the  number  of  reenlist- 
ments as  in  1911.  The  cause  of  this  falling  off  in  re- 
enlistments  may  be  fairly  traced  to  the  marked 
change  of  policy  already  alluded  to  and  to  widely 
published  accounts  of  testimony  given  before  Con- 
gressional Committees  and  numerous  public  inter- 
views antagonistic  to  men  who  under  previous  en- 
couragement had  decided  to  make  their  careers  in 
the  army. 

Assuming  that  the  new  system,  a  wholly  different 
scheme  from  any  in  the  great  armies  of  Europe, 
where  the  local  authorities  have  control  of  the  re- 

107 


THI5   AMERICAN  ARMY 


serves,  does  not  break  down  before  a  war  there  will 
probably  arise  an  infinite  trouble  of  execution  ex- 
cept in  the  cases  of  those  who  really  wish  to  return 
to  the  service  when  summoned.  Those  who  have 
married,  established  homes  for  their  families  and 
perhaps  invested  their  all  in  some  business,  will 
surely  appeal  for  release,  and  in  all  probability  they 
will  be  sustained  by  the  sentiment  of  the  community, 
because  the  summons  will  have  the  appearance  of 
unfairness  and  it  will  be  viewed  as  a  hardship  to  take 
such  men,  when  others  perhaps  without  family  ties 
of  a  character  to  prevent  service  are  not  required  to 
share  in  the  national  defense.  Herein  lieS  the  dif- 
ference between  a  country  with  a  small  regular  army 
and  a  European  nation-in-arms,  where  conscription 
places  the  same  duty  upon  all.  It  may  be  properly 
claimed  that  the  individual,  who  as  a  lad  signed  a 
reserve  agreement  for  seven  or  ten  years,  has  no  just 
cause  of  complaint,  but  there  can  be  but  little  doubt 
that  in  a  nation  where  there  is  no  general  resentment 
at  being  taxed  for  pensions  to  deserters  of  the  Civil 
War,  there  will  be  abundant  and  successful  sym- 
pathy for  individual  reservists,  in  civil  life,  who  no 
longer  feel  the  spirit  calling  to  arms.  In  such  a  sit- 
uation. Congress  may  in  one  vote  destroy  the  re- 
sults of  years  of  efforts  and  call  for  volunteers  as 
of  old,  in  order  to  release  the  reservists  from  an 
obligation  under  which  they  have  become  restive  be- 
cause of  their  paucity  in  numbers  in  so  large  a  na- 
tion, and  for  the  further  reason  that  other  men  with 
good  discharges  from  the  army  who  are  not  reserv- 

108 


RESERVES 


ists  may  reenlist  in  war  and  receive  a  material 
bounty  for  so  doing. 

In  this  connection  it  may  be  well  to  cite  a  compila- 
tion— widely  published — showing  the  ages  attributed 
to  those  who  enlisted  in  the  Union  Army  during  the 
Civil  War: 

Those  10  years  and  under 25 

Those  11  years  and  under 38 

Those  12  years  and  under 225 

Those  13  years  and  under 300 

Those  14  years  and  under 1,523 

Those  15  years  and  under 104,987 

Those  16  years  and  under 231,051 

Those  17  years  and  under 844,891 

Those  18  years  and  under 1,151,438 

Those  21  years  and  under 2,159,798 

Those  22  years  and  over 618,511 

Those  25  years  and  over 46,462 

Those  44  years  and  over 16,071 

Of  the  total  men  enlisted,  2,778,304,  less^than  one- 

fojirth  were  over  21  years  of  age.  ' 

The  statistics  relating  to  very  young  boys — ^mere 
children — have  often  been  questioned,  but  it  should 
be  remembered  that  the  enlistment  of  young  boys 
as  drummers  and  fifers  was  formerly  authorized. 
The  author  entered  the  government  service  at 
twelve  years  and  six  months  of  age  and  was  em- 
ployed in  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland  as  a 
mounted  dispatch  messenger  during  1864.  The  just 
conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  the  tabulation  are  that 
in  past  wars  the  young  unmarried  men  and  boys  con- 
stituted the  main  fighting  force. 

109 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


The  present  law  provides  for  a  seven  years'  en- 
listment, four  years  with  the  colors  and  three  in  re- 
serve, or  should  the  soldier  elect,  he  may  be  trans- 
ferred to  the  reserve  after  three  years'  service  with 
an  organization.  The  reserve  may  be  further  in- 
creased by  enlistment  or  reenlistment  of  men  mth 
honorable  discharges  from  the  army,  but  during  the 
year  following  the  passage  of  the  law  only  eight  men 
had  enlisted  in  the  reserve,  one  of  whom  enlisted  in 
Porto  Rico,  and  at  the  expiration  of  two  and  a  half 
years,  only  seventeen  men  had  become  reservists. 

Existing  statutes  provide  that  in  time  of  war  or 
when  war  is  imminent,  and  after  the  President  shall, 
by  proclamation,  have  called  upon  honorably  dis- 
charged soldiers  of  the  regular  army  to  present 
themselves  for  reenlistment,  physically  qualified, 
honorably  discharged  soldiers  under  forty-five  years 
of  age  not  furloughed  to  the  reserve,  may  be  re- 
enlisted  and  receive  a  bounty  based  upon  the  time 
elapsed  since  their  discharge  from  the  army  not  ex- 
ceeding three  hundred  dollars  in  any  case.  Men  of 
this  class  are  intended  to  be  utilized  to  fill  up  the 
army  in  the  same  manner  as  men  furloughed  to  the 
reserve.  The  President  may  summon  the  latter  class, 
however,  only  in  tlie  event  of  actual  or  theoretical 
hostilities,  when  so  authorized  hy  Cofigress,  and  in 
event  of  reservists  being  called  back  to  the  colors  all 
distinctions  of  rank  vanish  and  noncommissioned 
staff  ofiicers,  sergeants  and  corporals,  report  as  pri- 
vates, while  their  inferiors  in  military  qualifications 

110 


RESERVES 


may  aspire  to  the  higher  offices  in  the  volunteers 
raised  in  every  war. 

Under  the  old  militia  laws  which  prevailed  for 
quite  a  century,  it  was  the  duty  of  the  captain  or  the 
mustering  officer  of  each  district  to  keep  a  record  of 
all  men  subject  to  military  duty.  This  embraced 
those  males  born  in  the  district  and  who  continued 
to  reside  there  until  of  militia  age,  as  well  as  those 
who  moved  in  from  other  districts.  It  is  no  longer 
the  duty  of  any  official  to  watch  over  these  matters 
and  only  the  total  of  militia  age  available  may  be 
surmised  by  analysis  of  the  census  records.  There 
is  no  uniform  military  hierarchy  in  state  or  nation 
at  this  time  which  may  be  depended  upon  to  main- 
tain that  intimate  knowledge  of  the  reservists  which 
will  be  essential  in  procuring  their  prompt  return  to 
the  army  in  event  of  war. 

The  result  of  many  years  of  study  of  the  military 
history  of  our  country  has  brought  the  conviction 
that  it  is  only  by  maintaining  the  small  regular  army 
always  at  war  strength,  and  establishing  regimental 
depots,  that  we  may  count  upon  readiness  to  strike 
and  upon  the  necessary  flow  of  men  to  fill  the  vacan- 
cies incurred  in  campaign,  and  that  for  the  greater 
war  force  we  must  provide  for  the  maintenance  of 
federal  volunteers  in  peace,  with  depots  in  each  dis- 
trict, which  will  insure  a  flow  of  trained  men  to  keep 
those  organizations  at  full  strength  in  war.  It  is  prob- 
able that  men  in  each  district  who  have  served  the 
prescribed  period  of  training  in  local  volunteer  or- 

111 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


ganizations  will  either  rejoin  them  for  war  or  join 
new  volunteer  organizations,  as  officers  or  noncom- 
missioned officers,  without  being  carried  as  members 
of  a  reserve. 

A  force  of  federal  volunteers  will  attract  the  patri- 
otic young  men  who  feel  the  obligation  to  qualify  for 
the  service  of  the  nation  in  war,  but  who  may  not  be 
counted  upon  ever  to  attach  themselves  to  militia 
organizations  which  are  more  and  more  frequently 
employed  for  the  preservation  of  order  during  labor 
troubles.  Strike  and  riot  duty  have  been  well  per- 
formed by  many  state  organizations,  but  it  is  not  the 
type  of  service  which  appeals  to  young  jnen  gen- 
erally. It  is  not  contemplated  that  the  potential  re- 
serve of  federal  volunteers  shall  ever  be  called  into 
active  service  except  for  training  and  actual  war. 

It  is  more  than  probable  that  the  seeming  unpop- 
ularity of  service  in  militia  organizations,  under 
state  control,  and  which  prevents  those  forces  from 
ever  becoming  the  dependable  national  reserve  re- 
quired for  war,  will  continue  as  long  as  their  use  as 
constabulary  prevails.  With  a  century  of  experi- 
ence in  the  effort  to  avoid  the  maintenance  of  a  con- 
siderable regular  army  by  giving  encouragement  to 
militia,  we  are  compelled  to  admit  that  the  evidence 
is  all  against  the  theory  that  the  state  organizations 
will  ever  constitute  a  dependable  reserve  available 
for  service  with  federal  troops.  We  may  continue 
the  hope  that  a  body  of  men  worthy  the  name  of  re- 
serve may  materialize  under  the  existing  militia  stat- 
utes, but  it  is  vain  when  we  consider  the  probable 

112 


RESERVES 


field  of  action  of  any  army  we  may  need  in  the  years 
to  come. 

Much  has  been  written  recently  concerning  the 
practicability  and  value  of  the  short  enlistment  as  a 
means  of  increasing  the  reserves  of  partially  trained 
soldiers.  There  can  be  no  question  that  under  ex- 
perienced officers  and  noncommissioned  officers,  the 
average  group  of  recruits  may  be  taught  the  drill 
regulations  and  trained  in  field  firing  sufficiently  in 
six  months  to  prepare  them  to  render  valuable  serv- 
ice in  war,  provided  the  whole  period  is  devoted 
solely  to  instruction.  There  is  a  vast  difference, 
however,  between  such  an  organization  and  a  body  of 
soldiers  prepared  for  active  service  and  any  attempt 
to  turn  the  whole  regular  army  into  such  a  training 
school  will  disqualify  the  organizations  as  to  readi- 
ness to  meet  immediate  demands  for  distant  service. 
The  experiment  has  been  tried  in  a  few  organiza- 
tions, and  it  is  entirely  practicable  to  give  the  mat- 
ter a  more  generous  trial,  but  the  organizations  des- 
ignated as  training  schools  should  be  removed  from 
the  roster  for  active  service. 

The  recent  establishment  of  two  or  three  summer 
camps  for  college  students  is  justified  from  the  stand- 
point of  arousing  interest  and  creating  a  public  opin- 
ion, but  if  relied  upon  to  produce  trained  men  for  the 
ranks,  or  qualified  aspirants  for  command,  they  will 
bring  disappointment,  because  from  the  very  nature 
of  our  needs  the  results  of  the  camps  must  be  insig- 
nificant. A  few  of  the  larger  colleges  and  universi- 
ties have  for  years  been  turning  out  well-drilled 

113 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


young  men  from  their  cadet  corps,  who  constitute 
splendid  material  for  officers  and  noncommissioned 
officers  of  the  proposed  reserve  of  federal  volun- 
teers. 

When  we  consider  the  ages  attributed  to  upwards 
of  two  million  of  the  young  men  who  fought  in  the 
Civil  War,  it  would  seem  that  without  turning  our- 
selves into  a  nation-in-arms  we  could  safely  give  en- 
couragement to  the  extension  of  the  military  depart- 
ments already  existing  in  schools  and  universities, 
and  the  establishment  of  a  government  school  in 
every  state  for  the  education  and  military  training 
of  young  men  as  officers  of  volunteers.  It  should  be 
borne  in  mind  at  all  times  that  training  our  boys  and 
young  men  in  sanitation,  military  exercises  and 
marksmanship  does  not  in  the  least  subject  the  na- 
tion to  a  just  charge  of  so-called  militarism,  for  such 
instruction  is  for  the  purpose  of  fitting  them  phys- 
ically and  technically  for  the  arduous  duties  of  a  sol- 
dier's life.  Without  such  training,  they  more  readily 
fall  victims  of  preventable  diseases.  If  never  called 
to  serve  in  war,  their  training  is  not  lost,  for  through 
it,  they  have  become  more  valuable  citizens  in  their 
several  communities.  The  statutes  relieving  certain 
religious  sects  from  military  service  should  all  be  re- 
pealed in  order  that  the  available  members  of  such 
bodies  may  be  employed  in  the  hospitals,  supply  de- 
pots and  in  other  ways  to  relieve  able-bodied  men 
whose  religious  principles  do  not  deny  them  the 
right  to  use  force  in  defense  of  their  liberty  or  to 
resist  encroachments  upon  their  native  soil. 

114 


RESERVES 


The  value  of  a  body  of  trained  soldiers,  in  reserve, 
carried  on  furlough  from  their  organizations,  is 
theoretically  of  highest  potentiality.  The  essence 
of  failure  of  the  system  in  our  country  lies  in  the 
fact  that  our  army  has  never  been  territorialized. 
When  that  is  accomplished,  we  may  then  develop  a 
genuine  asset  in  local  reserves,  trained  in  regiments 
devoted  to  the  instruction  of  short  term  men  while 
the  current  demands  upon  the  army  for  over-sea  and 
other  service  are  met  by  war  strength  organizations 
with  regimental  depots  for  training  their  owti  re- 
cruits. Many  of  our  experienced  officers  in  the  past 
have  deemed  the  utilization  of  men  with  former  serv- 
ice as  most  appropriate  with  the  new  volunteers, 
and  particularly  that  men  discharged  as  regimental 
noncommissioned  staff  officers,  and  as  sergeants  of 
companies,  would  be  more  valuable  as  officers  or  non- 
commissioned officers  of  high  grade  in  the  volun- 
teers than  if  brought  back  to  serve  under  the  re- 
serve system  as  privates  in  the  regulars.  Any  sys- 
tem which  induces  men  of  former  service  to  reenter 
in  war  meets  with  general  approval,  the  difference 
of  opinion  being  solely  as  to  where  they  may  be  best 
utilized. 

The  young  men  who  enlist  and  follow  the  flag  to 
distant  shores  should  be  given  every  encouragement 
while  in  the  service  to  qualify  themselves  for  ad- 
vancement. The  number  of  commissions  available 
in  the  regular  army  is  sufficient  to  reward  only  a  very 
small  proportion  of  the  good  men.  Every  civil  serv- 
ice position  under  the  War  Department  and  many  in 

115 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


the  postoffice  and  possibly  other  departments  should 
be  given  to  discharged  soldiers  qualified  for  the  va- 
rious duties.  Once  adopted,  the  men  would  strive  to 
reach  a  high  degree  of  fitness  and  an  honorable  dis- 
charge with  a  certificate  from  the  commanding  offi- 
cer should  take  the  place  of  the  civil  service  exam- 
ination. 

In  time  of  war  it  is  of  immense  advantage  to  have 
railway  employees  familiar  with  army  conditions  and 
movements.  It  is  not  too  much  to  expect  that  a  cam- 
paign of  education  among  railroad  presidents  would 
develop  a  spirit  in  harmony  with  a  scheme  that 
would  send  a  small  but  constant  stream  of  young 
men  of  certified  character  and  fine  physique  to  their 
roads  for  employment.  Men  who  have  served  two 
or  three  enlistments  in  the  army  are  usually  manly, 
straightforward  soldiers,  whose  characters  are  well 
established.  They  have  ever  been  the  backbone  of 
the  discipline  and  esprit  which  has  always  carried 
the  regular  organizations  to  victory. 

Similar  experience,  even  if  briefer,  in  the  federal 
volunteers,  should  gradually  make  available  in  every 
district  an  ever  increasing  number  of  trained,  relia- 
ble men  of  great  value.  Their  communities  will 
gradually  come  to  recognize  them  and  also  the  value 
of  the  system  which  produces  such  men. 


vm 


BEGIMENTAL  DEPOTS 


"It  Is  mucli  easier  at  all  times  to  prevent  an  evil  than  to  rectify 
mistakes;  it  is  infinitely  better  to  have  a  few  good  men  than 
many  indifferent  ones." — Washington. 

A  DEPOT  system  for  passing  trained  men  into 
the  ranks  of  organizations  employed  in  active 
campaign  is  absolutely  essential  to  an  economical 
and  efficient  conduct  of  war.  Our  wars  have  all  been 
excessively  expensive  due  to  the  neglect  of  this  most 
important  feature  of  military  organization.  Dur- 
ing the  Civil  War  the  killed  represented  only  a 
small  fraction  of  the  losses  in  the  average  regiment. 
Sickness,  with  long  periods  of  convalescence,  de- 
sertions, and  reported  missing,  constituted  together 
an  appalling  total.  The  large  regiments  that  went 
to  the  front  shrunk  rapidly  in  numbers  and  although 
the  reduced  organizations  represented  the  survival 
of  the  fittest,  and  grew  daily  more  valuable  with  ex- 
perience of  camp,  march  and  battle,  it  was  only  a 
question  of  time  when  by  mere  attrition  many  of 
them  ceased  to  be  regiments  except  in  name.  Regi- 
ments which  had  entered  the  service  with  a  thousand 
or  more  strong  soon  fell  to  half  that  number.  In  the 
meantime,  the  number  of  officers  and  noncommis- 
sioned officers  remained  constant  so  that  the  real 
loss  fell  upon  the  bone  and  sinew  of  the  fighting 
force — the  privates.     Some  relief  was  demanded 

117 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


from  a  system  which  was  rapidly  sapping  the 
strength  of  the  various  armies.  New  regiments  of 
volunteers  with  full  quotas  of  officers  were  con- 
stantly^ coming  into  service.  The  remedy  applied  by 
Congress  was  drastic,  extravagant  and  calculated  to 
discourage  the  whole  army  in  the  field  through  the 
loss  of  its  trained  officers  and  noncommissioned  of- 
ficers. The  sections  of  the  law  enacted  which  gave 
the  most  severe  blow  to  efficiency  directed  that  when- 
ever a  regiment  of  volunteers  should  become  reduced 
to  one-half  the  maximum  number  prescribed  by  law, 
the  President  was  authorized  to  direct  the  consolida- 
tion of  the  companies  of  such  a  regiment,  and  the 
War  Department  order  issued  in  conformity  with 
the  law,  directed  that  each  regiment  ''of  the  volun- 
teer army  now  reduced,  or  that  may  be  reduced  here- 
after, as  set  forth  in  said  sections,"  should  be  con- 
solidated into  six,  or  a  less  number  of  companies  and 
the  colonel,  major,  one  assistant  surgeon  and  such 
company  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  as 
might  be  rendered  supernumerary  by  the  consolida- 
tion should  be  mustered  out  of  service. 

General  Sherman  emerged  from  the  Civil  War 
with  a  reputation  for  soldierly  ability  second  only  to 
that  of  General  Grant.  As  a  military  student  and  a 
forceful  writer  his  reputation  is  unexcelled.  That 
he  was  quick  to  discern  the  evil  effects  of  the  con- 
solidation order  and  prompt  in  his  efforts  to  bring 
the  military  mistake  to  public  attention  may  be  best 
shown  by  quoting  a  letter  written  to  his  distin- 
guished brother,  then  a  senator : 

118 


REGIMENTAL   DEPOTS 


*'Camp  Befoke  Vicksbukg,  April  23,  1863. 
"Dear  Brother — I  have  noticed  in  the  Conscript 
Act  the  clauses  which  empowered  the  President  to 
consolidate  the  ten  companies  of  a  regiment  into 
five,  when  the  aggregate  was  below  one-half  the  max- 
imum standard,  and  to  reduce  the  officers  accord- 
ingly. Had  I  dreamed  that  this  was  going  to  be 
made  universal,  I  should  have  written  you  and 
begged  you  for  the  love  of  our  ruined  country  to  im- 
plore Lincoln  to  spare  us  this  last  fatal  blow.  Two 
years  of  costly  war  have  enabled  the  North  to  realize 
the  fact  that  by  organized  and  disciplined  armies 
alone  can  she  hope  to  restore  the  old  and  found  a 
new  empire.  We  had  succeeded  in  making  the  skel- 
etons of  armies,  eliminating  out  of  the  crude  mate- 
rials that  first  came  forth  the  worthless  material, 
and  had  just  begun  to  have  some  good  young  colo- 
nels, captains,  sergeants  and  corporals.  And  Con- 
gress had  passed  the  Conscript  Bill,  which  would 
have  enabled  the  President  to  fill  up  these  skeleton 
regiments  full  of  privates  who  soon,  from  their  fel- 
lows, and  with  experienced  officers,  would  make  an 
army  capable  of  marching  and  being  handled  and  di- 
rected. But  to  my  amazement  comes  this  order. 
This  is  a  far  worse  defeat  than  Manassas.  Mr. 
Wade,  in  his  report  to  condemn  McClellan,  gave  a 
positive  assurance  to  the  army  that  henceforth,  in- 
stead of  fighting  with  diminishing  ranks,  we  should 
feel  assured  that  the  gaps  made  by  the  bullet,  by  dis- 
ease, desertion,  etc.,  would  be  promptly  filled,  where- 
as only  such  parts  of  the  Conscript  Law  as  tend 

119 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


to  weaken  us  are  enforced,  viz. :  five  per  cent,  for  fur- 
lough and  fifty  per  cent,  of  officers  and  noncommis- 
sioned officers  discharged  to  consolidate  regiments. 
Even  Blair  is  amazed  at  this.  He  protests  the  order 
can  not  be  executed,  and  we  should  appeal  to  Mr. 
Lincoln,  whom  he  still  insists  has  no  desire  to  destroy 
the  army.  But  the  order  is  positive  and  I  don't  see 
how  we  can  hesitate.  Grant  started  to-day  down  to 
Carthage,  and  I  have  written  to  him,  which  may 
stave  it  off  for  a  few  days,  but  I  tremble  at  the  loss 
of  so  many  young  and  good  officers,  who  have  been 
hard  at  work  for  two  years,  and  now  that  they  be- 
gin to  see  how  to  take  care  of  soldiers,  must  be 
turned  out.   .   .   . 

**If  not  too  late,  do,  for  mercy's  sake,  exhaust 
your  influence  to  stop  this  consolidation  of  regi- 
ments. Fill  all  the  regiments  with  conscripts,  and 
if  the  army  is  then  too  large  disband  the  regiments 
that  prefer  to  serve  north  of  the  Potomac  and  the 
Ohio.  Keep  the  war  south  at  all  hazards.  If  this 
Consolidation  Law  is  literally  enforced,  and  no  new 
draft  is  made,  this  campaign  is  over.  And  the  out- 
side world  will  have  a  perfect  right  to  say  our  Gov- 
ernment is  afraid  of  its  own  people.    .   .   . 

**  Affectionately  yours, 

''W.  T.  Sherman." 

Having  applied  the  thoroughly  democratic  and 
righteous  rule  of  conscription  to  carry  on  the  war  in 
which  the  life  of  the  nation  was  at  stake,  Congress 
had  full  power  to  demand  that  the  law  be  executed 

120 


EEGIMENTAL   DEPOTS 


in  such  manner  as  to  fill  the  ranks  of  all  existing 
regiments  and  that  the  raising  of  new  regiments  be 
stopped.  The  very  provisions  for  mustering  out  re- 
*  duced  regiments  constituted  an  acknowledgment  that 
the  other  part  of  the  law  providing  conscription  to 
fill  the  ranks  was  doomed  to  failure. 

Much  of  the  writing  in  which  prominent  officers  of 
the  Civil  War  indulged  subsequent  to  the  close  of 
that  conflict  bore  generally  upon  discussions  of  va- 
rious campaigns  and  battles.  A  very  few  urged  the 
nation  to  profit  by  the  lessons  of  that  war  and  al- 
most without  exception  their  words  were  unheeded. 
The  clearest  proof  of  this  exists  in  the  fact  that  prac- 
tically nothing  had  been  done  to  perfect  a  depot  sys- 
tem of  meeting  losses  at  the  front  at  the  time  war 
with  Spain  was  declared.  Everything  done  from 
April,  1898,  until  the  close  of  the  Philippine  Insur- 
rection was  pushed  with  characteristic  American 
vigor,  but  an  historical  examination  of  the  sequence 
of  events  and  the  remedies  applied  leaves  the  con- 
viction that  nearly  all  legislative,  administrative  and 
executive  action  was  based  on  emergency  considera- 
tion and  the  expediency  of  the  moment.  The  coun- 
try gloried  in  the  easy  victory  ovar  Spain,  but  re- 
mained anchored  to  an  obsolete  and  defective  sys- 
tem of  maintaining  the  fighting  efficiency  of  its  field 
armies  so  far  as  filling  the  losses  in  campaign.  His- 
tory will  repeat  itself,  and  unless  a  remedy  is  found 
in  peace  which  will  function  in  war,  similar  condi- 
tions will  prevail  again.  When  the  war  with  Spain 
was  declared,  instead  of  having  a  plan  which  had 

121 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


received  the  sanction  of  Congress,  the  hands  of  the 
clock  were  turned  back  to  1861.  Volunteer  regi- 
ments were  brought  into  service  and  hurried  to 
large  camps  before  proper  provision  could  be  made 
for  them.  Thousands  of  recruits  were  enlisted  for  the 
regular  army,  but  as  nearly  all  the  regiments  had 
gone  to  Cuba  before  the  recruits  could  join  and  be 
equipped  and  there  were  no  established  regimental 
depots,  the  men  were  assembled  in  large  numbers, 
under  a  few  strange  officers  rebelling  at  heart  at  be- 
ing compelled  to  remain  behind  when  their  comrades 
were  joining  battle  with  the  enemy.  It  was  nobody 's 
business  to  look  after  the  men  of  any  particular  or- 
ganization. If  another  war  is  allowed  to  find  the  na- 
tion with  no  better  system  for  expanding  the  army 
and  maintaining  its  efficiency  in  the  field,  so  far  as 
replenishment  of  its  ranks  is  concerned,  public  con- 
demnation will  follow  as  surely  as  it  did  in  1898, 
even  though  that  same  public  may  continue  quite  in- 
different to  the  whole  subject  of  army  efficiency  un- 
til war  is  declared. 

To  accomplish  proper  results,  some  form  of  de- 
pot organization  is  absolutely  necessary.  There  may 
be  several  feasible  plans  for  accomplishing  the  pur- 
pose, but  the  essential  thing  to  be  borne  in  mind  is 
that  in  preparing  each  regiment  for  war  there  must 
be  a  prearranged  plan  under  which  the  regiment  will 
know  that  its  sick  and  wounded  will  not  only  be 
cared  for  but  returned  to  duty  through  its  ot\ti  de- 
pot, without  undue  delay,  and  that  permanent  va- 
cancies in  the  ranks  will  be  filled  with  acceptable  re- 

122 


REGIMENTAL   DEPOTS 


emits,  trained  by  those  interested  in  the  welfare  of 
the  regiment.  These  questions  satisfactorily  solved 
make  for  economy,  contentment  and  efficiency.  The 
depot  system  here  mentioned  should  not  be  con- 
founded with  the  experiment  with  **home  battalions" 
during  the  Philippine  Insurrection  and  the  last  oc- 
cupation of  Cuba. 

As  a  military  proposition  strong  regiments  make 
for  good  morale,  increased  confidence  and  battle  effi- 
ciency. Weakness  in  the  real  battle  element,  the 
fighting  privates,  on  the  other  hand,  stands  for  dis- 
couragement, excessive  guard  and  fatigue  duty  and 
a  lowered  capacity  for  efficient  military  employment 
of  all  kinds.  A  regiment,  in  the  mind  of  the  average 
general  officer,  stands  for  a  specific  organization 
possessing  certain  vital  characteristics,  and  when- 
ever the  number  of  men  in  the  ranks  has  become  re- 
duced to  one-half  or  one-third  the  proper  number, 
that  particular  organization  suffers  in  consequence. 

Very  early  in  the  Civil  War  this  question  of  fill- 
ing up  organizations  at  the  front  became  acute,  and 
on  December  3, 1861,  an  order  was  issued  forbidding 
any  more  regiments  of  volunteers  to  be  raised  ex- 
cept upon  the  special  requisition  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment, and  at  the  same  time  established  a  recruiting 
service  under  general  superintendents  for  each 
state,  with  general  depots  for  the  collection  and  in- 
struction of  recruits.  The  futility  of  this  plan  was 
soon  recognized  and  early  in  1862  officers  detailed 
for  the  volunteer  recruiting  service  were  directed  to 
recruit  for  their  own  regiments.    Later  in  the  year 

123 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


it  was  ordered  that  all  men  who  desired,  singly  or  by- 
squads,  to  join  any  particular  regiment  or  company 
in  the  field,  should  be  enrolled  and  forwarded  at 
once  and  that  ''recruits  for  regiments  now  in  the 
field  will  be  permitted  to  select  any  company  of  the 
regiment  they  may  prefer.*' 

That  the  absence  of  a  prearranged  depot  system 
was  a  constant  source  of  embarrassment  is  evidenced 
by  repeated  orders  and  instructions  on  the  subject 
such  as : 

*'A  large  number  of  volunteers  are  absent  from 
their  regiments  who  are  now  fit  for  duty.  To  enable 
them  to  return,  the  Governors  of  States,  are  author- 
ized to  give  them  certificates  or  passes  which  will 
entitle  them  to  transportation  to  the  station  of  the 
nearest  United  States  Mustering  Officer  or  Quarter- 
master, who  will  pay  the  cost  of  transportation  for 
the  soldier  to  his  regiment  or  station. ' ' 

*'At  large  camps,  depots,  or  posts,  where  ab- 
sentees arrive  en  route  to  their  companies,  the  com- 
manding officers  will  immediately  set  apart  a  par- 
ticular place  where  the  men  may  be  quartered,  in 
buildings,  tents,  or  huts,  as  soon  as  they  arrive,  and 
may,  without  delay,  receive  food  and  clothing.  Par- 
ties will  be  detailed  to  await  at  landing  places  the 
arrival  of  such  soldiers,  and  to  direct  them  to  their 
quarters.  They  will  be  assigned  immediately  to 
temporary  companies,  composed  as  far  as  possible 
of  men  from  the  same  regiments  or  brigades.    .   .    . " 

There  was  much  vacillation  of  policy.  On  April 
3,  1862,  orders  were  issued  that  recruiting  parties 

124 


REGIMENTAL   DEPOTS 


for  the  volunteer  service  should  be  disbanded,  the 
public  property  used  in  connection  therewith  sold 
to  the  best  advantage  and  the  offices  closed.  On  the 
first  of  the  following  month  it  was  announced  that 
authority  would  be  given  to  governors  of  the  re- 
spective states  to  recruit  for  regiments  in  service 
when  requested  by  commanders  of  armies  in  the 
field,  and  on  July  25, 1862,  orders  were  issued  estab- 
lishing the  recruiting  service  for  each  volunteer  regi- 
ment in  the  field. 

All  of  which  goes  to  show  the  economic  desirabil- 
ity of  fixing  upon  a  plan  in  peace  when  there  are  not 
so  many  conflicting  interests  to  be  subserved.  Of 
course  it  is  well  understood  that  the  policy  of  to- 
day may  be  destroyed  to-morrow,  even  if  established 
in  conformity  to  law,  but  it  is  certain  that  carefully 
devised  plans  written  in  the  statutes  in  peace  are 
not  so  apt  to  be  overturned  in  war  as  those  brought 
forward  as  hasty  and  ill-digested  schemes  based  on 
the  expediency  of  the  moment. 

In  order  to  obtain  the  views  of  general  officers  of 
experience  in  the  war  with  Spain,  a  study  of  a  de- 
pot system  was  prepared  by  the  author  and  sub- 
mitted some  years  ago  to  a  number  of  them  and  the 
following  excerpts  exhibit  their  views  on  this  very 
important  question : 

Lieutenant-General  J.  C.  Bates : 

"You  so  well  state  the  necessity  for  a  depot  sys- 
tem and  the  advantage  of  a  home  station  for  the 
regiment  in  the  field  that  I  fully  agree  with  you 
except  on  one  point,  that  is,  the  organization  of  in- 

125 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


fantry.  I  am  fully  convinced  that  the  enlisted 
strength  of  a  company  of  infantry  should  not  be 
greater  than  104.  ...  I  believe  this  is  as  large  a 
body  as  a  captain,  not  mounted,  can  control,  and  I 
think  the  commander  of  a  company  of  infantry 
should  not  be  mounted.    .    .    .** 

Major-General  F.  D.  Grant : 

"Permit  me  to  say  that  your  proposition  in  gen- 
eral for  recruiting  regiments  at  the  front  and  feed- 
ing the  firing  line  in  time  of  war  is  not  only  interest- 
ing and  of  great  value,  but  must  be  regarded  by  all 
serious-minded  men  as  of  vital  importance ;  your  ar- 
ticle strikes  me  as  being  more  interesting  than  any- 
thing ever  suggested  before  on  that  line  in  this 
country.  .  .  .  The  fact  that  Congress  must  be  ap- 
pealed to  in  the  matter  should  not  deter  those  who  are 
charged  with  the  task  of  preserving  the  best  wel- 
fare of  the  army,  to  go  to  any  extent  necessary  in 
order  to  prevent  a  recurrence  of  the  deplorable  ex- 
perience of  the  great  Civil  War  as  well  as  those 
which  would  have  happened  in  the  recent  Spanish- 
American  war  had  it  continued.'* 

Major-General  J.  M.  Lee: 

**I  fully  agree  with  you  as  to  the  necessity  for  de- 
pots; but  I  believe  the  depot  'home  company' 
taken  from  each  battalion  will  prove  an  expensive 
and  unsatisfactory  experiment.  I  am  not,  however, 
wedded  to  any  special  plan.  The  desideratum  is,  to 
find  some  method  which  will  fill  up  the  old  regiments 
in  time  of  war  instead  of  letting  them  run  down  to 
skeletons  by  organizing  new  regiments.    .    .    ." 

126 


REGIMENTAL   DEPOTS 


Major-General  J.  F.  Bell: 

"...  There  is  no  question  but  that  the  system 
of  furnishing  recruits  to  organizations  in  the  field 
during  time  of  war  is  badly  in  need  of  reform.  I 
know  of  no  better  suggestion  that  has  ever  been 
made,  than  the  one  you  suggest,  and  I  should  be 
greatly  pleased  to  see  a  systematic  plan,  based  upon 
your  suggestions,  given  a  fair  trial.  I  believe  it 
would  work  far  more  satisfactorily  than  the  present 
system.  During  the  time  I  commanded  a  volunteer 
regiment  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  I  frequently 
found  it  necessary  to  send  an  officer  to  collect  the 
men  who  were  in  hospitals  and  who  had  worked  their 
way  back  to  the  headquarters  of  the  regiment  in  the 
city  of  Manila.  This  led  to  the  detailing  of  an  of- 
ficer to  remain  at  those  headquarters  all  the  time, 
and  thereafter  I  had  no  trouble  having  men  re- 
turned to  the  regiment  as  soon  as  fit  for  duty,  in- 
stead of  attaching  them  to  the  headquarters  in 
Manila." 

Brigadier-General  F.  Funston : 

**  Your  arguments  in  favor  of  a  depot  company  for 
each  battalion  are  very  convincing,  but  would  it  not 
be  better  in  case  of  volunteer  regiments  to  send  each 
regiment  to  the  front  as  a  whole,  and  as  the  cam- 
paign progressed  and  the  inevitable  number  of  sick 
and  wounded  convalescents  became  available,  to  send 
those  for  each  regiment  to  some  previously  desig- 
nated place  in  the  State  or  general  locality  whence 
the  regiment  came,  to  constitute  the  nucleus  of  a 
depot  detachment  for  the  regiment?    .    .    .    Two 

127 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


months  of  any  kind  of  service  would  furnish  enough 
men,  unequal  to  duty  at  the  front,  who  would  be  glad 
enough  to  come  home  and  drill  recruits. '  * 

Brigadier-General  C.  C.  C.  Carr: 

"I  have  been  so  strongly  impressed  by  the  array 
of  facts  and  the  effective  manner  in  which  they  have 
been  employed  as  a  foundation  for  your  argument 
and  appeal  for  a  better  method  of  keeping  up  to  their 
maximum  efficiency  the  different  arms  of  the  service 
in  time  of  war,  that  nothing  has  been  left  for  me  to 
suggest  except  the  adoption  of  the  scheme  you  have 
proposed  and  an  early  trial  of  it  with  such  means  as 
may  be  available.  In  my  opinion,  the^only  possi- 
bility of  securing  it  is  in  time  of  peace,  when  there 
are  few  persons  interested  in  opposing  it,  and  bring- 
ing the  whole  power  of  the  government  to  bear  to 
prevent  its  repeal  on  the  occurrence  of  war. ' ' 

The  officers  whose  views  are  quoted  represent  in 
their  service  every  phase  of  army  experience ;  three 
served  through  the  Civil  War,  one  of  whom  was  in 
the  volunteer  infantry,  one  in  the  regular  infantry 
and  one  in  the  cavalry.  Of  the  remaining  three  one 
has  served  thirty-five  years  in  the  regulars,  one  re- 
signed from  the  regular  army  and  reentered  the 
service  in  the  war  with  Spain,  and  one  served  in  the 
volunteers  of  that  war  and  was  appointed  therefrom 
in  the  regulars. 

It  is  of  sufficiently  recent  date  to  be  remembered, 
that  in  1898  large  numbers  of  soldiers  drifted  about 
the  country  to  hospitals  or  their  homes,  without  de- 
scriptive lists  or  means  of  identification,  and  created 

128 


REGIMENTAL   DEPOTS 


just  such  a  condition,  on  a  smaller  scale,  as  that 
which  existed  in  1863  when  Congress  felt  called  upon 
to  take  cognizance  of  the  situation.  It  should  be  rec- 
ognized that  similar  conditions  will  arise  again,  in 
any  serious  or  prolonged  war,  unless  some  means  be 
devised  to  correct  or  reduce  the  evil.  It  can  never 
be  wholly  eradicated  when  armies  are  actively  en- 
gaged, but  as  training  in  the  use  of  the  first  aid 
package  has  reduced  materially  the  percentage  of 
losses  from  wounds,  so  the  adoption  of  a  home  sta- 
tion or  regimental  depot  will  conserve  the  strength 
of  the  army  by  inducing  the  absent  from  any  cause, 
except  desertion,  to  find  their  way  to  comrades,  and 
recognition  which  carries  a  personal  interest,  food, 
clothing  and  pay.  It  would  be  in  the  interest  of  econ- 
omy, if  there  is  a  probability  that  war  will  continue 
for  a  prolonged  period,  to  construct  temporary  bar- 
rack and  hospital  accommodations  for  each  depot 
establishment.  This  would  insure  good  sanitary  ar- 
rangements and  more  continuous  and  effective  in- 
struction than  if  the  men  were  kept  in  rented  quar- 
ters or  under  canvas. 

The  regimental  depot  affords  a  means  of  decen- 
tralizing the  recruiting  of  the  army.  The  centraliza- 
tion of  too  much  of  the  detail  of  army  administration 
in  the  War  Department  has  caused  most  serious  diffi- 
culties in  the  past  and  similar  experiences  may  be 
expected  in  future,  if  the  root  of  the  evil  is  not  laid 
bare  and  corrective  measures  applied.  The  mass  of 
letters  and  telegrams  coming  from  recruiting  sta- 
tions, rendezvous,  state  camps,  mustering  officers 

129 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


and  innumerable  other  sources  during  periods  of  war 
excitement  will  break  do^vn  any  system  which  has 
ever  existed  or  which  may  be  adopted,  unless  control 
over  many  details  heretofore  receiving  attention  at 
the  War  Department  is  distributed  to  local  authori- 
ties. Any  system,  which  will  insure  full  strength  to 
tried  and  trained  regiments  in  contact  with  the 
enemy,  reduces  expenses  of  maintaining  the  army 
and  lessens  subsequent  pension  claims.  That  the 
depot  system  will  accomplish  this  and  more,  there 
can  be  little  reasonable  doubt.  This  subject  has  been 
under  consideration  for  half  a  century  in  this  coun- 
try, just  the  same  period  of  delay  as  occurred  be- 
tween the  appearance  in  General  Lee's  army  at  Pe- 
tersburg of  an  inventor  with  his  *'Artis  Avis,"  or 
bird  machine,  from  which  he  proposed  to  drop  explo- 
sives within  the  lines  of  the  besieging  army  of  Gen- 
eral Grant,  and  the  utilization  of  the  modern 
aeroplane  for  a  similar  purpose ;  between  the  use  of 
the  submarine  boat  with  fixed  torpedo  of  the  Civil 
War  and  the  development  of  the  present  cruising 
submarine  of  tonnage  equal  to  the  old  line  of  battle 
ships ;  and  in  the  general  adoption  of  smokeless  pow- 
der in  our  army,  after  its  properties  and  adaptability 
for  military  purposes  had  been  demonstrated  by  our 
own  officers.* 


*It  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  our  army,  which  gave  the  encour- 
agement necessary  to  Professor  Langley  and  the  Wright  Brothers 
to  lead  onward  in  the  development  of  aeroplanes,  has  in  its 
official  archives  a  record  which  establishes  our  failure  to  forecast 
the  utilization  of  smokeless  powder  and  permitted  our  troops  to 
engage  in  battle  half  a  century  later,  handicapped  with  black 
powder,  with  all  its  target  exposing  qualities,  in  the  hands  of  our 

130 


EEGIMENTAL   DEPOTS 


**Iii  consequence  of  the  quickness  and  intensity  of 
action  of  the  guncotton  when  ignited,  it  can  not  be 
used  with  safety  in  our  present  firearms.  Without  a 
modification  of  this  agent,  or  a  great  change  in  our 
firearms  the  use  of  guncotton  for  military  purposes, 
is  not  to  be  recommended,"  was  the  conclusion 
reached  and  the  use  of  smokeless  powder  in  our 
military  firearms  awaited  its  development  and  appli- 
cation for  non-military  uses. 

European  nations  rely  upon  their  regular  armies 
and  trained  reserves  to  prosecute  war.  In  the  past 
we  have  relied  upon  organizing  armies  after  war  is 
declared,  expecting  them  to  get  their  training  in  the 


artillery  and  volunteers.  This  is  the  record,  in  part,  of  experi- 
mentation made  at  the  Washington  Arsenal: 

"The  discovery  of  explosive  guncotton,  announced  last  year  by 
Professor  Schonbein,  naturally  attracted  at  once  the  attention  of 
the  military  world,  and  when  a  patent  for  the  invention  was 
taken  out  in  this  country,  the  new  compound  was  subjected  to 
trial  at  this  arsenal,  in  order  to  compare  its  effects  with  those  of 
gunpowder,  and  to  ascertaining  the  practicability  of  using  it  in 
firearms.  Under  date  of  December  3,  1846,  I  had  the  honor  to 
make  the  following  report  of  these  experiments: 

"Wishing  to  try  the  explosive  cotton  in  a  large  cannon,  as  well 
as  in  the  musket,  I  prepared,  according  to  Schonbein's  formula 
which  had  been  made  known  to  me,  as  much  of  it  as  my  other 
pressing  engagements  left  me  time  for. 

"The  mean  velocity  of  the  ball  in  17  rounds,  with  60  grains  of 
guncotton  is  1,670  feet  a  second,  and  the  mean  of  48  rounds  with 
120  grains  of  musket  powder  is  1,600  feet.  The  mean  velocity 
of  the  ball  in  23  rounds — good  cannon  powder  is  1,427  feet,  almost 
exactly  the  same  as  that,  1,422  feet  given  by  guncotton. 

"Having  determined,  by  my  experiments,  that  60  grains  would 
be  the  proper  charge  of  guncotton,  to  give  the  requisite  force  to 
the  musket  ball,  I  made  the  following  trials:" 

Here  follows  a  description  of  results  obtained  by  loading  mus- 
kets with  abnormal  charges  to  represent  the  errors  of  soldiers 
under  the  excitement  of  battle,  resulting,  with  smokeless  powder, 
in  bursting  of  the  gun  barrels.  The  musket  barrel  of  that  period 
of  muzzle-loading  arms  was  calculated  to  withstand  the  explosion 
of  two,  three  or  four  cartridges  at  one  time. 

131 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


expensive  school  of  actual  war  and  making  only 
spasmodic  and  ineffective  provision  for  replacing  the 
losses  of  campaign.  The  establishment  of  a  regi- 
mental depot  system  for  the  existing  mobile  army 
and  its  application  to  volunteers  and  militia,  when 
called  into  active  service  by  the  President,  ought  to 
go  far  toward  eliminating  the  evils  from  which  we 
have  suffered  in  the  past. 


IX 

FEDEKAL   VOLUNTEERS 

"To  be  prepared  for  war  is  one  of  the  most  effective  means  of 
preserving  peace." — Washington. 

THE  Constitution  specifically  places  upon  Con- 
gress the  power  and  duty  of  declaring  war  and 
providing  armies  to  carry  it  to  a  conclusion.  It  is 
essential  that  the  force  necessary  for  initiating  war 
should  possess  a  national  character  and  be  under  the 
direct  control  of  the  President.  The  militia,  which, 
in  the  nature  of  things,  embraces  all  state  troops, 
can  not  he  invested  with  this  national  character  until 
it  has  been  called  into  the  service  and  then  only  for 
a  limited  use  within  our  borders. 

Since  the  war  with  Spain,  efforts  have  been  con- 
tinuous to  provide  for  the  automatic  transition  of  the 
national  guard  or  organized  militia  of  the  states 
from  a  peace  to  a  war  basis,  as  part  of  the  federal 
force,  but  notwithstanding  the  ingenious  devices  ar- 
ranged to  nationalize  the  state  organizations,  they 
still  remain  ** militia,"  available  only  for  service  as 
authorized  by  the  Constitution  which  not  only  enu- 
merates the  specific  occasions  when  the  state  forces 
may  be  called  into  service,  but  forbids  their  employ- 
ment for  any  other  purpose.  It  should  be  borne  in 
mind  that  the  liberality  of  the  general  government 
toward  the  militia  during  recent  years  has  failed  to 

133 


THE   AMERICAN"  ARMY 


develop  any  increase  in  strength  and  the  opinion  of 
those  best  informed  on  the  subject  is  quite  nnani- 
mous  that  no  improvement  is  to  be  expected  unless 
Congress  shall  appropriate  pay  for  the  state  organ- 
izations, while  leaving  them  still  under  the  control  of 
the  governors,  in  nowise  a  national  force  until  they 
have  individually  volunteered  in  war. 

It  has  been  shown  how  very  meager  a  force  of  reg- 
ulars remains  available  within  the  United  States, 
after  detaching  the  garrisons  necessary  for  the  out- 
lying possessions.  A  statement  of  the  legal  status  of 
the  militia,  the  only  other  existing  military  force, 
may  well  be  repeated. 

The  Act  of  May  27,  1908,  contains  a  limitation 
upon  military  efficiency,  peculiarly  embarrassing 
when  the  extent  and  distribution  of  the  forty-eight 
states  are  considered:  *'When  the  military  needs  of 
the  Federal  Government  arising  from  the  necessity 
to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union,  suppress  insurrec- 
tion, or  repel  invasion,  can  not  be  met  by  the  regular 
force,  the  organized  militia  shall  be  called  into  the 
service  of  the  United  States  in  advance  of  any  volun- 
teer forces  which  it  may  he  determined  to  raise." 

The  most  recent  statute  relating  to  the  war  estab- 
lishment, the  Act  of  April  25, 1914,  provides  for  rais- 
ing the  volunteer  forces  of  the  United  States  in  time 
of  actual  or  threatened  hostilities,  and  definitely  pre- 
scribes that  the  land  forces  of  the  United  States  shall 
consist  of  the  regular  army,  the  organized  land  mili- 
tia while  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  and  such 
volunteer  forces  as  Congress  may  authorize.    The 

134 


FEDERAL  VOLUNTEERS 


new  statute  modifies  the  Act  of  May  27,  1908,  to  the 
extent  that  after  the  organized  land  militia  of  any 
arm  or  class  shall  have  been  called  into  the  military 
service  of  the  United  States,  volunteers  of  that  par- 
ticular arm  or  class  may  be  raised  and  accepted  into 
service,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  act,  re- 
gardless of  the  extent  to  which  other  arms  or  classes 
of  militia  shall  have  been  called  into  service.  It 
should  be  borne  in  mind  that  for  any  military  opera- 
tions beyond  our  borders  the  militia  can  not  be  called 
into  service  but  must  volunteer,  so  that  until  the 
members  of  each  organization  decide  whether  or  not 
three-fourths  of  the  minimum  number  prescribed  as 
the  strength  of  the  particular  unit  will  volunteer,  the 
President  is  debarred  from  calling  for  volunteers  of 
similar  arms  or  classes.  All  this,  be  it  observed,  is 
to  take  place  after  war  is  upon  the  nation. 

Some  of  our  problems  may  become  international  in 
character  at  a  moment  unforeseen  and  unpropitious. 
In  an  age  when  ruptures  of  diplomatic  relations 
come  so  suddenly  as  to  preclude  the  possibility  of 
remedying  grave  defects,  there  should  be  no  reliance 
upon  any  system  concerning  which  there  is  a  shadow 
of  doubt. 

To  avoid  the  waste  inseparable  from  going  to  war 
without  proper  preparation  there  must  be  devised 
and  ready  a  complete  system  for  passing  from  a 
peace  to  a  war  establishment.  There  should  be  no 
necessity  for  congressional  action  at  such  a  time  be- 
yond the  exercise  of  its  functions  of  declaring  war. 
The  responsibility  for  proper  preparation  for  war  is, 

135 


THE   AMEEICAN  ARITY 


in  the  final  analysis,  placed  by  the  people  on  the  War 
Department  and  it  should  be  known  there  at  all  times 
just  what  force  and  supplies  are  available. 

Our  people  are  somewhat  misled  by  the  very  vast- 
ness  of  our  military  resources  which,  to  be  of  any 
potential  value,  must  be  organized  and  directed  by  a 
central  authority.  It  is  only  through  coordination 
of  available  men  and  material  in  peace,  that  organ- 
ization and  administration  may  be  so  perfected  that 
the  nation  can  pass  to  a  war  establishment  without 
undue  friction.  While  the  millions  now  being  spent 
upon  the  state  militia  are  not  a  total  loss,  the  return 
in  the  shape  of  an  immediately  available  army  bears 
no  relation  to  the  asset  we  would  have  in  a  force  of 
federal  volunteers  at  whatever  cost. 

Once  the  organization  of  the  federal  volunteers  is 
completed,  the  need  for  so  large  a  force  of  organized 
militia  would  no  longer  exist  and  that  force  may 
then  be  reduced  to  such  numbers  as  the  states  may 
be  willing  to  provide  for  by  commonwealth  appro- 
priations. Young  officers,  noncommissioned  officers 
and  well  instructed  privates  of  the  organized  militia 
should  find  a  field  of  broader  usefulness  in  the  new 
federal  volunteers,  their  places  in  the  state  forces 
being  taken  by  men  whose  family  or  other  ties  might 
serve  to  limit  their  field  of  military  employment. 

The  territorial  distribution  of  federal  volunteers 
should  embrace  every  congressional  district  wherein 
should  be  established  the  local  depots  for  receiving 
and  training  the  recruits  required  in  war  to  maintain 

136 


FEDERAL   VOLUNTEERS 


the  organizations  in  tlie  field  at  maximum  strength. 
No  danger  to  the  liberties  of  the  people  lies  in  this 
scheme — on  the  contrary  it  contains  the  only  fair  dis- 
tribution of  the  debt  of  personal  service  in  the  hour 
of  the  country's  need.  Being  a  federal  force,  the  ex- 
pense incident  to  the  organization  and  maintenance 
of  proper  arms,  equipments  and  supplies  to  be  in 
readiness  for  active  service,  will  of  necessity  be 
borne  by  the  general  government. 

At  the  present  time  there  are  435  members  of  Con- 
gress, apportioned  on  a  basis  of  212,407  of  popula- 
tion, and  while  the  population  in  each  district  is  not 
exactly  the  same,  for  the  practical  purposes  of  ap- 
portioning federal  volunteers,  they  may  be  so  re- 
garded. Infantry  constitutes  the  basic  foundation  of 
all  armies,  and  we  should  begin  by  establishing  one 
regiment  of  federal  volunteer  infantry  in  each  con- 
gressional district.  With  this  force  as  a  foundation, 
authority  should  be  granted  to  the  President  to  add 
other  organizations,  line  and  staff,  of  the  types  and 
character  of  those  maintained  in  the  regular  army, 
the  whole  to  constitute  a  force  so  proportioned  as  to 
be  capable  of  mobilization  as  brigades,  divisions  and 
corps  or  field  armies. 

All  enlistment  contracts  in  the  federal  volunteers 
should  be  for  two  years,  with  privilege  of  reenlist- 
ment,  and  an  express  provision  that  in  event  of  mo- 
bilization for  active  service,  all  enlistments  shall  be 
automatically  extended  for  three  years  or  the  period 
of  the  war,  if  terminated  in  less  than  three  years. 

137 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


The  appointment  of  officers  to  continue  under  a 
scheme  of  age  and  grade  apportionment  and  satis- 
factory accomplishment. 

In  order  that  the  federal  volunteers  shall  be  pre- 
pared in  a  thorough  manner  for  the  duties  of  active 
service  and  maintained  in  a  state  of  readiness  for 
immediate  mobilization  for  war,  each  regiment 
should  be  commanded  by  a  regular  officer  and  there 
should  be  in  addition  an  adjutant,  a  quartermaster,  a 
sergeant-major,  a  quartermaster  sergeant,  a  com- 
missary sergeant  and  an  ordnance  sergeant  selected 
from  the  regular  army  for  permanent  duty  with  each 
organization.  The  colonels  should  be  selected  from 
the  field  of  officers  or  captains  of  not  less  than  five 
years  *  service  in  command  of  companies. 

The  increments  of  special  branches  required  to 
make  a  properly  balanced  force  should  be  assigned 
to  localities  in  the  vicinity  of  stations  of  the  regular 
army  garrisoned  by  similar  organizations.  It  will 
then  be  practicable  to  train  cavalry,  field  artillery, 
engineers,  signal  and  hospital  corps  organizations 
by  periodically  assigning  them  to  actual  duty  as  part 
of  the  regular  organizations,  utilizing  the  public  ani- 
mals and  equipment  for  the  purpose.  That  will  in- 
sure practical  instruction  in  the  least  expensive 
manner. 

It  is  recognized  by  all  military  men  that  the  crea- 
tion of  any  force  worthy  the  name  of  army  demands 
trained  officers  of  established  character.  Our  mili- 
tary and  naval  academies  are  maintained  in  a  man- 
ner unequalled  the  world  over  to  supply  officers  of 

138 


FEDERAL  VOLUNTEERS 


the  regular  forces.  For  the  greatly  increased  num- 
bers required  by  the  war  establishment  other  meas- 
ures are  necessary  and  they  should  be  perfected  in 
peace.  Occasionally,  in  war,  a  leader  of  marked 
ability  to  command,  but  without  previous  technical 
training,  may  reverse  the  usual  order  and  master  the 
details  of  the  military  profession  from  the  top  down- 
ward. Dependence  upon  these  rare  exceptions 
should  not  lead  the  nation  astray  as  to  the  necessity 
for  training  for  the  business  of  war  in  the  most  com- 
prehensive manner. 

The  officers  of  federal  volunteers  should  all  be  ap- 
pointed on  the  recommendation  of  the  colonel  and  in 
the  initial  stage  should  be  taken  preferably  from 
such  of  the  experienced  young  officers  of  the  existing 
organized  militia  as  may  desire  to  enter  the  new  or- 
ganizations ;  from  honorably  discharged  soldiers  of 
the  regular  service  and  graduates  of  schools  and  col- 
leges having  courses  of  military  training  of  the 
standards  fixed  by  the  War  Department.  In  this 
connection,  attention  may  well  be  directed  to  the 
anomalous  condition  brought  about  by  the  statutory 
requirements  for  military  instruction  in  agricultural 
colleges  receiving  government  aid.  It  would  serve  a 
national  purpose  in  a  much  more  practical  way  to 
establish  outright  government  schools  in  the  several 
states  where  military  instruction  shall  be  considered 
as  of  first  importance.  Legislation  along  these  lines 
has  recently  been  proposed  in  Congress  and  is  most 
worthy  of  consideration. 

When  the  communities  once  take  upon  themselves 

139 


THE   AMERICAN  ARIVIY 


the  public  duty  of  encouraging  their  own  local  troops 
to  give  a  good  account  of  themselves,  we  shall  see  the 
nation  backed  by  all  the  patriotic  power  which  right- 
eously comes  from  those  for  whom  the  government  is 
maintained — all  the  people  and  not  some  of  the  peo- 
ple. In  their  awakening,  they  will  demand  trained 
officers  to  prepare  and  lead  their  sons  in  battle  and 
it  will  be  the  duty  of  the  federal  government  to  meet 
this  demand.  It  was  this  urgency  of  the  Civil  War 
which  was  contemplated  by  General  Grant  when  he 
said :  * '  It  would  have  been  a  great  deal  better  if  the 
regular  army,  except  the  staff  and  the  staff  corps, 
had  been  disbanded  at  the  outbreak  of  the  rebellion 
and  the  officers  sent  home  to  their  respective  states 
for  the  purpose  of  entering  and  helping  organize  the 
volunteer  army.'* 

The  passing  of  the  Indian  warrior  and  his  vast 
hunting  grounds  and  the  increased  density  of  popu- 
lation have  had  the  effect  of  diminishing  the  military 
characteristics  of  Americans.  As  they  recede  far- 
ther and  farther  from  aptitude  in  the  use  of  firearms 
and  familiarity  with  the  dangers  and  hardships  of 
campaigning,  it  is  necessary  to  evolve  some  system 
which  will  serve  to  inculcate  the  characteristics  no 
longer  derived  in  the  school  of  experience.  The 
training  of  the  individual  as  a  federal  volunteer  at 
his  own  home  vnil  tend  to  ameliorate,  if  not  correct 
this  condition. 

"With  any  given  organization,  drill  regulations  can 
be  evolved  so  as  to  make  a  workable  machine  for  the 
service  of  regulars,  but  having  in  mind  the  greater 

140 


FEDERAL   VOLUNTEERS 


war  army  of  untrained  or  partly  trained  volunteers, 
it  is  the  dictate  of  wisdom  to  provide  the  simplest 
possible  organization  and  make  the  drills  of  the  com- 
pany, the  battalion  and  the  regiment  as  nearly  iden- 
tical as  consistent  with  the  battle  functions  of  each. 

Congress  has,  from  time  to  time,  fixed  by  statute 
the  details  of  organization  of  the  several  branches  of 
the  service.  Modifications  of  ancient  formations  for 
drill  and  battle  action  have  come  usually  as  the  re- 
sult of  improvement  in  arms  and  material.  Sim- 
plicity in  drill  and  tactical  evolutions  for  volunteers 
becomes  of  paramount  importance  not  only  for  ac- 
tual battle  action,  but  to  bring  about  ease  and  rapid- 
ity of  training  new  troops. 

Our  present  organization  of  infantry  comprises 
three  battalions  to  the  regiment,  three  regiments  to 
the  brigade  and  three  brigades  to  the  division.  Each 
battalion  has  four  companies.  The  cavalry  is  simi- 
larly organized,  except  that  the  company  is  called 
''troop"  and  the  battalion  is  called  "squadron"  and 
comprises  four  troops. 

It  is  quite  generally  accepted  by  military  students 
that  many  millions  would  have  been  saved  in  the 
Civil  War  had  each  regiment  been  localized  and  pro- 
vided with  its  own  depots  for  receiving  and  training 
recruits.  It  is  certain  unless  the  depot  companies  are 
designated  in  peace,  that  when  the  critical  moment 
for  action  comes  there  will  be  much  scheming  and 
straining  to  avoid  being  left  behind.  Of  course,  as 
incidents  of  campaign  send  homeward  the  wounded, 
the  weak  and  the  sick,  those  at  the  depots  mil  find 

141 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


their  opportunity  for  service  at  the  front.  It  follows 
that  the  tactical  organization  should  lend  itself  to 
that  form  of  administration  which  includes  a  depot 
for  each  regiment. 

The  two  elements,  therefore,  to  be  considered  in 
devising  the  organization  of  federal  volunteers  are 
simplicity  of  drill  throughout  and  a  sufficient  number 
of  companies  to  admit  of  permanent  depot  organiza- 
tions. In  order  that  the  war  army  may  be  organized 
and  administered  as  a  harmonious  whole,  the  regular 
army  should  be  given  the  same  organization  as  that 
which  may  be  provided  for  volunteers.  This  would 
automatically  place  upon  the  organized  militia  the 
same  organization. 

The  matter  of  simplicity  is  not  difficult  of  adjust- 
ment, for  it  is  only  necessary  to  cut  off  one  company 
from  each  infantry  battalion  and  one  troop  from  each 
cavalry  squadron.  Then  by  arranging  the  regula- 
tions for  habitual  division  of  the  company  into  three 
platoons  we  have  the  very  simple  arrangement  of 
drill  which  enables  the  training  of  the  three  platoons 
in  the  company,  the  three  companies  in  the  battalion, 
the  three  battalions  in  the  regiment,  and  the  three 
regiments  in  the  brigade,  to  proceed  upon  similar 
lines  and  by  practically  identical  commands,  thereby 
greatly  reducing  the  amount  to  be  committed  to 
memory,  in  taking  over  the  duties  of  the  higher  units. 
The  division  of  the  units  into  threes  lends  itself  per- 
fectly to  formation  of  line  to  the  front  from  column, 
by  both  flanks,  and  also  to  echelons  in  three  lines. 
The  necessity  of  a  simple  and  rapid  system  of  pass- 

142 


FEDERAL   VOLUNTEERS 


ing  from  column  to  line  and  for  taking  up  formations 
in  echelon  has  become  very  apparent  in  view  of  the 
effectiveness  of  modern  field  artillery,  especially  of 
shrapnel  fire.  Formation  of  line  from  column  and  of 
column  from  line,  comprise  the  major  portion  of  tac- 
tical evolutions  in  war. 

Some  objection  has  been  offered  in  the  past  to  cut- 
ting off  a  company  from  the  battalion  because  of  the 
reduction  of  strength  of  the  regiment.  It  is  quite 
certain  that  three  companies  in  which  the  vacancies 
arising  in  campaign  are  kept  filled  by  their  regi- 
mental depot  will  be  habitually  in  better  condition 
to  meet  the  enemy  than  a  battalion  of  four  companies 
without  a  depot  organization.  To  meet  this  argu- 
ment it  has  been  suggested  that  another  battalion  be 
added  to  each  regiment.  This  not  only  sacrifices  the 
very  great  advantage  of  the  tactical  possibilities  of 
the  units  of  threes,  but  retards  promotion  to  the 
grade  of  captain  too  much  for  effective  service.  Our 
army  in  the  past  has  experienced  the  deplorable  re- 
sults of  delayed  promotion  to  the  grade  of  captain. 
It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  men  in  the  ranks 
are  usually  very  young  and  their  energies  should  not 
be  sacrificed  through  the  control  of  captains  too  old 
for  their  grade.  The  addition  of  another  battalion 
would  make  the  climb  up  the  ladder  to  the  grade  of 
colonel  at  an  age  appropriate  to  the  command,  hope- 
less except  to  those  who  enter  the  service  at  the 
minimum  age. 

To  provide  properly  for  the  new  army  of  federal 
volunteers,  it  is  necessary  first  to  reorganize  those 

143 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


branches  of  the  regular  army  which  are  to  be  copied 
in  the  new  organizations.  In  this  reorganization  we 
should  give  careful  consideration  to  the  question  of 
localizing,  territorially,  the  regular  regiments,  in 
such  manner  as  to  best  serve  the  purpose  of  utilizing 
them  in  connection  with  the  federal  volunteers.  This 
applies  with  special  force  to  the  cavalry,  field  artil- 
lery, engineers  and  signal  corps  organizations. 

The  immediate  result  of  the  reorganization  of  our 
thirty  regiments  of  regular  infantry,  with  three  com- 
panies to  each  battalion  and  one  for  the  regimental 
depot,  would  be  to  release  two  companies  from  each 
regiment,  sixty  in  all,  available  for  the  creation  of 
six  new  and  very  much  needed  regiments,  requiring 
only  the  addition  of  the  necessary  field  and  staff  offi- 
cers— six  colonels,  six  lieutenant  colonels,  eighteen 
majors,  eighteen  captains,  six  chaplains,  eighteen 
first  and  eighteen  second  lieutenants  and  the  author- 
ized regimental  and  battalion  noncommissioned  staff 
officers,  band  and  detachments.  There  is  no  other 
possible  way  of  gaining  so  much  efficiency  at  so  little 
additional  cost  as  by  this  reorganization. 

Similarly,  the  reorganization  of  the  cavalry  would 
release  two  troops  from  each  of  the  fifteen  regi- 
ments, a  total  of  thirty  troops,  available  for  the  crea- 
tion of  three  more  regiments  of  cavalry,  by  the  addi- 
tion of  the  necessary  field,  staff  and  noncommis- 
sioned staff  officers,  bands  and  detachments.  The 
existence  of  a  depot  troop  for  the  training  of  recruits 
and  horses  is  even  more  essential  for  cavalry  than  is 
a  depot  for  infantry  and  is  dictated  by  every  princi- 
ple of  economic  administration. 

144 


FEDERAL   VOLUNTEERS 


The  present  field  artillery  regiment  does  not  admit 
of  any  detachment  of  an  organization  as  a  depot.  To 
create  a  depot  requires  the  addition  of  a  battery. 
This  branch  of  the  army  is  so  deficient  in  numbers 
that  a  considerable  increase  is  necessary  and  the  re- 
organization should  embrace  not  only  the  additional 
depot  organizations,  but  a  sufficient  number  in  all  to 
take  over  the  siege  artillery  added  to  the  army  from 
time  to  time  and  avoid  the  necessity  of  withdrawal  of 
coast  artillery  from  the  permanent  fortifications  to 
man  material  with  the  mobile  army. 

The  assertion  is  sometimes  made  that  our  sea- 
coasts  are  unduly  fortified,  and  that  few,  if  any,  of 
the  batteries  will  ever  fire  a  hostile  shot  is  sometimes 
made  an  excuse  for  detaching  coast  artillery  to  other 
duties  as  part  of  the  mobile  army.  This  latter  is 
possibly  true,  but  it  arises  from  the  very  presence  of 
the  guns  with  trained  gunners  to  man  them.  Our 
system  of  harbor  fortification,  adopted  when  the 
nation  was  deep  in  humiliation  over  the  sacking  and 
burning  of  the  capital,  is  not  likely  to  be  materially 
modified,  for  without  it  our  fleets  would  be  anchored 
to  our  coasts  and  deprived  of  the  great  advantage 
arising  from  carrying  the  war  into  the  enemy's 
waters.* 


♦General  Simon  Bernard,  a  graduate  of  the  ^cole  Polytech- 
nique,  a  distinguished  engineer  of  the  French  Army  and  aide- 
de-camp  of  Napoleon,  was  granted  an  indefinite  leave  after  the 
battle  of  Waterloo  and  came  to  America  at  the  invitation  of  the 
government,  still  rankling  over  the  destruction  of  the  capital  at 
Washington,  in  the  then  recently  closed  War  of  1812.  General 
Bernard  was  commissioned  as  Brevet  Brigadier  General  and  As- 
sistant Chief  of  Engineers,  United  States  Army.  During  his  serv- 
ice, 1816-1831,  and  under  his  technical  advice,  fortifications  were 
begun  at  almost  every  harbor  of  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts, 

145 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


With  the  reorganization  of  the  regular  regiments 
provided  for,  we  may  then  consider  the  greater  army 
of  federal  volunteers.  There  are  435  congressional 
districts,  to  each  of  which  it  is  proposed  to  assign 
one  ten-company  infantry  regiment  of  federal  volun- 
teers, comprising  nine  companies  of  150  mean  each, 
which,  with  the  machine  gun  platoon,  regimental  de- 
tachment and  depot  company,  will  aggregate  about 
1,500  men.  This  would  give  theoretically  a  body  of 
652,500  volunteer  infantry  enlisted  in  peace,  with  an 
enlistment  contract  providing  for  two  years '  service 
in  peace  and,  in  event  of  war,  its  automatic  extension 
for  three  years  or  during  the  war,  if  less-^than  three 
years.  And  be  it  understood,  this  is  not  a  standing 
army,  for  it  is  not  contemplated  to  withdraw  the  fed- 
eral volunteers  from  their  customary  vocations  any 
more  than  the  organized  militia  is  now  withdrawn, 
but  to  systematize  their  training  and  provide  officers 
of  approved  merit  to  lead  them  in  active  service. 

It  is  contemplated  that  the  course  of  instruction  in 
each  regiment  of  federal  volunteers  shall  embrace 
not  only  the  training  in  rifle  practice,  drill  and  camp 
sanitation,  so  essential  to  successful  campaigning, 
but  also  instruction  covering  the  organization  and 
character  of  our  government  and  the  duties  of  citi- 
zenship. In  this  manner  it  is  expected  to  win  the 
approval  and  cooperation  of  the  residents  of  each 
district  by  proving  the  merit  and  value  of  the  system 


among  these  the  great  Fortress  Monroe.  Subsequent  to  his  re- 
turn to  his  natire  land,  he  was  created  a  baron  and  field  marshal 
of  France.  At  the  time  of  his  decease  he  was  Minister  of  War  of 
France. 

146 


FEDERAL   VOLUNTEERS 


which  provides  for  a  war  army  at  a  fraction  of  the 
cost  of  a  similar  force  maintained  as  regulars. 

It  is  entirely  probable  that  the  existing  war  in 
Europe  will  cause  a  modification  in  the  proportions 
and  employment  of  cavalry  and  field  artillery,  and 
the  number  of  federal  volunteers  allotted  to  these 
branches  may  well  be  determined  after  the  history 
of  the  operations  becomes  available.  In  the  mean- 
time the  minimum  number  necessary  under  our  ex- 
isting tables  of  organization  should  be  authorized 
and  assigned  to  favorable  localities,  not  restricted  to 
congressional  districts,  but  distributed  with  refer- 
ence to  horse  supply  and  probable  opportunity  for 
training.  Incidentally,  this  will  afford  opportunity 
for  a  census  of  horses  and  mules  available  for  war 
purposes.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  during 
the  Civil  War  the  number  of  cavalry  regiments  be- 
came too  great  for  the  supply  of  horses.  Much  more 
satisfactory  results  may  be  expected  from  restrict- 
ing the  organization  of  cavalry  regiments  to  the 
number  which  can  be  sustained  in  campaign  by  a 
regular  flow  of  trained  men  and  horses  from  the  reg- 
imental depots.  In  fixing  upon  the  proportions  of 
cavalry  to  infantry  it  should  be  remembered  that  in 
any  war  of  magnitude,  involving  invasion,  a  consid- 
erable part  of  the  infantry  would  not  be  embraced  in 
the  mobile  army,  but  assigned  to  the  land  defense  of 
seacoast  fortifications. 

The  increments  necessary  to  provide  the  reliefs 
required  to  man  the  seacoast  defenses  in  war  should 
be  provided  by  companies  of  federal  volunteers  per- 

147 


THE   AMERICxVN  AR^IY 


nianently  assigned  to  the  particular  batteries  rather 
tlian  by  organization  of  regiments  similar  to  those  of 
the  organized  militia.  This  would  insure  competent 
direction  and  control  of  fire  by  trained  officers  and 
gunners  assisted  by  volunteers.  Organization  of  fed- 
eral volunteers  of  the  coast  artillery  branch  should 
not  be  limited  to  the  districts  immediately  adjoining 
the  coast  defenses.  The  type  of  men  best  fitted  for 
the  duty  is  found  in  the  industrial  centers.  If  their 
recruitment  and  organization  are  committed  to  the 
oflficers  of  the  coast  artillery  the  necessary  gun  crews 
for  war  purposes  will  soon  materialize,  whereas,  un- 
der the  existing  militia  system,  ten  years  of  effort 
has  failed  to  develop  any  comprehensive  relief  of  a 
serious  situation. 

In  all  this  there  should  be  every  encouragement 
given  to  local  pride,  not  only  of  the  state  and  dis- 
trict, but  of  the  county,  for  this  would  tend  to 
eliminate  the  prodigious  stream  of  desertions  such 
as  occurred  from  the  volunteers  of  the  Civil  War 
and  which  has  been  a  continuous  source  of  deep  con- 
cern and  regret  to  those  responsible  for  the  recruit- 
ment of  the  regular  army.  A  young  man  would  hesi- 
tate to  quit  his  command  in  the  field  if  he  knew  he 
would  have  to  account  for  his  absence  at  the  home 
depot  of  his  regiment. 

It  has  been  quite  plainly  established  that  we  can 
not  count  upon  all  the  men  of  any  organized  militia 
regiment  volunteering  for  war.  Then  there  are  some 
old  militia  organizations  of  established  reputation, 
that  may  be  much  better  utilized  than  by  volunteer- 

148 


FEDERAL  VOLUNTEERS 


ing  in  a  body,  for  their  records  of  past  services  es- 
tablish that  they  furnished  a  large  number  of  officers 
of  volunteer  regiments  in  the  Civil  War  and  in  the 
war  with  Spain  and  they  should  be  expected,  in  any 
future  emergency,  to  act  in  accord  with  their  past 
traditions. 

The  latest  statute  on  the  subject  prescribes  an  en- 
listment period  of  four  years  for  volunteers,  the 
same  as  for  the  regular  army,  omitting  the  period  in 
reserve.  The  enlistment  period  for  federal  volun- 
teers is  recommended  to  be  fixed  at  two  years,  with 
the  automatic  extension  for  three  years  or  the  war, 
in  the  event  of  hostilities,  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  after  experimentation  in  Europe  with  the  two- 
year  term  it  was  abandoned  in  favor  of  three  years. 
Two  years  is  the  shortest  time  which  will  permit  of 
a  fair  degree  of  instruction,  and  proper  ideas  of  the 
discipline  essential  for  fire  control,  while  still  en- 
gaged in  civil  affairs.  Our  system  of  training  should 
be  adapted  to  the  purely  volunteer  soldier.  To  se- 
cure the  best  results  and  enable  a  progressive  course 
of  instruction  to  be  followed,  arrangements  should 
be  made  for  receiving  recruits,  at  specified  dates,  in 
sufficient  numbers  to  constitute  workable  units. 

Under  the  proposed  reorganization  of  the  in- 
fantry, the  cavalry  and  field  artillery  of  the  regular 
army  we  secure,  at  a  minimum  expense,  a  model  of 
organization  peculiarly  adapted  to  volunteer  troops 
and  with  the  marked  advantage  of  having  the  depot 
machinery  always  available  for  filling  vacancies  in 
the  firing  line.    As  the  federal  volunteer  regiments 

149 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


are  organized  the  number  of  field  ofiicers  and  cap- 
tains and  noncommissioned  staff  officers  of  the  corre- 
sponding branches  of  the  regular  service  should  be 
increased  in  order  to  supply  the  skeleton  personnel 
of  regulars  necessary  with  each  volunteer  regiment. 
When  the  federal  volunteers  have  been  organized  the 
support  of  the  organized  militia,  except  as  to  arms 
and  equipments  of  government  model,  should  be 
taken  over  by  the  states. 

The  proposed  army  of  regulars  and  federal  volun- 
teers will  cost  more  than  the  existing  force  of  regu- 
lars and  organized  militia,  but  the  one  will  be  an 
asset  of  highest  potential  value  and  probably  equal 
to  any  emergency  likely  to  arrive  without  warning, 
while  the  other  is  unequal  to  the  smallest  military 
contingency  within  the  forecast  of  statesmen  and 
students. 

The  system  of  federal  volunteers  has  encountered 
active  opposition  from  the  higher  officers  of  the  na- 
tional guard,  and  this  may  always  be  expected.  Until 
public  opinion  on  the  subject  of  national  defense  be- 
comes more  masterful  than  this  narrow  but  concen- 
trated opposition,  no  change  may  be  expected.  In  so 
grave  a  matter.  Congress  is  entitled  to  the  generous 
approval  of  a  non-partisan  public  opinion,  because 
the  policy  will  call  for  continuing  appropriations  to 
be  balanced,  however,  later  on  by  that  preparedness 
for  war  which  makes  for  lessened  obligations  for 
pensions  and  claims  in  the  years  to  come. 


EXPEDITIONARY   FORCE 

"A  corrective  Is,  indeed,  highly  necessary.  The  practice  of  fur- 
loughing  officers,  and  then  renewing  the  furloughs  from  time  to 
time,  is  extremely  injurious  to  the  service,  and  ought  to  be  dis- 
continued on  ordinary  occasions.  And  that  of  frittering  away  the 
army  into  small  garrisons  is,  if  possible,  worse.  It  will  never  be 
respectable  while  these  evils  exist;  and  until  it  can  be  more  con- 
centrated, and  the  garrisons  frequently  relieved  by  detachments 
from  the  main  body,  discipline  will  always  be  lax.   .   .   ." 

— ^Washington. 

THE  urgency  of  establishing  and  maintaining  an 
expeditionary  force  to  serve  as  a  model  tactical 
miit  and  school  of  practice  for  our  generals  and  staff 
officers,  has  long  been  apparent.  The  accomplish- 
ment of  this  most  needed  feature  of  our  military 
establishment  has  not  been  practicable  for  various 
reasons,  the  primary  one  being  an  insufficient  num- 
ber of  regiments  to  meet  the  recurring  needs  of 
actual  service. 

If  we  are  to  have,  as  military  men  are  agreed  we 
should,  an  expeditionary  force  in  readiness  to  pro- 
ceed to  threatened  points,  where  initial  success 
should  make  for  simplicity  and  economy  of  subse- 
quent operations,  we  must  organize,  equip  and  main- 
tain it  at  all  times  with  its  complete  military  hier- 
archy of  commanders  and  staff  officers,  ready  to 
move  at  a  mere  signal  without  necessity  of  detailed 
orders  from  the  War  Department.    The  practice  of 

151 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


giving  orders  in  great  detail  concerning  every  con- 
ceivable subject  has  long  been  the  bane  of  our  army 
and  has  served  greatly  to  intimidate  and  curtail  the 
initiative  of  a  most  reliable  and  well-educated  body 
of  ofiBcers.  The  establishment  of  the  higher  tactical 
organizations  should  accomplish  much  in  decentral- 
izing the  giving  of  orders  and  gradually  foster  con- 
fidence in  our  generals,  who  by  all  tests,  except  those 
of  exercising  large  commands,  in  war,  have  justified 
such  confidence. 

The  expeditionary  force  should  be  comprised  of 
complete  organizations  at  war  strength  and  main- 
tained in  a  modest  cantonment  requiring  only  care- 
takers during  their  absence  on  active  service  or  in 
field  instruction.  In  event  of  a  serious  war,  the  can- 
tonment would  fill  a  most  important  need  as  a  ren- 
dezvous for  the  concentration  and  instruction  of  vol- 
unteers, and  when  no  longer  required  for  that 
purpose,  the  buildings  would  be  available  for  use  as 
hospital  accommodations  during  continuance  of  hos- 
tilities. 

Nations  can  not  engage  in  war  merely  to  test  their 
military  systems,  but  wisely  provide  opportunities 
for  the  development  of  weak  links  in  the  chain  of 
theory.  The  most  useful  method  of  accomplishing 
this  is  by  trying  out  men  and  material  on  a  suffi- 
ciently large  scale  to  furnish  employment  for  the 
generals  and  the  administrative  staff  upon  whom 
rests  the  responsibility  once  war  is  declared.  The 
British  have  solved  the  problem  at  home  by  the  es- 
tablishment at  Aldershot  of  an  expeditionary  force, 

152 


EXPEDITIONARY   FORCE 


ready  to  proceed  to  distant  points  of  the  empire 
whose  garrisons  encircle  the  globe.  Here  are  ac- 
quired by  all  grades  the  habitude  of  service  in  war 
organizations.  No  other  nation  has  had  such  varied 
experience  in  the  problems  of  transportation  and 
supply  as  the  British  and  their  methods  and  expedi- 
ents in  campaign  appeal  naturally  and  strongly  to 
men  of  Anglo-Saxon  mental  processes. 

While  we  carefully  observe  all  nations  with  a  view 
to  noting  the  development  of  military  material,  the 
problems  of  the  British  are  more  nearly  akin  to  those 
confronting  us  than  any  to  be  found  amongst  other 
nations.  In  fact,  the  train  of  liabilities  which  has 
followed  in  the  wake  of  the  war  with  Spain,  together 
with  the  absence  of  conscription  and  dependence 
wholly  upon  voluntary  enlistments  for  recruiting  our 
army  make  the  military  problems  of  the  two  coun- 
tries practically  identical.  There  is  not  a  new  dis- 
covery but  has  been  thoroughly  understood  and  com- 
mented upon  by  conservative  officers  who  appre- 
ciated full  well  the  obstacles  to  be  encountered  in 
any  attempt  to  graft  European  systems  upon  the 
American  army. 

The  government  already  possesses  a  handsome 
property,  comprising  about  2,500  acres  of  blue-grass 
land,  with  an  artesian  water  supply,  apparently  in- 
exhaustible, near  the  important  trunk  railroad  cen- 
ter at  Indianapolis,  Indiana.  The  value  of  this  site 
for  a  division  cantonment  has  been  tested  by  actual 
occupancy  on  several  occasions  during  combined  in- 
struction of  the  regular  army  and  national  guard. 
^  153 


THE  AMERICAN  ARMY 


The  military  reservation  is  an  asset  of  great  value 
as  a  site  for  mobilization  of  volunteers  in  any  serious 
war.  It  occupies  a  central  location  as  regards  dis- 
tribution of  population  and  mth  its  exceptional  rail- 
road facilities  would  enable  an  expeditionary  force 
to  be  promptly  put  in  motion,  in  an  emergency,  to  the 
north,  south,  east  or  west  with  nearly  equal  facility. 
It  is  in  the  very  midst  of  the  great  granary  of  the 
nation  and  but  a  few  hours  distant  from  several  of 
the  world 's  greatest  meat  packing  industries.  Here 
is  found  neither  the  extreme  cold  of  our  more 
northern  stations  nor  the  debilitating  heat  of  those 
nearer  the  gulf.  In  a  material  way  the  -plan  com- 
mends itself  for  the  great  economy  of  maintenance 
of  such  a  command  at  a  central  point  of  food  and 
clothing  supply.  Its  influence  upon  the  training  of 
volunteers  and  militia  should  be  marked,  for  here 
would  be  solved  in  practice  all  theories  relating  to 
improvements  in  methods  and  materials.  The  estab- 
lishment of  such  a  command  does  not  conflict  with 
any  policy  of  the  government  and  harmonizes  per- 
fectly with  the  views  of  a  great  body  of  our  officers 
who  have  recognized  the  need  for  such  action  ever 
since  our  nation  assumed  duties  in  so  many  widely 
separated  parts  of  the  world.  Especially  will  such  a 
force  be  needed  in  view  of  our  relations  arising  un- 
der the  Monroe  Doctrine,  for  American  interests 
may  demand  a  show  of  force  at  any  moment  and 
without  time  for  proper  mobilization  of  units  not 
maintained  by  the  army  in  peace. 
We  have  the  site,  we  know  the  urgency  of  the  need 

154 


EXPEDITIONARY   FORCE 


and  we  have  but  to  make  a  beginning  based  upon  the 
ultimate  strength  of  the  expeditionary  force  to  be  as- 
sembled in  order  that  the  upbuilding  shall  be  pro- 
gressive and  require  no  destruction  or  reconstruc- 
tion. The  future  force  to  be  provided  for  at  first 
should  embrace  a  complete  tactical  division  at  war 
strength,  with  the  commanders  and  staff  necessary 
in  war,  who  should  execute  all  the  functions  of  their 
office  without  dependence  upon  territorial  command- 
ers or  supply  officers  other  than  for  the  possible  uti- 
lization of  the  most  economical  markets. 

The  reservation  at  Indianapolis  already  contains 
Fort  Benjamin  Harrison,  comprising  recently  con- 
structed permanent  barracks  and  quarters  for  a  regi- 
ment of  infantry.  Inasmuch  as  the  existing  scheme 
of  organization  for  a  division  provides  for  twelve 
regiments,  the  twelve  company  barracks  and  corre- 
sponding officers'  quarters  afford  an  ideal  opportu- 
nity and  ample  means  to  try  out  a  depot  system  by 
assigning  one  of  the  barracks  to  each  of  the  regi- 
ments of  the  division  which  will  comprise  the  expe- 
ditionary force  assembled  in  cantonment  in  the 
vicinity. 

The  policy  adopted  some  years  ago  in  relation  to 
the  distribution  of  the  army  in  permanent  posts  has 
been  recently  the  cause  of  serious  misunderstanding 
between  the  War  Department  and  Congress.  Gen- 
eral Sheridan  has  always  been  credited  with  the 
responsibility  for  the  policy  of  locating,  at  some  dis- 
tance from  large  cities,  the  permanent  posts  for  the 
mobile  army,  construction  of  which  was  begun  about 

155     ^ 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


the  time  it  became  apparent  that  the  Indian  question 
was  approaching  final  settlement.  The  upbuilding 
of  various  so-called  permanent  posts  progressed 
steadily  for  some  years.  In  a  few  cases,  entirely 
new  sites  were  obtained  in  the  vicinity  of  large  cities 
— as  at  Atlanta  and  Chicago — ^but  the  usual  plan  fol- 
lowed was  to  construct  anew  at  or  near  the  sites  of 
old  posts.  The  reorganization  of  the  army  under 
the  Act  of  February  2,  1901,  necessitated  provision 
for  additional  organizations,  but  as  the  regular 
regiments  were  nearly  all  on  foreign  service,  the 
matter  was  not  urged.  In  March,  1903,  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  decided  to  have  further  canstruction 
carried  on  under  some  definite  system,  and  directed 
the  War  College  Board — the  General  Staff  Corps 
had  not  then  been  organized — to  recommend  a  gen- 
eral allotment  of  the  available  appropriations  in 
such  manner  as  to  constitute  a  continuing  policy. 
The  board  recommended  that  a  comprehensive  and 
progressive  study  of  the  subject  of  stations  of 
troops  and  projects  for  quartering  them  should  be 
continued  from  year  to  year,  with  a  view  to  utilizing 
the  appropriations  to  the  best  advantage  and  to 
prevent  the  useless  expenditure  of  public  funds  at 
posts  which,  in  the  near  future,  might  be  abandoned 
or  completely  modified.  The  board  then  proceeded 
to  recommend,  in  detail,  a  distribution  of  available 
appropriations,  all  to  be  expended  at  existing  posts, 
and  further  recommended  withdrawal  of  troops  from 
certain  other  posts  with  a  view  to  gradually  assem- 
bling them  in  regimental  garrisons,  except  that  a  few 

156 


EXPEDITIONAEY   FORCE 


of  the  larger  posts  should  have  mixed  garrisons  of 
cavalry,  field  artillery  and  infantry.  This  policy, 
recommended  by  the  War  College  Board,  was  ap- 
proved by  the  then  Secretary  of  War. 

In  his  annual  report  for  1906,  the  Secretary  of 
War,  Hon.  William  H.  Taft,  referred  to  the  sub- 
ject in  this  language : 

"It  seems  to  me  the  general  policy  should  be  to 
do  away  with  the  small  posts  as  rapidly  as  possible 
and  to  concentrate  the  army  as  far  as  practicable 
in  regimental  and  brigade  posts,  care  being  taken 
to  utilize  in  every  possible  way  those  posts  of  re- 
cent construction,  and  especially  those  which  by 
their  location  are  capable  of  being  expanded  into 
regimental  or  brigade  posts  without  too  great 
cost.    .   .   . 

**The  change  to  brigade  posts  ought  to  be  made 
gradually,  and  we  should  avail  ourselves  of  those 
posts  which  are  nearest  now  in  point  of  capacity  to 
brigade  posts,  and  which  have  reservations  suffi- 
ciently large  to  permit  the  maneuvers  of  brigade  or 
larger  bodies  of  troops.  The  posts  which  I  recom- 
mend for  enlargement  to  brigade  posts  are  shown  in 
the  following  list : 

' '  Fort  D.  A.  Russell,  Wyo. 

"Fort  Leavenworth,  Kans. 

"Fort  Riley,  Kans. 

"Fort  Sam  Houston,  Texas. 

"Each  of  these  posts  may  well  be  made  a  com- 
mand of  a  brigadier  general,  and  if  the  present  pur- 
pose of  the  Department  is  carried  out  will  be  made 

157 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


so  even  before  the  completion  of  the  structure  nec- 
essary to  garrison  a  full  brigade.  ...  At  Fort 
Sill,  in  Oklahoma,  there  is  a  very  fine  military  res- 
ervation of  50,000  acres,  with  an  adjoining  forest 
reservation  which  can  be  properly  used  for  military 
maneuvers,  which  will  make  a  total  reservation  of 
100,000  acres.  This  ought  to  be  ultimately  made  into 
a  brigade  post. 

**Fort  Oglethorpe,  which  is  now  situated  on  part 
of  the  reservation  of  the  Chickamauga  Military 
Park,  can  be  enlarged  by  the  purchase  of  15,000  acres 
of  land  at  a  very  reasonable  price,  probably  not  to 
exceed  an  average  of  $15  an  acre,  and  this  could  be 
made  the  brigade  post  of  the  southeast.  A  brigade 
post  upon  the  western  coast  ought  to  be  constructed 
at  American  Lake,  "Washington,  which  is  com- 
mended most  highly  as  a  proper  place  on  Puget 
Sound,  though  the  cost  of  the  reservation  will  be 
high.  With  seven  or  eight  brigade  posts  and  the 
full  regimental  posts  which  we  now  have,  I  think 
the  army  would  be  properly  distributed  and  housed 
with  a  view  to  its  efficiency  and  proper  training." 

In  his  annual  report  for  1909,  the  Secretary  of 
War,  Hon.  J.  M.  Dickinson,  under  the  head  of  '  *  Mili- 
tary Policy,"  said  on  the  subject  of  army  posts: 

"In  order  to  .  .  .  permit  of  practice  under  war 
conditions  in  time  of  peace  by  the  Regular  Army 
and  Militia  in  combination,  the  United  States  should 
be  divided  into  a  number  of  territorial  and  tactical 
districts,  so  that  the  organized  militia  of  the  States 
comprising  such  districts  may  be  conveniently  com- 

158 


EXPEDITIONARY   FORCE 


bined  with  the  Regular  Army  stationed  therein  into 
permanent  brigades,  divisions  and  corps  for  instruc- 
tion and  tactical  organization.  It  will  probably  be 
found  desirable  to  have  in  each  State  in  such  a  dis- 
trict at  least  one  military  post.  .  .  .  No  post 
smaller  than  a  regimental  one  is  of  real  value  from 
a  military  standpoint,  so  far  as  education,  discipline 
and  drill  are  concerned. ' ' 

The  original  idea  of  having  some  large  posts  with 
garrisons  of  the  three  arms  of  the  service  was  to 
utilize  them  in  each  case  as  a  basis  of  a  larger  force 
of  regulars  and  national  guard ;  they  were  never  in- 
tended as  brigade  posts  in  the  sense  of  tactical 
brigades  of  the  mobile  army  which  comprise  regi- 
ments of  the  same  arm  of  the  service. 

It  should  be  remembered  that  during  all  the  years 
which  have  elapsed  since  the  construction  of  per- 
manent posts  to  replace  the  frontier  cantonments 
was  begun,  the  units  of  the  army  were  provided  for 
on  a  peace  basis,  and  the  barracks  were  calculated 
for  minimum  strength  organizations.  The  expan- 
sion of  a  peace  strength  company  to  a  war  strength 
organization  introduces  a  physical  factor  of  serious 
proportions  for  not  only  must  barrack  accommoda- 
tions be  doubled,  but  entire  plans  of  posts  already 
completed  must  be  changed  for  the  reason  that 
building  sites,  sewers,  roads  and  water  supply  were 
all  based  upon  the  smaller  units  and  no  spaces  were 
left  for  additions.  In  fact,  many  of  the  posts  were 
completed  before  1901  when  authority  of  Congress 
was  obtained  for  expansion  of  regiments  during 

159 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


emergencies  from  a  peace  to  a  war  strength  basis. 
Similar  difficulties  arise  whenever  cavalry  or  field 
artillery  units  are  substituted  for  dismounted  or- 
ganizations in  posts  constructed  for  infantry,  for 
stables,  gun  sheds  and  forage  storehouses,  black- 
smith shops  and  corrals  have  to  be  provided.  The 
organization  of  the  field  artillery  into  regiments  and 
its  redistribution  several  years  ago  involved  the 
abandonment  of  many  new  and  expensive  barracks 
constructed  without  warning  as  to  the  change  of 
field  artillery  organizations. 

A  new  policy  recently  under  consideration  at  the 
War  Department  had  for  its  object  an  abandonment 
of  the  former  system  of  maintaining  garrisons  in 
posts  established  at  some  distance  from  cities,  and 
contemplated  the  construction  of  barracks  within 
city  limits  for  the  men  only,  requiring  the  officers  to 
find  accommodations  wherever  available. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  questions  concerning 
the  distribution  of  the  army,  its  tactical  organization 
and  the  construction  of  posts  have  grown  to  be  far 
more  complex  than  would  be  the  case  if  we  had  a 
new  army  and  the  disposition  of  it  to  consider  as  an 
original  and  single  proposition.  A  redistribution  of 
the  army  to  meet  new  demands  for  foreign  gar- 
risons has  become  a  necessity,  and  unless  the  army 
is  increased,  or  foreign  garrisons  reduced  below 
what  are  now  regarded  as  essential,  some  of  the 
garrisons  must  be  withdrawn  from  posts  within  the 
United  States  in  the  near  future,  this  regardless  of 

160 


EXPEDITIONARY   FORCE 


the  policy  of  bringing  the  mobile  army  together  in 
large  tactical  units. 

Successful  achievements  under  legislative  control 
are  mainly  the  results  of  compromises.  In  the  end 
it  will  probably  be  found  that  the  best  interests  of 
the  nation  will  be  served  by  a  combination  of  the 
several  plans  for  caring  for  the  army  and  that  regi- 
mental posts  will  continue  to  fill  a  highly  useful  pur- 
pose, especially  when  grouped  in  territorial  areas 
permitting  of  concentration  for  practice  in  brigade 
and  division  training.  When  the  army  is  increased, 
as  now  seems  absolutely  necessary,  if  it  is  to  meet 
fairly  the  duties  pressing  heavily  upon  the  present 
force,  it  would  not  be  advisable  to  abandon  any  of 
the  existing  regimental  posts  unless  they  are  badly 
placed  with  reference  to  fulfilling  the  important  part 
to  be  performed  in  future  in  connection  with  the  in- 
struction of  volunteers,  reservists  and  militia. 

Improvements  in  material  and  implements  of 
war  are  based  upon  experiments  which  would  be 
greatly  facilitated  and  expedited  if  there  existed  a 
permanently  mobilized  expeditionary  force  where 
exchanges  of  views  could  be  obtained  concerning 
matters  of  interest  to  the  mobile  army.  The  more 
scattered  the  army,  the  more  difficult  to  reach  def- 
inite conclusions  concerning  important  matters. 

Whatever  may  be  the  policy  finally  to  prevail  con- 
cerning widely  dispersed  regimental  posts,  nothing 
should  be  allowed  to  prevent  the  concentration  of 
at  least  one  complete  division  at  war  strength.    Its 

161 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


value  as  a  training  school  for  generals  and  supply 
and  sanitary  ofiScers  will  alone  be  worth  the  cost. 
Tlie  habitude  of  service  with  war  strongtli  organiza- 
tions will  be  of  inestimable  value  and  make  for  econ- 
omy and  dispatch  in  the  practical  operations  of  war. 


XI 


ABMY  ADMINISTRATION 

"No  sound  mind  can  doubt  (the  essentiality  of  military  science  in 
time  of  war,  any  more  than. the  moral  certainty  that  the  most 
pacific  policy  on  the  part  of  a  government  will  not  preserve  it 
from  being  engaged  in  war  more  or  less  frequently." — Wash- 
ington. 

THE  great  administrative  branch  of  the  govern- 
ment known  as  the  War  Department^  and  pre- 
sided over  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  ranks  second 
to  none  in  real  importance.  The  vast  business  car- 
ried on  under  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  is  of 
the  most  varied  kind,  involving  expenditures  in  the 
aggregate  probably  exceeding  those  of  any  depart- 
ment of  the  government  during  the  century  just 
passed.  Much  of  this  business  has  little  or  no  con- 
nection with  the  military  arm  of  the  government, 
but  by  a  process  of  accumulation  of  statutes  and  au- 
thorities, resulting  often  from  the  expediency  of  the 
moment,  the  present  dimensions  have  been  reached 
— dimensions  so  vast  in  extent  that  it  is  beyond  the 
physical  power  of  any  Secretary  of  War  to  exercise 
more  than  a  general  supervision  of  the  great  ad- 
ministrative machine  under  his  control. 

When  the  Colonies,  through  the  Declaration  of 
Independence,  found  themselves  confronted  with  a 
contest,  upon  the  result  of  which  their  liberties  de- 

163 


THE   AMERICAN  AEMY 


pended,  they  were  without  any  form  of  administra- 
tive government  calculated  for  war,  which  in  all 
ages  requires  certain  fixed  elements — ^men,  muni- 
tions, arms,  clothing,  food,  a  military  hierarchy,  and 
last,  but  not  least,  a  substantial  money  chest.  There 
was  much  groping  in  the  dark,  for,  while  the  min- 
ute men  were  also  riflemen  of  the  highest  type  then 
known,  there  was  wanting  that  cohesion  and  system 
which  can  be  supplied  in  no  other  way  than  by  a 
properly  organized  military  department. 

When  one  considers  the  Declaration  of  Independ- 
ence and  the  wonderful  document  embodjdng  the 
Constitution  of  the  Republic,  it  becomes  .difficult  of 
belief  that  the  same  talented  men  who  so  wisely 
framed  these  incomparable  state  papers  could  have 
had  any  part  as  members  of  Congress  in  the  con- 
duct of  military  affairs  during  the  Revolution.  The 
student  of  military  history  stands  aghast  at  the  rev- 
elation of  stupidity  and  jealousy  which  character- 
ized the  conduct  of  Congress  in  dealing  with  the 
practical  business  of  establishing  and  perpetuating 
independence  after  having  proclaimed  it. 

During  the  Revolution  Congress  issued  the  com- 
missions to  generals  and  staff  officers,  and,  by  reso- 
lution, frequently  dictated  the  control  of  military 
affairs  in  minutest  detail.  At  the  earnest  solicita- 
tion of  General  Washington,  a  committee,  consist- 
ing of  John  Adams  and  Thomas  Jefferson,  was  ap- 
pointed to  hear  Colonel  Tudor  on  the  subject  of  the 
insufficiency  of  the  disciplinary  articles  for  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  army,  and  this  resulted  in  the  adop- 

164 


ARMY  ADMINISTRATION 


tion  by  the  Continental  Congress,  September  20, 
1776,  of  the  British  Articles  of  War,  which,  in  turn, 
had  been  bodily  drawn  from  those  in  use  by  the 
Romans.  The  adoption  of  the  Articles  of  War  laid 
the  foundation  of  that  discipline  not  inaptly  defined 
as  **the  orderly  sequence  of  events,"  which  in  time 
brought  the  Continentals  to  a  capacity  to  contend 
successfully  with  British  veterans  and  as  allies  to 
rival  the  best  troops  of  France. 

The  expediency  of  establishing  a  War  Office  was 
constantly  urged  upon  Congress,  and  on  June  12, 
1776,  the  method  of  conducting  military  affairs  by 
resolutions  of  that  body  was  discontinued,  and  the 
''Board  of  War  and  Ordnance,"  consisting  of  a 
committee  of  five  members,  was  established.  Among 
other  duties  this  board  was  charged  with  **  superin- 
tending the  raising,  fitting  out  and  despatching  all 
land  forces  ordered  for  the  service  of  the  United 
Colonies ;  immediate  care  of  all  artillery,  arms,  am- 
munition and  warlike  stores  not  employed  in  actual 
service;  to  keep  a  register  of  the  names  of  all  offi- 
cers of  the  land  service,  with  rank  and  date  of  com- 
mission; accounts  of  the  State  and  disposition  of 
the  troops  in  the  respective  Colonies. '  *  This  board 
continued  to  act  until  Congress  created,  by  resolu- 
tion of  October  17,  1777,  a  Board  of  War  to  consist 
of  three  persons  not  members  of  Congress.  That 
seeming  necessity  for  jealously  guarding  against 
any  possible  encroachment  of  military  power  in- 
duced the  legislators  to  provide  specifically  that  the 
proceedings  of  this  board  should  be  subject  to  in- 

165 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


spection  of  Congress  once  a  month,  or  oftener,  and 
that  every  member  of  Congress  should  have  free  ac- 
cess to  the  records  of  the  hoard,  with  the  right  to 
make  copies  of  all  documents  except  returns  of  ar- 
mies, provisions  or  military  stores,  which  could 
be  obtained  only  on  the  order  of  Congress  itself. 
The  personnel  of  the  board  changed  frequently,  and 
the  question  of  a  quorum  gave  considerable  trouble. 
Finally,  on  October  29, 1778,  Congress  provided  that 
the  Board  of  War  should  consist  of  two  members  of 
Congress  and  three  persons  not  members,  and  that 
three  should  constitute  a  legal  quorum  in  order  that 
important  matters  should  not  be  unduly  -delayed. 

The  Board  of  War  continued  to  exercise  its  func- 
tions until  Major  General  Lincoln  accepted,  on  No- 
vember 26,  1781,  the  office  of  Secretary  of  War, 
which,  with  those  of  Superintendent  of  Finance  and 
Secretary  of  Marine,  had  been  authorized  February 
7,  1781,  under  the  act  creating  certain  executive  de- 
partments. By  resolution,  Congress,  from  time  to 
time,  assigned  various  duties  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,  and  required  and  enjoined  upon  all  military 
and  other  officers  connected  vAi\i  the  army  to  ob- 
serve his  directions.  July  3, 1782,  he  was  specifically 
"authorized  to  order  all  persons  to  be  arrested  and 
tried  for  disobedience  of  any  orders  which  he  is  em- 
powered to  issue." 

The  various  duties  outlined  for  the  Board  of  War 
during  the  Revolution,  and  subsequently  for  the 
Secretary  of  War,  resulted  from  resolutions  based 
upon  the  necessity  for  meeting  emergencies  arising 

166 


ARMY  ADMINISTRATION 


from  day  to  day.  It  was  not  until  January  27,  1785, 
that  "An  Ordinance  for  ascertaining  the  powers  and 
duties  of  the  Secretary  of  War"  was  passed.  The 
War  Department  as  now  known  may  be  said  to  have 
had  its  foundation  laid  in  this  ordinance  which  pre- 
scribes in  great  detail  the  powers  and  duties  of  the 
Secretary  of  War. 

Matters  drifted  along  under  makeshift  devices, 
which,  however,  were  furnishing  that  experience  in 
administration  which  culminated  in  the  conviction 
that  the  confederation  was  too  frail  a  vessel  to  sup- 
ply this  great  continent  with  a  stable  government. 
During  this  period  the  functions  of  the  office  of  Sec- 
retary of  War  embraced,  to  a  great  extent,  both 
those  of  a  commander-in-chief  and  those  of  an  ad- 
ministrative and  executive  officer.  In  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  government  under  the  Constitution,  the 
President  having  been  made  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  Army  and  Navy,  Congress  enacted,  on  Au- 
gust 7,  1789,  that  there  should  be  a  principal  officer 
in  the  Department  of  War  "called  the  Secretary 
for  the  Department  of  War,  who  shall  perform  and 
execute  such  duties  as  shall  from  time  to  time  be  en- 
joined on  or  entrusted  to  him  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States  agreeable  to  the  Constitution,  rela- 
tive to  military  commissions,  or  to  the  land  or  naval 
forces,  ships  or  warlike  stores,  or  to  such  other  mat- 
ters respecting  military  or  naval  affairs  as  the  Presi- 
dent shall  assign  to  the  said  department,  or  relative 
to  the  granting  of  lands  to  persons  entitled  thereto 
for  military  services  rendered  to  the  United  States, 

167 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


or  relative  to  Indian  affairs ;  and  furthermore,  that 
the  said  principal  officer  shall  conduct  the  business 
of  the  said  department  in  such  manner  as  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  shall  from  time  to  time  or- 
der or  instruct."  The  Navy  Department  was  cre- 
ated by  the  Act  of  April  30,  1798,  and  thereafter 
ceased  to  be  an  adjunct  of  the  War  Department. 
Up  to  this  date  it  will  be  observed  that  the  War  De- 
partment included  in  the  scope  of  its  administration 
the  work  of  three  executive  departments — ^War, 
Navy  and  Interior,  as  now  constituted.  At  the  time 
of  the  establishment  of  the  present  War  Department 
General  Henry  Knox,  who  had  been  Secretary  un- 
der the  former  regime  was  reappointed  to  the  office 
by  President  Washington.  General  Knox's  famil- 
iarity with  the  requirements  of  the  office  enabled 
him  to  establish  administrative  methods  upon  a 
proper  basis  at  the  outset.  The  entire  business 
method  of  the  department  was  based  upon  the  idea, 
which  has  since  been  coniBrmed  by  the  Supreme 
Court,  that  the  Secretary  of  War  is  the  representa- 
tive of  the  President  with  full  legal  powers  with  re- 
spect to  all  administration  and  control  of  the  army 
and  its  affairs.  The  only  change  in  this  has  been 
when  Congress,  from  time  to  time,  has  provided  that 
specific  things  be  done  by  or  under  the  direction  of 
the  Secretary  of  War,  and  which  without  specific 
statute  would  not  be  an  attribute  of  any  particular 
executive  department. 

Prior  to  the  Act  of  July  16, 1798,  the  War  Depart- 
ment suffered  much  embarrassment  in  the  matter  of 

168 


ARMY  ADMINISTRATION 


supplies,  because  all  purchases  of  and  contracts  for 
supplies  for  the  military  service  were  made  under 
and  by  the  Treasury  Department.  The  change  made 
in  the  methods  of  purchase  were  not  sufficiently 
drastic  to  meet  the  conditions  then  confronting  the 
Republic,  which  appeared  to  be  unwillingly  ap- 
proaching a  rupture  with  France,  the  able  and  effi- 
cient ally  of  the  Colonies  in  their  struggle  for  inde- 
pendence. The  resulting  legislation  enacted  March 
3,  1799,  established  the  system  which  has  since  pre- 
vailed by  authorizing  and  requiring  the  Secretary 
of  War  to  make  purchases  and  enter,  or  cause  to  be 
entered  into,  all  contracts  for  providing  annually  all 
clothing,  camp  utensils  and  equipage,  medicines  and 
hospital  stores  necessary  for  the  troops  and  armies 
of  the  United  States.  The  political  dissension  of 
the  times,  together  with  the  paucity  of  national  re- 
sources and  lack  of  adequate  means  of  defense 
caused  serious  embarrassment  in  the  hour  of  dan- 
ger. 

Fortunately,  the  country  was  saved  from  hostile 
collision  with  France,  but  the  war  scare  had  given 
much  food  for  thought  to  public  officials.  It  had  be- 
come evident  thus  early  that  the  militia  act  of  1792 
was  lacking  in  the  elements  essential  for  producing 
a  reliable  combatant  army.  In  1803  the  President 
invited  Congress  to  cause  a  review  of  the  militia 
laws,  and  the  result  was  the  adoption  of  a  resolu- 
tion requesting  the  President  to  write  to  the  execu- 
tive of  each  state,  *' urging  the  importance  and  in- 
dispensable necessity  of  vigorous  exertions  on  the 

169 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


part  of  the  State  Governments  to  carry  into  effect 
the  militia  system  adopted  by  the  National  legisla- 
ture agreeably  to  the  powers  reserved  to  the  States 
respectively  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  and  in  a  manner  the  best  calculated  to  in- 
sure such  a  degree  of  military  discipline  and  knowl- 
edge of  tactics  as  will,  under  the  auspices  of  a  be- 
nign Providence,  render  the  militia  a  sure  and  per- 
manent bulwark  of  National  defence.**  The  nation 
has  for  a  century  continued  to  play  battledore  and 
shuttlecock  with  a  militia  system. 

Under  the  Confederation  the  Secretary  of  War 
possessed  much  authority  subsequently  specifically 
designated  as  prerogatives  of  the  President.  While 
the  relations  between  the  President  and  Secretary 
were  left  untrammelled  with  any  restrictions  in  the 
Act  of  1789  creating  the  War  Department,  it  grad- 
ually came  to  be  understood  that  when  Congress  spe- 
cifically names  the  Secretary  of  War  in  connection 
with  legislation  regarding  matters  falling  within  his 
department,  there  is  no  disturbance  of  system  or  of 
the  harmonious  relations  between  the  President  and 
his  cabinet  officer.  This  adjustment  has  received 
recognition  through  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court 
wherein  the  Secretary  of  War  is  regarded  exclus- 
ively as  the  active  agent  of  the  President  in  all  mat- 
ters falling  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  War  De- 
partment, and,  in  short,  for  military  purposes  the 
order  of  the  Secretary  of  War  is  the  order  of  the 
President — the  Commander-in-Chief. 

As  early  as  1809  the  Secretary  of  War  declared 

170 


ARMY   ADMINISTRATION 


*'that  the  business  of  the  Department  had  increased 
beyond  what  the  capacity  of  any  one  man  could  per- 
form." It  was  not,  however,  until  1812  that  Con- 
gress made  an  effort,  coincident  with  the  increase  of 
the  army,  to  give  some  relief  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  from  the  vast  burden  of  details  that  pressed 
upon  him.  The  President  proposed  that  the  relief  be 
afforded  by  the  addition  of  two  assistant  secre- 
taries, but  Congress  established  the  present  system 
of  bureau  chiefs  who  control  the  various  staff  and 
supply  departments.  The  Act  of  March  3, 1813,  au- 
thorized the  Secretary  of  War  to  prepare  general 
regulations  defining  and  prescribing  the  respective 
duties  and  powers  of  the  officers  composing  the  va- 
rious bureaus.  Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  in  groping 
for  some  method  which  would  make  it  possible  for 
the  Secretary  of  War  to  perform  the  higher  func- 
tions of  his  office,  without  being  crushed  with  the 
burden  of  details,  a  bureau  system  was  introduced, 
with  a  number  of  semi-independent  chiefs,  each 
working  along  his  own  lines  without  of  necessity 
having  any  knowledge  of  the  character  and  extent 
of  equally  important  work  going  on  in  other  bureaus. 
The  army  is  absolutely  dependent  upon  these  admin- 
istrative and  supply  bureaus,  and  success  depends 
upon  the  coherent  total  of  all  their  efforts.  The 
methods  remain  practically  the  same  to-day  as  in 
the  War  of  1812,  except  that  through  a  long  course 
of  years  there  has  grown  up  a  system  of  laws  and 
regulations  fixing  in  great  detail  the  duties  of  the 
various  bureaus.    There  is   a  most  complex   and 

171 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


expensive  branch  of  another  executive  department 
to  audit  and  control  all  the  accounts. 

The  severe  hardships  of  war  and  military  life  in 
general  result  in  wastefulness  and  loss  of  public 
property,  and  some  well-devised  system  is  essential 
to  protect  the  treasury  from  undue  strain.  Through 
a  long  course  of  years,  the  principles  early  enunci- 
ated by  Secretary  of  War  Calhoun,  that  some  one 
must  be  held  accountable  for  each  and  every  article 
of  public  property ;  that  each  chief  of  bureau  must 
be  responsible  that  all  accounts  are  promptly  and 
properly  rendered,  and  that  all  disbursements  are 
made  from  funds  advanced  on  proper  -estimates, 
have  prevailed.  During  the  earlier  years  many  of 
these  functions  were  performed  by  civil  agents,  but 
military  rank  was  gradually  conferred  upon  all  the 
principal  officials  of  the  War  Department  who  were 
called  upon  from  time  to  time  to  exercise  their  func- 
tions in  contact  with  troops.  From  modest  begin- 
nings, both  as  to  duties  and  rank,  the  staff  bureaus 
of  the  War  Department  have  gradually  reached  their 
present  proportions.  Several  of  these  bureaus  are 
of  comparatively  recent  origin,  but  to  trace  the 
growth  of  others  would  be  to  follow  the  army 
through  the  vicissitudes  of  a  century  of  able  and  ear- 
nest military  effort. 

When  the  Civil  War  Secretary,  Edwin  M.  Stanton, 
took  up  the  work  of  the  Department,  which  for  four 
years  laid  such  a  mental  and  physical  strain  upon 
him  as  few  men  could  bear,  he  found  a  condition  cal- 

172 


ARMY  ADMINISTRATION 


culated  to  bring  discouragement  to  the  stoutest 
heart.  The  relations  between  the  Secretary  of  War 
and  the  Commanding  General  of  the  Army  had  long 
been  of  such  a  character  that  the  latter  officer  had 
removed  his  headquarters  to  New  York  City.  It 
became  necessary  to  reorganize  the  business  meth- 
ods of  the  various  bureaus  to  meet  the  exceptional 
tasks  confronting  them  in  the  organization,  equip- 
ping and  supplying  of  an  army  suddenly  increased 
from  about  ten  thousand  to  ultimately  more  than 
one  million  men  in  actual  service. 

The  general  system  of  administration  was  similar 
to  that  pursued  during  the  Mexican  War,  and  much 
reliance  was  placed  on  the  veterans  of  that  conflict. 
The  history  of  the  great  struggle  is  still  fresh  in 
the  minds  of  the  American  people,  but  it  may  be 
safely  stated  that  only  a  very  limited  number  have 
a  proper  appreciation  of  the  great  administrative 
work  performed  by  the  War  Department  during  the 
days  and  nights  of  the  whole  four  years  of  war. 
There  were  periods  of  marching,  of  battle,  and  of 
monotonous  camp  life  for  the  average  regiment; 
but  for  the  Secretary  of  War  and  his  coadjutors 
there  was  one  unending  round  of  high  tension  work. 

Armies  are  useless  without  food,  clothes,  ammuni- 
tion and  transportation,  and  to  obtain  and  distribute 
these  essential  requisites  in  the  quantities  demanded 
during  the  Civil  War  required  administrative  and 
executive  ability  of  a  high  order.  The  absence  of  a 
directing  and  coordinating  professional  authority 

173 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


in  the  scheme  of  army  organization  threw  an  im- 
mense strain  upon  the  Secretary  of  War  and  Presi- 
dent. 

Nothing  in  all  previous  military  history  equals 
the  business  administration  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment as  exemplified  in  the  muster-out  and  transpor- 
tation of  the  great  volunteer  armies  to  their  homes 
at  the  close  of  the  Civil  War.  The  great  burden  of 
current  expense  was  quickly  reduced,  a  matter  of 
vital  importance  at  the  time. 

Follo"\ving  close  upon  the  muster-out  of  the  volun- 
teers a  reorganization  and  increase  of  the  regular 
army  took  place.  A  portion  of  the  new  army  was 
destined  for  service  in  the  Southern  States  during 
the  reconstruction  period.  The  duties  required  of 
the  army  during  the  long  and  disastrous  efforts  at 
sustaining  '* carpet-bag'*  governments  were  in- 
tensely distasteful  to  both  officers  and  men,  as  well 
as  to  the  better  element  amongst  the  southern  peo- 
ple. To  be  sure  the  Civil  War  had  just  closed,  and 
it  was  necessary  to  reestablish  law  and  or- 
der throughout  a  vast  territory  inhabited  by  a  negro 
population,  which  regarded  the  army  as  the  em- 
bodiment of  that  power  which  had  struck  off  the 
shackles  of  slavery.  The  use  of  the  army  at  the  polls 
and  in  civil  matters  generally  has  ever  been  re- 
pugnant to  American  ideas,  and  at  this  period  it 
only  succeeded  in  embittering  the  southern  people 
to  such  an  extent  that  one  of  their  first  and  most  in- 
sistent policies,  after  the  reconstruction,  was  to  de- 
mand a  reduction  of  the  regular  army.    Under  this 

174 


ARMY   ADMINISTRATION 


pressure  the  maximum  strength  of  the  army  was 
fixed  at  25,000  men,  and  so  remained  until  the  out- 
break of  the  war  with  Spain. 

The  War  Department  had  continued  in  charge  of 
the  Indians  until  the  close  of  the  Mexican  War,  after 
which  period  their  affairs  were  managed  by  Indian 
agents,  with  minimum  salaries  and  maximum  temp- 
tations. Many  times  the  army  was  compelled  to 
stand  idly  by  and  witness  the  perpetration  of 
wrongs,  and  when  the  Indians,  in  desperation, 
** broke  out,"  the  War  Department  was  called  upon 
to  bring  about  another  era  of  peace.  Year  after 
year  regiments  were  summoned  to  the  field,  some- 
times under  tropical  suns,  and  again  in  the  land  of 
blizzards,  where  the  icy  winds  made  campaigning 
miserable  alike  to  pursuer  and  pursued.  With  each 
recurring  surrender  the  Indians  were  restored  to 
the  tender  mercies  of  the  agent  and  his  harpies,  only 
to  find  their  grievances  multiplied. 

As  years  wore  on  the  settlers,  with  their  wire 
fences,  closed  in  slowly  but  surely  around  the  res- 
ervations, and  the  fact  dawned  upon  the  Indians 
that  the  wild,  free  life  of  the  West  had  gone.  The 
march  of  civilization  had  swept  away  the  old  life 
and  left  but  mere  remnants  of  once  proud  tribes 
stranded  as  driftwood  along  the  shores  of  progress. 
Encountering  only  the  worst  elements  amongst  the 
whites,  too  often  the  mere  outcasts  of  society,  the 
poor  warriors,  shorn  of  the  power  wielded  by  their 
ancestors,  turned  restlessly  for  some  light  to  those 
with  whom  they  had  battled  and  at  whose  hands 

175 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


they  had  often  suffered  defeat.  The  War  Depart- 
ment resumed  charge,  when  army  officers  were 
again  installed  as  Indian  agents  and  gradually  laid 
the  foundations  of  lasting  peace  by  showing  the  In- 
dians the  utter  futility  of  contending  against  inevi- 
table fate. 

The  Indian  question  having  been  finally  settled,  a 
plan  was  adopted  by  the  War  Department  of  bring- 
ing together  the  scattered  fragments  of  the  regular 
army,  which  in  its  entirety  did  not  equal  in  number 
a  single  army  corps.  The  necessity  for  guarding 
isolated  and  exposed  points  had  for  years  prevented 
proper  instruction  of  officers  and  men  in  the  admin- 
istration of  maneuvers  of  battalions,  regiments  and 
brigades,  but  in  minor  warfare  they  were  not  out- 
classed by  any  soldiers  the  world  over.  To  accom- 
plish the  best  results  numerous  small  posts  were 
abandoned  and  regimental  posts  established. 

The  unwillingness  of  Congress  to  recognize  the  ur- 
gent need  of  men  to  garrison  the  growing  coast 
defenses,  while  continuing  to  spend  millions  upon 
fortifications  and  guns,  caused  the  War  Department 
grave  concern.  After  years  of  pleading  for  proper 
legislation,  a  piteous  appeal  was  finally  made  for 
two  additional  regiments  of  artillery,  and  action  was 
slowly  maturing  in  this  regard  when  other  events 
occurred  which  rapidly  roused  the  country  to  action. 

For  more  than  half  a  century  Cuba  had  been  a 
source  of  incessant  anxiety  and  trouble  to  every  ad- 
ministration. Forty  years  previously — December, 
1858 — President  James  Buchanan,  in  complaining 

176 


ARMY   ADMINISTEATION 


in  a  message  to  Congress  of  past  conditions,  said; 
''Spanish  officials  under  the  direct  control  of  the 
Captain  General  of  Cuba  have  insulted  our  national 
flag,  and  in  repeated  instances  have  from  time  to 
time  inflicted  injuries  on  the  persons  and  property 
of  our  citizens.  .  .  .  All  our  attempts  to  obtain 
redress  have  been  baffled  and  defeated.  .  .  .  The 
truth  is  that  Cuba,  in  its  existing  Colonial  condition, 
is  a  constant  source  of  injury  and  annoyance  to  the 
American  people.  ...  It  has  been  made  known 
to  the  world  by  my  predecessors  that  the  United 
States  have  on  several  occasions  endeavored  to  ac- 
quire Cuba  from  Spain  by  honorable  negotiation. 
.  .  .  We  would  not,  if  we  could,  acquire  Cuba  in 
any  other  manner.  This  is  due  to  our  national  char- 
acter. .  .  .  Our  relations  with  Spain,  which  ought 
to  be  of  the  most  friendly  character,  must  always  be 
placed  in  jeopardy  whilst  the  existing  Colonial  gov- 
ernment over  the  island  shall  remain  in  its  present 
condition. '  * 

There  was  a  widespread  sentiment  throughout  the 
United  States  in  behalf  of  the  Cubans  in  their  in- 
surrection against  Spanish  domination,  but  the  Sec- 
retary of  War  and  his  co-workers  were  advised  of 
the  unprepared  state  of  the  army  and  of  the  defenses 
for  immediate  war.  Everything  which  could  be  le- 
gitimately done  at  the  time  was  hastened  forward 
to  make  up  for  past  neglect,  but  guns,  ammunition 
and  armies  do  not  appear  by  magic. 

The  country  had  not  engaged  in  war  since  the  close 
of  the  gigantic  struggle  of  1861  to  1865 ;  no  progress 

177 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


in  legislation  had  been  made  in  a  hundred  years  so 
far  as  utilization  of  organized  militia  was  concerned, 
and  there  was  no  law  extant  under  which  the  War 
Department  could  take  any  of  those  preliminary 
steps  so  essential  to  success  in  war.  During  April 
all  of  the  little  regular  army  which  could  be  spared 
was  assembled  in  southern  camps  and  organized  in 
brigades  and  divisions.  This  was  a  measure  of  ex- 
treme precaution;  the  results  at  Santiago  prove  it 
to  have  been  one  of  those  fortunate  strokes  upon 
which  the  fate  of  nations  often  hang. 

Notwithstanding  the  many  years  of  threatening 
clouds,  there  was  no  well-defined  plan  for  or- 
ganizing the  army  when  called  into  active  service. 
Brigades,  divisions  and  corps  gradually  came  into 
being  through  the  expediency  of  the  moment.  A 
heterogeneous  mass  of  staff  officers  was  distributed 
to  the  general  officers,  and  in  many  instances,  instead 
of  being  useful,  they  proved  to  be  encumbrances.  In 
numerous  cases  the  generals  in  command  detailed 
subordinate  regular  officers  to  perform  the  duties 
while  the  volunteer  officers  held  the  higher  staff  rank 
and  drew  the  pay  of  offices  requiring  technical 
knowledge,  which  is  not  immediately  supplied 
through  patriotism  and  willingness  to  serve.  The 
humiliating  experience  of  some  of  the  great  volun- 
teer camps  should  be  enough  to  prevent  a  repetition 
of  such  mistakes. 

The  need  for  ships  was  urgent,  and  the  navy  was 
seeking  them  at  the  same  time  as  the  army.  The 
War  Department  had  had  no  previous  personal  ex- 

178 


ARMY  ADMINISTRATION 


perience  with  transports,  and  the  history  of  the 
Vera  Cruz  expedition  of  the  Mexican  War  appeared 
to  have  been  forgotten.  General  Shafter's  magnifi- 
cent corps  was  sent  to  Santiago,  inadequately 
equipped,  and  had  the  navy  not  come  to  the  rescue, 
the  success  of  the  campaign  must  of  necessity  have 
been  endangered  through  the  impossibility  of,  or 
long  delay  in,  effecting  a  landing.  Once  in  contact 
with  the  enemy,  the  American  army,  as  usual,  added 
laurels  to  its  already  long  list  of  successful  cam- 
paigns, but  in  doing  so  prevented  the  country  from 
seeing  clearly  the  results  of  neglect  of  sound  policy. 

The  expedition  to  Porto  Rico,  and  that  across  the 
wide  Pacific  to  Manila,  were  sent  with  less  haste,  and 
were  somewhat  better  equipped.  But  experience 
was  being  obtained,  and  now,  after  having  become 
possessed  of  a  fleet  of  transports,  the  War  Depart- 
ment is  enabled  to  point  with  just  pride  to  many 
years  of  such  successful  endeavol*  that  its  record  is 
not  exceeded  by  that  of  any  of  the  great  steamship 
lines.  This  service  ultimately  reached  such  a  de- 
gree of  efficiency  that  thousands  of  troops  have  been 
transported  seven  thousand  miles  across  the  Pacific, 
mthout  material  accident,  in  sufficient  comfort  to 
have  them  ready  for  immediate  field  service  on  ar- 
rival. 

With  the  signing  of  the  protocol,  it  became  neces- 
sary to  reduce  the  forces,  but  as  the  Spanish  army  in 
Cuba  was  still  intact,  it  was  decided  to  proceed  at 
once  with  the  muster-out  of  only  100,000  volunteers. 
The  occupation  of  posts  in  Cuba  to  be  evacuated  by 

179 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


Spanish  garrisons  employed  50,000  troops.  The 
question  of  withdrawing  the  volunteers  from  the 
Philippine  Archipelago  caused  the  War  Department 
much  concern.  Peace  once  an  accomplished  official 
act,  all  volunteers  would  become  entitled  to  dis- 
charge. The  department  concluded,  therefore,  to 
ask  outright  for  a  regular  army  of  100,000  men,  and 
the  House  of  Representatives  passed  a  bill  to  that 
effect,  but  it  failed  in  the  Senate.  A  compromise  of 
a  temporary  regular  army  and  another  force  of  vol- 
unteers was  agreed  upon.  The  muster-out  of  the 
volunteers  for  the  war  with  Spain  was  completed  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  having  in  mind  the  economy  of 
the  moment  as  well  as  protection  from  fraudulent 
claims  for  pensions  in  the  future. 

In  the  Philippines  the  army  was  confronted  mth 
many  serious  problems,  the  solution  of  which  de- 
manded a  showing  of  well-organized  force.  The  en- 
listment and  transportation  of  the  new  volunteers 
to  a  scene  of  action  ten  thousand  miles  from  their 
homes  for  a  comparatively  short  service,  involved 
such  an  appalling  expenditure  of  public  funds  that 
the  President  withheld  his  consent  to  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  new  regiments  until  conditions  became 
so  critical  that  the  reinforcement  could  no  longer  be 
delayed.  The  excess  of  cost  of  this  force  of  volun- 
teers over  what  the  cost  would  have  been  had  reg- 
ulars been  employed,  with  the  usual  three  years '  en- 
listments, has  been  estimated  by  the  various  bureaus 
of  the  War  Department  to  be  $16,374,009.04,  quite 
an  item  even  in  these  days  of  abounding  wealth.  The 

180 


ARMY  ADMINISTRATION 


new  volunteer  regiments  were  raised  and  com- 
manded by  regular  officers,  and  were  splendid  or- 
ganizations, but  they  were  of  necessity  brought  home 
and  mustered  out  with  an  average  of  fifteen  to 
eighteen  months*  service  over-sea,  altogether  a  very 
expensive  proceeding. 

The  exchange  of  troops  in  the  Philippines  to  en- 
able the  volunteers  who  went  out  in  the  first  expedi- 
tion to  come  home,  was  effected  during  active  insur- 
rection which  continued  until  a  force  of  nearly  70,- 
000  men  was  assembled  in  the  Islands. 

It  became  evident  that  makeshift  devices  would  no 
longer  serve  the  purpose,  and  the  Secretary  of  War 
presented  the  needs  of  the  service  in  carefully  pre- 
pared legislation,  which,  while  not  accomplishing 
everything  desired,  gave  the  Department  a  suffi- 
cient force  to  meet  the  urgent  demands  upon  the 
army  in  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  the  Philippines,  Alaska 
and  at  home. 

Ever  since  the  spring  of  1898  the  officials  of  the 
War  Department  have  discussed  the  confusion  which 
arose,  and  have  constantly  sought  the  best  means  of 
preventing  a  repetition  of  conditions  which  might 
lead  to  humiliation  and  temporary  defeat  in  a  war 
with  an  enterprising  and  audacious  enemy.  After 
mature  consideration,  the  Secretary  of  War  settled 
upon  the  plan  for  the  establishment  of  a  General 
Staff  Corps,  with  a  chief  at  its  head  who  is  the  Chief 
of  Staff  for  the  whole  army.  Under  this  plan  the 
misnamed  office  of  Commanding  General  has  disap- 
peared.   It  had  ever  been  a  delusion  and  a  disap- 

18X 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


pointment  for  the  distinguished  soldiers  who  had  oc- 
cupied it,  with  constant  but  fruitless  efforts  to  invest 
the  oflBce  with  something  more  than  a  name. 

The  reliability  and  excellence  of  the  river  and 
harbor  works,  under  the  War  Department,  caused 
the  nation  to  turn  to  it  when  all  those  previously  se- 
lected to  dig  the  Panama  Canal  had  acknowledged 
failure.  Under  the  system  developed  by  the  Corps 
of  Engineers,  its  officers,  headed  by  the  incompara- 
ble Goethals,  have  brought  that  great  public  work 
to  a  completion  well  within  the  time  limit  of  the  es- 
timates. It  is,  and  will  remain,  a  fitting  monument 
to  the  War  Department  in  general,  and  to  the  Corps 
of  Engineers  and  their  alma  mater  in  particular. 

The  administration  of  civil  affairs  of  great  im- 
portance to  the  nation  have  been  entrusted  to  the 
War  Department  until  the  burden  of  even  slight 
supervision  on  the  part  of  the  Secretary  of  War 
leaves  little  time  for  proper  attention  to  the  orig- 
inal functions  of  his  office  in  connection  with  the 
army.  War  has  become  a  complicated  and  absorb- 
ing science  demanding  a  knowledge  of  a  vast  array 
of  principles  and  details  on  the  part  of  those  re- 
sponsible for  the  administration  of  armies.  The  time 
has  arrived  when  the  burden  should  be  rearranged 
and  the  parts  not  correlated  with  preparation  for 
and  the  conduct  of  war  should  be  severed  from  the 
War  Department  so  as  to  bring  the  labors  of  the  of- 
fice within  the  mental  and  physical  capacity  of  su- 
pervision of  one  man.  If  this  can  not  be  accom- 
plished then  there  should  be  a  new  oflice  created, 

182 


ARMY  ADMINISTRATION 


that  of  Secretary  of  the  Army,  to  correspond  with 
that  of  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  The  necessity  for 
some  drastic  action  may  be  readily  appreciated  by 
a  slight  consideration  of  the  variety  and  importance 
of  subjects  requiring  the  personal  attention  of  the 
Secretary  of  War,  and  to  which  are  added  other  bur- 
dens at  almost  every  session  of  Congress. 

It  is  not  an  easy  matter  radically  to  recast  a  sys- 
tem, such  as  that  involved  in  the  organization  of  the 
War  Department,  because  of  the  personal  interests 
within  and  without  the  department  to  be  conserved, 
but  it  is  certain  that  unless  some  of  the  burden  is 
lifted  from  the  Secretary  of  War  and  dispersed  by 
authority  of  law  amongst  designated  assistants,  or 
transferred  to  other  branches  of  the  government, 
the  centralization  which  has  grown  up  will  break 
down  or  militate  against  fuU  success,  for  the  duties 
have  long  since  outgrown  the  capacity  of  any  indi- 
vidual. 

It  is  a  compliment  to  the  War  Department  system 
that  Congress  should  commit  to  it  so  many  matters 
requiring  discretion,  integrity  and  quick  action,  as 
in  the  case  of  floods,  earthquakes,  fires  and  other 
great  public  calamities.  It  shows  that  at  heart  pub- 
lic men,  as  well  as  the  people,  have  confidence  in  the 
honesty,  capacity  and  integrity  of  the  army. 


XII 


COMMAND   OP  THE   ARMY 

"If  an  army  was  in  existence,  and  an  officer  were  inyited  to  take 
command  of  it,  his  course  would  be  plain,  for  he  would  have 
nothing  more  to  do  than  to  examine  the  constitution  of  it,  and  to 
inquire  into  the  composition,  to  enable  him  to  decide  .  .  . 
The  difficulty  in  which  you  expect  to  be  involved,  in  the  choice 
of  general  officers,  when  you  come  to  form  the  army,  is  certainly 
a  serious  one;  and  in  a  government  like  ours,  where  there  are  so 
many  considerations  to  be  attended  to  and  to  combine,  it  will  be 
found  not  a  little  perplexing." — Washington. 

THE  present  status  as  to  the  command  of  the 
army  is  the  result  of  more  than  half  a  century 
of  discussion,  involving,  from  time  to  time,  some  of 
the  most  celebrated  men  of  their  day.  The  army 
regulations  in  force  prior  to  1855,  those  of  1836, 
1841  and  1847,  defined  the  duties  of  the  officer  as- 
signed to  command  the  army,  as  follows : 

**The  military  establishment  is  placed  under  the 
orders  of  the  Major  General  Commanding-in-Chief, 
in  all  that  regards  its  discipline  and  military  con- 
trol. Its  fiscal  arrangements  properly  belong  to  the 
administrative  departments  of  the  staff,  and  to  the 
Treasury  Department,  under  the  direction  of  the 
Secretary  of  War. '  * 

The  authority  of  the  Commanding  General  was 
further  specifically  extended  to  cover  supervision 
of  everything  which  entered  into  the  expenses  of  the 

184 


COMMAND   OF   THE   ARMY 


military  establishment,  and  to  **see  that  the  esti- 
mates for  the  military  service  are  based  upon 
proper  data  and  made  for  the  objects  contemplated 
by  law  and  necessary  to  the  due  support  and  useful 
employment  of  the  army.'* 

In  1855  the  regulations  were  changed  and  the 
Commanding  General  practically  ceased  to  exercise 
command  of  the  army,  until  1864,  when  under  pres- 
sure of  the  necessities  of  a  great  war,  General  Grant 
was  assigned  to  command  with  unlimited  authority 
over  all  its  parts.  As  soon  as  the  war  closed  the 
office  reverted  to  the  conditions  existing  between 
1855  and  1861. 

Generals  Scott,  Sherman,  Sheridan  and  other  dis- 
tinguished soldiers  found  themselves  harassed  with 
the  impossibilities  of  the  situation,  and  the  War  De- 
partment is  filled  with  records  of  efforts  to  find  a  so- 
lution satisfactory  alike  to  the  Commanding  Gen- 
eral and  to  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  Bureaus.  It  remained 
for  the  war  with  Spain  to  disclose,  in  the  most  glar- 
ing manner,  the  need  for  some  reform  of  so  impos- 
sible a  military  situation.  Long  and  bitter  experi- 
ence had  shown  the  impossibility  of  defining  any  line 
of  separation  between  the  duties  of  the  Command- 
ing General  of  the  Army  and  those  of  the  Secretary 
of  War.  All  attempts  to  accomplish  this  had  brought 
nothing  but  controversies  and  misunderstandings. 

Immediately  after  the  inauguration  of  General 
Grant  as  President,  having  in  mind  his  own  troubles 
as  Commanding  General,  he  authorized  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  to  assign  General  Sherman  to  command 

185 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


the  army,  and  to  order  that  all  official  business 
which  required  the  action  of  the  President  or  Sec- 
retary of  War  should  be  submitted  through  the  Com- 
manding General.  General  Sherman,  in  assuming 
command,  on  March  8,  1869,  announced  the  Chiefs 
of  Bureaus  as  his  ''general  staff."  When  a  new 
Secretary  of  War  assumed  duty,  a  few  days  later, 
he  caused  to  be  rescinded  all  the  instructions  except 
those  directing  General  Sherman  to  assume  com- 
mand of  the  army,  which  removed  the  Chiefs  of 
Bureaus  from  his  control. 

Gradually  the  practice  took  form  and  became 
fixed  whereby  the  office  of  the  Commanding  General 
of  the  Army  was  reduced  to  an  empty  title  and,  at 
the  last,  the  Adjutant  General  exercised  the  author- 
ity of  the  Secretary  of  War  and  became,  in  effect, 
the  real  coinmander.  Although  all  orders  were  is- 
sued in  the  name  of  the  Commanding  General,  he 
was  not  always  consulted,  and  frequently  knew  noth- 
ing of  important  orders  until  they  had  gone  into  ef- 
fect. The  situation  had  reached  a  crisis  intolerable 
to  the  soldiers  of  high  rank  selected  from  time  to 
time,  and  assigned  to  command  the  army,  and  none 
could  fill  the  office  without  becoming  restive  under 
the  conditions.  It  should  be  remembered  that  for 
more  than  forty  years  the  office  had  been  filled  by 
general  officers  who  had  won  such  distinction  in  cam- 
paign and  battle  as  would,  in  any  other  country,  have 
led  to  the  highest  honors  being  conferred  upon  them. 

This  situation  at  the  War  Department,  bad  enough 
in  peace,  became  obnoxious  and  impossible  in  the 

186 


COMMAND   OF    THE   AEMY 


face  of  a  foreign  war,  and  the  efforts  to  fix  the  re- 
sponsibility for  blame  made  it  clearly  apparent  that 
a  complete  reorganization  of  the  whole  system  was  a 
vital  necessity.  The  controversies  arising  at  the 
time  were  of  such  a  character  that  much  of  the  good 
work  accomplished,  in  spite  of  the  system,  was  quite 
ignored.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  with  a  very  small 
available  regular  army — ^less  than  the  strength  of  a 
modern  division — the  nation  forced  a  declaration  of 
war.  The  President  called  for  125,000  volunteers, 
and  the  corridors  of  the  White  House  and  the  War 
Department  became  blocked  immediately  with  ap- 
plicants for  commissions  in  the  army.  The  actual 
operations  essential  to  raising  and  organizing  the 
army  were  interfered  with  to  such  an  extent  as  to 
relegate  that  important  work  to  the  hours  of  dark- 
ness when  the  Department  was  closed  to  visitors. 
Another  call  for  volunteers  was  made  and  the 
process  of  moulding  brigades,  divisions  and  corps 
progressed  with  celerity  and  great  success,  when  it 
is  considered  that  there  had  been  no  real  prepara- 
tion for  war  of  any  kind  beyond  operations  against 
the  Indians  and  the  reconstruction  of  harbor  de- 
fenses during  the  preceding  thirty  years. 

Under  the  prevailing  system,  or  lack  of  system,  it 
had  been  impossible  even  to  formulate  plans,  let 
alone  execute  general  policies.  The  situation  was 
understood  by  military  students  and,  having  in  mind 
the  rapidly  changing  world  conditions,  continuous 
efforts  were  made  to  procure  and  arrange  for  pos- 
sible contingencies  all  the  information  concerning 

187 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


foreign  armies  which  could  be  properly  obtained, 
for  our  army  has  never  taken  kindly  to  the  shifty 
methods  and  unreliable  data  of  a  secret  service.  But 
through  all  the  years  there  had  been  a  continuous  ef- 
fort to  side-track  the  Commanding  General  of  the 
Army,  and  it  was  so  successful  that  when  the  crisis 
came  the  blame  for  defects  and  mistakes  could  not 
be  justly  laid  at  his  door  and  in  the  end  was  charged 
against  the  War  Department  and  its  bureaus. 

The  controversy  concerning  the  relations  of  the 
bureau  chiefs  to  the  Secretary  of  "War  and  their  in- 
dependence as  to  the  Commanding  General  became 
acute  as  far  back  as  the  reorganization-of  the  army 
in  1821.  Being  dissatisfied  at  what  was  claimed  to  be 
interference  on  the  part  of  the  Commanding  Gen- 
eral, the  Adjutant  General,  Roger  Jones,  on  January 
24,  1829,  submitted  to  Secretary  of  War  Porter  an 
**  Analysis  of  the  theory  of  the  Staff  wliich  sur- 
rounds the  Secretary  of  War,"  which  contains  all 
the  elements  of  the  tempest  which  raged  for  three- 
quarters  of  a  century.  After  enumerating  the  sev- 
eral bureaus  General  Jones  wrote  that : 

**  These  several  departments  constitute  so  many 
avenues  through  which  the  various  acts  and  meas- 
ures of  the  Executive  which  refer  to  commissions 
and  appointments  in  the  Army ;  to  permanent  forti- 
fications; the  construction  of  Ordnance;  Quarter- 
master's supplies;  Subsistence  of  the  Troops,  etc., 
are  communicated  and  executed  and  such  is  the  sym- 
metry in  this  organization,  that  whilst  each  member 
of  the  Military  Staff  of  the  War  Department  is  con- 

188 


COMMAND   OF   THE   AEMY 


fined  to  the  sphere  of  his  own  peculiar  functions,  all 
regard  the  Secretary  as  the  common  superior,  the 
head  of  the  harmonious  whole 

"It  will  be  plainly  perceived  then,  that  the  Ad- 
jutant General's  Office  is  now  (as  kindred  offices  for 
more  than  twenty  years  have  been)  an  important 
division  of  that  branch  of  the  Executive  Govern- 
ment, denominated  by  law  *The  Department  of 
War;'  and  that  it  is  the  place  where  everything 
*  relative  to  military  commissions,'  under  the  Secre- 
tary^ of  War,  is  conducted  and  registered.    .    .    . 

**  These  practical  duties  of  the  Adjutant  General, 
under  the  Secretary  of  War,  may  be  properly  termed 
administrative  in  contradistinction  to  his  Military 
Staff  duties  under  the  General  in  Chief  and  the  for- 
mer are  essentially  the  same,  which,  at  various 
epochs  of  legislation  since  1797,  have  been  per- 
formed by  some  such  Staff  Officer,  denominated, 
'  The  Inspector ; '  *  The  Adjutant  and  Inspector ; ' '  The 
Adjutant  and  Inspector  General'  and  finally,  since 
1821,  'The  Adjutant  General.' 

''Have  these,  or  similar  Executive  functions  ever 
been  assigned  to  any  general  officer  of  the  line  of  the 
Army?  Are  they  compatible  with  the  high  duties  of 
a  Commander  of  the  Army?  Ought  a  General  in 
Chief  to  crave  these  subordinate  responsibilities  and 
is  it  to  the  interest  of  the  Army,  thus  to  relinquish 
the  glories  of  the  field  ?    .    .    . 

' '  In  this  new  state  of  things  therefore,  consequent 
upon  the  Reduction  of  '21,  the  'ci-devant'  Adjutant 
and  Inspector  General's  Office  which  pertained  to 

189 


THE   AMERICAN   AEMY 


the  War  Department  but  now  denominated  '  The  Ad- 
jutant Generals  Office,*  was  also  made  accessible 
to  the  Commanding  General,  for  whatever  referred 
to  the  Troops  the  Posts  and  Military  Commands; 
whilst  all  the  Records  and  documents  ^relative  to 
Military  Commissions'  were,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
retained  and  reserved  for  the  sole  and  paramount 
jurisdiction  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  Like  his 
predecessor  (the  late  Adjutant  and  Inspector  Gen- 
eral), the  Adjutant  General,  but  not  the  General  in 
Chief,  continued  to  be  the  keeper  of  the  Records  al- 
ready enumerated,  under  the  Secretary  of  War,  and 
to  whom,  he,  only  is  responsible  for  all  duties,  which, 
are  connected  in  any  manner  whatever,  with  'Mili- 
tary Commissions.'  On  the  other  hand,  the  Adju- 
tant General,  is  responsible  to  the  General  in  Chief, 
as  Chief  of  the  Staff  according  to  the  definition  of 
duties  found  in  the  General  Regulations  for  the 
Army. 

*  *  ...  It  has  remained  however  for  the  present 
General  in  Chief,  aided,  it  is  thought,  by  the  Chief 
Clerk  of  the  War  Department,  to  claim  jurisdiction 
in  some  of  the  enumerated  duties  exhibited  in  the 
above  analysis,  which,  during  the  command  of  the 
lamented  General  Brown,  were  practically  acknowl- 
edged at  the  War  Office  to  pertain  to  the  Adjutant 
General.  Thus  for  example  until  recently  all  papers 
and  documents  referring  to  Commissions  and  Ap- 
pointments, were  sent  direct,  from  the  War  Office  to 
the  Adjutant  General,  but  now,  it  seems  as  if  it  were 
attempted  and  that  without  the  knowledge  of  the 

190 


COMMAND   OF   THE   ARMY 


Secretary  of  War,  to  throw  into  or  pass  through  the 
hands  of  the  General  who  commands  the  officers,  the 
appointments  and  commissions  of  the  same  officers. 
...  If  the  Hon.  Secretary  requires  information 
respecting  the  fortifications  or  of  the  cannon  neces- 
sary to  garnish  them,  where  is  the  resort  for  such  in- 
formation? Is  it  to  the  General  in  Chief — No:  re- 
course is  had  to  the  Colonels  of  Engineers,  and  of 
Ordnance.  Does  he  demand  a  report  on  the  State 
of  the  provisions,  or  of  Medical  Stores  for  the  Army? 
Is  reference  had  to  the  General  in  Chief — No :  The 
Commissary  General  of  Subsistence  and  the  Surgeon 
General  are  the  Officers  who  would  naturally  be 
called  upon  to  submit  such  Reports.  Then  where  is 
the  advantage,  or  the  propriety  or  expediency  of  dis- 
turbing the  harmony  and  rationality  of  this  beauti- 
ful system  which  encircles  the  War  Department? 
Wherefore,  let  it  be  respectfully  enquired,  attribute 
to  the  General  in  Chief  functions,  which  would  con- 
nect him  with  ^Military  Commissions'  and  which  of 
all  others,  are  the  very  last  he  should  or  can  ad- 
vantageously, have  to  do  with?  He  is  denied  juris- 
diction over  the  fortifications  while  in  progress  or 
construction;  and  Ordnance  and  clothing,  until  the 
one  is  placed  in  the  Bastion,  and  the  other  in  the 
Soldier's  knapsack — ^yet,  he  strangely  may  have 
something  to  do  with  ^Military  Commissions'! 

"  ...  It  surely  never  could  have  been  within 
the  contemplation  of  the  President  to  regard  the 
General  in  Chief,  as  having  a  right  to  act  in  any 
other  character,  than  commander  of  the  Army;  but, 

191 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


if  he  be  more  than  this  (correctly  speaking,  one 
should  say  less),  why  then  'General  Headquarters' 
are  metamorphosed  into  a  second  rate  bevican,  fixed 
at  the  seat  of  Government ;  and  the  highest  Military 
officer  known  to  the  Army  thus  forsaking  a  higher 
destiny  becomes  in  fact  no  other  than  one  of  the 
'Chiefs  of  Staff'  attached  to  the  War  Office." 

Presidents  and  Secretaries  of  War  had  not  been 
left  in  ignorance  of  the  situation  and  the  ancient  con- 
troversies attending  it.  After  General  Sheridan  had 
been  rebuked  and  humiliated  over  matters  trifling 
in  themselves  but  which  assumed  a  character  of  vital 
importance  when  considered  in  connection  with  the 
independence  of  the  Chiefs  of  War  Department  bu- 
reaus in  their  relations  with  the  Secretary  of  War, 
he,  the  leader  of  armies  in  war,  was  forced  to  sulk 
in  his  tent,  while  the  petty  affairs  of  our  little  army 
were  administered  through  staff  bureaus  and  their 
representatives  at  the  several  headquarters. 

General  Sheridan's  successor — General  Schofield 
— was  one  of  the  ablest  students  and  most  experi- 
enced administrators  in  the  army.  He  had  com- 
manded a  large  field  army  in  the  greatest  war  of 
modern  times  and  had  filled  the  office  of  Secretary 
of  War  at  a  critical  stage  of  our  history.  President 
Cleveland  was  desirous  of  ending  an  impossible 
military  situation  and,  at  his  desire.  General  Scho- 
field submitted  his  views  relative  to  military  admin- 
istration and  conunand,  and  it  was  a  national  mis- 
fortune that  the  President's  term  of  office  expired 
before  he  was  able  to  accomplish  a  needful  reform. 

192 


COMMAND   OF   THE   ARMY 


General  Schofield  defined  the  issues  and  based  his 
discussions  under  two  clear-cut  propositions: 

**Wliat  are  the  duties,  and  what  the  authority,  of 
the  Commanding  General  of  the  Army,  and  of  the 
General  officers  commanding  Divisions  or  Depart- 
ments, or  armies  in  the  field? 

"What  are  their  relations  to  the  "War  Depart- 
ment and  to  the  several  bureaus  thereof,  or  Staff 
departments  of  the  army?'* 

Those  are  the  questions,  definitely  stated,  which 
had  given  rise  to  so  much  controversy  and  had  never 
been  satisfactorily  answered.  The  practice  had  va- 
ried extremely  and  the  desirability  of  the  establish- 
ment of  well  defined  principles  as  a  guide  to  all  con- 
cerned in  the  complex  duties  and  responsibilities  of 
military  administration  and  command  had  become 
apparent.  Not  only  was  the  authority  of  the  Com- 
manding General  of  the  Army  denied  by  bureau 
chiefs,  but  complaints  were  constantly  made  con- 
cerning their  interference  with  the  several  parts  of 
the  line  of  the  army  by  giving  orders  direct  to  staff 
officers  serving  under  the  general  officers  command- 
ing the  troops.  It  was  fully  set  forth  to  the  Presi- 
dent that  to  permit  the  staff  officers  of  the  War  De- 
partment to  exercise  authority  over  the  army,  inde- 
pendently of,  and  without  even  the  knowledge  of  the 
Commanding  General,  would  be  destructive  to  that 
unity  of  authority  which  is  indispensable  to  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  service,  creating  a  military  system  un- 
der which  anything  worthy  the  name  of  an  army 
could  not  possibly  exist  for  any  considerable  time. 

193 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


It  should  be  observed  that  the  duties  and  responsi- 
bilities of  conunand  are  not  in  general  defined  by 
statute,  but  are  rather  derived  from  military  usage. 
A  general  officer,  especially  assigned  by  the  Presi- 
dent to  the  command  of  an  army  in  the  field,  or  of  a 
territorial  department  or  division,  is  necessarily 
clothed  with  great  military  authority,  to  be  exercised 
in  his  discretion,  subject  to  approval  or  disapproval 
only  of  his  military  superiors.  The  exercise  of  com- 
mand necessarily  involves  the  expenditure  of  money, 
governed  by  the  general  regulations  of  the  War  De- 
partment, but  in  respect  to  which  a  commanding  gen- 
eral must  in  many  cases  exercise  his  discretion.  In 
this  his  relation  to  the  Secretary  of  War  is  that  of  an 
administrative  subordinate,  no  less  so  than  the  chief 
of  a  staff  bureau.  While  independent  of  each  other 
they  are  responsible  to  a  common  superior — the  Sec- 
retary of  War. 

The  state  of  the  appropriations  or  the  fiscal  regu- 
lations may  not  permit  of  doing  all  which  the  mili- 
tary interests  seem  to  demand.  The  Commanding 
General,  under  his  responsibility  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,  must  act  promptly  upon  his  own  judgment  as 
to  the  military  necessity.  On  the  other  hand,  a  chief 
of  bureau,  not  responsible  for  action  or  failure  to 
act,  may  decide  calmly  to  review  the  case  and  disap- 
prove an  expenditure  already  made.  Every  officer  is 
entitled  to  the  judgment,  in  approval  or  disapproval 
of  his  acts,  of  his  superior  officers  in  regular  line  of 
succession  up  to  the  head  of  the  department  to  which 
he  belongs.    We  now  reach  the  crux  of  all  controver- 

194 


COMMAND   OF   THE   ARMY 


sies  for  chiefs  of  bureaus  generally  considered  that 
here  they  came  under  the  broad  and  protecting  wings 
of  civil  administration  in  connection  with  appropria- 
tions as  to  the  expenditure  of  which  the  treasury  offi- 
cials outranked  all  military  authority.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  the  authority  of  the  Comptroller,  exercised 
through  his  decisions,  had  long  since  become  a  seri- 
ous factor  in  military  administration,  for  it  always 
had  an  appearance  of  unfairness  to  order  a  subordi- 
nate to  make  expenditures  which  would  fall  under 
the  ban  of  that  official.  This  subject  was  frequently 
injected  into  the  controversy  by  appeals  arising  be- 
tween commanders  of  troops  and  staff  bureaus. 

Through  a  long  series  of  ingeniously  contrived 
items  of  legislation,  embodied  generally  in  appropri- 
ation bills,  the  estimates  for  which  are  prepared  in 
the  War  Department  bureaus,  the  authority  of  the 
Commanding  General  of  the  Army  and  the  general 
officers  commanding  the  troops  became  limited 
mainly  to  the  approval  of  detailed  expenditures,  def- 
initely authorized  through  chiefs  of  bureaus.  This 
situation  was  the  cause  of  numerous  briefs  and  pam- 
phlets upon  the  general  subject  by  those  who  con- 
tended that  the  Secretary  of  War  could  not  legally 
delegate  authority  to  chiefs  of  bureaus,  thus  practi- 
cally placing  them  over  the  Commanding  General  of 
the  Army  and  the  general  officers  commanding 
troops  who  were  their  seniors  in  rank.  The  statute 
requires  the  Secretary  to  perform  his  functions,  but 
does  not  authorize  him  to  delegate  them  to  chiefs  of 
bureaus. 

195 


THE   AMEEICAN  ARMY 


Experience  in  numerous  efforts  had  shown  the  im- 
possibility of  defining  any  line  of  separation  between 
the  duties  of  the  Secretary  of  War  and  those  of  the 
Commanding  General  of  the  Army,  and  the  offensive 
sore  was  allowed  to  fester  until  the  existence  of  war 
established  the  clear  cut  necessity  for  remedial  ac- 
tion. The  history  of  the  War  Department  and  all  the 
controversies  arising  therein  were  laid  bare.  Grad- 
ually certain  principles  seemed  to  formulate  them- 
selves, for  throughout  it  was  considered  that  all  par- 
ties were  honest  of  conviction  in  the  matters  in  con- 
troversy, and  were  simply  victims  of  an  irreconcila- 
ble situation. 

There  were  two  evils  clearly  to  be  avoided,  the 
arbitrary  exercise  of  authority  by  the  Commanding 
General,  acting  without  the  knowledge  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  and  the  equally  arbitrary  course  where 
chiefs  of  bureaus  exercise  authority  without  the 
knowledge  or  consent  of  the  Commanding  General. 
An  army,  however  large  and  complex  in  organiza- 
tion, must  act  under  one  head.  The  orders  of  the 
supreme  power  must  come  to  and  be  transmitted  by 
that  head  to  the  several  subordinate  bodies,  accord- 
ing to  the  function  of  each  and  with  regard  to  its  re- 
lation to  the  others. 

The  functions  of  bureau  chiefs  should  be,  as  far  as 
practicable,  delimited  and  prescribed  in  law  and  reg- 
ulations in  such  manner  as  to  admit  of  their  being 
given  much  discretion  in  respect  to  all  matters  en- 
trusted to  or  which  concerns  their  departments.  In 
this  way  the  chiefs  are  trained  to  assume  responsi- 

196 


COMMAND   OF   THE   ARMY 


bility  and  are  relieved  of  the  embarrassment  of  pre- 
senting continually  to  a  superior  matters  which  re- 
quire more  time  for  proper  consideration  than  the 
superior  can  give,  when  the  number  of  statf  chiefs  is 
considered. 

After  casting  of  many  nets  in  vain,  it  became  grad- 
ually apparent  that  the  Secretary  of  War,  as  the  rep- 
resentative of  the  President,  could  not  surrender  the 
authority  to  command  to  any  other  official  in  occu- 
pancy of  office  at  the  War  Department,  whatever  his 
title.  The  office  of  a  Commanding  General  had 
therefore  ceased  to  be  anything  but  a  name,  a  mere 
mockery  of  command.  It  was  useless  to  begin  a  new 
century  of  discontent  and  conflict  in  the  administra- 
tion of  army  affairs,  and  the  decision  was  finally 
reached  that  the  office  of  the  Commanding  General 
of  the  Army  should  be  abolished  and  that  the  com- 
mand should  thereafter  be  exercised  by  or  in  the 
name  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  through  a  Chief  of 
Staff. 

The  Commission  appointed  to  investigate  condi- 
tions arising  out  of  the  war  with  Spain  stated  in 
its  report : 

*'For  many  years  the  divided  authority  and  re- 
sponsibility in  the  War  Department  had  produced 
friction,  for  which,  in  the  interest  of  the  service,  a 
remedy,  if  possible,  should  be  applied.  The  Consti- 
tution makes  the  President  the  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  Army,  and  he  can  not  transfer  that  authority 
to  any  other  person.  The  President  selects  a  Secre- 
tary of  War,  who  is  his  confidential  adviser.    The 

197 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


President  must  have  the  power  of  selection  of  his 
General-in-Chief  as  he  has  of  his  Secretary  of  War ; 
without  this  there  can  be  no  guarantee  that  he  will 
give,  or  that  the  Secretary  of  "War  will  place  in  the 
General-in-Chief,  that  confidence  which  is  necessary 
to  perfect  harmony.  Neither  the  President  nor  the 
Secretary  of  War  should  have  in  command  of  the 
Army  an  officer  who  is  not  working  in  harmony  with 
him.'» 

In  his  testimony  before  the  Commission,  General 
Schofield  said : 

**  Recent  experience  has  served  to  confirm  all  the 
results  of  my  lifelong  study  and  large  experience, 
that  the  proper  position  for  the  senior  officer  of  the 
army  on  duty  at  Washington  is  not  that  of  Com- 
manding General,  a  position  which  is  practically  im- 
possible, but  that  of  General-in-Chief,  which  means 
in  fact  Chief  of  Staff  to  the  President.'' 

It  was  apparent  that  the  conditions  desired  to  be 
brought  about  could  not  be  effected  by  creating  the 
office  of  Chief  of  Staff  for  the  senior  general  officer 
of  the  Army,  who  might  be  a  gallant  leader  of  armies 
yet  not  possess  the  particular  qualities  demanded 
as  the  adviser  of  the  Secretary  of  War  and  super- 
visor of  the  technical  work  of  the  staff  bureaus.  It 
would  have  been  impossible  to  have  inaugurated  this 
change  by  merely  assigning  an  army  general  as 
Chief  of  Staff  to  exercise  functions  similar  to  those 
performed  by  General  Halleck  during  the  Civil  War, 
for  a  multitude  of  minor  statutes  had  been  passed 
during  the  intervening  years,  some  of  which  might 

198 


COMMAND   OF   THE   ARMY 


have  served  to  give  color  to  resistance  to  such 
authority. 

It  was  fully  recognized  that  other  changes  were 
desirable  coincident  with  the  abolition  of  the  office 
of  Commanding  General  of  the  Army,  and  legisla- 
tion was  asked  for  to  abolish  permanent  chiefs  of  bu- 
reaus and  to  fill  the  offices  by  details  for  periods  of 
four  years.  The  legislation  changing  the  permanent 
staff  departments  into  corps  comprised  of  officers 
detailed  from  the  line  was  effected  at  the  same  time 
as  the  change  of  tenure  of  chiefs  of  bureaus ;  it  was 
not  until  two  years  later,  1903,  that  legislation  was 
obtained  authorizing  the  substitution  of  a  Chief  of 
Staff  for  a  Commanding  General  in  the  War  Depart- 
ment. 

The  legislation  authorizing  a  Chief  of  Staff  also 
created  a  General  Staff  Corps  to  assist  with  War 
Department  administration  and  to  perform  very  im- 
portant functions  in  connection  with  preparation  for 
war.  The  organic  act  charges  the  Chief  of  Staff 
with  supervision  over  the  staff  bureaus,  but  the  legal 
technicalities  which  were  found  an  insuperable  ob- 
stacle to  giving  the  Commanding  General  of  the 
Army  such  supervision  of  staff  bureaus  were  over- 
come by  requiring  all  authority  to  be  exercised  by 
the  Chief  of  Staff  in  the  name  of  the  Secretary  of 
War,  and  not  in  his  own  right  of  command. 

The  change  of  form  has  satisfied  the  legal  objec- 
tions, and  while  contention  and  friction  may  never 
be  entirely  eliminated,  eventually,  when  practically 
all  the  staff  except  the  engineer  and  medical  officers 

199 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


will  be  detailed  line  oflficers,  all  friction  due  to  bu- 
reaucratic pride  should  be  eliminated. 

The  command  of  armies,  as  well  as  of  territorial 
departments  will  continue,  as  in  the  past,  to  be  exer- 
cised by  general  officers  of  the  army  specifically  as- 
signed to  such  duty  by  authority  of  the  President. 

The  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Army,  while  theoretically 
exercising  no  command  in  his  own  right,  as  a  matter 
of  fact  determines  the  line  of  action  and  gives,  in  the 
name  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  orders  concerning  a 
very  large  part  of  the  business  coming  before  him, 
consulting  with  and  harmonizing  the  reconunenda- 
tions  of  the  bureau  staff  officers  when  necessary. 
This  admits  of  coordinating  the  action  of  all  the  bu- 
reaus and  affords  an  opportunity  for  safeguarding 
the  army  in  its  varied  duties.  The  system  of  com- 
mand through  a  Chief  of  Staff,  removable  at  pleas- 
ure, differs  materially  from  command  by  the  senior 
general  officer  of  the  army  when  assigned  as  Com- 
manding General.  The  Chief  of  Staff  may  or  may 
not  be  the  senior  officer  of  the  army.  His  detail  as 
such  chief  is  limited  to  a  tour  of  duty  not  exceeding 
four  years,  and  it  is  especially  provided  that  if,  at 
any  time,  he  finds  himself  not  in  personal  accord  and 
sympathy  with  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
War  in  the  execution  of  his  office  it  becomes  his  duty 
to  apply  to  be  relieved.  The  office  of  the  Chief  of 
Staff  constitutes  a  supervising  military  bureau  of 
the  War  Department,  and  the  supervisory  power 
covers  duties  pertaining  to  the  command,  discipline, 
training  and  recruitment  of  the  army;  military  op- 

200 


COMMAND   OF   THE   ARMY 


erations,  inspections,  fortifications,  military  educa- 
tion and  instruction  and  kindred  matters  and,  in  an 
advisory  capacity,  includes  such  duties  connected 
with  fiscal  administration  and  supply  as  are  com- 
mitted to  him  by  the  Secretary  of  War.  The  super- 
visory power  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  extends  to  matters 
of  organization,  armament,  equipment,  discipline 
and  training  the  militia.  All  orders  and  instructions 
affecting  the  army  are  issued  through  the  Chief  of 
Staff  and  communicated  to  the  troops  and  individ- 
uals by  the  Adjutant  General. 

In  the  performance  of  his  enumerated  duties  and 
as  the  adviser  and  in  representation  of  the  Secretary 
of  War,  the  Chief  of  Staff  calls  for  information, 
makes  investigations,  issues  instructions,  and  exer- 
cises all  other  functions  necessary  to  secure  proper 
harmony  and  efiiciency  of  action  of  all  those  subject 
to  his  supervision.  It  will  be  observed  that  while  the 
Chief  of  Staff  is  entrusted  with  practically  all  the 
power  denied  in  former  years  to  the  Commanding 
General  of  the  Army,  it  is  required  that  he  shall  not 
set  up  any  claim  of  authority  except  in  representa- 
tion of  the  Secretary  of  War,  who,  as  a  civilian  Cabi- 
net minister,  overburdened  with  civil  duties,  may 
never  be  expected  to  have  that  familiar  knowledge  of 
the  service  which  can  be  acquired  only  after  years  of 
actual  experience. 

In  the  final  analysis,  the  Chief  of  Staff  has  far 
greater  power  than  was  ever  sought  for  or  expected 
by  the  distinguished  Commanding  Generals  of  the 
Army,  who  urged  in  vain  that  the  rights  and  duties 

201 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


of  the  great  office  should  be  defined  and  its  dignity 
protected  from  constant  humiliation.  The  authority 
of  the  Chief  of  Staff,  being  exercised  in  the  name  of 
another — a  civil  superior  with  only  a  general  knowl- 
edge of  military  matters — presupposes  that  those 
things  needful  and  necessary  for  the  proper  service 
of  the  army  will  be  undertaken  only  after  consulta- 
tion with  and  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  The 
office  of  Chief  of  Staff,  therefore,  carries  with  it  a 
great  responsibility,  for  the  very  reason  that  all  ac- 
tion is  under  cover  of  authority  of  the  Secretary  of 
War.  It  remains  for  the  future  to  determine 
whether  lust  for  power  may  create  dissension  to  the 
great  detriment  of  the  public  interest,  in  which  case 
the  solution  of  the  grave  question  undertaken 
through  the  substitution  of  a  Chief  of  Staff  for  a 
Commanding  General  of  the  Army  would  prove  un- 
satisfactory. 

It  is  within  the  power  of  the  President  to  relieve  a 
Chief  of  Staff,  but  this  authority  does  not  extend  to 
the  chiefs  of  bureaus,  who  are  appointed  and  con- 
firmed by  the  Senate  for  periods  of  four  years.  Re- 
peated efforts  were  made  to  secure  legislation  to  re- 
serve places  in  the  several  staff  corps  and  depart- 
ments for  officers  selected  to  serve  as  chiefs  of  bu- 
reaus, so  that  in  event  the  interest  of  the  service 
should  dictate  relief  instead  of  reappointment  at  the 
expiration  of  a  tour,  the  officer  relieved  could  return 
to  his  proper  grade  and  rank  in  the  permanent  estab- 
lishment.   For  the  past  ten  years  sufficient  antag- 

202 


COMMAND   OF   THE   ARMY 


onism  to  the  proposed  legislation  existed  to  prevent 
its  enactment,  but  it  has  been  recently  provided  that 
places  shall  be  retained  on  the  army  lists  of  their 
appropriate  grades  for  chiefs  of  bureaus  who  may 
hereafter  be  appointed,  making  the  present  chiefs 
practically  permanent.  Such  questions  are  not  so 
simple  and  easy  of  adjustment  as  mere  questions  of 
discipline.  There  is  a  grave  danger,  under  our  form 
of  government,  in  having  too  frail  a  tenure  of  office 
of  those  responsible  for  public  business  involving 
large  disbursements,  for  dissatisfied  contractors, 
with  powerful  political  friends,  would  find  it  more 
desirable  to  urge  removal  than  to  combat  a  consci- 
entious official.  One  of  the  most  disagreeable  bur- 
dens of  official  life  arises  from  efforts  of  contractors 
to  secure  relief  from  specification  requirements 
rather  than  performance  with  probable  loss  or  re- 
duction of  profits.  All  these  conditions  must  be  care- 
fully considered  in  making  changes  in  methods  of 
doing  public  business. 

There  is  nothing  in  the  theory  of  army  adminis- 
tration and  command,  through  a  Chief  of  Staff,  that 
should  render  full  success  improbable,  and  especially 
after  the  date  when  the  principal  bureau  officers  will 
all  be  detailed  officers  of  the  line.  There  is  an  adage 
as  old  as  war  which  recites  that  armies  may  be  led 
but  never  driven,  and  which  suggests  that  mutual  re- 
spect for  differing  opinions  and  a  tactful  fulfilment 
of  official  duties  is  a  sacred  obligation  of  those  re- 
sponsible for  the  administration  and  command  of  the 

203 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


army.  When  this  view  fully  obtains,  controversies 
should  cease  and  the  Chief  of  Staff  and  all  heads  of 
bureaus  should  move  forward  in  harmonious  action 
as  the  united  staff  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  acting 
as  the  representative  of  the  Constitutional  Com- 
mander-in-Chief— the  President. 


XIII 

THE   GENEKAl,   STAFF   COKPS 

"To  remark  to  a  military  man,  how  all-important  the  General 
Staff  of  an  army  is  to  its  well-being,  and  how  essential  conse- 
quently to  the  Commander-in-Chief  seems  to  be  unnecessary." 
— ^Washington. 

THE  crying  need  of  the  army  during  the  past 
half  a  century  had  been  that  of  a  General  Staff 
or  body  of  officers  whose  business  it  is  to  do  the  pre- 
liminary planning  for  the  army  in  order  to  prepare 
it  for  war  and  to  make  of  its  various  elements  a  har- 
monious working  machine.  The  only  practicable  way 
to  secure  the  needed  reform  seemed  to  lie  in  a  frank 
statement  to  Congress  that  a  continuance  of  existing 
conditions  in  the  command  and  administration  of  the 
army  was  inimical  to  the  welfare  of  the  nation.  The 
proposed  abolition  of  the  office  of  Commanding  Gen- 
eral of  the  Army,  and  the  establishment  of  a  General 
Staff  Corps  whose  head  should  be  the  Chief  of  Staff 
of  the  Army  was  not  the  result  of  caprice,  experi- 
ment or  desire  for  change,  but  was  suggested  by  the 
recorded  experience  of  three-quarters  of  a  century, 
including  the  great  Civil  War,  where  more  than 
3,000,000  men  struggled  for  the  mastery,  and  the 
war  with  Spain  and  its  train  of  new  and  strange 
experiences.  No  trained  mind  could  examine  the 
records  of  that  long  and  eventful  period  without 
reaching  the  conclusion  that  a  drastic  modification  of 

205 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


our  system  was  justified  by  every  military  and  busi- 
ness consideration.  Many  of  the  functions  devolving 
upon  the  General  Staff  in  other  countries  had  been 
performed  in  our  army  by  officers  of  various  staff 
departments  and  of  the  line,  because  such  business 
did  not  properly  pertain  to  any  particular  corps  and 
the  performance  of  it  seemed  needful  for  the  well- 
being  of  the  service.  There  was  no  central  authority, 
other  than  the  Secretary  of  War,  empowered  to  co- 
ordinate and  direct  the  manifold  interests  of  the 
various  branches  of  the  service — staff  and  line.  The 
proposed  establishment  of  a  General  Staff  Corps 
was  received  without  enthusiasm  by  Congress  as  well 
as  the  army,  and  even  at  the  present  day  it  fails  of 
much  support  which  should  have  been  given  in  gen- 
erous measure.  To  military  men  preparedness  to 
strike  is  the  watchword  to  success.  If  reasons  be 
longer  needed  in  justification  of  the  creation  of  the 
General  Staff  Corps,  let  those  who  are  still  in  doubt 
ponder  on  the  experience  of  this  warlike  but  unmili- 
tary  nation  in  1898. 

When  it  had  become  certain  that  a  declaration  of 
war  with  Spain  was  a  question  of  but  a  few  days,  the 
following  order  was  signed  by  the  Adjutant  General : 

**War  Department, 
"Adjutant  General's  Office, 

'' Washington,  April  13, 1898. 
**Lt.Col.T.  Schwan,Lt.  Col.  A.  L.  Wagner,  Major 
W.  H.  Carter  are  appointed  a  Board  to  formulate 
plans  for  the  call  of  a  volunteer  force  to  the  number 

206 


THE  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

of  40,000  for  active  field  service ;  and  20,000  for  re- 
serve sea-coast  service.  The  Board  will  make  any 
recommendation  that,  in  its  judgment,  the  possibili- 
ties of  the  day  seem  to  call  for. ' ' 

The  report  of  this  board  was  desired  immediately 
and  was  made  as  follows : 

'  *■  War  Department, 
''Adjutant  General's  Office, 

''Washington,  April  14, 1898. 
' '  memorandum 

' '  Two  kinds  of  duty  will  devolve  upon  the  Army. 

"First. — The  defense  of  our  sea-coasts. 

''Second. — Offensive  operations  against  the  ene- 
my's territory. 

' '  The  duty  of  the  first  kind  will  require  sea-coast 
artillery  and  a  force  of  infantry  to  protect  the  bat- 
teries from  land  attack.  The  second  will  require  in- 
fantry, cavalry,  and  field  artillery. 

"It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  raw  troops  can  not 
be  depended  upon  to  conduct  offensive  operations 
successfully,  but  they  can  be  depended  upon  when 
acting  upon  a  pure  defensive,  especially  behind  in- 
trenchments.  The  infantry  for  the  sea-coast  de- 
fenses should,  therefore,  be  taken  from  the  volun- 
teers or  militia.  The  offensive  operations  would  re- 
quire our  best  and  most  proficient  troops,  and  the 
forces  for  this  purpose  should,  therefore,  be  com- 
posed of  the  regular  infantry,  cavalry  and  light  artil- 
lery, supplemented  by  the  best  regiments  and  bat- 
teries of  the  volunteers. 

207 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


^ '  The  prompt  concentration  of  the  forces  destined 
for  offensive  operations  is  desirable  for  two  reasons. 
First,  to  give  the  troops  a  period,  however  brief,  of 
instruction  in  the  movements  of  large  bodies,  snch  as 
brigades  and  divisions.  Second,  their  concentration 
for  the  purpose  of  embarkation. 

**For  the  first  of  these  purposes  concentration  at 
any  points  offering  facilities  for  drill  and  instruc- 
tion would  be  sufficient.  Bearing  the  second  object 
in  mind  it  would  seem  best  to  concentrate  the  troops 
for  organization  and  instruction  at  points  where  they 
could  embark  for  the  operations  which  they  are  to 
undertake,  as  it  would  not  be  advisable'  to  compel 
them  to  entrain  and  detrain  at  an  intermediate  point 
when  their  concentration  could  be  effected  with  a 
single  entraining  and  detraining. 

* '  The  embarkation  of  the  troops  for  Cuba  could  be 
made  from  Tampa,  Mobile  or  New  Orleans,  or  better, 
from  these  three  bases  at  once,  as  the  embarkation 
could  be  more  rapidly  effected  in  three  fleets  of 
transports — one  from  each  of  these  ports — ^which 
could  concentrate  off  Key  West. 

**It  is  believed  that  it  would  be  best  to  have  the 
regular  troops  brigade  with  the  volunteers,  one  regi- 
ment of  regular  infantry  and  two  of  volunteer  in- 
fantry, constituting  a  brigade.  The  regiments  of 
regular  infantry  should  at  once  be  each  designated 
as  the  nucleus  for  a  brigade  bearing  its  number ;  thus 
the  First  Infantry  would  be  the  base  regiment  of  the 
first  brigade;  the  Twelfth  Infantry,  of  the  twelfth 
brigade  and  so  on.    The  seventy-two  regiments  of 

208 


THE  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

infantry  thus  brought  together  could  be  formed  into 
three  army  corps.  From  two  to  four  batteries  of 
artillery  should  be  attached  to  each  division  as  divi- 
sional artillery,  and,  as  a  reserve,  at  least  six  bat- 
teries to  each  corps  as  corps  artillery.  One  regiment 
of  cavalry  should  be  assigned  to  each  corps  as  corps 
cavalry,  and  the  remaining  seven  regiments  should 
be  grouped  into  a  cavalry  corps.  Every  available 
man  in  the  infantry,  cavalry  and  light  artillery  of 
the  regular  army  should  be  taken  for  the  army  of 
invasion.  This  would  embrace  all  the  cavalry  of  the 
Regular  Army  and  all  the  infantry  except  the  Four- 
teenth. 

*'The  following  concentration  of  the  regular 
army  is,  accordingly,  recommended;  The  1st,  7th, 
10th,  15th,  18th,  20th,  23d,  and  24th  Infantry  and  1st, 
2nd,  4th,  5th,  7th,  8th,  9th,  and  10th  Cavalry  at  New 
Orleans.  The  2d,  3d,  4th,  8th,  11th,  12th,  and  16th 
Infantry  and  6th  Cavalry  at  Mobile.  The  4th,  5th, 
6th,  9th,  13th,  17th,  19th,  21st  Infantry  and  3d  Cav- 
alry at  Tampa. 

*'The  volunteer  infantry  sufficient  to  complete 
brigades  to  be  sent  to  each  of  the  designated  bases 
and  a  sufficient  number  of  batteries  of  volunteer 
artillery  to  be  sent  to  raise  the  number  of  batteries 
with  each  corps  to  a  minimum  of  at  least  twelve  and 
a  maximum  of  twenty. 

*' These  points  of  concentration  should  be  desig- 
nated without  delay  to  the  Chiefs  of  the  supply  divi- 
sions, who  should  receive  instructions  to  regulate 
their  movements  accordingly,  and  an  officer  should 

209 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


be  sent  to  each  of  these  points  at  once  to  select  suit- 
able ground  for  camps  and  maneuvers. 

**It  is  evident  that  the  measures  here  proposed 
would  leave  our  interior  military  posts  without  gar- 
risons. It  is  recommended  that  a  detail  consisting 
of  one  officer  from  each  garrison  and  two  men  from 
each  company  be  left  at  each  garrisoned  post;  and 
it  is  suggested  that  the  Quartermaster  General  be 
authorized  to  hire  watchmen  in  such  numbers  as  may 
be  necessary  to  assist  in  the  proper  care  of  the  posts, 
and  that  in  hiring  such  watchmen  preference  be 
given  to  retired  enlisted  men. 

**The  measures  proposed  in  the  preceding  para- 
graph manifestly  relate  only  to  those  posts  which 
could,  without  detriment  to  the  public  service,  be  left 
ungarrisoned  for  some  time.  Other  posts,  especially 
those  in  the  Indian  country,  need  garrisons  and  such 
garrisons  should  be  obtained  at  once  from  the  volun- 
teer forces,  for  even  comparatively  raw  and  inexpe- 
rienced troops  might  be  utilized  for  the  purpose  of 
keeping  Indians  in  check  when  such  troops  would  be 
of  very  little  account  in  Cuba.  Such  posts  as  Forts 
Sheridan,  Leavenworth,  Crook,  Snelling,  Thomas, 
and  Columbus  Barracks,  should  be  utilized  as  re- 
cruiting rendezvous. 

"Assuming  that  the  Department  Commanders  are 
to  take  the  field  it  is  recommended  that  an  officer  be 
designated  to  act  as  Adjutant  General  at  each  De- 
partment Headquarters  to  represent  the  Department 
Commander  in  his  absence. 

**The  above  recommendations  are  based  upon  the 

210 


THE  GENEEAL  STAFF  CORPS 

understanding  that  it  is  not  deemed  expedient  to  con- 
centrate the  Army  at  Chickamauga  Park.  If  it  be 
deemed  practicable  to  concentrate  the  entire  forces 
at  that  point  the  advantages  to  be  gained  by  organiz- 
ing and  instructing  the  Army  at  a  single  point  might 
outweigh  the  disadvantages  of  a  double  entraining 
and  detraining.  As  soon  as  a  concentration  of  the 
troops  has  been  decided  upon  it  is  recommended  that 
a  general  officer  be  sent  to  each  point  of  concentra- 
tion without  delay,  to  assume  command  of  the  troops 
as  they  arrive.'* 

The  Commanding  General  of  the  Army  had  as  his 
military  family  at  that  time  only  his  personal  staff 
officers  and  an  Assistant  Adjutant  General.  The 
Adjutant  General  of  the  army  had  established  an 
Information  Division  in  his  own  office,  but  there  was 
no  General  Staff  to  plan  for  and  guide  the  orderly 
procedure  of  a  nation  from  a  state  of  peace  to  that  of 
war.  It  was  a  humiliating  lesson  to  those  in  author- 
ity in  a  nation  about  to  engage  in  a  foreign  war  of  its 
own  choosing.  In  the  bustle  and  confusion  incident 
to  creating  an  army,  there  was  no  time  to  give  to 
questions  of  great  moment  the  study  and  research 
they  deserved.  The  result  was  hasty,  ill-digested 
action  with  its  train  of  consequences.  It  is  not  prac- 
ticable to  discuss  the  economic  features  in  detail  be- 
cause there  is  no  basis  for  calculation,  but  enough  is 
known  to  justify  the  assertion  that  a  General  Staff, 
possessing  the  authority  of  law  for  its  existence, 
could  have  arranged  in  advance  of  war  the  mass  of 
details  with  reference  to  distribution,  transportation 

211 


THE  AMERICAN  ARMY 


and  mobilization  of  armies,  and  the  establishment  of 
supply  depots,  in  such  manner  as  to  have  effected  a 
vast  saving  of  men  and  material. 

It  has  never  been  claimed  that  a  General  Staff  will 
prove  a  panacea  for  all  the  misfortunes  which  may 
overtake  a  nation  engaged  in  war,  but  history  con- 
tains innumerable  instances  showing  that  previous 
preparation  for  war  tends  to  abbreviate  the  period 
of  active  hostilities  and  thereby  to  effect  immense 
saving  in  life  and  treasure.  Under  the  old  system, 
before  the  creation  of  the  General  Staff  Corps,  it  was 
quite  possible  for  a  bureau  chief  to  work  along  his 
own  lines  in  ignorance  of,  and  on  a  different  basis 
from,  what  other  bureaus  were  doing — a  course  con- 
trary to  every  economic  and  business  principle. 
Through  the  agency  of  a  General  Staff,  military  and 
political  policies  may  be  harmonized  as  becomes  our 
form  of  government  and  the  chiefs  of  War  Depart- 
ment bureaus  and  others  whose  functions  have  to  do 
with  waging  war  may  be  brought  into  line  and  work 
more  coherently  and  to  a  common  purpose. 

During  peace  the  duties  of  a  General  Staff  Corps 
consist,  to  a  great  extent,  of  bureau  work — ^including 
the  preparation  of  maps,  the  drawing  up  of  schemes 
for  organization  and  concentration  of  troops,  the 
formation  of  plans  for  the  national  defense,  and  a 
study  of  the  higher  military  science  to  keep  pace 
with  modern  progress.  The  soldierly  spirit,  in- 
formed by  experience  of  actual  service  with  troops, 
must  ever  be  the  actuating  impulse  of  such  an  organ- 
ization, and  for  this  reason  all  officers  of  such  a  corps 

212 


THE  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

must  return  periodically  to  service  with  the  line. 
Any  system  which  allows  officers  of  the  General  Staff 
to  degenerate  solely  into  bureau  officers,  will  cause 
them  to  forfeit  the  respect  of  the  line  of  the  army. 
It  is  on  this  account  that  a  sufficient  number  should 
be  maintained  in  such  a  corps  to  furnish  ample  de- 
tails both  for  office  employment  and  for  duty  with 
various  branches  of  the  army,  interchanging  from 
one  kind  to  another  at  frequent  intervals. 

Above  all  else,  the  personnel  of  a  General  Staff 
Corps  should  be  selected  with  reference  to  ability, 
and  without  any  suspicion  of  favoritism.  There  is  a 
widespread  opinion  that  influence  is  more  potent 
than  trained  talent  and  fitness.  Republics  do  not 
differ  much  from  monarchies  in  some  ways,  and  it  is 
Utopian  to  expect,  under  any  form  of  government,  a 
system  which  will  always  put  the  best  man  in  the 
place,  with  or  without  influence.  Favoritism  will  oc- 
casionally help  an  individual  but  the  service  at  large 
is  quite  sure  to  observe  it  and  to  exaggerate  it  to 
such  a  degree  that  it  will  react  unfavorably,  some- 
time, upon  the  source  of  it  as  well  as  upon  the  recip- 
ient. It  is  possible,  however,  that  the  common  idea 
as  to  the  success  of  influence  in  forcing  men  to  the 
top  is  exaggerated.  It  would  be  a  grave  misfortune 
to  the  army  if  this  opinion  were  to  fasten  upon  it 
even  though  the  finger  of  scorn  may  point  unerringly 
to  glaring  instances.  It  is  certain  in  the  long  run, 
that  the  officer  who  accepts  his  commission  with  a 
determination  to  fit  himself  thoroughly  for  each 
grade  as  he  progresses  in  the  army,  and  for  as  much 

213 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


more  as  lies  within  his  power,  and  who  performs 
his  duties  in  a  conscientious,  intelligent  and  forceful 
manner,  is  more  apt  to  rise  in  the  estimation  of  his 
brother  officers  and  his  superiors  than  he  who  per- 
forms only  the  duty  required  of  him  and  that  in  a 
perfunctory  manner.  Fortunately  for  the  country, 
it  is  considered  discreditable  among  the  great  body 
of  army  officers  for  one  not  to  be  thoroughly  posted 
in  his  professional  duties.  It  should  of  right  be  ex- 
pected that  no  details  to  the  General  Staff  Corps, 
except  from  officers  who  have  displayed  character 
and  talent  sufficient  to  justify  their  being  placed 
amongst  a  professionally  trained  body  of  ambitious 
and  competent  men,  shall  ever  be  made. 

In  the  comparatively  brief  existence  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staif  Corps  there  has  developed,  as  was  antici- 
pated, the  question  as  to  the  proper  manner  in  which 
effect  should  be  given  to  the  determinations  reached 
by  such  a  body  of  officers  on  the  various  matters  af- 
fecting the  army.  It  had  been  expected  that  the  de- 
tailed studies  of  all  questions  by  members  or  sec- 
tions of  the  General  Staff  would  be  considered  by  a 
council  of  senior  officers  responsible  for  maintaining 
consistent  courses  of  action,  which  would  ultimately 
constitute  fixed  policies.  That  the  recent  course  of 
events  in  this  regard  has  varied  from  the  original 
conception  is  no  cause  for  alarm.  The  foundation 
stones  have  been  carefully  laid  even  though  the  char- 
acter of  the  superstructure  may,  from  time  to  time, 
be  modified  to  meet  the  views  of  an  ever  changing 
personnel. 

214 


THE  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

It  ougiit  not  to  be  necessary  to  state  that  the  offi- 
cers of  the  General  Staff  serving  with  the  command- 
ers of  troops  are  there  for  the  purpose  of  furnish- 
ing professional  information ;  to  assist  in  the  prep- 
aration of  detailed  plans  and  orders  and  to  relieve 
their  commanders  from  as  much  as  possible  in  or- 
der that  they  may  devote  themselves  to  the  con- 
sideration of  the  higher  questions  of  command  and 
make  success  more  probable.  A  Commanding  Gen- 
eral can  act  more  intelligently  in  a  theatre  of  cam- 
paign which  has  received  the  careful  study  of  the 
General  Staff,  if  he  has  an  officer  of  that  corps  at 
hand  who  can  elucidate  and  explain  the  situation 
upon  which  orders  for  the  movement  of  supplies  and 
troops  may  be  based,  than  the  same  general  can  do 
if  dependent  upon  his  own  efforts  and  those  of  a 
group  of  staff  officers  suddenly  assembled  about  him 
at  the  outbreak  of  war,  and  of  whose  qualifications 
he  is,  to  a  certain  extent,  ignorant. 

The  General  Staff  should  always  justify  its  exist- 
ence by  making  certain  that  important  matters  which 
require  investigation  shall  be  given  grave  considera- 
tion by  a  body  of  selected  and  highly  trained  officers, 
whose  time  should  not  be  frittered  away  with  rou- 
tine affairs,  and  whose  opinions  should  be  based 
upon  systematic  examination  and  mature  thought. 
It  is  only  in  this  manner  that  the  evils  of  hasty  and 
imperfectly  considered  opinions  may  be  escaped 
and  the  necessity  for  continual  reversal  of  action 
and  revocation  of  orders  may  be  avoided. 

In  the  earlier  efforts,  an  attempt  was  made  to  de- 

215 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


vise  legislation  which  would  create  a  General  Staff 
Corps,  by  consolidation  of  the  Adjutant  General's 
and  the  Inspector  GeneraPs  Departments;  but  a 
careful  study  of  the  matter  determined  against  dis- 
turbing the  Adjutant  General's  Department,  which, 
besides  being  the  bureau  of  correspondence,  is  the 
office  where  are  deposited  and  arranged  for  current 
reference  all  the  records  pertaining  to  the  armies 
of  the  United  States  and  which  have  been  the  basis 
of  settlement  of  pensions  and  other  service  and  war 
claims  amounting  to  many  thousands  of  millions  of 
dollars.  Those  for  pensions  alone  have  exceeded 
$4,000,000,000  since  the  Civil  War.  This  decision  not 
to  compromise  this  vast  business  by  consolidation 
was  not  arrived  at  without  careful  study  and  con- 
sideration. It  was  demonstrated  to  the  satisfaction 
of  those  in  authority  at  the  time,  that  it  would  im- 
pede and  impair  the  proper  development  of  a  Gen- 
eral Staff  Corps,  along  the  lines  of  its  most  prom- 
ising usefulness,  if  it  was  created  out  of  another  de- 
partment, or  through  a  consolidation  of  two  depart- 
ments. The  necessary  legislation  was  therefore 
asked  for  and  secured  to  create  an  entirely  new  Gen- 
eral Staff  Corps  and  to  assign  to  it  the  duties  which, 
while  most  important,  had  long  been  neglected  be- 
cause they  had  never,  by  statute  or  custom,  per- 
tained to  any  particular  department  or  part  of  the 
army.  A  careful  examination  of  the  duties  pre- 
scribed for  the  General  Staff  Corps  is  sufficient  to 
convince  those  familiar  with  the  duties  and  records 
of  the  Adjutant  General's  Department  that  there  is 

216 


THE  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

ample  employment  of  a  legitimate  kind  for  both 
corps. 

We  do  not  consolidate  tlie  fire  department  with 
the  public  health  or  street  cleaning  departments  be- 
cause of  a  period  of  no  fires  or  a  smaller  number 
than  were  expected,  and  likewise  there  should  be  no 
modification  of  the  General  Staff  Corps  organic  act 
until  a  fair  test  has  been  made  covering  a  sufficient 
period  to  eliminate  all  personal  equations,  and  to 
obtain  a  resultant  composite  picture  of  the  real 
merits  and  defects,  if  any,  of  the  system.  The  Gen- 
eral Staff  Corps  was  created  mainly  as  a  selected 
and  highly  trained  body  of  military  experts  to  plan 
for  war  rather  than  to  perform  the  duties  of  routine 
administration,  other  than  that  necessary  in  co- 
ordinating the  work  of  the  line  and  the  several  War 
Department  bureaus. 

There  have  always  been  some  who  advocate 
amendments  to  the  Constitution  whenever  its  re- 
strictions prove  embarrassing,  but  as  the  decades 
go  by  it  is  seen  more  clearly  how  very  few  changes 
have  been  really  needed.  So  excellent  and  long 
needed  a  law  as  that  which  provided  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  General  Staff  Corps  should  be 
studied  and  executed  in  the  good  faith  advised  by 
Washington  in  his  Farewell  Address : 

**It  is  important  likewise,  that  the  habits  of  think- 
ing in  a  free  country  would  inspire  caution  in  those 
intrusted  with  its  administration,  to  confine  them- 
selves within  their  respective  constitutional  spheres, 
avoiding  in  the  exercise  of  the  powers  of  one  depart- 

217 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


ment  to  encroach  upon  another.  The  spirit  of  en- 
croachment tends  to  consolidate  the  powers  of  all 
other  departments  in  one,  and  thus  to  create,  what- 
ever the  form  of  government,  a  real  despotism.  A 
just  estimate  of  that  love  of  power  and  proneness  to 
abuse  it  which  predominate  in  the  human  heart,  is 
sufficient  to  satisfy  us  of  the  truth  of  this  position. 
The  necessity  of  reciprocal  checks  in  the  exercise 
of  political  power,  by  dividing  and  distributing  it 
into  different  depositories,  and  constituting  each 
the  guardian  of  the  public  weal  against  invasions 
of  others,  has  been  evinced  by  experiments  ancient 
and  modern ;  some  of  them  in  our  oAvn  country  and 
under  our  own  eyes.  .  .  .  But  let  there  be  no 
change  by  usurpation;  for  though  this,  in  one  in- 
stance, may  be  the  instrument  of  good,  it  is  the  cus- 
tomary weapon  by  which  free  governments  are  de- 
stroyed. The  precedent  must  always  greatly  over- 
balance in  permanent  evil,  any  partial  or  transient 
benefit  which  the  use  can  at  any  time  yield.** 


XIV 

THE   CORPS   OF   OFFICERS 

"It  is  not  my  intention  to  dispute  the  powers  of  the  President  to 
make  this  or  any  other  promotion,  which  his  inclination  or  the 
solicitation  of  others  may  prompt  him  to;  but  I  will  add,  without 
fear  of  contradiction  by  any  one  acquainted  with  the  usage  and 
prescriptire  right  of  armies  that  if  he  wishes  to  preserve  the 
peace  and  harmony  of  ours,  rules  must  be  observed,  and  the  feel- 
ings of  the  oflEicers  attended  to  in  promotions.  ...  As  respects 
myself,  I  have  no  object  separated  from  the  general  welfare  to 
promote.  I  have  no  predilections,  no  prejudices  to  gratify,  no 
friends,  whose  interests  or  views  I  wish  to  advance  at  the  expense 
of  propriety." — Washington. 

SUBSEQUENT  to  the  war  with  Spain,  and  after 
full  opportunity  for  personal  observation,  Hon. 
Elihu  Eoot,  Secretary  of  War,  testified  before  a 
committee  of  Congress,  that :  ' '  There  is  not  an  abler 
body  of  men  to  be  found  anywhere  in  the  world  than 
the  officers  of  the  American  Army.'* 

Whether  or  not  this  opinion  is  too  exalted,  the 
history  of  the  past  fifteen  years  discloses  no  call  of 
duty  which  our  officers  have  failed  to  meet  with 
courage,  intelligence  and  professional  equipment  of 
a  high  order.  Happy  augury  for  the  future  that,  in 
a  country  abounding  in  business  opportunities,  so 
many  men  of  established  high  character,  education 
and  honorable  ambition  continue  willing  to  sacrifice 
the  chances  of  wealth  and  ease  and  submit  without 

219 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


murmur  to  the  discomforts  and  dangers  of  the  mili- 
tary service. 

The  army  in  its  methods  of  selection  and  train- 
ing of  officers  and  verification  of  results  is  on  an  en- 
tirely different  plane  from  any  other  profession. 
Candidates  enter  the  army  as  officers  through  West 
Point,  by  service  in  the  ranks,  or  by  direct  appoint- 
ment from  civil  life  and  in  every  case  examinations 
are  held  to  determine  their  entrance  qualifications. 
Once  in  the  service,  the  officer  is  continually  tested 
in  the  duties  of  his  profession,  theoretical  as  well  as 
practical,  in  the  garrison  schools  and  at  the  various 
other  army  schools.  From  his  entrance  into  the 
army  as  an  officer  until  he  has  reached  the  grade  of 
field  officer,  usually  a  period  of  twenty-five  years  or 
more  for  the  line,  constant  instruction  and  exam- 
ination are  the  order  of  the  day,  and  no  officer  can 
be  promoted  who  has  not  been  certified  as  qualified 
for  the  higher  office  by  a  board  of  his  superiors  in 
rank. 

Time  and  again  since  the  nation  assumed  the  role 
of  a  World  Power  there  have  been  thrust  upon  ju- 
nior subalterns  the  determination  of  grave  ques- 
tions involving  diplomacy,  commerce  and  the  law, 
international,  civil  and  criminal.  A  correct  decision, 
with  prompt  and  forceful  action,  may  tide  over  a 
grave  emergency,  whilst  an  honest  error  may  live  to 
mar  a  record  through  a  lifetime  of  loyal  service. 
These  are  the  chances  that  every  candidate  for  a 
military  career  must  needs  take.  In  taking  these 
professional  risks,  the  young  officer,  if  he  anticipates 

220 


THE   CORPS   OF   OFFICERS 


a  contented  life,  must  accept  the  general  rule  and  be 
satisfied  with  a  consciousness  of  duty  honestly  per- 
formed as  the  highest  reward  that  will  come  in  the 
majority  of  cases.  If  perchance,  others  of  not 
greater  merit  be  called  for  important  service,  he 
must  needs  nerve  himself  against  the  sting  of  envy, 
else  it  may  poison  his  mind  and  inspire  him  with 
discontent.  Despite  the  small  number  of  chances  of 
obtaining  high  rank,  and  with  assured  prospects  of 
frequent  hardships  and  deprivations,  there  has 
never  been  a  time  when  candidates  of  approved 
character  and  merit  were  not  in  waiting  for  commis- 
sions in  the  army. 

In  the  army,  as  in  the  navy,  there  are  representa- 
tives of  many  families  which  have  sent  sons  of  every 
generation  into  one  or  the  other,  and  sometimes 
both  services.  Almost  without  exception  these  sons 
may  be  counted  upon  for  loyal  and  gallant  services 
because  of  personal  characteristics,  as  well  as  pride 
in  the  records  of  their  families.  Respect  for  the 
uniform  is  usually  bred  in  the  bone  of  these  men  and 
they  value  the  privilege  of  following  in  their  fath- 
ers* footsteps  beyond  the  opportunities  of  material 
success  in  business. 

In  a  nation  so  much  given  to  genealogical  research, 
in  the  effort  to  locate  ancestors  who  have  rendered 
the  nation  some  service,  it  is  remarkable  that  many 
men  are  entirely  content  with  the  service  of  their 
forebears,  and  oblivious  to  the  fact  that  they  too 
might  render  some  public  service  to  which  their  de- 
scendants could,  in  time,  point  with  pride.    The  cov- 

221 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


eted  privilege  of  membership  in  one  of  the  numerous 
patriotic  societies  seems  to  satisfy  the  ambition  of 
altogether  too  many  able-bodied  descendants  of 
virile  ancestors.  The  British  nobility  and  landed 
gentry  have  ever  given  not  only  of  their  best  blood 
to  the  army,  but  have  habitually  supplied  the 
greater  part  of  the  fortunes  necessary  for  the  sup- 
port of  the  large  body  of  officers.  This  burden  has 
always  been  regarded  as  a  patriotic  duty  to  the 
Crown  and,  through  several  centuries,  these  tradi- 
tional gentlemen  have  freely  risked  and  often  sac- 
rificed their  lives  in  protecting  the  rights  of  some 
distant  and  obscure  trader  over  whom"  floated  the 
British  flag.  Strange  to  say,  that  in  America  those 
who  by  reason  of  accumulations  of  property  have 
assumed  the  role  of  the  leisure  class,  seldom  con- 
sider the  propriety  of  devoting  themselves  or  their 
sons  to  the  public  service,  except  as  ambassadors  or 
ministers  at  foreign  courts. 

While  it  is  true  that  the  number  of  desirable  ap- 
pointive offices  has  become  extremely  small  because 
of  the  constant  extension  of  the  civil  service  sys- 
tem, there  still  remain  many  opportunities  of  which 
the  sons  of  the  wealthy  could  avail  themselves  for 
rendering  public  service  to  the  nation.  In  a  country 
under  whose  flag  enormous  fortunes  have  become  the 
rule,  and  under  whose  laws  protection  is  guaranteed 
to  vast  aggregations  of  capital  in  single  families, 
public  opinion  should  encourage  the  members  of 
these  families  to  some  participation  in  the  govern- 
ment beyond  the  mere  payment  of  taxes.    The  army 

222 


THE   CORPS   OF   OFFICERS 


and  the  navy,  through  the  medium  of  the  national 
academies,  are  always  open  to  a  considerable  num- 
ber, and  many  do  take  advantage  of  the  educational 
facilities  furnished  by  these  institutions;  but,  with 
few  exceptions,  they  resign  before  opportunities  for 
distinction  have  arrived.  Many  of  the  young  men 
of  wealth,  who  have  thus  quitted  an  honorable  serv- 
ice which  abomids  in  fine  traditions,  have  taken  up 
active  business  or  professional  careers.  Others  have 
sacrificed  their  trained  talents  to  the  idle  life  of  the 
leisure  set,  which,  in  America,  has  few  resources 
worthy  of  men  of  their  education  and  character.  If 
more  of  such  men  should  seek  and  remain  in  the 
service,  they  would  not  only  honor  their  families  by 
so  doing,  but,  here  and  there,  opportunities  for  dis- 
tinction would  come  to  some,  whose  names  would  be 
inscribed  with  credit  upon  the  pages  of  the  nation's 
history.  The  satisfaction  derived  from  social  suc- 
cesses of  an  otherwise  idle  life  is  as  naught  com- 
pared to  the  pride  which  comes  of  having  rendered 
the  state  some  gallant  or  useful  ser\dce. 

Every  man  physically  fit  and  of  proper  age,  whose 
titles  to  property  are  confirmed  and  protected  by 
the  laws,  should  not  only  be  ready  to  take  part  in  the 
defense  of  his  country,  but  should  regard  it  as  a  sol- 
emn obligation  to  qualify  himself  for  it  by  some 
service  in  peace  in  the  army,  the  navy  or  the  active 
militia.  The  Constitution  rests  upon  the  basic 
theory  that  every  able-bodied  citizen  is  part  of  the 
nation's  bulwark,  and  it  should  be  made  impossible 
that  any  of  those  described  shall,  in  future,  be  al- 

223 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


lowed  to  avoid  service  in  war.  This  once  adopted 
as  a  national  policy,  those  upon  whom  the  call  for 
service  would  fall  would  endeavor  to  qualify  for  it. 
There  is  always  an  infinite  need  of  educated  officers 
with  practical  training  when  war  comes. 

With  all  the  advantages  and  all  the  drawbacks 
weighed  in  the  balance,  there  remains  a  goodly  mar- 
gin in  favor  of  the  army  as  a  career  for  a  man 
adapted  to  the  profession  of  arms.  It  is  entirely 
possible  for  a  young  man  to  live  with  decency  and 
credit  upon  his  pay,  but  a  small  private  income  re- 
moves the  anxiety  incident  to  extraordinary  and  un- 
foreseen contingencies.  There  are  frequent  occa- 
sions when,  as  public  officials,  both  army  and  navy 
officers  become  involved  in  heavy  expense  which  in 
justice  should  be  met  from  the  public  purse.  It  is 
to  their  credit  that  they  generally  measure  up  to 
such  occasions  like  gentlemen,  even  though  their  do- 
ing so  may  subsequently  involve  them  in  unpalata- 
ble economy.  Altogether,  whether  in  the  govern- 
ment of  Indian  or  Oriental  tribes,  in  the  fair  and 
patient  handling  of  angry  mobs,  in  the  tender  nurs- 
ing of  earthquake  sufferers  or  in  the  supreme  test 
of  battle,  the  army  has  ever  -conducted  itself  in  a 
way  to  deserve  well  of  the  country  and  to  encourage 
those  who  regard  the  army  as  a  career. 

The  officers  of  our  army  come  from  the  nation  at 
large  and  should  be  truly  representative.  Those 
who  are  graduates  of  the  military  academy  at  West 
Point  are  accredited  mainly  to  the  congressional  dis- 
tricts of  all  the  states  and  those  appointed  from  the 

224 


THE   CORPS   OF   OFFICERS 


ranks  and  direct  from  civil  life  are  nearly  as  widely 
dispersed  as  to  birth  and  citizenship.  With  so  use- 
ful an  institution  for  establishing  and  moulding  the 
character  of  young  men,  it  is  a  national  misfortune 
that  all  aspirants  for  army  commissions  should  not 
have  the  benefits  of  the  education  and  training  as- 
sured by  the  course  at  "West  Point.  The  value  of 
the  West  Point  preparation,  in  establishing  sub- 
ordination and  character,  is  shown  comprehensively 
by  army  statistics. 

Since  and  including  1890,  appointments  have  been 
made  to  the  Corps  of  Engineers  and  to  the  line  of 
the  army  as  follows: 

Graduates  from  the  U.  S.  Military  Academy. , .  1,771 

Prom  the  ranks  of  the  army 649 

From  civil  life 1,769 

Total 4,189 

Of  these  there  have  been  dropped  from  the  rolls 
by  dismissals  of  courts-martial,  for  desertion  and 
forced  resignations : 

Graduates  of  the  U.  S.  Military  Academy 17  or  about  .95  of  1% 

Appointments  from  the  ranks  of  the  army..  38  or  about  5.5% 
Appointments  from  civil  life 64  or  about  3.6% 

The  records  seem  to  establish  that  the  process  of 
elimination  at  West  Point,  before  appointment  to 
the  responsible  position  of  commissioned  officer  of 
the  army,  is  very  thorough.  As  to  the  initial  quali- 
fications for  the  military  profession  upon  gradua- 
tion, there  should  be  no  question.  As  to  the  results 
of  competition  in  actual  service,  the  records  of  the 

225 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


Civil  War  show  that  before  the  four  years*  struggle 
had  ended  the  Army  Commanders  in  that  great  con- 
flict were  Grant,  Sherman,  Sheridan,  Meade, 
Thomas,  Schofield,  Bumside,  Hooker,  Rosecrans, 
McClellan,  Halleck,  Buell,  Ord,  Howard,  Pope,  Slo- 
cum,  Canby,  Wright,  McDowell  and  Curtis. 

Among  the  Corps  Commanders  were  Reynolds, 
Newton,  Hancock,  Couch,  Humphreys,  Heintzelman, 
French,  Keys,  Gordon,  Granger,  Stanley,  Sykes, 
Warren,  Griffin,  Smith,  Wright,  Steele,  Reynolds, 
Parks,  Gillmore,  Williams,  Davis,  Smith,  Foster, 
Franklin,  Emory,  Grover,  McCook,  Augur,  Hartsuff, 
Gibbon,  Weitzell,  Stoneman,  Pleasanton,  Merritt, 
Wilson  and  Fits-John  Porter. 

Among  the  Division  Commanders  were  Double- 
day,  Stevens,  Ricketts,  Rufus  King,  Richardson, 
Webb,  Sully,  Hays,  W.,  Hays,  A.,  Berry,  Prince, 
Hamilton,  Whipple,  Elliott,  Ward,  Casey,  Ayres, 
Morell,  McCall,  Robinson,  Barnes,  Getty,  Russell, 
Neill,  Seymour,  Davidson,  Carr,  Wilcox,  Brannan, 
Saxton,  Ames,  Turner,  Gordon,  Greene,  Smith, 
Baird,  Carlin,  Morgan,  Hazen,  Ransom,  Martindale, 
Palmer,  Wessels,  Sherman,  T.,  Abercrombie,  Ruger, 
Kautz,  Jackson,  Buford,  Gregg,  Custer,  Kilpatrick, 
Upton  and  Mackenzie. 

All  of  these  were  graduates  of  the  military  acad- 
emy. Of  their  nongraduate  brothers-in-arms  of  the 
old  regular  army  none  were  in  command  of  armies, 
only  Sumner  commanded  a  corps,  and  Kearney  and 
Mower  commanded  divisions. 

Given  also  with  equal  emphasis  in  the  armies  of 

226 


THE   CORPS   OF   OFFICERS 


the  South  and  justified  by  the  results  of  a  score  of 
campaigns  and  of  a  hundred  battles,  this  is  the  ver- 
dict of  the  greatest  of  our  wars.  No  lesson  in  war 
was  ever  more  clear-cut  and  decisive.  After  a  des- 
perate struggle  of  four  years,  involving  over  three 
millions  of  combatants,  the  officers  of  a  little  body 
of  ten  thousand  regulars,  almost  wholly  graduates 
of  the  Military  Academy  at  West  Point,  commanded 
as  Lieutenant  or  Major  GKenerals  every  army  in  the 
field,  nearly  all  of  the  army  corps,  and  a  large  pro- 
portion of  the  divisions.  In  every  great  battle  of 
that  war  both  sides  were  commanded  by  graduates 
of  West  Point. 

It  was  not  only  in  the  Civil  War  that  the  West 
Point  training  proved  its  value,  for  following  the 
Mexican  War,  General  Winfield  Scott  wrote : 

**I  give  as  my  fixed  opinion  that,  but  for  our  grad- 
uated cadets,  the  war  between  the  United  States  and 
Mexico  might,  and  probably  would,  have  lasted  some 
four  or  five  years,  with,  in  its  first  half,  more  de- 
feats than  victories  falling  to  our  share;  whereas, 
in  less  than  two  campaigns,  we  conquered  a  great 
country  and  a  peace,  without  the  loss  of  a  single  bat- 
tle or  skirmish." 

On  the  occasion  of  the  Centennial  celebration  at 
West  Point  in  1902,  Hon.  Elihu  Root  said : 

**A11  honor  to  the  volunteers  who  have  been  and 
who  must  always  be  the  main  support  of  our  coun- 
try in  war.  All  honor  to  the  genius,  the  courage, 
the  self-sacrifice  of  the  men,  many  of  whom  I  see 
before  me  now,  who  have  won  immortal  renown  as 

227 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


generals  of  the  volunteer  army.  They  will  be  the 
first  to  say  aye  when  I  declare  that  the  formative 
power,  the  high  standard  of  conduct,  the  informing 
spirit  of  every  American  army  is  to  be  found  in  the 
regular  army  of  the  United  States.  All  honor  to  the 
officers  of  the  regular  army,  who  in  true  republican 
fashion  have  worked  their  way  up  from  the  ranks  as 
did  Chaffee,  Commanding  in  the  Philippines.  And 
all  honor  to  the  officers  who,  turning  aside  from  the 
allurements  of  wealth  and  honor  in  civil  life,  have 
been  appointed  to  the  army  as  civilians,  accepting 
the  slender  income  and  the  hard  life  that  is  known 
to  accompany  the  duties  of  a  soldier.  They  will  be 
the  first  to  say  aye  when  I  say  that  the  informing 
spirit,  the  high  standard  of  the  regular  army  are 
derived  from  the  graduates,  the  teachings  and  the 
traditions  of  the  Military  Academy.  Happy  augury 
for  the  future  that  here  where  for  a  hundred  years 
honor  has  ever  ruled — honor  made  up  of  courage, 
truth,  compassion,  loyalty — is  to  be  found  the  form- 
ative and  controlling  power  of  the  American  army 
of  the  future — regular,  militia  and  volunteer.  No 
army  inspired  by  the  spirit  of  the  Military  Academy 
can  ever  endanger  a  country's  liberty  or  can  ever 
desert  its  country's  flag." 

Promotion  in  the  army  under  normal  conditions 
is  usually  extremely  slow.  "With  all  the  losses  inci- 
dent to  the  war  with  Spain,  the  Philippine  cam- 
paigns and  the  employment  of  troops  in  China,  pro- 
motion has  not  been  accelerated  to  a  point  which  en- 
ables an  officer  to  get  his  eagles  and  the  command  of 

228 


THE   CORPS   OF   OFFICERS 


a  regiment  with  less  than  from  thirty  to  thirty-five 
years  of  service.  For  the  young  lieutenants  recently 
commissioned  the  climb  upward  looks  interminable, 
but  the  element  of  chance  usually  plays  a  prominent 
part  in  keeping  up  an  average  movement  towards 
the  top.  The  methods  of  filling  vacancies  in  the  low- 
est grade  of  commissioned  officers  is  in  accord  with 
the  American  theory  that  no  door  of  public  employ- 
ment should  be  closed  to  any  citizen.  For  nearly  a 
hundred  years  promotions  from  the  ranks  followed 
the  British  custom  of  restriction  to  meritorious  non- 
commissioned officers  who  had  proved  their  courage 
and  their  ability  to  command  men.  Not  satisfied 
with  this  open  door,  legislation  was  enacted  so  that 
any  private  of  two  years '  service  and  within  certain 
age  limits  may  compete  for  a  commission  in  an  ex- 
amination which  requires  no  greater  ability  than  is 
called  for  by  the  entrance  examination  at  the  West 
Point  Military  Academy.  The  law  was  intended  to 
open  the  door  for  commissions  to  all  men  without 
possibility  of  their  aspirations  being  barred  by 
prejudice.  Many  misfits  have  resulted  and  alto- 
gether the  real  object  of  the  law — ^to  elevate  the 
character  of  the  whole  personnel  of  the  ranks — ^has 
not  been  realized  in  the  slightest  degree.  On  the 
contrary,  the  presence  in  the  ranks  of  young  men, 
not  infrequently  the  kinsmen  of  officers,  whose  sole 
object  is  to  obtain  commissions  and  who  generally 
elect  to  serve  in  particular  organizations  with  ex- 
pectation of  rapid  advancement  to  the  noncommis- 
sioned   grades,    has    a    disheartening   effect   upon 

229 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


other  men,  particularly  the  "back-bone"  of  the 
army — the  sterling  old  noncommissioned  ofl&cers 
who,  through  defective  education  or  over-age,  are 
not  qualified  to  compete  in  the  examinations.  Many 
of  these  young  aspirants  for  commissions  through 
the  ranks  adopt  that  course  after  failure  to  obtain 
appointments  as  cadets.  It  would  be  a  real  advan- 
tage to  the  service  if  commissions  direct  from  the 
ranks  were  reserved  for  meritorious  noncommis- 
sioned officers  of  approved  courage  and  exceptional 
qualifications  in  control  of  men,  and  all  young  candi- 
dates, between  the  ages  of  18  and  22,  who  pass  the 
preliminary  examination  for  enlisted  men,  should  be 
sent  as  additional  cadets  to  West  Point,  where  suffi- 
cient accommodations  exist  for  them,  instead  of  be- 
ing promoted  as  commissioned  officers.  The  indi- 
vidual and  the  nation  would  be  the  gainer  by  full 
utilization  of  the  military  academy  whose  product 
in  trained  and  disciplined  men  has  justified  its  ex- 
istence as  a  business  proposition  aside  from  the  pub- 
lic need  of  a  special  institution  devoted  to  military 
instruction  in  a  country  whose  policy  demands  a  min- 
imum army. 

The  lesson  of  all  this  is  clear-cut  and  decisive.  The 
public  welfare  demands  that  the  corps  of  cadets  at 
West  Point  should  comprise  the  maximum  number 
possible  to  educate  there  without  changing  the  stand- 
ard. A  probationary  period  of  appointment  should 
be  created  for  candidates  for  commissions  from  other 
sources  in  order  that  every  reasonable  precaution 
may  be  taken  to  insure  the  exclusion  of  demonstrated 

230 


THE    CORPS   OF   OFFICERS 


unfitness.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  waiving 
defects  and  deficiencies  of  candidates  results  in 
placing  them  in  line  for  promotion  to  the  most  re- 
sponsible military  office  in  the  army — that  of  colonel 
of  a  regiment — ^which  in  due  course  will  be  reached 
through  seniority  promotion. 

While  pride  in  the  past  glories  of  the  regiment  has 
not  departed,  the  abolition  of  regimental  promotion 
and  the  establishment  of  lineal  lists  for  all  grades  in 
each  branch  of  the  service — artillery,  cavalry,  in- 
fantry— ^has  tended  to  create  a  broader  esprit-de- 
corps  of  the  arm  and  in  fact  of  the  whole  army.  The 
old  system  had  its  merits  but  resulted  in  so  much 
inequality  of  promotion  and  in  so  many  cases  of  ap- 
parent injustice  that  few,  if  any,  would  discard  the 
new  system  which  has  done  so  much  to  enlarge  the 
horizon  of  personal  experience,  through  contact  with 
an  ever  increasing  number  of  brother  officers,  as  well 
as  in  a  greatly  extended  knowledge  of  the  world, 
geographically  and  socially.  The  adoption  of  lineal 
promotion  has  made  it  possible  not  only  to  promote 
officers  in  the  order  of  entry  into  their  arm  of  the 
service  but,  through  a  system  of  examinations  before 
promotion,  to  inflict  a  definite  penalty  upon  those 
who  fail  to  measure  up  to  the  professional  require- 
ments. Under  a  system  of  regimental  promotion 
this  would  be  impossible  because  of  the  influence  of 
accident  of  employment  and  lack  of  uniformity  in 
the  flow  of  promotion  in  the  several  regiments. 

Following  the  adoption  of  lineal  promotion  came 
the  detail  system  of  staff  employment,  which  has 

231 


THE   AMEEICAN  ARMY 


far  more  merit  than  has  usually  been  conceded  to 
it.  Under  this  system  all  the  staff  corps  and  de- 
partments, except  the  Corps  of  Engineers,  the  Med- 
ical Corps  and  possibly  the  Judge  Advocate  Gen- 
eral's Department,  will  be  comprised  eventually  of 
detailed  line  officers.  As  admission  to  the  line  of 
the  army  is  conjfined  to  the  lowest  grade,  that  of  sec- 
ond lieutenant,  and  under  carefully  devised  regula- 
tions for  examination  before  appointment  and  be- 
fore each  subsequent  promotion,  eventually  all  the 
corps  of  staff  officers  will  have  had  previous  instruc- 
tion and  experience  in  the  line,  and  the  opportunity 
for  further  appointments  to  important  positions  in 
the  staff,  direct  from  civil  life  and  based  solely  upon 
political  influence,  will  have  disappeared.  The 
bringing  about  of  this  condition  was  long  and  suc- 
cessfully opposed,  the  influence  thrown  against  it 
being  strong  enough  to  delay  the  necessary  legisla- 
tion for  half  a  century.  It  was  primarily  a  deter- 
mination to  improve  the  staff  corps  and  depart- 
ments, in  their  relation  to  the  needs  of  the  line,  that 
at  last  brought  about  the  reform. 

Owing  to  various  increases  of  the  army  and  fre- 
quent disturbance  of  the  list  of  officers  available  for 
staff  assignments,  the  full  value  of  the  detail  sys- 
tem has  been  temporarily  impaired,  but  that  the 
principle  is  correct  and  its  ultimate  importance  to 
the  army  as  a  fighting  machine  very  great,  there  can 
be  no  reasonable  doubt.  It  is  certain  that  our  system 
of  military  education  and  training,  up  to  the  point 
of  practical  application  in  the  larger  organizations 

232 


THE   CORPS   OF   OFFICERS 


of  divisions  and  armies,  is  unexcelled  and  that 
American  officers  generally  are  splendidly  equipped 
for  all  duties,  line  and  staff.  This  has  been  well 
exemplified  in  the  very  satisfactory  performance 
during  the  past  fifteen  years  of  a  wide  range  of  ex- 
ceptionally difficult  and  delicate  duties  arising  in  the 
various  foreign  possessions  which  have  come  under 
our  flag  and  in  the  Relief  Expedition  to  Pekin,  the 
Pacification  of  Cuba,  services  in  China,  and  the  long- 
continued  border  patrol  on  the  frontiers  of  Mexico. 

In  making  details  under  the  new  system  to  the 
several  staff  corps  and  departments,  they  were  by 
an  administrative  order,  allotted  to  the  different 
branches  of  the  line  in  accordance  with  their  strength 
of  commissioned  officers.  The  law  does  not  require 
this,  it  having  been  intended  to  leave  it  within  the 
discretion  of  the  President  or  his  representative,  the 
Secretary  of  War,  to  make  details  in  such  manner  as 
to  prevent  radical  inequalities  of  promotion  in  the 
several  branches  of  the  line. 

Questions  involving  rank  and  promotion  have  been 
prolific  sources  of  appeals,  decisions  and  acts  of 
Congress  since  the  days  of  the  Revolution.  More 
heart-burnings  have  been  caused  by  actual  or  imag- 
ined wrongs  in  that  regard  than  from  probably  any 
other  cause,  and  some  of  the  deepest  grievances  have 
come  from  injuries  arising  from  efforts  to  repair 
presumed  wrongs  in  other  cases. 

Prior  to  the  establishment  of  the  detail  system  in 
1901,  scarcely  any  administration  passed  into  his- 
tory without  influence  being  brought  to  bear  to  ad- 

233 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


vance  some  officer  over  others  without  reference  to 
or  involving  the  question  of  merit.  For  many 
years  appointments  and  promotions  to  the  staff  de- 
partments were  regarded  in  the  same  light  as  other 
patronage,  but  from  time  to  time  the  field  of  selec- 
tion was  limited  by  statutes  until  finally  in  1894  it 
was  enacted  that:  ** Hereafter  all  appointments  to 
fill  vacancies  in  the  lowest  grade  of  the  Adjutant 
General  *s,  the  Inspector  GeneraPs,  the  Quarter- 
master's and  Subsistence  Departments,  respectively, 
shall  be  made  from  the  next  lowest  grade  in  the  line 
of  the  army.  * ' 

When  the  usual  reorganization  of  the  army  fol- 
lowing a  war  took  place  in  1901,  tremendous  pres- 
sure was  brought  to  bear  to  have  officers  with  brief 
service  in  the  volunteers  appointed  in  the  regulars 
with  rank  above  those  of  long,  faithful  and  excel- 
lent service.  It  was  successful  to  a  degree  in  the 
staff  departments,  with  the  result  that  some  com- 
paratively young  men  soon  reached  the  highest 
grades  of  field  officer  without  having  served  at  all 
in  the  line  of  the  army.  The  light  in  which  army  pat- 
ronage is  viewed  at  such  times  may  be  illustrated  by 
citing  some  of  the  appointments  made.  Among  the 
faithful  White  House  employees  during  the  war  with 
Spain  were  an  executive  clerk,  a  telegraph  operator 
and  a  doorkeeper;  the  clerk  was  commissioned  a 
captain  in  the  Pay  Department,  the  telegraph  op- 
erator a  captain  in  the  Signal  Corps,  with  tem- 
porary rank  of  lieutenant  colonel,  and  the  door- 
keeper was  appointed  a  military  storekeeper  with 

234 


THE   CORPS   OF   OFFICERS 


rank  of  captain  and  subsequently  through  the  op- 
eration of  an  act  of  Congress  reached  the  rank  of 
major  in  the  regular  army.  When  the  war  with 
Spain  began  there  were  many  officers  in  the  army 
who  had  served  as  lieutenants  more  than  twenty 
years  before  reaching  the  grade  of  captain. 

In  urging  the  interchangeable  or  detail  system  of 
staff  employment,  the  Secretary  of  War,  Elihu  Root, 
said: 

**I  have  found  many  cases  of  officers  who  have 
been  doing  their  duty  silently  and  uncomplainingly, 
asking  no  favors  and  having  no  friends  at  court,  out 
on  the  frontier,  enduring  the  hardships  of  army  life, 
and  who  have  the  feeling  that  men  get  appointments 
here  at  Washington,  and  they  are  at  the  center  of 
things  and  know  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
War  and  the  Senators  and  Members  of  Congress, 
and  that  they  can  get  about  what  they  want.  The 
feeling  is  that  the  staff  officers  constitute  a  close  cor- 
poration here,  with  all  the  luxuries,  and  the  privi- 
leges and  all  the  power.  I  think  it  will  be  beneficial 
to  every  branch  of  the  service  to  have  the  men  who 
have  been  in  the  staff  offices  in  Washington  going 
back  into  the  line,  and  that  the  instruction  and  the 
kindly  feeling  and  the  better  understanding  which 
will  be  produced  by  that  will  be  a  great  benefit." 

In  advocating  in  the  Senate  the  adoption  of  the 
detail  system  and  abolition  of  permanent  staff  com- 
missions, Senator  Proctor,  formerly  Secretary  of 
War,  said : 

*'Wlaen  a  vacancy  occurs  in  the  staff  the  promo- 

235 


THE  AMERICAN  ARMY 


tions  are  made  regularly  and  an  appointment  is 
made  at  the  foot  of  the  list.  Less  care  is  used  than 
would  be  in  an  appointment  to  a  higher  place.  The 
scramble  for  the  place  commences  months  before  the 
vacancy  actually  occurs.  It  is  a  mere  statement  of 
fact  to  say  that  the  man  who  has  the  strongest  pull 
usually  gets  the  place.  Senator  A  or  Senator  B 
has  a  relative  or  a  constituent  with  powerful  in- 
fluence behind  him,  and  he  demands  the  appoint- 
ment and  gets  it.  The  appointee  has  received  a  pro- 
motion of  a  grade,  not  upon  merit,  but  by  influence, 
and  in  doing  it  has  jumped  many  of  his  fellow-offi- 
cers. No  system  could  be  better  calculated  to  kill 
ambition.  Under  a  detail  system  a  good  officer 
would  doubtless  be  selected  early  and  serve  on  dif- 
ferent staff  corps  and  have  the  all  around  training 
so  important  for  high  cormnand. '  * 

If  the  introduction  of  the  detail  system  in  the 
staff  corps  and  departments  accomplishes  nothing 
more  than  the  elimination  of  the  heart-burnings 
arising  from  such  conditions,  it  will  have  justified 
itself. 

Promotion  by  selection  is  now  confined  solely  to 
the  grade  of  major  general  and  brigadier  general, 
except  in  the  Judge  Advocate  General 's  department. 
This  method  has  resulted  in  some  junior  officers  be- 
ing appointed  to  the  rank  of  general  because,  as 
given  out  at  the  time,  they  could  not  be  appointed  or 
advanced  to  any  intervening  grade  as  a  reward  for 
gallant  and  distinguished  service.  This  is  a  serious 
matter  and  one  easily  remedied  without  the  aboli- 

236 


THE   CORPS   OF   OFFICERS 


tion  of  seniority  promotion  for  the  army  generally. 
Should  Congress  be  asked  to  enact  a  law  granting 
the  power  to  the  President  to  reward  gallantry  and 
achievements  of  recognized  excellence  in  active 
service  in  the  field  during  war  by  promotion  to  the 
next  higher  grade,  and  provide  that  officers  so  ad- 
vanced shall  be  carried  as  extra  numbers  in  the 
higher  grade  and  not  retard  the  regular  flow  of 
seniority  promotion,  there  would  be  every  probabil- 
ity of  securing  action,  for  there  could  be  no  legiti- 
mate objection  on  the  part  of  the  army. 

To  understand  that  the  fears  of  the  line  oflBcers 
absent  from  the  circle  of  personal  acquaintance  and 
influence  are  not  without  some  justification,  it  is  only 
necessary  to  review  the  selection  promotions  since 
the  war  with  Spain.  Since  the  reorganization  of 
the  army  in  1901,  there  have  been  one  lieutenant 
general  and  nine  major  generals  appointed  by  se- 
lection from  chiefs  of  bureaus,  including  chiefs  of 
artillery,  serving  at  the  War  Department.  Of 
these  five  were  retired  immediately  following  their 
advancement  and  five  were  assigned  to  line  duty  as 
general  officers.  As  this  left  several  chiefs  of  bu- 
reaus without  promotion  to  the  highest  grade,  in- 
fluence was  brought  to  bear  upon  Congress  and  a 
special  act  was  passed  which,  by  a  peculiar  arrange- 
ment of  language,  provided  for  advancing  four  other 
chiefs  of  bureaus  with  rank  of  brigadier  general  to 
the  rank  of  major  general,  upon  retirement. 

During  the  same  period  forty-four  officers  of  the 
permanent  staff  were  promoted  to  be  brigadier  gen- 

237 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


erals,  five  of  whom  were  assigned  to  duty  in  the  line 
under  their  new  commissions.  Colonels  of  the  line 
very  naturally  complain  that  their  chances  of  ever 
reaching  the  grade  of  general  officer  are  materially 
lessened  by  such  appointments  and  have  been  prac- 
tically a  unit  in  desiring  legislation  to  restrict  pro- 
motions to  the  position  of  general  officer  to  officers 
of  the  line,  as  promotions  to  chiefs  of  bureaus  have 
been  restricted  by  law  to  officers  holding  permanent 
commissions  in  the  staff  corps.  There  are  only  six 
major  generals  and  fifteen  brigadiers  for  duty  with 
the  line,  and  it  may  readily  be  seen  how  colonels  of 
regiments  should  feel  aggrieved  at  eacir diminution 
of  already  slender  opportunities  for  advancement. 

Such  conditions  in  the  army,  particularly  that  of 
a  Republic  with  a  regulated  civil  service,  are  sources 
of  constant  discontent,  and  it  was  to  get  rid  of  the 
possibility  of  such  things  in  the  future,  and  to  re- 
lieve the  President  of  some  of  the  solicitation  for 
preferment,  that  laws  were  recommended  to  and  en- 
acted by  Congress  to  limit  future  appointments  in 
the  army  to  the  lowest  grades  of  the  line  and  to  sup- 
ply the  officers  for  the  several  staff  departments  by 
details  from  appropriate  grades  of  the  line. 

There  is  still  another  reform  necessary,  in  order 
that  all  candidates  for  commissions  as  lieutenants 
of  the  line  may  receive  like  treatment.  If  a  cadet 
at  the  military  academy  is  pronounced  deficient 
upon  his  final  examination,  which  determines 
whether  he  shall  be  recommended  for  appointment 

238 


THE    CORPS   OF   OFFICERS 


to  the  grade  of  second  lieutenant,  there  is  no  possi- 
bility of  the  deficiency  being  waived  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  War.  The  practice  of  waiving  defects,  both 
mental  and  physical,  of  those  examined  for  appoint- 
ment from  civil  life  became  so  common  during  the 
Spanish  War  period  as  to  be  fraught  with  serious 
consequences,  because  the  second  lieutenant  of  to- 
day becomes  in  future  the  commander  of  a  regiment 
by  the  process  of  seniority  promotion.  Various  laws 
have  since  been  passed  in  the  effort  to  regulate  ap- 
pointments to  the  army  but  no  regulations  hold  in 
the  face  of  influence,  and  consequently  nearly  every 
competitive  examination  for  appointments  to  the 
grade  of  second  lieutenant  has  met  with  the  same 
fate — overruling  of  boards,  changing  of  marks  and 
waiving  of  mental  and  physical  disqualifications. 
Until  Congress  specifically  enacts  that  the  results 
of  competitive  examinations  shall  have  the  sanctity 
of  law,  and  not  be  subject  to  review  or  waiver  by 
higher  authority,  there  need  be  no  expectation  of  a 
change  of  the  evil  practice.  The  War  Department 
authorities  are  possessed  of  full  power  to  prescribe 
the  character  of  the  examinations  and  having  exer- 
cised that  power  no  subsequent  interference  is  de- 
manded by  any  public  interests.  The  integrity  of 
the  corps  of  officers  constitutes  the  foundation  stone 
of  efficiency.  The  removal  of  their  first  commis- 
sions from  even  a  suspicion  of  influence  Tvdll  be  of 
marked  value  in  the  course  of  time. 

In  1857,  when  one  of  the  periodic  efforts  to  im- 

239 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


prove  the  service  was  being  made,  the  Secretary  of 
War  invited  attention  to  what  he  considered  defects 
of  organization  and  said : 

**One  of  the  greatest  errors  of  detail  is  the  sep- 
arate, independent  character  of  our  staff  corps. 
This  removes  them  from  their  proper  position  as 
aids  or  assistants  to  the  commander,  and  consti- 
tutes them  his  equals.  It  contracts  the  sphere  of  ob- 
servation, and  experience,  and  thus  unfits  the  officer 
for  change  or  advancement,  and  begets  an  accumu- 
lation of  precedent  and  prerogative  at  war  with  the 
vital  principle  of  military  organization— ^the  inviola- 
ble and  undivided  authority  of  the  head. 

**A  general  provision  dispensing  with  the  staff 
bureaus  and  giving  the  President  authority  to  reg- 
ulate the  duties  on  the  principles  above  stated,  and 
to  transfer,  when  necessary,  officers  to  and  from  the 
line  and  staff,  would  restore  the  institution  to  its 
proper  effectiveness. 

*'We  have  retained  another  fault,  abandoned,  at 
least  practically,  in  almost  every  service  among  civ- 
ilized nations,  even  the  most  aristocratic  and  mon- 
archical. This  is  promotion  by  seniority.  Age  and 
experience  should  bring  excellence ;  but  the  test  lies 
in  the  actual  possession  of  the  latter,  and  not  merely 
in  the  circumstances  which,  it  is  assumed,  should 
produce  it.  Seniority,  with  the  requirements  essen- 
tial for  position,  ought  certainly  to  give  precedence ; 
but,  without  these,  that  dignity  and  respect  which 
belong  to  rank  and  command  can  never  be  secured. 

**A11  that  has  been  urged  in  favor  of  retaining  it 

240 


THE   CORPS   OF   OFFICERS 


with  us  is  the  danger  of  political  or  personal  favor 
governing  a  selection.  There  may  be  danger  from 
this  source ;  but,  by  the  rule  of  seniority,  the  worst 
officer  of  the  army  must,  if  he  Kves,  come  to  be  one 
of  the  most  important  and  responsible  officers  under 
the  government — the  colonel  of  a  regiment.  By  se- 
lection, it  is  possible  that  the  very  best  may  not  al- 
ways be  chosen,  though  the  chances  are  in  favor  of 
this  hypothesis ;  but  certainly,  the  very  worst  never 
will  be,  and  this  is  surely  a  gain  on  the  present  rule.'* 

Congress  has  given  the  army  the  full  power  to 
eliminate  the  quite  inconsiderable  number  of  officers 
who  fail  to  measure  up  to  the  established  standards 
of  examinations  for  promotion  and  boards  have  only 
to  remember  that  each  time  an  officer  of  doubtful 
aptitude  and  efficiency  secures  an  advanced  grade, 
he  is  one  step  nearer  the  command  of  a  regiment  and 
has  acquired  an  additional  appeal  to  sentiment  and 
sympathy  of  the  next  board,  by  reason  of  longer 
service. 

The  desirability  of  having  none  but  the  most  com- 
petent in  the  higher  grades  of  the  army  needs  no  ar- 
gument. The  defectiveness  of  a  system  which  ad- 
mits of  a  single  incompetent  officer  arriving,  through 
the  process  of  seniority,  at  the  head  of  a  regiment  is 
equally  obvious.  The  power  of  influence,  personal, 
social  and  political,  has  been  in  evidence  too  long  to 
have  escaped  the  attention  of  even  the  trusting  and 
generous  natures  which  so  much  abound  among  the 
officers,  and  at  no  period  have  they  been  willing  to 
hazard  their  careers  by  selection  promotion  under 

241 


THE   AMERICAN  AEMY 


any  system  of  efficiency  ratings  or  boards  yet  de- 
vised. 

It  sometimes  happens  that  at  about  forty-five  or 
fifty  years  of  age  a  lethargic  condition  takes  posses- 
sion of  an  individual  and  progress  seems  arrested. 
No  further  examinations,  perhaps,  being  required, 
it  is  possible  for  an  officer  so  afflicted  to  drift  along 
without  committing  himself  in  any  way,  until, 
through  seniority,  he  reaches  the  grade  of  colonel. 
Such  cases  are  rare,  but  the  government  is  justified 
in  protecting  itself  against  such  an  occurrence  be- 
cause the  colonel  absolutely  controls  the  welfare  and 
training  of  from  1,200  to  2,000  officers  and  men. 

It  is  entirely  probable  that  a  limited  system  of  se- 
lection, applicable  to  the  grade  of  lieutenant  colonel 
only,  would  commend  itself  to  the  army.  If  upon 
the  occurrence  of  a  vacancy  in  the  grade  of  colonel 
in  any  branch  of  the  army,  a  board  of  three  colonels 
of  that  arm  of  the  service  be  constituted  to  examine 
into  the  records,  personality,  temperament  and  pro- 
fessional equipment  of  tlie  senior  lieutenant  colo- 
nels and  to  recommend  whether  the  senior  should 
be  promoted,  it  would  tend  to  assure  that  none  but 
physically  and  mentally  alert  officers  would  com- 
mand. It  should  be  provided  that  in  event  the  senior 
lieutenant  colonel  is  not  deemed  qualified  to  com- 
mand, he  shall  be  promoted  and  retired.  The  num- 
ber who  may  be  passed  over  should  be  limited  to 
three,  or  at  most,  five,  so  as  to  keep  in  mind  that  the 
system  is  to  insure  active  colonels  and  not  to  create 
promotions  for  deserving  officers  lower  down  on  the 

242 


THE   CORPS   OF   OFFICERS 


lists.  By  starting  this  system  with  an  examination 
of  all  colonels  and  retirement  of  any  not  deemed 
qualified  to  command  a  war  strength  regiment,  it 
would  then  be  entirely  safe  to  establish  promotions 
to  the  grade  of  brigadier  general  by  seniority  in  the 
lists  of  colonels.  This  would  confine  selection  pro- 
motions to  the  two  most  important  grades,  those  of 
major  general  and  colonel,  carrying  normally  the 
command  of  a  division  and  a  regiment,  respectively, 
the  two  important  administrative  and  tactical  or- 
ganizations in  our  service.  In  our  navy,  seniority 
prevails  throughout  and  from  the  splendid  character 
of  service  always  rendered  by  that  branch  of  the 
service,  we  may  justly  conclude  that  mediocrity 
would  never  prevail  in  the  army  under  the  seniority 
rule,  with  limited  selection  in  the  two  most  impor- 
tant grades. 


XV 


ARMY   SCHOOLS 


"The  establishment  of  an  institution  of  this  kind  (military 
academy)  upon  a  respectable  and  extensive  basis,  has  ever  been 
considered  by  me  as  an  object  of  primary  importance  to  this 
country." — Washington. 

IT  IS  a  common  observation,  that  practical  quali- 
ties in  a  soldier  are  more  important  than  a 
knowledge  of  theory.  The  very  trutfi  of  this  has 
sometimes  been  made  the  excuse  for  indolence, 
which,  except  in  rare  and  gifted  individuals,  may 
destroy  efficiency.  Other  things  being  equal,  the  of- 
ficer who  keeps  his  mind  alert  by  intellectual  enter- 
prise, and  who  systematically  studies  the  reasons  of 
action  and  the  conditions  and  difficulties  with  which 
he  may  have  to  deal,  will  develop  into  the  stronger 
practical  man  and  better  soldier.  The  necessity  for 
the  soldier,  above  all  others,  being  familiar  with  the 
history  and  imbued  with  the  spirit  of  our  institu- 
tions, lends  encouragement  to  and  indicates  the  im- 
portance of  thorough  and  broad  education  for  mili- 
tary officers. 

Theoretical  study  is  of  moment  in  any  profession, 
but  in  the  army,  which  makes  immediate  application 
of  every  scientific  device,  a  knowledge  of  theory  is 
indispensable.  To  be  an  ordinary  line  officer  one 
need  not  be  a  distinguished  scientist  but  to  be  a  good 

244 


ARMY  SCHOOLS 


line  officer  one  can  not  have  too  much  knowledge  of 
science,  the  law,  business  and  the  various  trades, 
for  all  have  more  or  less  application  to  military- 
purposes.  The  primary  and  essential  qualifications 
for  a  good  officer  are  an  ability  and  aptitude  to  com- 
mand men  and  to  get  the  utmost  limit  of  endurance 
from  them,  willingly,  when  the  service  demands  it. 
This  can  come  only  to  those  to  whom  the  men  in  the 
ranks  attribute  the  possession  of  professional  abil- 
ity, coupled  with  common  sense  and  judgment.  A 
small  knowledge  of  the  duties  of  a  general  is  not  of 
so  much  consequence  to  a  lieutenant,  as  a  large  and 
varied  knowledge  of  small  things  useful  in  the  in- 
struction and  care  of  his  men.  Arising  from  the 
practice  and  traditions  of  the  British  service,  it  was 
long  the  custom  in  our  army  to  depend  largely  upon 
drill  sergeants,  but  with  the  passing  of  the  rough  and 
ready  period  the  necessity  for  a  different  school  of 
training  became  obvious.  It  is  recognized  that  mere 
knowledge  of  theory  is  of  little  value  to  the  army  of- 
ficer unless  he  has  the  power  of  practical  applica- 
tion. It  has  been  found  that  the  applicatory  system 
of  education  is  best  adapted  to  post  graduate  work 
of  the  army  and  wherever  possible  that  method  is 
employed. 

The  large  influx  of  young  men  appointed  from  civil 
life,  from  the  ranks  of  the  army,  and  from  volun- 
teers with  brief  service  in  the  war  with  Spain,  made 
it  necessary  to  rearrange  and  extend  the  system  of 
instruction  of  officers,  not  only  to  develop  their  ca- 
pacity for  higher  grades  but  to  prepare  them  for 

245 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


the  duties  of  the  grades  to  which  they  had  been  ap- 
pointed. Prior  to  the  war  with  Spain  a  system  of 
lyceum  instruction  was  established  at  all  army  sta- 
tions with  a  view  to  affording  opportunities  for  pro- 
fessional improvement.  After  a  considerable  trial 
it  became  evident  that  no  uniformity  of  results  could 
be  expected  from  a  system  which  was  greatly  de- 
pendent upon  the  personality  of  the  various  com- 
manding officers.  After  careful  consideration  it 
was  decided  to  abandon  the  lyceum  system  and  to 
establish  a  more  comprehensive  scheme,  under 
which  every  officer  entering  the  service  is  required 
to  establish  his  qualifications  to  perform  the  duties 
of  his  office  and  his  fitness  is  made  a  matter  of  rec- 
ord. 

There  has  long  been  established  in  the  regular 
army  a  system  of  examinations  for  promotion  which 
has  no  connection  with  the  scheme  of  instruction. 
The  legal  machinery  in  connection  with  these  exam- 
inations, however,  is  expected  to  play  an  important 
part  in  ridding  the  service  of  any  individual  officer, 
should  inefficiency  be  developed  during  the  progress 
of  the  general  plan  of  education  and  training,  estab- 
lished in  the  garrison  and  service  schools. 

While  certain  principles  remain  fixed  the  rapid 
progress  in  the  development  of  materials  causes  rad- 
ical changes  in  methods  of  making  war.  In  our 
army  it  has  been  found  necessary  to  have  post  grad- 
uate instruction  in  many  forms  to  keep  pace  with 
modern  improvements.  The  military  educational 
system  now  comprises : 

I  246 


ARMY   SCHOOLS 


The  Military  Academy  for  cadets  at  West  Point. 

The  Army  War  College. 

The  Army  Staff  College. 

The  Army  School  of  the  Line. 

The  Coast  Artillery  School. 

The  Engineer  School. 

The  Mounted  Service  School. 

The  Army  Medical  School. 

The  Army  Signal  School. 

The  Army  Field  Engineer  School. 

The  Army  Field  Service  School  for  Medical  Of- 
ficers. 

The  School  of  Musketry. 

The  Field  Artillery  School  of  Fire. 

There  are  also  schools  for  training  bakers  and 
cooks  for  the  army.  At  each  military  post  a  gar- 
rison school  for  instruction  of  officers  and  a  school 
for  the  instruction  of  enlisted  men  are  maintained. 

The  educational  scheme  contemplates  that  begin- 
ning his  career  in  the  garrison  school  every  officer 
shall  be  required  to  fit  himself  thoroughly  for  the 
responsible  duties  of  his  grade,  including  familiar- 
ity with  company  and  post  administration  and  that 
of  the  staff  and  supply  service.  Those  officers  who 
exhibit  the  most  aptitude  in  the  garrison  schools  are 
regarded  as  having  a  right  to  precedence  when  se- 
lections from  their  grade  are  made  for  attendance 
at  the  Army  School  of  the  Line.  Similarly  selections 
are  here  made  for  the  advanced  course  in  the  Army 
Staff  College.  Eventually  the  distinguished  gradu- 
ates of  the  Staff  College,  after  a  tour  of  service  with 

247 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


their  regiments,  are  destined  for  participation  in  the 
course  of  study  at  the  Army  War  College  where  they 
will  have  an  opportunity  not  only  to  observe  the 
work  of  the  General  Staff  in  connection  with  war 
plans  but  also  to  participate  in  similar  studies.  In 
this  way  it  is  expected  that  the  nation  will  eventually 
have  at  its  disposal  a  highly  trained  body  of  officers 
whose  qualifications  are  a  matter  of  official  record 
based  upon  progressive  work. 

The  rapid  development  of  modern  science,  as  ap- 
plied to  the  art  of  war,  caused  the  establishment 
some  years  ago  of  various  special  service  schools 
which  now  form  an  important  part  of  the  general 
system.  The  intricate  machinery  of  modern,  high- 
power,  coast  defense  guns  and  the  problems  of  sub- 
marine defense  necessitate  a  scientific  training  for 
the  economical  and  proper  management  of  this  ex- 
pensive arm  of  the  service  and  this  is  supplied  at 
the  coast  artillery  school  in  the  most  approved  man- 
ner. 

The  Mounted  Service  School  is  utilized  for  cav- 
alry and  horse  artillery  and  not  only  serves  as  a 
school  of  application  but  embraces  a  school  of 
equitation  which  is  gradually  establishing  a  high 
standard  of  horsemanship  and  developing  some  offi- 
cers to  a  degree  entitling  them  to  rank  amongst  the 
very  small  number  in  the  world  in  the  class  of  horse- 
masters,  which  includes  far  more  than  mere  ability 
to  ride  and  train  a  remount.  Here  also  are  main- 
tained schools  for  farriers  and  horseshoers  which 
have  given  the  army  standards  of  work  equal  to  any 

248 


ARMY   SCHOOLS 


in  the  world  and  far  superior  to  that  found  in  the 
average  civil  community. 

The  Army  Signal  School  is  a  valuable  adjunct  to 
that  branch  of  the  service  and  has  been  of  great  as- 
sistance in  training  experts,  as  well  as  in  perfecting 
material,  and  has  resulted,  on  the  whole,  in  the  line 
of  the  army  having  a  most  perfect  and  satisfactory 
system  of  field  communication,  the  equal  of  any  in 
the  world.  Other  nations  have  expended  funds  more 
lavishly  for  aeroplane  work  since  our  army  initiated 
it,  but  the  full  measure  of  usefulness  of  aeroplanes 
has  not  yet  been  determined.  No  large  force  can  be 
moved  in  modern  war  without  discovery.  Most 
important  and  satisfactory  results  have  been  de- 
rived from  ground  lines  and  the  portable  wireless 
system  of  communication  within  the  limits  of  our 
own  forces. 

The  Staff  Corps  have  their  special  arrangements 
for  instruction  of  their  own  officers  in  the  Engineer, 
the  Field  Engineer,  the  Medical  and  the  Army  Field 
Service  School  for  Medical  Officers,  all  of  which 
maintain  standards  well  abreast  of  anything  in  mod- 
em armies.  Officers  of  the  organized  militia  are 
admitted  to  the  various  schools  provided  they  are 
qualified  to  undertake  the  course  with  profit.  The 
history  of  our  country  points  clearly  to  the  fact  that 
at  the  outbreak  of  every  war  there  is  a  demand  for 
trained  officers  far  beyond  the  supply. 

Upon  the  reorganization  of  the  army  following 
the  war  with  Spain  a  large  number  of  young  volun- 
teer officers  who  had  seen  service  in  the  field  were 

249 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


appointed  in  the  regular  army.  It  was  very  essen- 
tial that  these  officers  should  be  grounded  in  the  the- 
ories of  the  profession  in  order  to  qualify  them  for 
their  duties  and  for  the  examinations  required  for 
the  higher  grades. 

The  whole  scheme  of  army  post  graduate  and 
other  schools  results  from  a  fixed  policy,  the  object 
of  which  is  to  make  our  small  army  as  perfect  as  pos- 
sible not  only  in  the  performance  of  its  own  duties 
but  in  its  capacity  as  instructor  for  the  greater  army 
of  citizen  soldiers  necessary  in  every  war  of  magni- 
tude. 

In  striving  to  meet  the  demands  of  dr  new  era,  dif- 
fering widely  from  conditions  during  the  period  of 
the  Indian  Wars,  the  War  College  Board  was  created 
soon  after  the  termination  of  the  war  with  Spain. 
The  duties  imposed  upon  this  board  were  almost 
wholly  of  the  character  of  general  staff  emplojTnent. 
The  senior  officers  of  our  army  had  long  been  occu- 
pied quite  exclusively  in  the  details  of  administra- 
tion, with  inadequate  opportunity  for  the  study  of 
the  broader  military  problems,  the  consideration  of 
plans  for  future  campaigns  and  the  coordination  of 
the  many  military  agencies  involved  in  the  harmo- 
nious employment  of  an  army.  Out  of  these  efforts 
to  meet  properly  a  genuine  need  have  come  the  sys- 
tem of  post  graduate  schools,  the  War  College  and 
the  General  Staif  Corps. 

Appreciation  of  the  opportunities  afforded  our  offi- 
cers for  perfecting  their  military  education  is  con- 
stantly shown  by  the  results  of  their  work.    In  the 

250 


ARMY   SCHOOLS 


war  with  Spain  and  the  subsequent  insurrection  the 
value  of  the  education  and  training  previously  given 
was  manifested  by  the  splendid  manner  in  which 
they  performed  every  military  duty  and  the  success 
with  which  they  assumed  the  new  and  grave  respon- 
sibilities involved  in  civil  functions  in  recently  occu- 
pied territory  of  an  unfamiliar  and  resourceful 
enemy.  The  delicate  situations  constantly  arising 
xmder  a  military  government  of  an  alien  civil  com- 
munity, just  emerging  from  insurrection,  can  only 
be  appreciated  by  those  who  have  carried  the  weight 
of  responsibility.  It  is  to  the  credit  of  the  army  and 
the  nation  that  the  American  officers  not  only  meas- 
ured up  to  all  the  scientific  requirements  of  their 
profession,  but  that  during  the  long  period  between 
the  cessation  of  hostilities  and  the  establishment  of 
civil  government  the  affairs  of  8,000,000  Orientals 
were  administered  by  them  with  the  integrity  and 
fidelity  only  found  in  those  who  serve  without  mer- 
cenary ends  and  for  the  reward  of  a  consciousness  of 
duty  well  done.  A  nation  which  can  continue  to  com- 
mand such  service  is  to  be  congratulated. 


XVI 

THE   TRIUMPH   OF   MEDICAIi   SCIENCE 

"It  "Will  be  worthy  of  a  free,  enlightened,  and  at  no  distant  period, 
a  great  nation,  to  give  to  mankind  the  magnanimous  and  too  novel 
example  of  a  people  always  guided  by  an  exalted  justice  and 
benevolence." — Washington. 

WHEN  war  with  Spain  was  declared,  those  in 
authority  did  not  contemplate  an  immediate 
movement  in  force  upon  Cuba,  for  the  climate  of  that 
island  in  midsummer  was  regarded  with  particular 
aversion.  But  the  destiny  of  nations  conforms  not 
always  to  the  schemes  of  men  and  so  when  Cevera's 
fleet  appeared  in  the  harbor  of  Santiago  the  depar- 
ture of  the  army  was  hastened  and  the  do^vnfall  of 
Spanish  power  followed  almost  immediately.  The 
army,  with  a  marvelous  burst  of  energy,  had  driven 
home  the  attack  at  Santiago  and  by  its  lavish  ex- 
penditure of  strength,  under  conditions  of  peculiar 
hardship,  laid  itself  bare  to  the  insidious  fevers  of 
that  tropical  island. 

The  occupation  of  Cuba  without  undue  delay  be- 
came a  necessity.  The  problems  of  sanitation  and 
disease  prevention  became  at  once  far  more  formid- 
able than  ever  before  in  the  history  of  our  army. 

252 


THE   TRIUMPH   OF   MEDICAL   SCIENCE 

Disease  has  always  been  the  scourge  of  armies  and 
to  such  a  degree  that  those  who  have  marched  and 
engaged  in  battle  have,  at  times,  suffered  less  than 
those  subjected  to  the  monotonous  routine  of 
crowded  camps. 

Yellow  fever,  the  most  dreaded  scourge  of  the 
West  Indies,  was  not  slow  in  making  its  appearance 
and  its  victims  numbered  some  of  the  bravest  and 
most  honored  of  the  invading  army.  And  yet  fur- 
ther sacrifice  was  demanded  in  order  that  the  history 
of  the  scourge  might  be  traced  beyond  doubt. 
Courage  far  greater  than  that  called  for  in  battle 
was  now  demanded  and  it  is  to  the  honor  and  glory 
of  American  arms  that  volunteers  were  found  to  sub- 
mit themselves  to  the  anxiety,  pain  and  horrors  of 
the  experiments  which  in  the  end  have  placed  civil- 
ization under  a  debt  of  gratitude  to  the  army  in  gen- 
eral, and  especially  to  Walter  Reed,  Carroll,  Lazear 
and  their  confreres,  whose  names  and  fame  will  go 
down  the  centuries  with  the  veneration  due  to  men 
who  have  accomplished  things  worth  while. 

It  had  become  essential,  before  any  real  con- 
structive work  could  be  done,  that  the  mysteries  of 
propagation  of  yellow  fever  should  be  determined. 
After  a  series  of  experiments  remarkable  alike  in 
their  inception  and  successful  culmination,  the  cul- 
prit mosquito  was  run  to  cover.  Not  only  was  the 
military  occupation  of  Cuba  made  possible  but  also 
the  fulfillment  of  the  dream  of  the  centuries — that  of 
the  construction  of  the  Panama  Canal.  In  the  past 
so  helpless  were  we  in  the  face  of  yellow  fever  that 

253 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


the  arrival  of  a  single  case  at  one  of  our  Gulf  ports 
was  sufficient  to  cause  immediate  establishment  of  a 
physical  line  of  quarantine  backed  by  fear  and  fire- 
arms. 

While  the  army  was  struggling  with  the  problems 
of  sanitation  in  the  islands  over  which  our  flag 
floated  in  the  wake  of  war,  the  nation  at  home  was 
aroused  over  the  hysterical  reports  of  death  and 
sickness  in  the  great  volunteer  camps.  Typhoid 
fever  had  run  its  rampant  course  and  the  only  imme- 
diate remedy  seemed  to  lie  in  dispersing  the  troops 
as  rapidly  as  possible.  Out  of  this  experience  was 
born  the  determination  to  prevent  such  Sonditions  in 
future,  but  the  requirements  of  successful  sanitation 
have  ever  demanded  labor  beyond  the  voluntary  ef- 
forts of  those  whom  it  was  designed  to  protect. 

The  story  of  unhealthy  camps  has  ever  been  the 
same.  It  is  only  in  the  very  recent  past  that  medical 
science  has  made  known  the  possibility  of  preserving 
health  through  careful  attention  to  well  known  laws 
of  sanitation.  The  cost  in  death  and  broken  health 
of  its  younger  men  in  each  war  has  been  a  serious 
draft  upon  the  vitality  of  the  nation.  An  officer  in 
the  mobilization  camp  of  General  Zachary  Taylor's 
army  on  the  Rio  Grande,  in  1846,  recorded  conditions 
in  his  diary  which  states : 

**The  mortality  in  our  camp  at  Camargo  was  ap- 
palling. The  dead  march  was  ever  wailing  in  our 
ears,  and  even  at  this  distant  period  I  can  scarcely 
look  back  to  our  brief  stay  there  without  a  shudder. 

254 


THE    TRIUMPH   OF   MEDICAL    SCIENCE 

At  almost  every  hour  of  the  day  funeral  escorts  of 
various  regiments  might  be  seen  following  the  bod- 
ies of  departed  comrades  to  that  vast  and  common 
cemetery,  the  chaparral,  where  officers  and  men,  4n 
dust,  without  distinction,  lie.'  The  large  hospital 
tents  were  constantly  full — the  dead  being  removed 
at  sunrise  and  sunset,  but  to  make  room  for  the 
dying. '* 

The  hospital  and  pension  records  of  the  Civil  War 
disclose  a  story  of  disease  only  exceeded  in  pathos  by 
the  silent  bivouac  of  unknown  dead  in  the  national 
cemeteries.  Had  the  armies  of  that  period  been  con- 
centrated in  the  proportions  now  common  in  great 
wars,  the  conditions  would  have  been  correspond- 
ingly worse.  And  amongst  all  diseases  of  camp  and 
hospital  none  was  more  to  be  deplored  than  typhoid 
fever.  But  the  science  of  investigation  has  once 
more  gained  the  victory  and  by  means  of  anti- 
typhoid inoculation  a  remarkable  degree  of  immu- 
nity has  been  established. 

The  immense  advance  in  camp  sanitation  and  the 
great  value  of  typhoid  inoculation  as  a  protective 
measure  may  be  illustrated  by  comparing  the  expe- 
rience of  the  Maneuver  Division  of  Regulars  in 
Texas,  during  its  concentration  from  March  until 
August  1911,  with  that  of  the  Second  Division,  Sev- 
enth Army  Corps,  which  was  organized  at  Jackson- 
ville, Florida,  about  June  1, 1898,  and  remained  there 
in  camp  until  October.  This  division  was  not  con- 
spicuous in  its  typhoid  record  for  that  time,  and  is 

255 


THE  AMERICAN  ARMY 


selected  because  of  the  close  similarity  of  its  condi- 
tions of  service  to  those  of  the  Maneuver  Division  in 
Texas.  The  two  divisions  were  encamped  in  nearly 
the  same  latitude  and  for  about  the  same  length  of 
time.  Each  had  a  good  camp  site  and  an  artesian 
water  supply  of  unimpeachable  purity.  While  the 
period  in  camp  of  the  Second  Division,  Seventh 
Army  Corps,  was  later  in  the  year,  the  number  of 
men  in  the  Maneuver  Division  was  larger. 

Table  showing  for  the  regiments  of  the  Second 
Division  of  the  Seventh  Army  Corps,  assembled  at 
Jacksonville,  Fla.,  the  mortality  and  morbidity  from 
^      typhoid  fever : 


Regiments 


a 


Cases  of 
Typhoid  Fever 

I* 

a 
S 

u 

o 
O 

•9  1 

m 

253 

341 

18 

147 

227 

16 

185 

318 

29 

209 

311 

46 

164 

253 

33 

153 

248 

18 

105 

152 

17 

135 

231 

21 

378 

612 

50 
248 

1,729 

2,693 

Second  Illinois 

First  North  Carolina. 
Second  New  Jersey . . . 

First  Wisconsin 

Fiftieth  Iowa 

Ninth  Illinois 

Second  Virginia 

Fourth  Virginia   

Forty-ninth  Iowa  

Total  


1,095 
1,164 
1,153 
1,232 
1,097 
1,288 
1,220 
1,274 
1,236 


10,759 


22 
20 
32 
48 
33 
28 
20 
28 
50 

281 


Table  showing  for  the  organizations  composing 
the  Maneuver  Division  at  San  Antonio,  Texas,  the 


256 


THE   TRIUMPH   OF   MEDICAL   SCIENCE 

morbidity  and  mortality  from  typhoid  fever,  March 
10  to  July  10, 1911 : 


Organization 


o  o  y 

Z.J3  * 

ID  >>o 
OSfHO 

O 


■w  p. 


3 
2" 

s  * 

a!-- 
A 


Eleventh  infantry 

Fifteenth  infantry 

Eighteenth  infantry  . . . 

Thirteenth  infantry 

Twenty-second  infantry 

Tenth  infantry 

Seventeenth  infantry  . . 
Twenty-eighth  infantry 

Third  field  artillery 

Fourth  field  artillery. . . 

Engineer  battalion   

Signal  corps  

Ninth  cavalry 

Eleventh  cavalry 

Sanitary  troops 

Total   


924 
969 

1,022 
929 

1,033 

1,016 
954 
951 
847 
741 
536 
197 
744 

1,143 
795 

12,801 


0 


3 
1 

11 


♦This  patient,  a  private  of  the  hospital  corps,  had  not  completed 
his  immunization,  having  taken  only  two  doses.  The  case  was 
very  mild  and  would  perhaps  have  been  overlooked  but  for  the 
rule  that  blood  cultures  were  made  in  all  cases  of  fever  of  over 
forty-eight  hours'  duration.  The  Widal  reaction  has  no  diag- 
nostic value  in  immunized  persons,  as  all  respond  to  it.  Forty- 
nine  cases  of  typhoid  fever,  with  nineteen  deaths,  were  reported 
as  occurring  in  the  city  of  San  Antonio  during  this  period. 


The  health  of  military  commands  is  usually  meas- 
ured by  the  constantly  non-effective  rate  which  rep- 
resents the  average  number  constantly  sick  in  each 
thousand  men.  This  was  for  the  Maneuver  Division 
twenty-two  per  thousand,  which  can  be  better  ap- 

257 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


predated  when  it  is  stated  that  the  rate  was  thirty- 
four  for  all  troops  in  the  United  States  for  the  year 
1910.  This  epoch-making  achievement  was  not  ac- 
complished by  merely  waving  a  magician's  wand  but 
through  the  generous  cooperation  of  line  officers  and 
men  and  employees  of  every  grade,  with  the  medical 
officers  and  sanitary  squads,  for  the  proper  sanita- 
tion of  crowded  camps  involves  far  more  of  practice 
than  theory.  As  to  the  spirit  which  pervaded  the 
command,  the  sanitary  inspector  has  reported: 

**The  sanitary  inspector  usually  dealt  directly 
with  the  regimental  sanitary  officer  and  was  accom- 
panied by  him  on  his  inspections.  The-  latter  was 
held  responsible  for  the  sanitary  conditions  of  his 
camp,  and  if  sanitary  defects  were  found,  he  was 
considered  to  be  at  fault  unless  he  could  show  that 
he  had  made  proper  efforts  to  have  them  corrected. 

**If  the  regimental  surgeon  was  unable  to  bring 
about  a  correction  of  the  defects,  the  matter  was 
taken  up  by  the  sanitary  inspector  with  regimental 
authorities.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  it  was 
never  necessary  for  the  sanitary  inspector  formally 
to  use  the  authority  granted  him  by  the  com- 
manding general.  It  seemed  to  be  well  understood 
that  the  sanitary  inspector  was  only  insisting  that 
the  commanding  general's  orders  be  carried  out,  and 
it  was  always  possible  to  arrive  at  a  satisfactory  un- 
derstanding without  friction  or  controversy. 

**With  few  exceptions,  organization  commanders 
were  more  than  willing  to  carry  out  any  directions 
or  suggestions  concerning  ways  and  means  of  pre- 

258 


THE   TRIUMPH   OF   MEDICAL   SCIENCE 

serving  the  health  of  the  commands.  Considerable 
difficulty  was  encountered  at  first  in  putting  the 
scheme  of  sanitation  into  effect,  largely  on  account 
of  a  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  necessity  and  pur- 
pose of  the  measures  prescribed. '  * 

Immediately  upon  mobilization  of  the  division,  or- 
ders were  given  making  typhoid  inoculation  compul- 
sory and  the  results  have  not  only  justified  the  ac- 
tion, but  fixed  a  model  for  future  camps.  The  area 
available  for  the  encampment  was  very  restricted. 
With  the  infantry  division  were  two  regiments  of 
cavalry,  about  the  equal  of  a  European  cavalry  divi- 
sion ;  two  regiments  of  field  artillery,  a  battalion  of 
engineers  with  a  ponton  train,  ambulance  and  field 
hospital  companies,  all  of  which  were  accompanied 
with  wagon  and  pack  train  transportation.  To  pro- 
vide immediately  for  the  proper  sanitation  of  the 
camp,  the  following  instructions  were  promulgated : 

**  General  Orders, 
''No.  2. 

* '  Headquarters  Maneuver  Division, 
' '  San  Antonio,  Texas. 

**  March  11, 1911. 
"The  following  regulations  for  camp  sanitation 
are  published  for  the  information  and  guidance  of 
all  concerned : 

*  *  1.  The  chief  surgeon  is  charged  with  the  general 
conduct  and  supervision  of  the  medical  department 
in  the  performance  of  its  duties,  and  will  make  such 
assignment  of  personnel  as  may  be  required. 

259 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


**2.  The  sanitary  inspector  is  charged  especially 
with  the  supervision  of  the  sanitation  of  the  camp. 
It  is  the  duty  of  commanders  to  remedy  defects  re- 
ported to  them  by  the  inspector. 

**3.  The  camp  water  supply  is  pure  and  whole- 
some and  no  sterilization  of  drinking  water  is  neces- 
sary. Precaution  must  be  taken,  however,  to  pre- 
vent subsequent  contamination  by  keeping  all  con- 
tainers scrupulously  clean  and  protected  from  dust 
and  other  sources  of  infection. 

**4.  The  senior  medical  officer  of  each  command 
will  make  at  least  one  inspection  daily  of  the  com- 
mand to  which  attached,  and  report  any-sanitary  de- 
fects, with  proper  recommendations  to  remedy  the 
same,  to  his  commanding  officer,  who  will  immedi- 
ately take  the  necessary  steps  for  their  correction, 
if  within  his  authority.  If  beyond  his  facilities,  or  if 
considered  impracticable,  he  will  immediately  for- 
ward the  report,  with  full  remarks,  for  action  of 
higher  authority. 

**5.  Organization  commanders  will  be  held  re- 
sponsible for  the  police  of  their  respective  camps. 
Each  company  or  similar  organization  will  construct 
incinerators  as  prescribed  in  Section  216,  Field 
Service  Regulations,  for  the  disposal  of  all  solid  and 
liquid  garbage  of  the  organization,  and  no  other  dis- 
position will  be  made  of  such  wastes.  Human  waste 
will  be  disposed  of  in  pits  provided  with  latrine 
boxes  unless  other  provision  has  been  made.  Two 
urinal  cans  will  be  placed  in  each  company  street  at 
night.    Latrine  pits  will  be  burned  out,  and  seats 

260 


THE    TEIUMPH   OF   MEDICAL   SCIENCE 

scrubbed  daily ;  crude  oil  and  straw  or  other  material 
will  be  used.  Urinal  cans  will  be  burned  out  daily 
and  bottoms  covered  with  milk  of  lime  before  put  in 
use.  Defilement  of  the  ground  in  or  about  the  camp 
is  absolutely  prohibited.  Manure  will  be  hauled  to  a 
designated  dumping  ground,  and  there  burned  with 
the  aid  of  crude  oil.  Rock  pit  crematories  will  be 
used  for  disposal  of  general  wastes  of  camp  areas 
not  under  the  jurisdiction  of  commanding  officers. 

*'6.  No  food,  drinks,  or  like  commodities  will  be 
sold  in  camp  except  in  the  authorized  exchanges. 

*  *  7.  Sanitary  squads  composed  of  medical  officers, 
noncommissioned  officers,  and  privates  of  the  hos- 
pital corps  will  be  organized  by  the  chief  surgeon. 
The  sanitary  squad  will  supervise  and  assist  in  the 
disposal  of  camp  wastes.  Civilians  employed  as  san- 
itary laborers  will  be  employed  by  the  quartermas- 
ter's department  and  turned  over  to  the  medical  de- 
partment. The  sanitary  police  officer  will  make 
requisition  on  the  chief  quartermaster  for  such 
transportation,  labor,  or  material  as  may  be  needed. 
When  assigned  to  this  service  they  will  not  be  di- 
verted to  other  uses  except  by  order  from  these 
headquarters. 

**By  Command  of  Major  General  Carter: 

''Stephen  C.  Mills, 
*  *  Colonel,  General  Staff, 
''Chief  of  Staff." 

It  was  clearly  comprehended  that  conditions  on 
the  Mexican  border  might  eventuate  in  the  troops 

261 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


comprising  the  Maneuver  Division  being  called  upon 
for  active  field  service,  and  it  was  inadvisable  to  in- 
augurate the  system  involving  the  expensive  and 
cumbersome  incinerators  and  other  patent  devices 
experimented  with  at  camps  of  instruction  in  recent 
years.  There  was  no  transportation  available  to 
carry  along  the  heavy  and  bulky  apparatus  and  it 
was  not  desired,  for  many  reasons,  to  increase  ma- 
terially the  transportation  accompanying  the  com- 
mand. It  was,  therefore,  decided  that  no  methods 
should  be  employed  which  would  require  material 
change  when  the  troops  should  proceed  upon  the 
march,  else  time  would  be  wasted  and  disaster  in- 
vited. All  apparatus  connected  with  the  sanitary 
system  was  of  the  simplest  kind  and  within  the  labor 
and  capacity  of  troops  to  install  quickly.  Storage  of 
garbage  and  kitchen  slops  in  receptacles  was  forbid- 
den. The  old  camp  custom  of  burying  garbage  was 
dispensed  with,  for  such  pits  become  breeding  places 
for  myriads  of  flies.  Open  pits  lined  with  small 
boulders,  with  a  continuous  fire,  were  found  entirely 
efficacious  for  destruction  of  kitchen  garbage,  but  on 
account  of  the  incessant  rains,  simple  forms  of  cov- 
ered incinerators  were  constructed  and  used  by 
some  organizations  while  in  the  permanent  camp. 
The  handling  and  storing  of  refuse  near  the  kitch- 
ens pollutes  the  ground,  attracts  flies  and  furnishes 
them  breeding  places.  If  the  garbage  is  hauled 
away  in  cans  or  carts  it  is  practically  impossible  to 
prevent  it  being  slopped  over,  with  consequent 
ground  pollution  and  attraction  of  flies.    Fire  alone 

262 


THE   TRIUMPH   OF   MEDICAL   SCIENCE 

seems  to  solve  the  question  of  its  immediate  and 
proper  disposal  in  the  vicinity  of  kitchens. 

The  past  ten  years  have  given  a  very  extended  ex- 
perience to  army  veterinarians,  not  only  in  our  own 
country  but  in  tropical  islands,  and  they  have  be- 
come familiar  with  all  known  diseases  of  animals, 
many  of  the  most  serious  of  which  have  never  been 
introduced  in  this  country.  There  were  more  than 
6,000  horses  and  mules  distributed  through  the  camp 
of  the  Maneuver  Division,  tied  at  picket  lines.  Very 
few  regimental  veterinarians  were  present  and  an 
improvised  corps  was  created  through  temporary 
employment  of  additional  civilian  veterinarians. 
The  experience  of  the  division  was  similar  to  that  of 
the  Civil  War  where,  in  the  final  analysis  of  records, 
it  was  found  that  in  our  country  armies  require  one 
horse  or  mule  to  every  two  men  in  campaign.  The 
animals  of  the  Maneuver  Division  were  exposed 
from  the  very  first  to  most  inclement  weather,  con- 
sisting of  a  series  of  northers,  accompanied  by  cold 
rains,  making  the  surrounding  soil  a  sea  of  mud.  It 
required  incessant  labor  to  ditch  and  partially 
drain  the  ground  around  the  picket  lines  without 
conducting  the  contents  amongst  the  adjoining  tents 
of  the  troops  and,  often,  for  days  at  a  time,  the  ani- 
mals were  forced  to  stand  in  mud  above  their  fet- 
locks. Such  conditions  not  only  subjected  the  ani- 
mals to  the  grave  danger  of  being  rendered  unserv- 
iceable by  ** thrush"  and  a  disease  of  the  heels 
known  as  '  *  scratches, ' '  but  made  it  more  difificult  to 
maintain  a  good  sanitary  condition   of   the   camp. 

263 


THE  AMERICAN  ARMY 


Owing  to  the  receipt  of  frequent  sliipments  of  ani- 
mals from  large  sales  depots,  some  diseases  were 
introduced  in  the  camp,  but  although  glanders  pre- 
vailed constantly  in  the  vicinity,  it  was  excluded  by 
a  rigid  system  of  inspection  of  all  animals  entering 
the  camp  limits.  Of  the  more  than  6,000  horses  and 
mules  with  the  division,  562  were  treated  at  the  im- 
provised canvas  hospital  of  which  201  were  suffer- 
ing from  shipping  fever,  strangles  and  kindred  dis- 
eases, and  361  were  invalided  because  of  injuries 
and  lameness.  The  loss  of  animals  treated  at  the 
hospital  during  the  existence  of  the  division  was 
twenty-nine,  being  five  and  one-sixteenth  per  cent, 
of  those  admitted  and  less  than  one-half  of  one  per 
cent,  for  the  whole  number  of  horses  and  mules  pres- 
ent in  the  camp  during  its  existence  of  five  months. 

The  picket  lines  were  stretched  between  com- 
pactly camped  regiments  and  their  cleanliness  was 
an  essential  part  of  the  sanitary  system.  The  ref- 
use from  the  picket  lines  was  disposed  of  by  haul- 
ing to  a  dump  several  miles  from  camp  where  it 
was  destroyed  by  burning  with  crude  oil.  The 
ground  about  the  picket  lines  was  carefully  swept 
and  once  a  week  hay  was  spread  over  the  surface 
and  burned  to  destroy  any  larvae  of  flies  which  had 
found  lodgment  there. 

No  new  sanitary  principles  were  attempted  but 
only  a  scientific  application  of  well-known  methods 
used  at  various  times.  There  was  some  perturba- 
tion because  some  recently  patented,  expensive  and 
cumbersome  appliances,  adapted  for  permanent 
camps,  were  not  put  in  use,  but  the  results  proved 

264 


THE   TRIUMPH   OF   MEDICAL   SCIENCE 

that  our  army  tactical  unit — the  division — may  camp 
and  march  in  comparative  immunity  from  disease 
with  little,  if  any,  more  impedimenta  than  was  car- 
ried during  the  Civil  War.  The  simplicity  and  prac- 
ticability of  the  methods  used  appealed  strongly  to 
experienced  soldiers  and  enlisted  their  zeal  in  car- 
rying them  out.  Efficient  sanitary  schemes  can  best 
be  formulated  and  carried  out  under  the  direction 
of  specially  trained  medical  officers,  having  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  origin,  nature  and  diffusion  of  infectious 
diseases,  and  the  proper  methods  of  combating  each. 
The  early  detection  and  prompt  isolation  of  infec- 
tious diseases  is  absolutely  necessary  to  prevent  epi- 
demics. The  results  of  the  scientific  system  em- 
ployed speak  for  themselves  in  a  record  previously 
unequalled  as  regards  healthfulness  and  simplicity 
of  methods,  and  at  a  cost  a  mere  fraction  of  that  in- 
volved at  some  maneuver  camps. 

In  1913,  the  Second  Division  was  concentrated 
about  Galveston  Bay  with  a  view  to  service  over-sea, 
but  was  kept  in  that  vicinity  throughout  the  year. 
The  main  camp  site  at  Texas  City  was  to  all  appear- 
ances far  less  favorable  than  that  occupied  by  the 
Maneuver  Division  in  1911,  but  with  the  immediate 
adoption  of  the  same  sanitary  rules  and  the  use  of 
the  anti-typhoid  inoculation,  the  12,000  men  were 
enabled  to  continue  their  field  training  through  the 
varied  weather,  winter  and  summer,  with  a  remarka- 
ble health  record.  The  results  obtained  in  these  two 
divisions  may  be  achieved  by  other  commands  with 
the  same  care  and  labor. 

And  in  other  lines  the  battle  for  prevention  of  dis- 

265 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


ease  has  been  waged  and  nowhere  with  more  re- 
markable results  than  by  the  army  in  Porto  Rico  and 
the  Philippines  where  parasitic  infection  is  giving 
way  to  the  regeneration  of  the  afflicted  people.  One 
of  the  most  remarkable  incidents  in  medical  history 
is  that  involved  in  the  regeneration  of  the  old  Span- 
ish prison  called  Bilibid,  in  Manila.  The  mortality 
here  had  reached  the  abnormal  proportions  of  238 
per  1,000.  Through  relief  from  overcrowding,  im- 
proved diet  and  proper  sanitation,  the  rate  was  re- 
duced to  70  per  1,000,  where  it  remained  until  an 
examination  of  the  3,500  remaining  prisoners  dis- 
closed that  eighty-four  per  cent,  were^  afflicted  with 
intestinal  parasites ;  fifty  per  cent,  with  two  varieties 
and  twenty  per  cent,  with  three  or  more.  Of  the 
whole  number  fifty-two  per  cent,  were  afflicted  with 
hookworm  disease.  Proceeding  then  with  proper 
treatment  the  death  rate  in  this  prison,  with  a  pre- 
vious record  rivaling  that  reported  of  the  Black 
Hole  of  Calcutta,  the  death  rate  fell  to  thirteen  per 
1,000.  This  disclosed  not  only  the  previous  foul- 
ness of  a  prison  and  the  victory  of  science,  but  sug- 
gested the  broadening  field  of  usefulness  of  prevent- 
ive medicine  to  restore  vigor  to  thousands  of  weak- 
lings ignorant  of  the  sapping  of  life 's  blood  and  en- 
ergy. War  loses  some  of  its  terrors  when  the  ex- 
perience flowing  from  it  discloses  so  signal  a  triumph 
of  medical  science  in  prevention  of  diseases  whose 
toll  of  death  in  the  past  has  rivaled  that  of  bullets. 


xvn 

THE   OEGANIZED   MILITIA 

"To  bring  men  to  a  proper  degree  of  subordination  is  not  the 
work  of  a  day,  a  month,  or  even  a  year." — Washington. 

THE  terms  "Organized  Militia'*  and  ''National 
Guard"  have  been  adopted  officially  to  desig- 
nate those  state  military  organizations  which,  par- 
ticipate in  the  appropriations  by  Congress  and  to 
differentiate  them  from  the  untrained  body  of  citi- 
zens between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  forty-five 
available  as  militia  or  levies  in  mass.  There  is  a 
wide  variation  in  the  strength,  discipline  and  effect- 
iveness of  the  state  forces.  Some  states  have  prac- 
tically no  troops  at  all,  while  others  have  regularly 
organized  brigades  and  divisions.  These  latter  are 
the  organizations  which  have  shared  in  the  appro- 
priations provided  by  Congress,  and  which  have 
been  declared  by  the  attorney-general  in  an  opinion 
rendered  February  17,  1912,  as  not  being  available 
for  national  service  beyond  our  borders.  The  na- 
tional guard  of  many  states  has  long  since  reached 
a  degree  of  instruction  which  has  caused  them  justly 
to  resent  being  classed  as  militia  in  the  old  accepta- 
tion of  the  word,  and  the  decision  of  the  attorney- 
general  that: 

*  *  The  constitutional  provision  here  considered  not 
only  affords  no  warrant  for  the  use  of  the  militia  by 

267 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


the  general  government,  except  to  suppress  insur- 
rection, repel  invasion,  or  to  execute  the  laws  of  the 
Union,  but,  by  its  careful  enumeration  of  the  three 
occasions  or  purposes  for  which  the  militia  may  be 
used,  it  forbids  such  use  for  any  other  purpose" 
came  to  them  as  a  distinct  shock. 

A  large  number  of  the  officers  and  men  of  the  na- 
tional guard  have  devoted  their  time  and  fortune  to 
its  improvement,  under  the  belief  that  in  event  of 
war  the  organizations  to  which  they  belong  would  be 
immediately  called  into  service  with  the  regular 
army.  Several  schemes  have  been  proposed  to  over- 
come the  situation  brought  about  by  the  decision  of 
the  attorney-general,  which  was  not  rendered  as  an 
abstract  opinion  but  at  a  time  when  the  probability 
of  calling  out  the  state  organization  for  active  duty 
beyond  our  borders  was  deemed  imminent. 

The  Constitution  provides  that  Congress  shall 
have  power : 

**To  provide  for  organizing,  arming,  and  disci- 
plining the  militia  and  for  governing  such  part  of 
them  as  may  be  employed  in  the  service  of  the 
United  States,  reserving  to  the  States,  respectively, 
the  appointment  of  the  officers,  and  the  authority  of 
training  the  militia  according  to  the  discipline  pre- 
scribed by  Congress.** 

The  Constitution  further  provides : 

**That  no  state  shall,  without  the  consent  of  Con- 
gress, keep  troops  or  ships  of  war  in  time  of  peace, 
or  engage  in  war,  unless  actually  invaded,  or  in  such 
imminent  danger  as  will  not  admit  of  delay.** 

268 


THE   OEGANIZED   MILITIA 


Some  of  the  states  now  maintain  military  organ- 
izations quite  equal  in  extent  to  the  entire  regular 
army  as  it  existed  prior  to  the  Civil  War.  Appro- 
priations by  Congress  for  the  militia  have  doubled 
under  recent  legislation,  and  their  improved  condi- 
tion has  been  held  to  justify  recognition  through  a 
further  annual  appropriation  of,  possibly,  $10,000,- 
000  to  pay  the  officers  and  men  of  the  existing 
organizations,  notwithstanding  they  remain  state 
troops. 

Since  Washington  expressed  his  convictions  so 
fully  upon  the  subject,  much  has  been  written  about 
the  failure  of  militiamen  to  make  good,  and  there  is 
no  gainsaying  that  the  record  is  decidedly  against 
the  employment  of  levies  of  short  service  men  by 
whatever  name  they  may  be  designated.  The  or- 
ganized militia  of  the  present  day,  however,  should 
not  be  compared  with  any  body  of  troops  ever  pre- 
viously employed  in  this  country  under  the  designa- 
tion of  militia.  Organized,  armed,  equipped,  and 
subject  to  training  under  the  laws  and  regulations 
governing  the  regular  army,  they  constitute  a  mili- 
tary force  far  better  prepared  for  immediate  active 
service  than  the  best  of  new  volunteer  organizations. 
So  long,  however,  as  the  national  guard  or  organized 
militia  remains  in  its  present  legal  status,  it  is  not 
an  immediately  available  asset,  and  it  will  constitute 
a  serious  blunder  on  the  part  of  the  nation  if  the  ex- 
isting system  is  not  thoroughly  revised  in  the  near 
future. 

When  the  war  with  Spain  was  declared,  it  was 

269 


THE   AMERICAN  AEMY 


found  necessary  to  prepare  legislation,  wliicli  would 
enable  the  military  organizations  existing  in  the  sev- 
eral states  to  participate  in  the  war  with  their  origi- 
nal organizations  intact.  Congress  provided  for  this 
by  authorizing  the  President  to  accept  the  service  of 
any  company,  troop,  battery,  battalion  or  regiment 
of  the  organized  militia  which  would  enlist  in  the 
volunteer  army  in  a  body.  No  provision  was  made 
for  receiving  into  the  service  the  many  generals  and 
staff  officers  of  state  troops.  The  generals  and  staff 
officers  needed  for  the  whole  army  of  regulars  and 
volunteers  were  appointed  by  the  President  as 
** United  States  Volunteers,"  not  accredited  to  or 
having  any  obligation  to  any  state.  There  was  a 
natural  feeling  of  dissatisfaction  on  the  part  of  the 
generals  commanding  brigades  and  divisions  and 
their  staff  officers  of  the  state  organizations  at  be- 
ing left  out  and  all  subsequent  legislation  proposed 
by  them  has  had  in  mind  the  recurrence  of  such  a 
condition  in  event  of  another  war.  There  was  also 
a  general  opinion  that  better  results  would  have  fol- 
lowed if  some  method  could  have  been  found  of  or- 
dering the  various  state  contingents  into  active  serv- 
ice without  waiting  for  each  individual  militiaman  to 
volunteer.  Some  organizations  declined  to  volun- 
teer and  of  those  which  did  purport  to  volunteer  as 
a  body,  so  large  a  number  of  individuals  failed  to 
do  so  that  the  war  efficiency  of  many  organizations 
was  materially  reduced  for  the  moment  because  of 
the  small  number  of  old  men  mustered  into  the  serv- 
ice, and  through  the  sudden  influx  of  large  numbers 

270 


THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA 


of  recruits.  Strong  influence  was  brought  to  bear 
to  reduce  the  number  of  privates  required  in  or- 
ganizations which  volunteered,  and  it  was  successful 
to  such  a  degree  that  it  became  necessary  for  the 
President  to  make  another  call  immediately  for  men 
to  fill  up  the  companies  which,  like  all  militia  or- 
ganizations, had  full  complements  of  officers.  Out 
of  the  dissatisfaction  at  that  time  have  come  the  con- 
tinuous efforts  to  modify  the  laws  under  which  ex- 
isting state  organizations  shall  be  received  into  the 
army  for  war  before  any  volunteers  may  be  ac- 
cepted. 

As  between  the  trained  or  partially  trained  active 
organizations  of  militia  and  new  regiments  of  volun- 
teers, there  should  be  no  question  of  relative  initial 
efficiency.  The  whole  matter  revolves  about  the 
probable  value  of  any  body  of  troops,  for  national 
purposes,  which  is  maintained  by  and  solely  under 
control  of  a  state,  during  peace,  even  though  ap- 
propriations for  their  support  are  made  by  the  gen- 
eral government.  The  history  of  our  country  since 
colonial  days,  a  period  of  a  century  and  a  half,  ren- 
ders a  steady  series  of  verdicts  against  the  probabil- 
ity of  success  of  any  combination  of  national  and 
state  forces  where  the  latter  remain  during  peace 
under  the  actual  command  and  control  of  the  several 
governors,  who  appoint  the  officers  and  direct,  as 
provided  by  the  Constitution,  the  training  according 
to  the  discipline  provided  by  Congress, 

As  a  matter  of  actual  practice  there  is  embarrass- 
ment in  joint  maneuvers  and  operations  between 

271 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


the  regular  army  and  organized  militia  for  the  rea- 
son that  officers  and  men  of  the  organized  militia 
conform  to  the  instructions  prepared  and  issued  by 
the  regular  army  commanders  only  as  a  matter  of 
courtesy.  Even  where  the  government  has  gone 
to  great  expense  in  preparing  camp  sites  for  them 
at  maneuvers,  organizations  of  state  troops  have  at 
times  felt  entirely  authorized  to  come  or  stay  away 
in  their  discretion.  The  fact  is  the  officers  of  the 
regular  army  and  organized  militia  have  gone  on 
making  the  best  possible  out  of  a  really  impossible 
military  situation. 

During  the  War  of  1812  three  members  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  Massachusetts  rendered  an  opin- 
ion that  while  the  militia  may,  under  the  language  of 
the  Constitution,  be  employed  to  execute  the  laws  of 
the  Union,  to  suppress  insurrection  and  to  repel  in- 
vasions, the  governors  of  the  several  states  have  a 
right  to  determine  whether  any  of  the  exigencies  ex- 
ist so  as  to  require  them  to  place  the  militia,  or  any 
part  of  it,  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  and  if, 
in  the  opinion  of  the  governors,  the  conditions  do  not 
require  obedience  to  the  call,  they  are  not  required 
to  obey  it.  It  is  a  matter  of  regrettable  history  that 
the  governors  of  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut  ex- 
ercised their  discretion  at  that  time,  and  refused  to 
furnish  militia  on  the  call  of  the  President. 

This  was  a  hundred  years  ago,  but  the  memory  of 
it  caused  the  insertion  in  the  statutes  of  1903,  whicli 
provided  for  reorganizing  the  militia,  of  a  provision 
which  authorized  the  President  to  call  out  any  por- 

272 


THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA 


tion  of  the  militia  by  direct  orders  to  the  several 
commanding  officers.  No  sooner  was  this  law  en- 
acted, however,  than  attempts  were  begun  for  its  re- 
peal, and  at  the  first  favorable  opportunity  the  law 
was  changed  and  provision  made  that  the  call  for 
the  militia  by  the  President  must  be  made  to  the  gov- 
ernors. The  inherent  defects  of  any  military  system 
which  depends  upon  state  executive  action  in  forty- 
eight  sovereign  states,  some  of  them  an  empire  in 
extent,  should  be  apparent  to  the  merest  novice  in 
military  administration. 

A  great  part  of  the  existing  organizations  of  state 
forces  had  settled  these  questions  in  their  own  minds 
and  had  no  doubt  that  they  had  already  volunteered 
by  entering  the  organized  militia  with  a  declaration 
of  intent  to  serve  without  regard  to  state  or  national 
boundaries.  The  individual  may  not  be  the  arbiter 
of  his  own  fate  in  this  matter,  and  it  is  now  certain 
that  the  most  ingeniously  contrived  statute  to  over- 
come the  obstacle  may  be  declared  unconstitutional 
at  a  moment  inconvenient  to  the  individual  and  per- 
ilous to  the  nation.  If,  therefore,  the  methods  of 
transition  from  state  forces  into  the  national  army, 
when  war  is  imminent  or  declared,  are  to  be  always 
matters  of  argument  and  doubt,  the  country  is  lean- 
ing upon  a  broken  reed  and  a  more  stable  form  of 
support  to  the  regulars  should  be  devised.  Any  sys- 
tem which  fails  to  utilize  the  enthusiastic  and  patri- 
otic young  men  who  have  been  preparing  themselves 
in  existing  state  organizations  for  the  duties  of  act- 
ive service  will  be  seriously  defective. 

273 


THE   AMERICAN  AIM\IY 


It  is  not  necessary  to  hark  back  to  Washington  and 
Hamilton  for  their  views  on  the  utilization  of  colo- 
nial and  state  troops  called  out  for  federal  service, 
but  they  wrote  much  on  the  subject  and  were  insist- 
ent in  their  efforts  to  evolve  a  more  stable  military 
system  out  of  the  widely  scattered  communities  of 
their  day.  The  question  then  was  and  now  is,  whether 
or  not  the  efforts  to  nationalize  the  state  militia 
should  be  abandoned  and  a  more  stable  and  unobjec- 
tionable system  of  providing  for  the  military  needs 
of  the  nation  be  adopted. 

The  amounts  appropriated  by  the  local  legisla- 
tures for  maintenance  of  their  militia  organizations 
vary  greatly  in  the  several  states.  The  amount  ap- 
propriated by  Congress  for  distribution  to  the  states 
of  arms,  equipments,  supplies  and  funds,  for  their 
organized  militia  remained  for  three-quarters  of  a 
century  at  a  fixed  annual  sum  of  $200,000.  This 
amount  which  was  originally  fixed  in  the  Act  of 
April  23,  1808,  usually  referred  to  as  section  1661, 
Revised  Statutes,  was  increased  February  12,  1887, 
to  $400,000,  on  June  6,  1900,  to  $1,000,000,  and  on 
June  22,  1906,  was  further  increased  to  $2,000,000 
annually.  In  addition  to  this  continuing  annual  ap- 
propriation, there  is  another  of  equal  amount,  $2,- 
000,000,  annually,  under  a  different  act  of  Congress 
usually  referred  to  as  section  13  of  the  militia  law. 
Since  the  passage  of  the  Act  of  January  21,  1903, 
for  reorganizing  the  militia,  appropriations  have 
steadily  increased  and  cover  a  much  wider  range  of 
subjects  than  in  prior  years,  as  shown  in  the  follow- 
ing analysis  of  the  several  acts  of  Congress : 

274 


THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA 


"•a 

0)   ^ 

a 

P< 

a 
0 

a  0) 

6 

-l-J 
CQ 

0 

ag 
a  <o 

a  0 

a© 
s2 

0? 

a 

d 

rd 

0 

a^ 

oo 

ag 
a  <!> 

02 

o 

u 

S 

d 

P.'C' 
0   (B 

0^ 

13 
0 

c<3 

CQ 

e 

0 

a  f3 

csg 

ct 

W     bfl 

+-> 

CQ 

U 

> 

+-> 

02 

s 

0) 

■!-> 

a  f3 

d 

02 

p. 2 
Pi 

'*>  p 

p 

02 

.a 
a 

CQ 

CQ 
(U 

03 
P 

(1) 
Pi 

2* 
'3 

03 

-d 
p 
a 

n:  a  g 

a  rt  a  rf 

©.S-iJ 

iJ  55 

0 

73 

a 

a;.& 

-^ 

©*" 

-d 

o-S- 

-I- 

03    ^ 

•«  a;.S<-tJ 

•a  3 
1^ 

i 

S  p. 

0 
0 

u 

1^ 

% 

«5 

O 
^ 

^    0    ^ 

i 

-d 

S 

CQ 

a 

;-i 
0 

g-d  prs 
•i-i  "rl  c"  P 

^-s 

^1^ 

»■§ 

mi 

CQ 

1^1 

a 

y 

1 

.1-) 

P 

ffS.?| 

0  «s 

0  QJXJ 

C8 

0  =« 

o'*^ 

0 

'S 

-   0«3 

1- 

0  ^ 

bO  01 

P 

0  0  ca.2 

E-t 

H 

H 

H 

H 

Eh 

H 

0 

0 

© 

© 

© 

© 

© 

-)-> 

0 

© 

© 

© 

© 

© 

0 

(3 

0 

©_ 

©^ 

© 

© 

© 

0 

3 

0 

© 

© 

\a 

© 

to 

c? 

o 

1 

0 
0 

© 
©^ 

© 
© 
1-? 

00 

© 
© 

rH 

a 

1^ 

CO  bo 

Ck 

OS   u 

Pi 

d  u 

P< 

*3  oj 

■3  C3 

a° 

■3  oj 

a° 

P  c3 

o 

xti  0 

a  - 

l>>-=l 

03 

Z-B 

0) 

4-> 

^2 

■^  5 

•■^ 

.2 

•*-« 

t<  -^ 

*'"J 

•r-i 

^1  +^ 

^ 

•f-t 

o  .cs 
0)  'C 

-§3 

ii 

1^ 

a 

•0  a 

0) 

a 

•c  a 
p 

gs 

CS    0) 

'^ 

ed  0 

-i-H      0 

-d 

eS  2 

-d 

e8  1) 

.d 

^^ 

Wf 

§|a 

< 

(4 

^f 

a 

K 

Pi 

c  bo 

•\*i^ 

Ti 

PI  ho 

"S 

P  U) 

•,-1 
P 

P  W) 

< 

•s  f3 

ra  S 

<a 

•;:;  1=^ 

ti  'E 

■3  "^ 

•d'C 

*3.S 

ra 

a  '^^ 

N 

a  ft 

05  ^ 

cd 
bO 

a  a 

OJ  -jJ 

bo 

ga 

<j 

<J 

< 

s 

<1 

S 

< 

^  « 

^ 

*       -» 

^ 

^ 

^ 

r  0) 
CQ  P 

w«' 

eq 

m"^ 

eo 

C<1 

02  ^^ 

c^ 

-u> 

v 

a> 

0} 

P 

«  tn 

.  a 

rf 

.  a 

.  p 

.d 

.»-» 

u 

Pi 

2 

cS 

«^ 

o  bo 
0)   C3 

r-1    rtj 

S 

.no 

^ 

.T3 

S 

rHtj«> 

02 

© 

<i-i    . 
oco 

0' 

<l-i      . 

©' 

0  10 

to  y  © 
5C<3oj 
rH        rH 

.a 

© 

OS 

© 

.a 

© 

OS 

© 

.a 

0 

Oi 

© 

.  -2  e<r 

§«'-' 

tJ-* 

^^-^ 

t>-^ 

^^^ 

3^ 

«   03  P, 

CQ 

<5 

m 

< 

m 

< 

CO 

eo 

CO 

■* 

\a 

in 

t£> 

«o 

© 

© 

© 

© 

© 

© 

© 

Oi 

01 

01 

OJ 

<ji 

OJ 

o» 

c  bo 

iH 

tH 

tH 

rH 

rH 

rH 

rH 

r-^  '^^ 

0 

© 

© 

© 

© 

© 

0 

cS'O 

CO 

eo 

CO 

CO 

CO 

CO 

eo 

0) 

a> 

(D 

a 

<U 

<D 

« 

Pt 

a 

a 

d 

P 

a 

S 

^ 

3 

3 
>-> 

3 

3 
•-> 

•? 

THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


H 

Q 

N 
I— ( 

z 
o 

H 
ffi 
H 

O 
H 

ff! 
O 

Ah 

04 

CO 

H 

a 
o 
o 

< 

o 


I— «     Qi 

t^   P. 

Pi 


0  cd 


>  eti 


a 


5a 


w  2  "w 

sa.2 


^-a 

■t-" "'-'  tl-l 

I— I    QJ    CQ 


3  cS 

c  ho 


<u 

^ 

->-> 

^ 

di 

o 

B 

u 

•a 

a 

rt 

T! 

(l 

a 

fl) 

<X) 

-K> 

U) 

fl  Si; 
ed  2  ® 

5:^  a^ 


u 

(h 

o 

!>0 

(U 

a 

-t-> 

o 

3 

O 

01 

«-i 

-M 

o 

CQ 

Vi 

on 

a> 

tX) 

>>fl 

^"2 

CO  a> 


Oh  ??    -  g 

•  a  <t-i      a> 


THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA 


^■^  xa 

a 
o 
m 


a 


<\> 


DQ 


a  cj  <i>  ^ 

a>  o  u  (h 

-<-'  T?  fP3  c3 
"la 


U) 


■»->  "^  N  o 
fl  *>  2    . 

^fl  si? 
5i  o^  o 


fl  ^  WJ 

s  o  a 
°^^ 

0)  R  o 

02  *^  3 
2    0)    CO 

5  2  2 
ft'    ii 

•^  cs  a 

S  s  ''^ 
«.  =^  s 

Eh 


1  a  t,  M)  o 


.5  ^H  t-  oj 
■^  o  a>  N 


p.  o 

is  a 


CO  <» 
<)-i  bO 

o 


:2  fl 


a-c 

o"  O 

s&a 


a  _r^ 

a  §  > 

3 .2  « 

t-  2  « 

^a  c8 

O   >>  W   >.  fl 

sa^aiS 
s  a  p. 

2s  o 


'cfl 


'^a 

S 


ft-O 


_,   I'S   >- 


§«■ 

p<  <]) 

S   -M 
Pitu 


S  M  _ 

.2  a  Pi 

wo  a 

-3  s  o 

CO  ^  u 


OS  "^ 

<u  rtTa  o 

ao"  w  « 

is -2 

S  S  a>  wi 
a>  o  o  f- 

.  to  +J        _ 

a  g  8  a  .2 


cd  a 

o 


*^.2<2  «3  "  o 

aggg^'H 

a  ajjl  a;  t. 
qT  a  t:^  o  "  =« 
s  8s  M  w*^™ 

to  .«  rO  "O    O 

l^tufl  S  ^  " 

•g  ce  o  n  -tS  cd  on 

GQ 


^ 

S 


O  00 


O  00 


CO 

i 

•-9 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


P  c3 

§S 

00 

a 

a 

u 

OJ 

B 
>> 

u 
a 
m 

OQ 

0) 

u 
<» 
d 

c8 
00 

cd 
c5 

_2 

id 

i^ 

d  >-< 
S  d 

OJ 

or    subsistence,    mileage    and 
commutation   of  quarters   for 
militia  officers  attending  serv- 
ice and  garrison  scliools. 

o 
P. 

3 

§5 

ll 

a" 

as 

©a- 

o  «3 

a 

b4 

ir  02    - 

^  rt  a 

?,  S  <V 

III 

4-1 

o 

"3 

.2* 
"3 

O" 
0) 

•d 

d 
a 

1 
d 

d 

+-> 

•d 
<i> 

Q> 
O 
(«! 
0) 

03 
S   o 

|l 
Ig 

ho  Eh 

o5 

u 

a 
<x> 
>, 

"eS 
o 

00 

td 
d 

d 

-»-> 
d 
d 
o 

a 

£| 

d  a, 
go 

a  d 
03a 

¥ 

»d 

"-3 

a 

-d 

CO  *^  3 

1"  J- 
diSiS 

^§a 

g£-d 

g,  d  W)  V 

H 

H 

* 

E-" 

Eh 

pc, 

o 

» 

o 

o 

o 

■4^ 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

n 

o 

o 
o 

o 

o 

o 

s 

o" 

o 

o" 

t-^ 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

tH 

a 

< 

o^ 

o 

o^ 

o_ 

N 

o 

(nT 

N 

ft 

"3  ei3 

a-^ 

rt 

-»-> 

P. 
"3  05' 

d 

<a  0  u  ^,  <u 

d 
o 

(3 

s 

u  « 

;=: 

u  ® 

S 

=  S     2> 

OS 

«-" -S 

o 

a 

o 

a 

a  d  2  a>  t- 

a  fefd<" 
gSl-^ 

u 

0.2 

-ga 

1-1     . 

-d'a 

*<    . 

u 

®  5:, 

OJ    0) 

fig's 

S   <D 

fig's 

a 

^ 

<. 

da 
p< 

d 

"! 

da 

d 

Oi 

a  bo 

CIS 

d  bo 

d 

CQ_       is -3 

■d  o 

<3 

fl  .2 

w  "3 

bo 

c  d 

m'B 

bO 

•;S  "d        S   C2 

d-a 

Cd    00 

g'ft 

a  c  (h 

g  OJ  o 

ga 

d  o"  u 

d   0)   o 

< 

Oj 

<5 

<J 

CQ 

CO  1^ 

CO  d 

CO 

CO 

•4^ 

3 

fl 

ii  M 

.►-, 

.•-3 

.d 

.d 

<i    0} 
O   bt) 

0)  O 

CO 

-"d 

«£> 

-fcj   o 

'S'O 

o 

w-S 

o 

So 

55  o 

OS 
T-l 

'-I 
Ood 

•H 

O  OS 

.a 

e<f 

o 

(7> 

.a 

(nT 

o 

OS 

o 

OS 

CQ 

«  ajc^ 

■S- 

w  cacq 

■S-" 

-•->  ^ 
«'-« 

CO 

<! 

CO 

< 

<} 

0)  bo 

o> 

o» 

o> 

o» 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

1-1 

o> 

o» 

o» 

o 

OS 

lH 

rH 

IH 

r-t 

tH 

•3S 

O 

O 

o 

O 

o 

w 

00 

CO 

CO 

eo 

a> 

« 

a 

(0 

© 

£ 

1 

d 

3 

d 

d 
•-> 

THE    ORGANIZED    MILITIA 


,a  a  (u  Pt-u     -,vJ,T      t-,         o  <ii  &      0  fi  o  ;-,  ^  a  <u  P14-1      ^  cs  c 


B-s^^a^-ss   •gl^-g'Sa    li-^sB-s^sg 


3  fl  -^  fl  b'S  -^  ^  a  £  §  s  ?  |.5 


Qo^o<uiig,ap,<P(5(vaoao<D  ^sa."  ^0^00+3  g,a  ^v  a 


^1 

8fe 

a*- 

u  ® 

.2 

d 

•d 
d 

d 
be 

0 

T-l 

OS 

coast 
ories. 
■quip- 
tia. 

0 

-i 
°rt 

a>  .rt 

•PH    +J 

<D 

0 

»-.  d     r5 

^Js-d  a 

■S    " 

a 

•0  a 

0 

a 

a  =* 
a 

-t-> 

of 

1 

p,g 

1 

a;2 

ftX3 

d 

"SI'S 
=3a-2 

D.  d 

qt  a 

u 

d 

d 

a 

u 

0) 

>■ 

d 

d  >>^  s 

gi 

d  W) 

a  ft 

w  d  bo 

d  0"  t4 
H  (u  0 

d  "* 

0 

a 

d 

CIS  0)  j;^ 

a.s3 

s 

H 

<{ 

<: 

M 

H 

w     -< 

^ 

^ 

r  01 
M  d 

^ 

^ 

^ 

Sf     c«^| 

eo 

eo 

w 

eo 

d 

d 

,d 

.d 

.t-9 

^ 

0 

1  p^^ 

u 

tf 

0 

1 

1^ 

tCrtO 

SgS 

1 

1         rA-Z^ 

0  01 

O06 

00 

0 

0 

eo  J5  Oi 

*S  0   rH    S  rH 

0 

0 

.  a  w 

.          0 

»H 

tH 

'-'       d    - 

,  05       .    d  (M 

.  OS 

,  Oi 

,  CJ 

,  0> 

OJ 

■S'-^ 

t^ 

0  rt^ 

0'-' 

■s-^ 

■4-) 

iH 

t^  2=^-^ 

< 

< 

02 

<) 

<: 

<3 

<ii     02 

d  d  d  d  (4  a       d 

d  d  d  d  3  d      d 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


u 

« 

a 

05 

0} 

u 

CQ 

0 

eS 

CS+J 

S3 
P. 

.2 

® 

5 

03 

.2 

a 

■*-> 

•d 

-o 

0 

.3 

0) 

e4 

?; 

3 

g 

s 

d 

S 

p< 

etf 

^ 

n 

a 

0 

=3  ±i  M 

sa^ 

(4     .  ™ 
«  ^  O 

^g.ag 


®   ^  a 
loss's 

O   jH   5   .     i; 


"Sgla 

^  to-  eS  cS 


03 


fa^l^ 

CT       no       'M 

fel.2S^ 
2  ^<  ^-  o  o 
p,  2  rt  oa  S 

o^toaa 

Eh 


e^ 


O  03 

Hg- 

<5 


™  O   03 

°    a 

*->  . 

fig's 

o)  :^  bo 

a  c  >H 

go;© 


111! 

O   o  "-I   w 

•^§3  2 

°s    a 
•*^  ^  s  s 

e)  ^  2  o 

m   *H    C!    o 

a-B 


N  .    . 

n-l    B'T* 
t3    Oj      ■. 

a  6od 


03 

g.^« 


o  *i 


r^   a. 


H 


sa 


^^2 

g.Sa 


a 

Pi 

0 

a 

0 

<D 

cS 

b 

J3 

■4-> 

+j 

0 

0 

-t-4 

t^ 

kl 

a 

a 
■0 

bO 

n1 

a> 

Ul 

a> 

03 

N 

OS 

0 

a 

•0 

"3 

<1> 

03 
bO 

bo 

pc, 

H 

fa  *- 

(V   d 


^ 
S 


O  06 


03        03 


<       < 


a 

«  bO 

r-l 

CO 

T-t 

CQ 

T-l 

r4 

iH 

o» 

01 

OJ 

a> 

o> 

a> 

tH 

1-1 

l-t 

r-l 

1-1 

tH 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

CO 

CO 

eo 

CO 

CO 

CO 

0) 

« 

<D 

a> 

<» 

0 

d 

a 

a 

f^ 

0 

a 

S 

3 

s 

0 

^ 

3 

d 

•-» 

•-3 

<-s 

•-9 

•^ 

H» 

THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA 


The  District  of  Columbia  has  a  separate  annual 
appropriation  which  averages  about  $80,000.  It  is 
also  authorized  by  the  Act  of  March  1, 1899,  to  draw 
any  amount  of  supplies  from  the  regular  army  ap- 
propriations on  requisitions  approved  by  the  Sec- 
retary of  War. 

There  are  other  expenses  of  a  minor  character, 
connected  with  rifle  competitions,  paid  by  the  gov- 
ernment, which  is  also  called  upon  to  furnish  reg- 
ular troops  for  guards,  markers,  range  officers  and 
other  duties  in  connection  with  rifle  competitions, 
whose  transportation  and  other  expenses  are  charged 
to  the  appropriations  for  the  regular  army.  The  ap- 
propriations made  by  Congress  are  allotted  to  the 
several  states  in  proportion  to  the  strength  of  the 
organized  militia  in  each.  The  states  are  expected 
to  devote  the  funds  to  the  purchase  of  the  necessary 
articles  properly  to  equip  the  organizations  and 
maintain  them  in  readiness  for  active  field  service. 
The  articles  procured  from  the  appropriations  by 
Congress  include  batteries  of  field  artillery,  small 
arms,  equipments,  tentage,  wagon  trains,  clothing 
and  everything  required  or  presumed  to  be  required 
by  an  army. 

The  total  strength  of  the  organized  militia  accord- 
ing to  the  returns  of  1913,  was  9,130  officers  and 
111,672  men.  When  the  number  of  men  enlisted  in 
the  organized  militia  of  the  states  is  considered,  it 
may  be  concluded  that  service  in  the  active  militia 
is  neither  popular  nor  deemed  an  exhibition  of  pa- 
triotism by  American  men  as  a  body.  Many  men 
join  the  organized  militia  in  good  faith,  who  under 

281 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


any  law  of  averages  will  not  be  available  for  active 
field  service  in  an  emergency.  The  actual  number 
now  reported  in  service  seems  to  represent  the  max- 
imum possible  to  put  in  the  field  and  for  whom 
arms,  clothing  and  equipage  must  be  maintained  in 
readiness.  It  may  be  safely  inferred  that  no  ma- 
terial increase  in  numbers  is  to  be  expected  under  ex- 
isting conditions. 

The  general  government  has  been  dealing  with  the 
organized  militia  with  increasing  liberality,  in  recent 
years,  but  the  strength  as  a  whole  has  not  materially 
changed  since  the  adoption  of  the  new  legislation 
which  purported  to  make  of  the  state  forces  a  stable 
and  dependable  part  of  the  first  line  for  war. 

The  tabulated  returns  for  December  31, 1911,  show 
the  reported  strength  of  the  organized  militia  to  be : 


Enlisted 
men 


Caralry    

Field   Artillery    

Coast  Artillery  Corps   

Infantry     

Corps  of  Engineers  

Signal  Corps    

Medical  Department   

Ordnance  Department  

Quartermaster's  Department 

Subsistence   Department    

Adjutant  General's  Department 

Inspector  General's  Department 

Inspectors  of  Small  Arms  Practice 

Judge  Advocate  General's  Department. 

Pay  Department  

General  officers  of  the  line 

Aides  (extra  officers)    

Chaplains    

Totals 

282 


3,919 

4.797 

7,240 

91,789 

1,112 

1,368 

2,515 

66 

92 

42 


112,940 


THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA 


In  1912  there  were  9,142  officers  and  112,710  men, 
and  in  1913,  9,130  officers  and  111,672  men,  a  de- 
crease of  twelve  officers  and  1,038  men.  The  re- 
ported strength  of  the  organized  militia  of  the  sev- 
eral states,  Territory  of  Hawaii  and  the  District  of 
Columbia  for  1913,  with  the  number  of  males,  as 
reported  by  the  Adjutants  General  of  States,  availa- 
ble for  military  duty,  and  the  number  of  militia  age, 
eighteen  to  forty-four  years,  inclusive,  according  to 
the  census  of  1910,  are  as  follows : 


State,  Territory  or 
District 


Strength  of  Organized 

Militia,  1913 

a 

s> 

S 

•d 

S 
o 

5 

SS 

d 

o 

» 

^^0  2 


"  fc  <» 
tf  OS 

a  -rfl 

o  «^ 


Alabama    

Arizona    

Arkansas    

California    

Colorado     

Connecticut     

Delaware    

District  of  Columbia 

Florida     

Georgia     

Hawaii    

Idaho  

Illinois    

Indiana  

Iowa    

Kansas    

Kentucky   

Louisiana   

Maine    

Maryland   

Massachusetts    

Michigan    


178 

2,391 

45 

477 

111 

1,248 

252 

3,360 

137 

1,309 

184 

2,457 

41 

441 

139 

1,507 

93 

1,127 

223 

2,675 

39 

426 

50 

790 

506 

5,408 

179 

2,297 

213 

2,768 

130 

1,694 

170 

1,843 

60 

1,082 

109 

1,339 

173 

1,799 

452 

5,341 

199 

2,551 

352,678 

40.538 

351,492 

357,434 

133,450 

149,552 

32,469 

80,199 

187,945 

572,946 

13,475 

33,760 

1,037,455 

647,449 

306,669 

376,735 

342,162 

486,070 

104,841 

204,024 

576,303 

521,667 


401,145 

58,962 

311,792 

665,522 

203,982 

257,996 

44,634 

78,349 

171,688 

497,095 

64.663 

86,384 

1,330,556 

580,557 

475,829 

370,227 

457,493 

338.343 

151,325 

271,373 

760,324 

616,729 


283 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


state,  Territory  or 
District 


Strength  of  Organized 
Militia,  1913 


» 


"•30.5 

a  « S^-°  S 

a  «s2  «GJ 


^     o 

o    S 
■  t  - 

-sag 

O  rt_2 


Minnesota    

Mississippi    

Missouri    

Montana   

Nebraska   

Nevada   

New   Hampshire. 

New  Jersey 

New  Mexico 

New  York   

Nortli    Carolina.. 
North    Dakota... 

Ohio   

Oklahoma  

Oregon    

Pennsylvania    . . . 

Rhode  Island 

South    Carolina. . 

South   Dakota 

Tennessee    

Texas    

Utah    

Vermont 

Virginia   

Washington   

West   Virginia . . . 

Wisconsin    

Wyoming   

Total 


218 
116 
256 

53 

134 

none 

94 
330 

49 

1,056 

251 

52 
529 

56 
109 
768 
106 
154 

71 
127 
174 

31 

72 
207 

91 
100 
195 

48 

9,142 


2,724 
1,327 
3,320 

557 
1,038 
none 
1,164 
4,052 

599 

14.901 

2,317 

577 
5,611 

896 
1,358 
9,766 
1,252 
1,755 

608 
1,707 
2,387 

323 

773 
2,492 
1,147 
1,283 
2,768 

640 

112,710 


227,824 
401,460 
663,503 

45,848 
131,100 

12,012 

41,248 
609,610 

55,623 

1,616,528 

352,658 

60,696 
929,646 
226,043 
136,472 
1,134,153 
101,361 
217,393 

90,702 
341,883 
502.777 

45,464 

50,858 
277,650 
236,212 
186,451 
497,922 

27,947 

16,127,357 


491,113 

345,745 

721,166 

123,232 

267,497 

29,383 

90,357 

597,513 

73,097 

2,156,361 

392,192 

145,628 

1.076,928 

357,933 

190,553 

1,788,619 

125,213 

276,788 

140,635 

423,088 

804,980 

84,449 

73,685 

398,728 

340,872 

275,048 

497,922 

54,654 

20,538,347 


Numerous  estimates  have  been  made  as  to  the 
probable  number  of  men  who  would  turn  out  with 
their  state  organizations  on  the  call  of  the  Presi- 
dent, and  expert  opinions  agree  that  between  sixty 
and  seventy-five  per  cent,  of  the  total  strength  on 

284 


THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA 


the  rolls  could  be  relied  upon  for  immediate  com- 
pliance. 

In  the  national  guard  all  sorts  of  arguments  and 
schemes  seem  necessary  to  secure  even  the  minimum 
numbers  in  many  organizations  required  to  partici- 
pate in  camps  of  instruction  and  maneuvers.  To  il- 
lustrate this  phase  of  the  matter,  at  a  recent  en- 
campment of  the  national  guard,  sixteen  and  one- 
third  per  cent,  of  a  regiment  numbering  422  men  had 
not  been  in  service  a  sufficient  time  to  qualify  for 
attendance  at  a  camp  of  instruction  and  they  could 
only  become  entitled  to  pay  by  crediting  them  with 
alleged  military  instruction  at  a  school.  The  actual 
conditions  are  disclosed  by  an  analysis  of  the  pay 
rolls  of  the  regiment,  from  which  it  appears  that  the 
largest  number  of  men  in  any  company  was  forty- 
five  ;  the  smallest  twenty-six.  The  company  having 
forty-five  present  reported  fourteen,  recently  joined, 
as  having  had  '* school  instruction.**  In  a  company 
of  thirty-seven  men,  fifteen  were  reported  as  having 
*' school  instruction,"  which  entitled  them  to  pay 
while  in  camp.  The  rolls  of  another  regiment  num- 
bering 377  men  showed  similar  conditions  with  six- 
teen and  one-half  per  cent,  qualified  for  pay  by 
*  *  school  instruction. ' '  These  facts  are  not  stated  in 
unkindly  criticism  but  such  conditions  must  be  con- 
sidered in  all  schemes  for  national  defense,  based 
upon  the  organized  militia.  The  conditions  are  not 
surprising;  on  the  contrary,  with  the  little  encour- 
agement given  in  any  American  community  to  those 
struggling  to  maintain  efficient  militia  organizations 

285 


THE  AMERICAN  ARMY 


the  wonder  is  that  they  manage  to  accomplish  what 
they  do  from  year  to  year. 

It  is  not  to  be  expected  that  a  movement,  such  as 
that  undertaken  when  the  change  of  form  of  the  mi- 
litia enlistment  to  one  containing  an  agreement  to 
serve  upon  call  of  the  President  without  regard  to 
border  lines,  could  be  fully  developed  in  a  brief  pe- 
riod. That  the  recent  laws  have  failed  to  meet  the 
expectations  of  the  national  guard,  and  of  the  War 
Department  which  gave  earnest  support  to  the  leg- 
islation containing  the  modifications  of  the  old  mi- 
litia laws,  is  made  evident  by  the  proposition  to 
have  Congress  appropriate  for  the  payment  of  the 
state  forces  for  attendance  at  all  drills,  camps  of  in- 
struction and  maneuvers.  It  seems  to  be  generally 
accepted  now  that  no  further  improvement  in  exist- 
ing conditions  in  the  organized  militia  may  be  ex- 
pected until  the  necessary  legislation  for  pay  is  ob- 
tained from  Congress.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is 
a  disposition  not  to  increase  expenditures  for  any 
forces  which  are  not  available  for  duty  beyond  our 
borders,  which  is  the  character  of  service  most  fre- 
quent in  the  army  since  the  outbreak  of  the  war  with 
Spain,  and  this  view  is  undoubtedly  the  most  sound 
by  reason  of  the  accumulated  evidence  in  its  favor. 

When  it  is  considered  that  the  population  of  the 
country  is  nearing  the  hundred  million  mark,  the 
total  strength  of  the  organized  militia  is  not  suffi- 
cient to  justify  the  continuance  of  existing  statutes 
which  prevents  any  organization  of  volunteers  being 
considered  until  after  war  has  been  declared  and 

286 


THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA 


the  organized  militia  has  been  called  into  service. 
This  status  of  legislation  has  resulted  from  the  act- 
ive efforts  of  the  association  of  ojBficers  representing 
the  interests  of  the  national  guard,  who  have  held 
the  opinion  that  the  organization  of  volunteer  regi- 
ments, for  national  purposes,  would,  in  time  of 
peace,  react  unfavorably  upon  the  organized  militia. 

The  serious  trouble  with  the  whole  situation  is 
that  all  our  efforts  since  the  war  with  Spain  have 
been  directed  along  wrong  lines,  doubtless  influenced 
by  the  high  degree  of  efficiency  which  obtains  in  a 
few  regiments  of  the  national  guard.  It  will  require 
great  moral  courage  to  admit  this  error  but  the 
sooner  it  is  done  the  better  off  the  nation  will  be  so 
far  as  real  preparation  for  war  is  concerned.  Let  it 
be  recognized  then  that  the  state  forces,  whether  des- 
ignated national  guard  or  organized  militia,  are  def- 
initely restricted  to  the  duties  for  which,  and  for 
which  only,  they  are  available  under  the  terms  of 
the  Constitution  and  as  set  forth  in  the  recent  deci- 
sion of  the  Attorney  General  of  the  United  States. 

Various  methods  have  been  devised  for  overcom- 
ing the  obstacle  raised  by  the  decision  of  the  attor- 
ney general,  that  the  Constitution  forbids  the  use  of 
militia  for  any  purpose  not  stated  therein  because 
of  its  careful  definition  of  the  occasions  upon  which 
the  state  forces  may  be  called  forth.  One  method 
which  seems  to  have  found  most  favor  is  embraced 
in  a  proposition  to  draft  the  militia  organizations 
into  the  army  whenever  war  is  imminent  or  declared. 
Congress  has  wide  discretion  in  its  constitutional  au- 

287 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


thority  to  raise  and  support  armies  and  may  prop- 
erly declare  that  all  men  between  twenty-one  and 
forty-five  years  of  age,  or  all  men  between  five  feet 
and  six  feet  in  height,  or  with  any  other  defined  qual- 
ifications, may  be  drafted  into  the  service, except  that 
plenary  powers  may  cease  when  they  conflict  with 
the  Constitution  wherein  the  use  of  the  militia  is  for- 
mally limited  as  set  forth  by  the  attorney  general. 

There  has  been  some  disposition  to  claim  that  the 
national  guard  is  not  the  militia  contemplated  in  the 
Constitution,  but  if  it  is  not,  then  it  must  be  declared 
to  fall  under  the  ban  of  the  provision  which  forbids 
any  state  to  keep  troops  or  ships  of  war  without  the 
consent  of  Congress. 

It  is  humiliating  to  think  of  so  much  effort  having 
resulted  in  such  complications.  There  are  occasions 
when  it  is  wiser  and,  in  the  end,  more  profitable,  to 
admit  defeat  and  begin  anew  upon  a  more  stable 
foundation.  Makeshifts  in  law  will  be  unsatisfac- 
tory because  of  their  liability  to  be  overturned  upon 
the  first  appeal.  The  nation  needs  a  dependable 
war  army  and  the  time  seems  propitious  to  begin 
its  upbuilding  by  adopting  a  system  against  which 
there  can  be  no  legal  assault. 

The  strength  required  to  meet  any  probable 
emergency  having  been  agreed  upon,  the  force 
should  then  be  apportioned  in  the  several  arms,  be- 
tween the  regular  army,  and  federal  volunteers,  the 
officers  of  volunteers  being  appointed  by  the  Presi- 
dent, in  whom  authority  should  be  vested  to  provide 
for  their  training  in  peace  and  calling  forth  for  war. 

288 


THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA 


Such  a  body  of  federal  volunteers  would  not  be  sub- 
ject to  call  from  a  governor  of  a  state  directly,  but 
will  be  available  under  the  orders  of  the  President, 
in  conjunction  with  the  regular  army,  when  disorder 
in  any  state  has  become  too  great  for  suppression 
by  the  local  authorities.  The  effect  of  this  move- 
ment upon  the  states  would  be  to  encourage  the  em- 
ployment of  constabulary  and  to  restore  the  organ- 
ized militia  to  its  true  functions  and  to  avoid  the 
apparent  necessity  for  adopting  resourceful  expedi- 
ents for  evading  the  language  and  spirit  of  the  Con- 
stitution. This  method  of  procedure  may  shock  the 
pride  of  some  of  the  old  national  guard  organiza- 
tions, but  it  is  a  safe  and  reasonable  prediction  that 
within  a  few  years  the  federal  volunteers  would  be- 
come a  body  of  dependable  soldiers  whose  numbers 
would  bear  a  more  definite  relation  to  the  nation's 
needs  for  war  purposes  than  will  ever  be  possible 
with  state  militia.  It  may  as  well  be  recognized  that 
the  doubts  which  have  adhered  in  the  minds  of  many 
public  men,  as  to  the  course  we  have  been  following 
at  considerable  cost,  have  now  been  justified  by  the 
opinion  of  the  cabinet  officer  whose  sworn  duty  it  is 
to  advise  correctly  the  administration  as  to  interpre- 
tation of  the  statutes.  The  suggestion  of  wisdom  is 
to  rebuild  from  a  new  foundation  in  accordance  with 
law. 

In  his  Farewell  Address,  Washington  wrote : 
*  *  The  basis  of  our  political  systems  is  the  right  of 
the  people  to  make  and  alter  their  constitutions  of 
government.    But  the  constitution  which  at  any  time 

289 


THE  AMERICAN  ARMY 


exists,  until  changed  by  an  explicit  and  authentic 
act  of  the  whole  people,  is  sacredly  obligatory  upon 
all.  .  .  .  Toward  the  preservation  of  your  gov- 
ernment and  the  permanence  of  your  present  happy 
state,  it  is  requisite,  not  only  that  you  steadily  dis- 
countenance irregular  opposition  to  its  acknowl- 
edged authority,  but  also  that  you  resist  with  care 
the  spirit  of  innovation  upon  its  principles,  however 
specious  the  pretext.  One  method  of  assault  may 
be  to  effect,  in  the  forms  of  the  constitution,  altera- 
tions which  will  impair  the  energy  of  the  system ;  and 
thus  to  undermine  what  can  not  be  directly  over- 
thrown. In  all  the  changes  to  which  you  may  be  in- 
vited, remember  that  time  and  habit  are  at  least  as 
necessary  to  fix  the  true  character  of  governments, 
as  of  other  institutions — that  experience  is  the  surest 
standard  by  which  to  test  the  real  tendency  of  the 
existing  constitution  of  a  cojmtry;  that  facility  in 
changes,  upon  the  credit  of  mere  hypothesis  and 
opinion,  exposes  to  perpetual  change  from  the  end- 
less variety  of  hypothesis  and  opinion ;  and  remem- 
ber, especially,  that  for  the  efficient  management  of 
your  common  interests  in  a  country  so  extensive  as 
ours,  a  government  of  as  much  vigor  as  is  consist- 
ent with  the  perfect  security  of  liberty  is  indis- 
pensable.'* 

With  the  official  decision  and  the  views  of  Wash- 
ington before  us  it  would  seem  that  the  only  course 
which  should  receive  consideration  for  a  moment, 
is  that  which  conforms  absolutely  to  the  highest  law 
of  our  land.    Not  so,  however,  for  the  first  step  sug- 

290 


THE   OEGANIZED   MILITIA 


gested  contemplates  an  evasion  of  the  Constitution 
so  as  not  to  disturb  the  organized  militia  in  a  status 
brought  about  by  much  careful  planning  and  nurs- 
ing. That  status  involves  two  features,  one  relating 
to  appropriations  by  the  general  government  for 
support  of  state  organizations,  and  the  other  to  ques- 
tions of  rank  and  command.  As  to  the  first,  it  is 
merely  a  question  for  Congress  to  determine  as  to 
how  far  it  is  desirable  to  go  in  maintaining  state 
forces  for  national  purposes,  bearing  in  mind  the 
limitations  upon  their  employment.  The  second  is  a 
far  more  serious  question. 

In  all  but  two  states  of  the  Union  militia  officers 
below  the  rank  of  major  are  elected  by  the  men,  and 
the  field  officers  by  the  company  officers.  It  is  need- 
less to  point  out  that  the  appointment  and  promo- 
tion of  officers  in  such  manner  is  wrong  in  principle 
and  tends  to  pernicious  results  so  far  as  the  disci- 
pline and  efficiency  of  the  troops  are  concerned.  Vol- 
unteer troops  with  experienced  officers  in  command 
have  proved  their  greater  efficiency  by  the  prompt- 
ness with  which  they  have  acquired  instruction  and 
a  high  state  of  discipline.  While  all  American  sol- 
diers enter  the  ranks  voluntarily  the  word  volunteers 
is  used  to  designate  a  body  of  troops  neither  regulars 
nor  militia,  and  enlisted  ordinarily  for  a  specified 
period  or  for  the  war,  and  the  statute  law  recog- 
nizes the  distinction  between  the  three  classes. 

The  statutes  provide  that : 

''The  organized  and  active  land  forces  of  the 
United  States  shall  consist   of   the  Army   of  the 

291 


THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


United  States  and  of  the  Militia  of  the  several  states 
when  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States: 
Provided,  That  in  time  of  war  the  Army  shall  con- 
sist of  two  branches  which  shall  be  designated,  re- 
spectively, as  the  Regular  Army  and  the  Volunteer 
Army  of  the  United  States. 

''That  the  Regular  Army  is  the  permanent  mili- 
tary establishment,  which  is  maintained  both  in 
peace  and  war  according  to  law.  That  the  Volun- 
teer Army  shall  be  maintained  only  during  the  ex- 
istence of  war,  or  while  war  is  imminent.    .    .    .*' 

Through  a  series  of  acts  of  legislatures  many 
states  have  adopted  tactical  divisions  as  their  unit 
of  organization  for  the  appointment  of  officers,  but 
not  a  single  state  has  succeeded  in  fulfilling  the  ob- 
ligation of  supporting  all  the  parts  necessary  to  com- 
plete a  division  for  war  purposes,  although  the  ma- 
jor generals,  the  brigadier  generals  and  all  the  staff 
officers  are  quite  invariably  appointed.  If  this 
merely  related  to  parades  and  reviews,  the  matter 
would  be  of  no  consequence  to  the  nation  at  large, 
but  this  is  far  from  being  the  case.  As  long  as  the 
tactical  divisions  are  organized  under  state  laws, 
and  are  solely  under  the  control  of  the  governors, 
it  is  not  practicable  to  assign  experienced  regular 
officers  to  command  them.  It  is  impossible  to  ac- 
qtiire,  by  experience  in  the  organized  militia,  the 
knowledge  of  active  service  and  of  the  real  business 
of  war  which  should  be  possessed  by  officers  en- 
trusted with  the  direction  of  large  commands  in  cam- 
paign and  no  person  should  be  entrusted  with  the 

292 


THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA 


leadership  of  American  armies  who  has  not  pre- 
pared himself  and  been  recognized  as  having  the 
necessary  professional  equipment.  Any  other  course 
is  unfair  to  the  men  in  the  ranks  and  a  source  of 
weakness  in  the  execution  of  great  plans  where  pro- 
fessional knowledge  is  of  more  importance  than  en- 
thusiasm and  patriotic  desire  to  accomplish  some- 
thing. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  the  nation  at  large  a 
very  undesirable  condition  has  been  brought  about, 
mainly  through  the  instrumentality  of  an  active 
body  of  national  guard  officers  in  their  earnest  ef- 
forts to  place  the  state  forces  upon  a  satisfactory 
basis.  As  recently  enacted  laws  now  stand,  no  vol- 
unteers are  presumed  to  be  called  out  until  all  the 
organized  militia  has  been  accepted  in  the  service, 
and  this  carries  along  all  the  high  ranking  officers, 
who  therefore  become  senior  to  all  regular  officers 
of  corresponding  grades  who  may  be  subsequently 
authorized  by  Congress  to  command  volunteers.  In 
other  words,  the  trained  and  proved  officers,  edu- 
cated through  a  long  period  of  years  of  active  mili- 
tary service  under  the  general  government,  must 
needs  be  employed  under  generals  appointed  by  gov- 
ernors of  states  in  time  of  peace  and  for  reasons 
which  perhaps  would  not  have  been  effective  had  the 
governors  recognized  that  the  peace  appointments 
would  carry  actual  command  in  war.  Such  a  system 
is  devoid  of  right  reason  and  common  sense  and  this 
was  so  recognized  when  war  with  Spain  was  de- 
clared and  Congress  refused  to  authorize  the  accept- 

293 


THE   AMERICAN  ARMY 


ance  of  any  organizations  of  the  national  guard 
above  that  of  a  regiment  which  might  volunteer  for 
the  war.  No  one  would  ever  think  of  suggesting  the 
appointment  of  a  naval  militia  officer  to  be  an  ad- 
miral of  the  fleet,  but  a  great  many  Americans  feel 
certain  that  they  can  fill  the  position  of  general 
officer  with  distinction,  although  the  military  profes- 
sion demands  more  technical  preparation  than  ever 
before. 

An  infinite  variety  of  reasons  could  be  elaborated 
to  show  the  need  of  correction  of  the  system  under 
which  we  are  now  drifting  to  certain  disappoint- 
ment. 


THE  END 


This  boo^ 


last  date  stamped  below 


University  of  California 

SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 

Return  this  material  to  the  library 

from  which  it  was  borrowed. 


NOV  2 1  1989 


C/ 


^/(«^ 


UC  SOUTHERN  REG^C'.AL 


-.AL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


A    000  690  975     8 


^ORHlA 


